General elections survey: after Ceuta, Vox gains up to 6 seats while the PP loses up to 7 and the PSOE holds firm, according to Target Point

The new Target Point survey for El Debate places Vox at 18.9% and between 66 and 67 seats, compared to the 60-62 it obtained in July, before the Ceuta crisis. The PP falls from 32.1% to 31.5% and goes from 141-143 to 135-136 deputies, while the PSOE drops half a point to 25.6% but keeps its range practically intact, with 106-107 representatives.

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PP and Vox would add between 201 and 203 seats, one of the major data points from a poll in which the movement occurs mainly within the blocks.

The first Target Point poll for El Debate after the summer provides a particularly useful snapshot to measure what has happened since before the Ceuta crisis, because the same polling company published its previous national survey in mid-July, with fieldwork conducted between the 15th and 17th, when there were still almost two weeks left before the events of July 30.

The comparison shows a notable change, but not exactly the one that a quick reading of the blocks might suggest. PP and Vox already had a very large absolute majority before the summer and they maintain it. What has changed significantly is the distribution of power between the two: Santiago Abascal grows while Alberto Núñez Feijóo declines.

Target Point now places PP at 31.5% and between 135 and 136 deputies, PSOE at 25.6% and between 106 and 107, Vox at 18.9% and between 66 and 67, Sumar at 6.9% and 10 seats, and Podemos around 2.8% and two representatives. The fieldwork was conducted this week through 1,012 online interviews.

The before and after Ceuta: Vox gains 5-6 seats and PP loses 6-7

This is the central data of the poll.

In July, Target Point granted Vox between 60 and 62 deputies. Now it gives it between 66 and 67.

Abascal's party therefore gains between five and six representatives when comparing the equivalent extremes of both ranges. In percentage, it goes from 17.6% to 18.9%, an increase of 1.3 points in less than two months.

PP is moving practically in the opposite direction. It had 32.1% and between 141 and 143 deputies before Ceuta; now it drops to 31.5% and between 135 and 136.

Feijóo loses six tenths and between six and seven seats

We are not, therefore, facing a uniform growth of the right. The block maintains a very large majority, but Vox occupies a significantly larger part of it.

PSOE loses half a point, but barely cedes seats

The socialist evolution is quite different.

In July, Target Point placed PSOE at 26.1% and between 106 and 108 deputies. Now it places it at 25.6% and between 106 and 107.

Sánchez loses half a point and about 117,000 votes in Target Point's estimation, but the parliamentary translation barely moves: it retains the lower end of its range and loses only one deputy at the upper end.

This nuance is important because it avoids exaggerating the so-called Ceuta effect. In this survey, the crisis coincides with a socialist loss in votes, but not with a new collapse in seats.

The PSOE was already arriving at the summer well below its 2023 result and the additional movement since July is limited.

Sumar recovers two deputies

Sumar also stars in a movement that breaks the idea of a homogeneous fall of the entire left.

In July it was at 6.1% and eight seats.

Now it rises to 6.9% and achieves 10.

It gains eight tenths, about 179,000 votes according to Target Point and two deputies.

Podemos remains with two representatives and hovers around 2.8% of the vote.

The sum of PSOE-Sumar-Podemos thus reaches between 118 and 119 deputies, compared to the approximately 116-118 they obtained in July.

That is to say, although the PSOE retreats, Sumar compensates part of that movement and the whole of the state left does not worsen in parliamentary representation compared to the previous Target Point.

PP and Vox go from 49.7% to 50.4%

Also by blocks, the comparison is more nuanced than it seems.

In July:

  • PP: 32.1%.
  • Vox: 17.6%.

Total: 49.7%.

Now:

  • PP: 31.5%.
  • Vox: 18.9%.

Total: 50.4%.

The sum of both gains seven tenths and crosses the 50% barrier.

But practically all the movement is explained because Vox gains 1.3 points while the PP loses six tenths.

In seats, something even more interesting happens.

  • In July, PP and Vox summed between 201 and 205.
  • Now they sum between 201 and 203.

Therefore, the majority does not grow in representation. It even narrows slightly from above.

The big change is internal: fewer deputies for Feijóo and more for Abascal.

The gap between the blocks barely changes

PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos summed in July approximately 34.9% of the vote.

Now they reach 35.3%.

They rise four tenths together because the recovery of Sumar compensates for the socialist fall.

The distance against PP and Vox goes from 14.8 to 15.1 points.

