There are summits that are measured by what they announce and summits that are measured by what they fulfill. The one in Ankara, held on July 7 and 8, belongs to the latter. As the world is in 2026, that thirty-two democracies - the noun matters - sit down at the same table, agree on a common text, and pose all together for the family photo is, in itself, good news.
The reunion
The summit has been preceded by the roughest period in transatlantic relations in decades. The Ukraine war is heading into its fifth year, having become what it is, a war of attrition and resilience, no longer fought only on the front lines, but in budgets and in the rear of our societies.
The Middle East adds a second conflict, perhaps with a worse prognosis; and it was there, in the Iran crisis, where the disagreement between Washington and the European capitals hit rock bottom, with decisions made without consultation by the American side to the supposedly necessary allies, who found out through the press. Added to this is an American administration that multiplies its challenges to its partners and distrusts what precisely defines us, being democracies.
We Europeans have learned that transatlantic trust is earned almost daily with Trump. That is why Ankara has been, first and foremost, the summit of reunion: after some slammed doors, the allies have sat down again. The differences have not been resolved, but the alliance remains in a process of transformation. In diplomacy, that is already an achievement.
What the words say
The final declaration of Ankara is brief - barely 500 words in six points, compared to the ninety points of the Vilnius Communiqué in 2023 -. If we look at the declarations and communiqués of the last five summits, there are three issues to highlight.
The first is that there is a DNA that does not mutate. Security and defense are the two most repeated nouns in the five declarations, from Madrid to Ankara, without exception. In the NATO, everything is discussed except its backbone.
The second is very revealing: the vocabulary of the summits has shifted from naming the enemy to naming money. Russia was the second or third noun in Madrid, Vilnius, and Washington; in The Hague and Ankara, it appears exactly once in each text, with the identical template formula - "the long-term threat that Russia poses to Euro-Atlantic security" - and without a single condemnation. It has ceased to be the protagonist of the narrative to become what justifies the bill.
Instead, they scale up spending, commitment, capabilities and, very eloquently, billions. The last two summits of 2025 and 2026 are, in their lexicon, summits about budget, not about Russia.
The third is in the verbs. Four of the five declarations conjugate the language of permanence: continue, ensure, reinforce, maintain, reaffirm. Ankara breaks the series with a new verb as the protagonist: delivering, "fulfilling".
The Alliance no longer promises, it executes and backs it up with figures: 154 billion dollars more in European and Canadian spending from 2024 to 2026, and 70 billion euros committed to Ukraine for 2026, which are mainly financed by Europeans today. A NATO 3.0 is beginning to emerge: more European in its funding, more industrial in its language, more technological in its ambition.
What matters to Spain
Spain arrives with its homework done. Eight years ago, we dedicated 0.9% of GDP to Defense; today, we consolidate 2% and spending has more than tripled, exceeding 35 billion euros. But what is characteristic is not so much the accumulated amount, but the acceleration: in the last three years, Spain has practically doubled its investment and is the sixth NATO ally to have grown the most, ahead of Germany and the Netherlands, and far above France, the United Kingdom, or the United States.
In the classification for the period 2014-2026, we are at the gates of the leading group, a segment occupied by the Baltics and Nordics, the allies who have the Russian threat right on their border. For a society that does not feel the war close by, it is an effort that deserves recognition.
The increase in spending that we Europeans will have to bear - yes or yes - will only be socially sustainable if it becomes our own industry, skilled employment, and technological sovereignty. If we take advantage of the opportunity for the Spanish Defense industry, if we renew governance and spend efficiently and transparently, if we modernize without sacrificing what we defend - the welfare state, which must be made compatible with a much more demanding security policy in these times. Only then can Spain face this stage not as a more or less exemplary ally, but as a net beneficiary of the new NATO 3.0.
In Ankara, thirty-two democracies have once again sat at the same table, to renew their values, plan their defense together, and pay for it. When so many things are breaking, maintaining unity, solidarity, and collective strength is vital - as the Declaration says - for the billion citizens of our Alliance of free and democratic nations.
About the signing:
Ana Botella is the President of the Spanish Atlantic Association (AAE) and former Secretary of State for Security (2018-2020). She has also been a Member of Parliament for the PSOE for four terms (2016-2023) and Government delegate in the Valencian Community under José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero.