General elections survey: after Ceuta, PP and Vox exceed 50% for the first time and the left falls to 36.1%, according to 40dB

The 40dB barometer for El País and Cadena SER places the PP at 32.4%, Vox at 17.8%, and the PSOE at 27.6%. Compared to July, Feijóo gains four tenths, Abascal six, and Sánchez loses four, while Sumar and Podemos also decline. PP and Vox go from 49.2% to 50.2%, their highest for the entire legislature, while PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos drop from 36.9% to 36.1%.

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The first survey of 40dB after the summer leaves a demographic milestone: PP and Vox jointly exceed 50% of the estimated vote for the first time since the legislature began. PP would reach 32.4%, Vox 17.8%, PSOE 27.6%, Sumar 5.7% and Podemos 2.8%.

The fieldwork was carried out a month after the start of the Ceuta crisis, allowing for a comparison of the new snapshot with the last barometer prior to the summer, published in July.

The evolution is clear although not abrupt. PP and Vox rise. PSOE, Sumar and Podemos fall.

What changes since July: Vox +0.6, PP +0.4 and PSOE -0.4

Vox is the party that improves the most compared to the previous 40dB. It goes from 17.2% to 17.8%, an increase of six tenths. PP advances four, from 32% to 32.4%. PSOE travels exactly that distance in the opposite direction: it falls from 28% to 27.6%. Sumar goes from 5.8% to 5.7%, one tenth less, while Podemos declines from 3.1% to 2.8%, three tenths.

For its part, SALF rises slightly, from 2.1% to 2.2%.

The comparison thus leaves a very clear signal:

  • PP: +0.4
  • PSOE: -0.4
  • Vox: +0.6
  • Sumar: -0.1
  • Podemos: -0.3

PP and Vox go from 49.2% to 50.2%

In July, PP and Vox totaled 49.2%. Now they reach 50.2%. They gain a joint point and cross for the first time the 50% threshold in the 40dB series during this legislature.

The opposite movement occurs on the left. PSOE, Sumar and Podemos totaled 36.9% in July. Now they remain at 36.1%.

The distance between the two blocks therefore goes from 12.3 points to 14.1 points. The gap increases by 1.8 points since July.

If SALF is included, the right reaches 52.4%

Vox is the party that gains the most after the summer

The most favorable monthly movement corresponds to Santiago Abascal. Vox gains six tenths and reaches 17.8%. Moreover, it is the only one of the three major parties that is clearly above its result in the general elections of 2023. Then it obtained 12.4% and now adds 5.4 points more.

PP, despite being the leading force, is still seven tenths below the result of 23J. PSOE is 4.1 points below.

The accumulated transformation during the legislature consists not so much of an extraordinary expansion of PP as of the growth of Vox and the socialist loss.

PP returns to 32.4%, but remains below 23J

PP reaches 32.4%. It is four tenths more than in July and matches its best record of 2026 in this series. But it remains below the 33.1% achieved in the general elections of 2023.

This introduces an important reading for Feijóo: the possibility of reaching La Moncloa does not depend on whether the PP has experienced a great electoral expansion. It mainly depends on Vox being five points above 2023 and on the left block having weakened.

The PSOE loses four tenths and is 4.8 points behind the PP

The PSOE drops to 27.6%. In July it was at 28%. The loss is moderate, four tenths, but coincides with the popular advance and causes the PP-PSOE distance to increase by eight tenths at once.

Feijóo goes from leading Sánchez by four points to leading him by 4.8.

The alternative left also does not capture the socialist fall

One of the problems for Sánchez is that the vote lost by the PSOE does not turn into a recovery for its possible partners. Sumar slightly drops to 5.7%. Podemos also retreats to 2.8%. Together they only reach 8.5%.

In the 2023 elections, they ran under the same candidacy and achieved 12.3%. The space is now 3.8 points below that joint result.

The weakness of Sumar and Podemos is decisive for any future investiture majority, because even if the PSOE resisted around 28%, it would need a much stronger alternative left to compensate for a PP-Vox sum greater than 50%.