Just three tenths more.

This makes this survey one of the most interesting for understanding the period after Ceuta: it does not reflect a large aggregated movement from the left to the right, but rather a reorganization within the two blocks.

The transfer PP-Vox explains a good part of Abascal's rise

Target Point also provides a very specific figure.

Vox gains about 351,000 votes compared to July. Of them, approximately 135,000 would come from former PP voters.

This means that about 38% of Vox's net growth during this period can be associated, according to the pollster's estimate, with voters who in July were in the orbit of the PP.

The transfer matrix offers an even broader perspective since the 23J: around 15.3% of those who voted for the PP in 2023 would now opt for Vox, a volume that Target Point estimates at approximately 1.2 million people.

The reverse movement is much smaller: just over 17,000 former Vox voters would shift towards the PP.

The PP compensates part of its loss by attracting PSOE and abstainers.

Feijóo manages to compensate for part of that loss through other means.

Target Point calculates that the PP would attract about 220,000 former socialist voters and around 636,000 people who did not vote in the general elections of 2023.

This explains why the PP does not fall much more despite the significant transfer to Vox.

The party loses votes on its right, but incorporates support from the PSOE and abstention.

Still, its electoral loyalty drops to 75.8%.

The PSOE has about 1.2 million former undecided voters

The socialist problem still largely lies within its own base.

Only 65.6% of those who identify as Sánchez voters claim to have decided to repeat their vote. The pool of undecided reaches 15.7%, which Target Point translates into about 1.2 million people.

This data is perhaps more important for the PSOE than the monthly drop of half a point.

A very significant part of its future result depends not so much on recovering voters already settled in other parties as on re-mobilizing voters from 2023 who today have not decided their ballot.

Compared to the 23J, Vox doubles its seats

The comparison with the last general elections shows that the accumulated change during the legislature is much greater than that produced since July.

Vox obtained then 12.4% and 33 deputies.

Now Target Point places it at 18.9% and between 66 and 67.

That is 6.5 points more and between 33 and 34 additional deputies.

In other words, Vox would exactly or slightly more than double its representation from the 23J.

The PP would have fewer deputies than in 2023

The situation of the PP is very different. Feijóo achieved 33.1% and 137 seats in 2023.

Now it appears at 31.5% and between 135 and 136. It loses 1.6 points and between one and two deputies.

This is probably the great structural transformation of the bloc during the legislature.

The PSOE loses between 14 and 15 deputies since the 23J

The PSOE obtained 31.7% and 121 representatives.

Target Point now places it at 25.6% and between 106 and 107. The accumulated loss is 6.1 points and between 14 and 15 deputies.

But, again, a large part of that deterioration is prior to Ceuta.

In July it was already at 106-108. The crisis coincides with an additional half point drop, but barely modifies its representation.

Sumar and Podemos lose 19 deputies compared to the joint candidacy

In 2023, Sumar ran with Podemos integrated and obtained 12.3% and 31 deputies.

Now the two formations appear separated.

  • Sumar obtains 6.9% and 10 seats.
  • Podemos hovers around 2.8% and two.

Together they would sum approximately 9.7% and 12 representatives.

The loss compared to 23J would be 2.6 points and 19 seats.

The fragmentation explains why a relatively moderate drop in percentage has such a strong impact on representation.

PP and Vox gain between 31 and 33 seats compared to 23J

The sum of both parties was 170 deputies after the 2023 elections.

Now it would be between 201 and 203.

That is between 31 and 33 more seats.

But the composition is revealing.

PP: from 137 to 135-136.

Vox: from 33 to 66-67.

The majority is much larger, but the PP has not grown.

The growth belongs entirely to Vox.

The investiture bloc also does not reach

Sánchez's problem is not limited to PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos.

Target Point calculates that even adding Junts, ERC, PNV, EH Bildu, BNG, Coalición Canaria, and Adelante Andalucía, and taking in each case the most favorable extreme of the ranges, the total would reach a maximum of 148 deputies.

That is 28 less than the absolute majority.

Junts appears especially weakened, with between three and four seats compared to the current seven.

Therefore, although the state left slightly improves its sum compared to July thanks to Sumar, the overall arithmetic remains far from allowing an alternative majority.

Result and comparison

Target Point Survey: current result, before Ceuta, and comparison with 23J

The comparison with the last Target Point poll prior to the Ceuta crisis shows a strong movement within the right bloc: Vox gains between five and six seats while the PP loses between six and seven. The PSOE drops half a point, but practically maintains its representation.

