General Elections

General elections survey: Target Point reviews the CIS, gives victory to the PP and subtracts 34 seats from the PSOE

A review by Target Point on the July CIS survey substantially modifies the estimate published by the public body. While the barometer led by José Félix Tezanos places the PSOE as the first force with 33% of the votes and around 146 seats, the re-estimation positions the PP as the winner and reduces the socialists to a maximum of 112 deputies.

5 minutes

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By Dolores Sánchez

Published

18 JUL, 2026 - 09:42

Last updated

18 JUL, 2026 - 09:42

5 minutes

This is not a new survey, but a review of the CIS

The Target Point estimate does not come from an independent fieldwork conducted later, but from a review of the results published by the CIS.

This means that both projections use the same July survey as a basis, but apply different models to convert the responses of the interviewees into vote and seat estimates.

The CIS projects the PSOE as the leading force with an advantage of approximately eight points over the PP. Target Point interprets those same data very differently and places the popular party ahead.

Therefore, this is not about two surveys conducted on different samples, but about two distinct demographic readings of the same measurement.

Target Point places the PP at 32.3%

The Target Point review places the PP as the leading force with 32.3% of the votes and around 141 seats.

The result would imply a slight loss in percentage compared to the general elections of 23J, when Alberto Núñez Feijóo obtained 33.1%. However, the parliamentary projection would be somewhat higher than the 137 deputies achieved then.

The difference is explained by the territorial distribution of the vote and by the changes experienced by the other parties. In the Spanish electoral system, small variations in certain provinces can alter the distribution of the last seats.

Against those 141 deputies projected by Target Point, the CIS attributes around 108 to the PP.

The distance between both models is approximately 33 seats.

The PSOE goes from 146 to a maximum of 112 deputies

The biggest change affects the PSOE.

The CIS estimates 33% of the votes for the socialists and approximately 146 seats, 25 more than they obtained in the general elections of 2023.

Target Point reduces that estimate to 26.6% and a maximum of 112 deputies.

The difference between both projections is 6.4 points in votes and 34 seats.

With the calculation of Target Point, the PSOE would lose at least nine deputies compared to the 121 obtained on 23J and would clearly be behind the PP.

A difference of almost six points between PP and PSOE

The revision shows a lead of 5.7 points for the PP over the PSOE.

The popular party would reach 32.3%, while the socialists would remain at 26.6%.

The picture is practically opposite to that published by the CIS, which attributes an approximate lead of eight points to the PSOE.

The distance between the two models highlights to what extent the methodology used to correct the direct intention to vote can modify the final result of a survey.

Why the CIS and Target Point arrive at such different results

Electoral surveys do not merely reproduce the direct response of the interviewees. Polling companies apply models to correct factors such as vote recall, the probability of going to the polls, political sympathy, indecision, and electoral loyalty.

The CIS uses its own methodology to transform that data into vote estimation. Target Point applies an alternative model based on the information from the barometer.

The divergence does not by itself mean that one estimation is correct and the other incorrect. They are projections made with different criteria and must be analyzed alongside the rest of the published surveys.

In this case, the revision of Target Point is closer to the general picture offered by other recent private polls, which place the PP as the leading force and the PSOE between 25% and 28%.

Vox barely changes between both estimates

Unlike what happens with PP and PSOE, the projections of the CIS and Target Point for Vox are practically coincident.

The variation is minimal both in percentage of votes and in seat estimation, according to the information published by El Debate.

The arithmetic would change completely

The projected distribution by Target Point transforms the parliamentary reading of the barometer.

With the original estimation from the CIS, the PSOE would reach around 146 deputies and would be in a very favorable position to try to articulate a new investiture majority.

With the revision from Target Point, the PP would obtain about 141 seats and the PSOE would be at a maximum of 112.

The parliamentary distance between the two would be close to 29 deputies in favor of the PP.

The possibility of government would depend afterwards on the result of Vox and the rest of the forces, but the first position would clearly change hands.

The PSOE would be five points below the 23J

The estimate from Target Point places the PSOE at 26.6%.

In the general elections of 2023, the socialists obtained 31.7%, so the setback would be 5.1 points.

In representation, they would go from 121 to a maximum of 112 deputies.

The CIS, on the other hand, projects an improvement compared to the 23J both in percentage and in seats.

This is one of the biggest differences between the public model and the private revision: one reflects a socialist recovery and the other maintains the setback that appears in a good part of recent polls.

The PP would slightly decrease in vote, but would gain seats

The PP would obtain 32.3%, eight tenths less than in the last general elections.

