Survey Ceuta: 89% of Spaniards believe that Morocco facilitated the massive entry of migrants, according to SocioMétrica

The Spanish regulation of the so-called border returns (pushbacks at the border in Ceuta and Melilla) remains in force today under the same basic terms approved in 2015: it has not been repealed or replaced by a new organic law, but it is strongly conditioned by constitutional and European case law. In the Cortes, there are several initiatives seeking to change this framework in opposite directions: a “guarantee-based” reform proposal promoted from the Podemos space to eliminate the legal basis for hot returns, and an organic law proposal registered by the PP to extend the border pushback also to sea entries. Neither has completed its processing, and in addition, the reform of the Citizen Security Law (Gag Law) incorporates a political commitment to reorganize the regime of Ceuta and Melilla through a future reform of the Immigration Law. As of August 7, 2026, there is no record of any specific government draft bill on border returns in consultation or public hearing phase.

Current framework: Immigration Law and Citizen Security Law

The current legal basis is found in Organic Law 4/2000, on immigration, and in Organic Law 4/2015, on the protection of citizen security. The latter added to the Immigration Law a tenth additional provision on the “special regime of Ceuta and Melilla”, which allows the border pushback of foreigners detected at the border line while trying to enter irregularly and attempting to overcome border containment elements, always respecting international human rights and international protection regulations:

• Organic Law 4/2000
• Organic Law 4/2015

The Constitutional Court, in rulings on the Citizen Security Law (for example, STC 172/2020 and STC 13/2021, published in the BOE as Ruling 172/2020 and Ruling 13/2021), declared this special regime constitutional, but only if strict guarantees are applied: individualized examination, possibility of judicial review, special attention to minors and vulnerable persons, and full respect for the non-refoulement principle. More recently, the Supreme Court has further limited its scope, excluding those intercepted at sea before overcoming a physical barrier.

Ongoing or recent parliamentary initiatives

1. Organic Law Proposal to reform the Citizen Security Law

In Congress, the Organic Law Proposal to reform Organic Law 4/2015 is registered, signed by Ione Belarra and the Mixed Group (around Podemos), with file number 122/000103. According to the official record, the initiative was admitted for processing on September 7, 2024, and is listed as pending consideration by the Plenary:

• Proposal record
• Congress Bulletin

The Bulletin itself states that this proposal includes, among other measures, the elimination of the tenth additional provision of Organic Law 4/2000, precisely the one that supports the regime of pushbacks at the border in Ceuta and Melilla, “in order to prevent so-called hot returns from being carried out in Spain.” From a parliamentary point of view, therefore, it is an initiative in a very early phase: it has not yet been debated in the Plenary for consideration nor has it passed to committee.

2. PP Organic Law Proposal to extend border pushbacks

Simultaneously, the Popular Party registered in 2026 an organic law proposal to modify the tenth additional provision of the Immigration Law and enable border pushbacks also against irregular entries by sea in Ceuta and Melilla. Democrata details that the text has already been published by Congress and proposes that people “detected or intercepted at the land or sea border line while trying to access irregularly” may be pushed back, maintaining in the articles the explicit reference to respect for human rights, the non-refoulement principle, and access to international protection:

• Demócrata news on the PP proposal
• Additional information on processing

Demócrata’s information indicates that, as it is an organic reform, it would require an absolute majority in the final overall vote. There is no record that the consideration session has yet been held or that it is in the drafting or committee phase; Congress closed the session period on July 23, and most initiatives registered in July have been postponed to September.

3. Reform of the Gag Law and commitment to reform Immigration Law

Another relevant piece is the Organic Law Proposal for the protection of freedoms and citizen security (reform of the Gag Law), which, according to the newspaper Demócrata, is in drafting phase in Congress. The PSOE–Sumar–EH Bildu–PNV–ERC political agreement linked to this reform includes a commitment: the Government will have six months to modify the Immigration Law and introduce a new additional provision regulating a special regime in Ceuta and Melilla that guarantees the rights of migrants and access to asylum:

• Demócrata analysis on the Gag Law reform

However, this mandate has not yet translated — according to available information — into a concrete organic draft bill nor into a specific public consultation on border returns on ministerial portals.