Party September July, before Ceuta Change 23J Change vs. 23J
PP 31.5% · 135-136 32.1% · 141-143 -0.6 points · -6/-7 seats 33.1% · 137 -1.6 points · -1/-2 seats
PSOE 25.6% · 106-107 26.1% · 106-108 -0.5 points · 0/-1 seat 31.7% · 121 -6.1 points · -14/-15 seats
Vox 18.9% · 66-67 17.6% · 60-62 +1.3 points · +5/+6 seats 12.4% · 33 +6.5 points · +33/+34 seats
Sumar 6.9% · 10 6.1% · 8 +0.8 points · +2 seats 12.3% · 31 together with Podemos See note
Podemos ≈2.8% · 2 2.7% · 2 ≈+0.1 points · no changes Integrated into Sumar See note

In the general elections of 2023 Podemos ran integrated into Sumar. Compared together, both forces go from 31 deputies in the 23J to 12 in the current estimate of Target Point.

Published on 13/09/2026 in El Debate

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the current phase of the processing of the Spanish electoral law and what recent reforms have been proposed in the Congress?

The Organic Law 5/1985, on the General Electoral Regime (LOREG), remains the basic electoral law in force in Spain, in consolidated wording and continuously modified by partial reforms. In this legislature, there is no comprehensive reform of the LOREG, but there is a significant block of projects and bills under processing in the Congress that address very specific points, along with some reforms already approved.

Current situation of the “electoral law” (LOREG)

The LOREG is fully in force as the cornerstone of the electoral system. Since 1985 it has been modified many times (external voting, disability, financing, etc.), and in recent years the following stand out:

  • The Organic Law 12/2022, which abolished the requested vote and completely reconfigured the vote of Spaniards residing abroad (art. 75 LOREG).
  • The 2026 reform that adapts the LOREG to the own constituency of Formentera for the Senate, modifying articles 161 and 165 so that Ibiza and Formentera each elect their own senator. This reform has already been approved by Congress and Senate and is in force, guaranteeing that in the next general elections Formentera will have its own seat in the Upper Chamber.

In addition to these completed reforms, in the XV Legislature there is a set of new modifications underway affecting very diverse aspects of the electoral regime.

Main electoral reforms under processing in the Congress

Among the initiatives affecting the LOREG, the following stand out:

  • Organic Bill modifying the LOREG (121/000063, Government). It is currently under processing in the Congress, in the amendment phase (the deadline has been extended until mid-September 2026).
    Main content:
    • It reforms article 66 LOREG to introduce the obligation of at least one electoral debate on public media during the campaign, taking into account previous results and the existence of “significant groups”.
    • It strengthens the regulation of electoral polls (art. 69 et seq.), requiring more transparency about methodology and microdata to combat disinformation and improve trust in surveys.
  • Organic Bill proposal modifying the LOREG regarding causes of ineligibility Originating in the Senate (622/000048) and processed in the Congress as 124/000028. It is also in the amendment phase in the Constitutional Commission.
    Main content:
    • It adjusts article 6 LOREG on who can be a candidate, reinforcing the exclusion of candidacies linked to illegalized parties or their successors.
    • It systematizes and expands certain causes of supervening incompatibility of elected officials linked to illegalized formations.
  • Organic Bill regulating the right of rectification (121/000083, Government). It is under processing, also in the amendment phase, and although its central object is the right of rectification in media, it includes a final provision that modifies the LOREG to harmonize the treatment of that right during the electoral period.
  • Organic Bill proposal guaranteeing the right to truthful information and combating disinformation (122/000107, Mixed Group). It has been admitted for processing and awaits consideration by the Plenary.
    Impact on the LOREG:
    • It adds a new Title VII to regulate the elections to the Council of the Right to Information, expressly configured according to the rules of the LOREG (state constituency, proportional system, scrutiny, electoral litigation, subsidies, etc.).
    • It introduces punctual modifications in several articles (1, 44 bis, 56, 62, 66 bis, 86, 95, 112, 127…) to integrate those elections into the general electoral regime and strengthen media and advertising transparency obligations.
  • Organic Bill proposal on electoral “deepfakes” (122/000073, SUMAR). Admitted and pending consideration.
    Key reform: adds a new article 144 bis LOREG to typify as an electoral crime the malicious dissemination, during the campaign, of images or audios manipulated with artificial intelligence of candidates.
  • Organic Bill proposal to include fugitives from justice as ineligible (122/000065, Vox). Also admitted and awaiting consideration.
    It proposes to modify article 6.2 LOREG to declare ineligible —in all electoral processes— those who are wanted by Spanish justice for serious crimes against the Constitution, the unity of the Nation, or the Public Administration.
Overall: many partial reforms, no “new great electoral law”