Ceuta enters the survey with immigration at the center

The timing of the fieldwork matters. The interviews were conducted approximately a month after the start of the Ceuta crisis.

This means that we are not facing an immediate reaction from the first hours. There has been time for the migratory issue, the relationship with Morocco, border security, and the Government's response to be incorporated into political perceptions.

The survey ended, however, before some subsequent events, including new revelations from the police report on Ceuta and Sánchez's appearance in Congress.

For this reason, it cannot be considered a snapshot of the full effect of all the news known during the first days of September.

Vox appears as the party most capable of managing immigration

Here probably appears the data that best connects the Ceuta crisis with the rise of Vox. When 40dB asks which party is best equipped to manage immigration, Vox takes the first position.

27% of all Spaniards point to Abascal's party. The PSOE appears second, with 18.4%. The PP stands at 13.9%.

Furthermore, 23% respond that none of them are qualified.

Even one in four voters of the PP prefers Vox to manage immigration. The penetration of Vox in the popular electorate is especially striking. Among those who would currently vote for the PP, 56% consider their own party to be the most capable of managing immigration. But 23% point to Vox.

Among Vox voters, on the other hand, support for their own party is almost monolithic: 89% consider it the most qualified.

Vox has the highest electoral loyalty

The strength of Vox is also evident in its ability to retain voters. 85.9% of those who voted for Abascal in 2023 say they will do so again.

  • In the PP, loyalty is 77.5%.
  • In the PSOE, it is 68.4%.
  • And in Sumar it drops to 44.5%.

Vox therefore has not only an expanding base but also the most stable base among the major parties.

Almost 13% of PP voters are moving to Vox

The transfer between PP and Vox is clearly tilted towards Abascal. 12.8% of those who voted for the PP in 2023 now say they would support Vox. In the opposite direction, only 3.4% of former Vox voters would move to the PP. The ratio is practically four to one.

The PSOE loses more votes to the right than to the left

The transfer matrix leaves another important data.

Among socialist voters of 23J:

  • 6.8% would go to the PP.
  • 4.3% to Vox.
  • 3.9% to Sumar.
  • 1.5% to Podemos.

That is, the leaks to PP and Vox total 11.1%, clearly more than those directed towards Sumar and Podemos. Furthermore, 7.5% of former socialist voters remain undecided.

Vox also leads mobilization

71.6% of those who voted for Vox in 2023 assure that they will vote with total certainty. It is the highest percentage among the four main electorates.

Sumar stands at 69.2%, PP at 68.5%, and PSOE at 66.3%.

Vox thus combines three simultaneous advantages: growth compared to 2023, maximum loyalty, and high mobilization.

Vox leads among those under 35

Generational segmentation adds another structural change. In direct voting intention, Vox appears as the leading force among citizens up to 34 years old. Its support decreases as age increases.

The PSOE, on the contrary, finds its main strength in the older electorate: among those over 65 years old, it hovers around 30% of direct voting intention.

Published: El País, 7/09/2026

Result of 40dB and comparison with July and 23J

The first 40dB barometer after the summer places PP and Vox above 50% combined for the first time during the legislature. Vox is the party that grows the most compared to July, while PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos decline.

Party September July Change 23J Change vs. 23J
PP 32.4% 32.0% +0.4 33.1% -0.7
PSOE 27.6% 28.0% -0.4 31.7% -4.1
Vox 17.8% 17.2% +0.6 12.4% +5.4
Sumar 5.7% 5.8% -0.1 12.3%* —
Podemos 2.8% 3.1% -0.3 Integrated in Sumar —

* Podemos ran integrated in Sumar in the general elections of 2023. Together, Sumar and Podemos now total 8.5%, compared to the 12.3% obtained by the unitary candidacy of 23J.

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AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the current parliamentary status of the electoral reform regulating the allocation of seats in the Congress of Deputies?

As of today, according to the official register of initiatives of the Cortes Generales, there is no reform in process that specifically modifies the rules of allocation of seats in the Congress of Deputies (number of seats per constituency, distribution formula, state electoral threshold, etc.). What does exist is a set of reforms of the LOREG and electoral regulations that affect other aspects of the system, with different parliamentary statuses.