Assessment of the “parliamentary status”

In summary, the border returns regime in Spain is currently in a situation of regulatory stability but high political tension:

• The current regulation (tenth additional provision of the Immigration Law) remains in force and operates under the conditions imposed by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court.
• In Congress, opposing initiatives coexist: one to eliminate the legal basis for hot returns; another to extend border pushbacks to sea entries.
• The reform of the Gag Law adds a political mandate to the Government to reform Immigration Law, but there is not yet a government text in processing that materializes this mandate.

Until one of these legislative paths is definitively approved by Congress and Senate and published in the BOE, the Spanish regulation on border returns will remain the currently valid one, with the interpretative limits set by the courts.

The Prime Minister does not have, according to available information, “own” and exclusive competencies in migration policy separate from the rest of Government action, but exercises in this area the same general functions of political direction, normative promotion, and coordination that the Constitution and laws assign to the Executive. Based on what is known about the Government's legislative initiative and its position in the parliamentary system, it is possible to identify how these powers are projected over immigration and migration policy. What can be clearly stated is that migration policy is articulated through laws and Government decisions (bill projects, budgetary norms, etc.) in whose definition the Prime Minister plays a central role of impetus and guidance.

Political direction and priority setting

In migration matters, the Prime Minister exercises a general political direction function that projects over:

• Setting priorities: politically choosing whether the migration agenda is more oriented to border control, integration, talent attraction, regularizations, etc.
• Guidance of the entire Government: marking the general lines later developed by the competent ministries (Interior, Inclusion, Foreign Affairs, Labor, etc.).
• Promotion of plans and strategies: although sectoral strategies are formally approved by the Government as a whole, it is the Prime Minister who politically decides whether they are developed and with what scope.

This direction function does not derive from a specific migration norm in the available sources, but from the general role of the Government as responsible for legislative initiative and the conduction of state policy, which naturally also applies to the migration field.

Normative initiative in immigration and migration matters

According to available information on the Government's legislative initiative, the Executive can present bill projects in any matter, including migration and immigration policy. Some relevant elements are:

• The Government's legislative initiative is embodied in the bill project, which is approved in the Council of Ministers and sent to Congress for parliamentary processing.
• The purpose of these projects is to create, modify, or repeal laws, including norms regulating entry, stay, work, rights, and duties of foreigners.
• In contrast, parliamentary group bill proposals can also address migration policy, but are not Government initiatives.

Within this framework, the Prime Minister decides which migration reforms are prioritized in the Council of Ministers and with what political scope, although the technical drafting corresponds to the competent ministries.

Veto capacity on initiatives affecting the budget

Available information highlights a key Government competence against bill proposals: according to article 134.6 of the Constitution and the Congress Rules, the Government can oppose the processing of initiatives that imply an increase in expenditure or a decrease in revenue of the General State Budgets.

Applied to migration policy, this means that:

• If a parliamentary group presents a migration bill proposal that substantially increases expenditure (for example, expanding benefits to certain migrant groups) or reduces revenue, the Government can block its processing due to budgetary impact.
• This decision is politically directed by the Prime Minister, in coherence with the Government's migration and budgetary strategy.

Interministerial coordination

Although the sources do not detail the internal architecture of the Executive, from its general position it follows that the Prime Minister is primarily responsible for ensuring that migration policy, which affects several departments (Interior, Inclusion and Social Security, Foreign Affairs, Labor, etc.), is developed coherently. This translates into:

• Arbitrating conflicts between ministries when their priorities differ (for example, security vs. integration).
• Defining a unified line that is conveyed to Parliament and the public, facing the diverse sensitivities within the Government.