In summary, the “Spanish electoral law” is not being replaced by a new text, but tweaked piece by piece. The current phase can be described as:

  • LOREG in force and consolidated, already adapted to the end of the requested vote and the new constituency of Formentera.
  • Several partial reforms underway in the Congress, focused on causes of ineligibility, mandatory debates and polls, crimes linked to artificial intelligence, truthful information regime, and a new sectoral electoral body (Council of the Right to Information).
  • Other proposals (such as those from Vox on postal voting in separate ballot boxes) that have been debated and rejected, reflecting that, for now, there is no consensus for deep structural changes in the representation system (open lists, general thresholds, etc.).

What are the competencies and political trajectory of Alberto Núñez Feijóo as president of the Popular Party?

Alberto Núñez Feijóo has been, since spring 2022, president of the Popular Party (PP) and the main leader of the opposition to Pedro Sánchez's Government. He was elected at the extraordinary congress in Seville following the internal crisis that forced Pablo Casado's departure, with very broad support from the organization (around 98.35% of the votes, according to Demócrata).

Organically, information from Demócrata and the PP's own website show that, as president, Feijóo concentrates the political and strategic direction of the party. Under his mandate, he defines the structure of the leadership (“management committee” and National Executive Committee), decides the configuration of the deputy secretariats and the General Secretariat, and pilots internal replacements. For example, in 2025 he promotes Miguel Tellado to the General Secretariat and Ester Muñoz to the spokesperson in Congress, reinforcing harder profiles with the Executive.

Likewise, the PP president sets the major ideological and programmatic lines and guides the public discourse. In health, a review of these two years published by ConSalud highlights that Feijóo has prioritized the approval of a specific law on ALS, the expansion of MIR positions — including an extraordinary MIR for rural Primary Care — and a review of euthanasia and the Trans Law, with the declared idea of repealing it and replacing it with another regulation.

Another de facto competence is the organization of internal congresses and the territorial reconfiguration of the party. Reports indicate that, under his presidency, the National Board and the National Executive Committee, chaired by him, convene key regional congresses (such as the Catalan PP or the New Generations) and reorganize regional leaderships, even imposing managing committees when deemed necessary, as in the Valencian Community after Carlos Mazón's resignation.

Regarding his political trajectory as PP president, his access to the position is directly linked to the crisis between Casado's leadership and the Madrid president, Isabel Díaz Ayuso. The article “Feijóo's legislature: four years since Casado's fall…” recounts how, after that “night of the long knives” in February 2022, Casado called an extraordinary congress and the party “opened the Feijóo path,” culminating in Seville with his acclamation election.

Since then, Feijóo has transferred to national politics the profile he had built in Galicia: a leader who came from four absolute majorities in the Xunta and who presented himself as a “statesman” and supporter of “politics for adults.” Various chronicles (such as the report from eldiario.es) recall that his career began very young in administration (Insalud, Correos, vice presidency of the Xunta, presidency of the PPdeG) and that his move to Madrid sought to complete that path with the presidency of the Government.

Already at the head of the PP, a substantial part of his trajectory focuses on reorganizing the organic leadership. In 2022 he configured a scheme with five deputy secretariats, one General Secretariat, and one General Coordination. Later, as detailed by Demócrata in “Who stays and who falls? The PP reconfigures under Feijóo's command,” he undertook several reshuffles: replacing Cuca Gamarra as spokesperson in Congress, reinforcing Tellado, incorporating Alma Ezcurra as new deputy secretary of Sectoral Coordination, and consolidating a more centralized hard core around his leadership.

In parallel, he acts as head of the opposition. Articles from Demócrata and other outlets record his role in the failed investiture session as candidate for the presidency of the Government, his opposition to initiatives such as the State Public Health Agency in a context of clash with the Executive, and his wear-down strategy against Sánchez on issues like regional financing, Ceuta and migration policy, or judicial independence.