1. LOREG reforms currently in process

In the XV legislature there are, at least, two relevant organic initiatives on Organic Law 5/1985, of the General Electoral Regime, that are open, but none of them alters the distribution of seats in the Congress among constituencies nor the allocation formula:

  • Organic Bill modifying the LOREG (121/000063)
    It comes from the Government of Spain and is processed in the Congress of Deputies as an organic bill. Its main purpose, according to the text published on 07/24/2025, is to strengthen the regulation of electoral debates in public media and electoral polls (articles such as 66 and 69 of the LOREG), in order to guarantee pluralism, transparency, and adequate information to the electorate.
    The latest parliamentary status recorded is the extension of the deadline for submitting amendments in the Congress until September 9, 2026. That is, the bill is still in an early phase, in the Congress, pending the closure of the amendment period to the articles and can then proceed to committee and commission. It does not modify the seat distribution rule of the Congress, but the conditions of the campaign and electoral information.
  • Initiative to modify the LOREG on ineligibilities (124/000028 / (15)622/000048)
    It is an initiative promoted by the Senate, processed both in the Senate and the Congress, focusing on adjusting the causes of ineligibility provided in the LOREG. The register does not indicate changes in constituencies or seat distribution, but in who can or cannot be a candidate.
    Its current status in the Congress is also an extended amendment period until September 9, 2026, so it is also in the amendment phase, without having yet proceeded to committee or commission debates.

Therefore, none of these two initiatives constitute an ongoing reform on the allocation of seats in the Congress in the strict sense.

2. Recent electoral reforms already concluded

In the current legislature, several organic reforms with impact on the electoral system have been processed and concluded, but they are no longer in parliamentary phase:

  • Organic Bill proposal to modify the LOREG linked to art. 69.3 CE (122/000280 / (15)624/000010)
    Presented by the Socialist Parliamentary Group in the Congress, it adapts the LOREG to the reform of article 69.3 of the Constitution, recognizing Formentera as its own constituency and regulating the election of the seat corresponding to it in the Senate. It focuses on territorial representation in the Upper Chamber, not on the distribution of seats in the Congress.
    The initiative was definitively approved and on 06/26/2026 the official approval of the text was published, so its processing is concluded.
  • Organic Bill project on parity representation and balanced presence of women and men (121/000001 / (15)621/000002)
    Government project introducing parity representation rules in different spheres, including electoral lists. It was definitively approved on 07/23/2024 and published as approved text on 07/31/2024 in both Congress and Senate.
    Although it affects the configuration of candidacies (for example, zipper lists or balanced presence requirements), it does not modify the number or territorial distribution of seats in the Congress, nor the formula by which they are assigned.
  • Organic Bill proposal by Vox to modify the LOREG (122/000200)
    Registered by the Vox Parliamentary Group, it was processed in the Congress, but the initiative “fell through” on 09/23/2025 and on 09/26/2025 the rejection text was published. Its processing is therefore closed and has not resulted in any reform.
3. Conclusion

Based on the available parliamentary information, there is currently no electoral reform in process that changes the allocation of seats in the Congress of Deputies (constituencies, number of seats per province, or distribution formula). What there are are ongoing LOREG reforms on debates and electoral polls and on ineligibilities, both still in amendment phase in the Congress, and already approved reforms affecting territorial representation in the Senate and parity in candidacies, but not the basic mechanism of seat distribution in the Congress.

If you had a specific initiative in mind (for example, a political or media debate about changing the provincial seat distribution), as of today that change does not correspond to an organic law in process that is modifying those core elements of the electoral system of the Congress.

What are the competencies of the president of the Partido Popular according to the party statutes and what has been Alberto Núñez Feijóo's political trajectory?

The president of the Partido Popular (PP) is, according to the statutes and the statutory report approved at the XXI National Congress of 2025, the figure that concentrates the political leadership of the party, presides over its main bodies, and is at the center of the internal and external representation of the organization. Currently, this position is held by Alberto Núñez Feijóo, whose trajectory combines a long executive career in Galicia with the national leadership of the PP and the role of opposition leader in Spain.