Relations with the EU, third countries, and crisis management

The consulted sources do not provide specific information on the Prime Minister's competencies in relations with the European Union and third countries in migration matters, nor on the concrete management of migration crises. With the available information, it can only be stated that:

• Migration policy has a budgetary and legislative dimension in which the Government, led by the Prime Minister, acts through bill projects and decisions on budget veto.
• Actions against migration crises (emergency measures, resource reinforcement, urgent legal changes) are inserted in that general capacity of normative initiative and political guidance of the Government.

No further information is available in the consulted sources on more specific competencies of the Prime Minister in this area.

The last elections to the Assembly of the Autonomous City of Ceuta were held, as in the rest of Spain, on May 28, 2023, but in the consulted sources there is no specific data on results (vote percentage, number of seats per party, turnout, etc.). There is abundant recent political information about Ceuta and electoral processes in other communities, but nothing detailing the count or the resulting composition of the Ceuta Assembly. Therefore, it is not possible to provide a reliable figure of how many seats each party obtained in those last elections to the Ceuta Assembly with the available information.

What exact information is missing

In the research, databases of the newspaper Demócrata as well as official notes were searched, expressly looking for “results elections Assembly of Ceuta 2023,” “seat distribution,” “votes per party,” or similar terms. However, no specific piece was found that records the electoral result of Ceuta in 2019 or 2023, nor a subsequent summary detailing the Assembly's configuration after May 28.

References were also not found in Central Electoral Board agreements analogous to those existing for European elections, such as the agreement on the 2024 European elections, where disaggregated data by constituency (including Ceuta, but only in a European key) appear. In summary: there is no table or direct report with “PP/PSOE/VOX/etc.: so many votes, so many seats” for the Ceuta Assembly in the consulted sources.

Recent political context of Ceuta

Although the 2023 results are not recorded, there is much information about the political and social situation in the city in 2026, strongly marked by the migration crisis. The newspaper Demócrata details, for example, the unanimous request of the Assembly to declare a national emergency due to the massive entry of migrants, including Government rejection, in this report. The estimate of the Ceuta president, Juan Jesús Vivas, about the arrival of between 60,000 and 80,000 people and the contrast with the Ministry of Interior figures is followed in this article and in the subsequent Interior report in another piece.

The political and social tensions related to this crisis are reflected in reports on citizen protests and the actions of various national political forces: for example, the gatherings in Plaza de los Reyes covered in this news, Pedro Sánchez's visit and his hostile reception in this account, or clashes around events by Vito Quiles and Alvise Pérez, narrated in this piece and in this other.

This context helps understand the political climate but does not substitute the formal electoral data that determined how many seats each party has in the Assembly.

Where to consult official results

Given the absence of numerical data in the sources used, the safest way to know the results of the last elections to the Ceuta Assembly is to go to official electoral results platforms (Ministry of Interior and Electoral Board) or to the Autonomous City's own institutional website, where election counts are usually published.

As a general reference on the functioning of the Spanish electoral system — including the consideration of Ceuta as its own constituency in general elections — the Ministry of Interior glossary can be consulted in this note, and on Ceuta's role in the Senate, the Upper Chamber's note explaining its representation is in this information.

Other useful political and electoral resources

Although there are no specific data for Ceuta, the same sources offer detailed analyses of other recent electoral processes that can serve as methodological guides to interpret results when official data are available. Among them stand out Demócrata's specials on Andalusia in general results, its live tracking by provinces and municipalities in this special, and the historical analysis in this piece.

Similarly, for Castilla y León, 2026 results can be seen in this special, the real-time count in this page, and the historical review since 1983 in this analysis; for Aragón, the 2026 detail is in this special and the historical context piece in this article.

These examples show the type of breakdown (percentages, seats, maps, historical evolution) that will likely also exist for Ceuta on official websites, although it does not appear in the sources used for this answer.

Conclusion

In summary: the last elections to the Assembly of the Autonomous City of Ceuta were held on May 28, 2023, but the consulted databases do not contain detailed results (neither votes, seats, nor turnout), so it would not be rigorous to invent or complete those data. To obtain them precisely, it is essential to consult official electoral results portals or the Autonomous City's own documentation.