His presidency is also characterized by intensive use of the PP's absolute majority in the Senate, where he promotes resolutions and, for example, a proprietary model of “balanced and privilege-free” regional financing, approved in the Upper Chamber. At the same time, he maintains intense media and social network activity, reinforcing his image as a national leader and articulator of the government alternative.

In summary, Feijóo's competencies as PP president combine organic control of the apparatus — team design, congresses, internal reshuffles — with defining the party's political and programmatic project and leading the parliamentary and media opposition strategy. His trajectory since 2022 is marked by the transition from Galician regional leadership to the headship of Spain's main right-wing party, with the explicit goal of preparing a “change of cycle” that places him in La Moncloa.

Can you detail how the internal organization of the PP has changed since Feijóo became president and what weight each deputy secretariat has? What are the main differences between Feijóo's way of exercising the opposition and that of his predecessor Pablo Casado? How has Feijóo's previous trajectory in the Xunta de Galicia influenced his current leadership at the head of the Popular Party?

How many seats did the PSOE obtain in the last general elections and how has its parliamentary group evolved since then?

In the last general elections held on July 23, 2023, the PSOE obtained 121 seats in the Congress of Deputies. That figure made it the second largest force in the Chamber and is also the size with which the Socialist Parliamentary Group was constituted at the start of the XV Legislature. To date, according to the parliamentary database used by Demócrata, the socialist group still has 121 active deputies, despite having been the group with the most internal rotation in the entire Chamber.

Demócrata's data on seat changes show how much the group has been in motion. In a first assessment, as of August 2024, the Congress had renewed almost 10% of its seats and the PSOE concentrated 21 departures of deputies (18.33% of its group) since the start of the legislature, well above the rest of the forces ( analysis of seat renewals ). Later, another assessment in January 2025 raised the figure to 29 socialist departures, 24.2% of the group ( one in eight deputies has resigned the parliamentary seat ).

That intense rotation has not translated, however, into a structural reduction in the size of the group. The resignations have been accompanied by the entry of substitutes from the electoral lists, so that the PSOE has generally maintained the 121 potential votes in the Plenary. A recent example is the resignation of former minister José Luis Ábalos: after his move to the Mixed Group in February 2024 due to the Koldo case and his subsequent resignation from the seat in January 2026, the Central Electoral Board was required to issue the credential to the next candidate on the list for Valencia, which allowed the Socialist Group to recover that seat and return to 121 votes ( report on Ábalos's resignation ).

The general pattern of the group's evolution can be summarized as follows:

  • Electoral result and starting point: 121 seats in the 2023 general elections, marking the initial composition of the Socialist Group.
  • Many departures, but almost all “ordered”: most resignations are due to appointments in the central Government, embassies or public companies, regional governments, or the European Parliament. Several Sánchez ministers (Teresa Ribera, Margarita Robles, José Manuel Albares, Pilar Alegría, Diana Morant, Fernando Grande-Marlaska, Isabel Rodríguez, Luis Planas, among others) left their seats at the start of the legislature, being replaced by the next on the socialist list.
  • Group with the highest rotation in the Chamber: both the August 2024 and January 2025 assessments agree that the PSOE is the party with the most seat changes since the start of the legislature, ahead of the PP and other forces.
  • Impact of the Ábalos case: the expulsion of the former minister from the Socialist Group and his move to the Mixed Group meant, for a time, that the group effectively lost one of its own votes. That anomaly was closed with his resignation and the entry of a new socialist deputy for Valencia, returning the group's count to 121.
  • Little defection to other groups: the exploitation of the stakeholders database identifies a single case of a deputy who, after having been associated with the Socialist Group, later appears as an active author linked to the Popular Parliamentary Group in Congress. This is an exception in a pattern dominated by internal rotations, not transfers between blocks.
  • No unaffiliated members from the PSOE: cross-checking data does not detect former socialist deputies currently as “unaffiliated” in Congress; group departures have been resolved either by resignation from the seat or — in very few cases — by integration into another existing group.

Alongside this rotation, the group has incorporated numerous new profiles, including young deputies – the so-called Generation Z – who have reinforced the internal renewal component ( analysis on “Z” deputies ). This combination of departures due to institutional promotion and entries of new names explains that, although the number of PSOE seats remains at 121, the internal composition of the parliamentary group in 2026 is quite different from that which emerged from the 2023 elections.

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How many seats would Vox obtain according to the latest Target Point survey conducted after the Ceuta crisis?

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