Competencies of the president of the Partido Popular according to the statutes

The statutes approved at the XXI National Congress of the PP in July 2025, along with their Statutes report, do not merely list bodies but redefine the organizational model by strengthening the role of the presidency as the axis of a party “organized, well-oiled, and serving society” and aspiring to “support the next Government of Spain” with Alberto Núñez Feijóo at the helm.

From the statutory documentation and internal notes of the PP itself, several core functions of the national president emerge:

  • Political and strategic leadership of the party: the presidency leads the PP’s political project, sets major priorities (for example, commitment to “transparency, participation, and listening”) and guides the opposition line and government alternative. The party texts emphasize that the statutes are the “reflection of how an administration will be governed,” reinforcing the president’s role as guarantor of that model.
  • Presidency and promotion of leadership bodies: the national president leads the National Executive Committee and the Steering Committee, selects the core of deputy secretariats, and decides the configuration of the leadership (general secretariat, spokespersons, etc.), as seen in successive internal reshuffles led by Feijóo.
  • Territorial and sectoral coordination: the new statutes create councils and committees (Council of Autonomous Presidents, Committee of Mayors of Large Cities, Coordination Committee among Provincial Deputies, Cabildos and Consells, Council of New Spaniards). The national president is part of these bodies and is the reference point to articulate common positions on matters such as water, education, health, or immigration relations.
  • Promotion and supervision of the ethical code and accountability: the Statutes report strengthens the obligation of public officials to submit to an ethical code and render periodic accounts. The presidency embodies and publicly defends this standard and, together with the Compliance Office foreseen in the statutes, is politically responsible for ensuring that “whoever does wrong pays and leaves this party.”
  • External and international representation: in the new organizational chart, the presidency directly assumes the competencies of the party’s international wing, which previously was under a specific secretariat. This places the president as the main spokesperson of the PP before other European political forces, international institutions, and foreign public opinion.
  • Relationship with the membership and congress process: the reformed statutes put “members at the center” and establish telematic mechanisms to vote and participate. The president is subject to re-election at national congresses, presents his candidacy, team, and political program, and answers to delegates and the membership.

Overall, the statutes configure the national president as the highest responsible for political line, internal cohesion, selection of the leadership team, and projection of the PP as a “reformist center” party, aspiring to represent all Spaniards.

Political trajectory of Alberto Núñez Feijóo

Alberto Núñez Feijóo (Ourense, 1961) has been president of the Partido Popular since the extraordinary congress in Seville on April 1, 2022. He arrived at that conclave after the internal crisis that ended Pablo Casado’s leadership and was elected almost by acclamation. Four years later, in 2026, the PP presents itself as a party united by its electoral victories and he has been re-elected as president at the XXI National Congress.

Before his leap to national politics, Feijóo built his profile as a manager in administration and in Galicia. According to the biography collected in his institutional profile and the press:

  • He began his political career in the state administration as president of Insalud at 31 years old, and later was president of Correos.
  • He returned to Galicia as vice president of the Xunta and inherited from Manuel Fraga the leadership of the PP of Galicia (PPdeG), from where he consolidated as a party reference.
  • He was president of the Xunta of Galicia between 2009 and 2022, a period in which he achieved four absolute majorities and built an image as a prudent manager oriented to budgetary stability, although he also faced political and media controversies.

In 2023 he left the presidency of the Xunta to lead the PP nationwide and present his candidacy for the presidency of the Government. In the 2023 general elections, he achieved that the PP went from 89 to 137 deputies while Vox dropped from 52 to 33, but he did not obtain the necessary support to be invested in the Congress, thus consolidating as leader of the opposition.

In the XV legislature, he is listed as a deputy in the Congress and a member of the Permanent Deputation, while maintaining the presidency of the PP. The press describes him as a leader who has reordered the leadership at Génova, strengthened the power of the general secretariat and his circle of trust, and who directs his project to “repeal sanchismo” and offer an alternative of “institutional reconstruction,” emphasizing democratic regeneration and economic stability.

What was the composition of the Congress of Deputies after the 2023 general elections and how many seats did each party obtain?

After the general elections held on July 23, 2023, the Congress of Deputies of the XV Legislature was composed of 350 seats distributed among eleven political formations. The initial seat distribution by party was as follows: a first minority of the Partido Popular (PP), followed by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), and a set of state and territorial forces completing the absolute majority of the Chamber.

According to official results, the seat distribution immediately after the elections was as follows:

  • Partido Popular (PP): 137 seats. It was the most voted force and the group with the greatest representation in the Chamber, but fell short of the absolute majority (176 deputies), which prevented it from forming a government majority on its own.
  • Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE): 121 seats. Second force in number of seats and the axis of the subsequent investiture bloc that allowed Pedro Sánchez's re-election as president of the Government.
  • Vox: 33 seats. Third force in the hemicycle and main parliamentary partner of the PP in the right-wing bloc. Its seats, added to those of the PP and UPN, form one of the two major numerical blocs of the legislature.
  • Sumar: 31 seats. Coalition of parties to the left of the PSOE, led by Yolanda Díaz. These seats are essential to form the government bloc and the majority supporting the Executive in the Chamber.
  • Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC): 7 seats. Catalan independentist force that is part of the support network necessary for the Government to pass key laws.
  • Junts per Catalunya (Junts): 7 seats. Another Catalan independentist formation, decisive in the parliamentary arithmetic of the legislature, both in investiture and in votes of high political content.
  • EH Bildu: 6 seats. Leftist coalition of Basque-Navarrese scope, also a relevant piece in the bloc that supported the investiture and the approval of legislative initiatives of the Government.
  • Basque Nationalist Party (PNV): 5 seats. Traditional Basque nationalist party, with significant weight in state politics. Its five deputies usually hold a swing position in close votes.
  • Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG): 1 seat. Galician nationalist formation that contributes one seat to the left bloc and usually conditions its support on certain territorial commitments.
  • Canarian Coalition (CC): 1 seat. Canary Islands party, whose deputy can be decisive in votes where the margin between blocs is reduced to one or two seats.
  • Union of the Navarrese People (UPN): 1 seat. Navarrese center-right formation, traditionally aligned with the PP in the Congress, completing the main opposition bloc.

Adding these results, we obtain the total of 350 seats that make up the Congress of Deputies. From here, the different parliamentary blocs were configured. According to the analysis published by the newspaper Demócrata, the set formed by PSOE and Sumar totaled 147 seats, which combined with the support of ERC (7), Junts (7), EH Bildu (6), PNV (5), BNG (1), and Canarian Coalition (1) allowed the articulation of a potential bloc of 179 deputies for an investiture and key votes of the legislature.

On the other side of the hemicycle, the bloc led by the PP consisted of its 137 deputies, along with the 33 from Vox and the deputy from UPN, thus reaching 171 seats. This balance of forces —179 versus 171 in scenarios where the investiture bloc remained united— explains the enormous tension and the very narrow margin with which the Government must negotiate each legislative initiative.

From an institutional point of view, this composition configures a very fragmented Congress, in which no force can impose its agenda without weaving stable or punctual agreements. The need to coordinate a considerable number of territorial parties (Catalan, Basque, Galician, and Canary Islands) grants these formations notable influence beyond their individual numerical weight. The legislature is thus built on complex arithmetic in which practically “every vote counts” in the most sensitive laws.

In summary, the Congress resulting from the 23-J 2023 elections is a hemicycle with a clear numerical leadership of the PP, but with a potential government majority articulated around the PSOE and Sumar thanks to the support of various nationalist and left-wing forces. This combination of fragmentation and tight blocs defines the political dynamics of the XV Legislature.

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What combined percentage do PP and Vox reach according to the latest 40dB survey?

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Which party is perceived by most Spaniards as the most capable of managing immigration?

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Which party shows the highest voter loyalty according to the 40dB survey conducted after the summer of 2026?

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