However, Target Point places it around 141 deputies, four more than the 137 achieved in 2023.

There is no automatic relationship between national percentage and number of seats. The distribution depends on how the vote is distributed in the 52 constituencies and on the competition for the last deputies in each province.

A party can lose some tenths in the whole of Spain and, at the same time, improve its representation if it better concentrates its support.

Target Point anticipates problems for the PNV

The revision also modifies the relationship between the main Basque parties.

The CIS attributes six deputies to the PNV and four to EH Bildu. Target Point considers the opposite scenario more likely: that EH Bildu surpasses Aitor Esteban's party.

According to the re-estimation, EH Bildu would reach 1.2% of the national vote, compared to 0.9% for the PNV.

This difference would be enough for the abertzale formation to surpass the PNV by three deputies.

The result would consolidate a relevant change in the Basque political balance and could affect the ability of both forces to condition a future investiture.

The CIS projects a drop for EH Bildu that Target Point does not share

The CIS estimates that EH Bildu would drop from the 1.4% obtained in the 2023 elections to 0.8%.

Target Point raises its result to 1.2%, much closer to the level reached in the last general elections.

In the case of the PNV, the revision places it at 0.9%.

The difference between both estimates causes opposite parliamentary results. The CIS keeps the PNV ahead, while Target Point anticipates a surpass by EH Bildu.

Comparison between the CIS and the Target Point review

Party	CIS July	Target Point	Main difference
PSOE	33% and about 146 seats	26.6% and up to 112 seats	-6.4 points and -34 seats
PP	About 108 seats	32.3% and about 141 seats	Around +33 seats
Vox	Similar estimate	Similar estimate	Minimal variation

Comparison with the general elections of 23J

Party	Result 23J	Target Point review	Change
PP	33.1% and 137 seats	32.3% and about 141 seats	-0.8 points and around +4 seats
PSOE	31.7% and 121 seats	26.6% and up to 112 seats	-5.1 points and at least -9 seats

PNV and EH Bildu according to both estimates

Party	CIS	Target Point	Reading
EH Bildu	0.8% and 4 seats	1.2%	Would surpass the PNV by three deputies
PNV	6 seats	0.9%	Would fall behind EH Bildu

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the processing status of the CIS barometer and how often is it published?

The CIS barometer does not have a “processing status” in a legal or parliamentary sense, because it is not a law or regulation, but a periodic survey that the Sociological Research Center produces and publishes on its own initiative. Its cycle is purely technical: questionnaire design, fieldwork, analysis, and dissemination on the CIS website. In practice, the Opinion Barometer is conducted and published regularly with a monthly frequency, with fieldwork concentrated in the first or second week and publication at the end of the month or the beginning of the next.

What “processing status” means applied to the barometer

In the language of the Cortes or the Official State Gazette (BOE), “processing” refers to the life of a law or regulation (bill, proposal, decree-law, etc.). The CIS barometer is different: it is a sociological study that does not go through Congress or the Senate nor through a regulated approval procedure.

Therefore, when talking about its “status,” only internal phases of the study itself can be distinguished:

Questionnaire design: defining the questions and the thematic module for each month.
Fieldwork: conducting interviews during specific days. Demócrata recalls that the CIS “usually carries out the fieldwork of its monthly barometer during the first or second week of each month,” so the March survey, for example, “is being prepared precisely these days” at the beginning of the month, according to the analysis on the “flag effect” of Sánchez and Trump in this article.
Data cleaning and estimation: data cleaning and application of the estimation model (the CIS refers to a two-dimensional model of “inertia-uncertainty”).
Publication: dissemination of the barometer on the CIS website and a public note on the results.

According to the sources consulted, there is no more “processing” than this internal sequence. Only during electoral periods does the Central Electoral Board intervene to control certain public surveys, as seen in other CIS studies, but this does not turn the barometer into a parliamentary file.

Frequency of publication of the CIS Opinion Barometer

The official information from the CIS and Demócrata’s coverage agree that the Opinion Barometer is a study with a fundamentally monthly frequency. On the CIS website, barometers are published successively with their technical sheet and questionnaire (CIS page), and recent studies (January, March, April, July, etc.) show this month-to-month cadence.

Recent examples collected by the newspaper Demócrata:

In January 2026, it was announced that “the CIS will publish this Friday its January Opinion Barometer,” the first after the Extremadura elections, as reported in this information.
In March 2026, another article states that “the CIS will publish this Wednesday its March Opinion Barometer,” the first after the war in the Middle East and the regional elections in Castilla y León.
In April 2026, Demócrata explains that “the CIS has informed [...] that it will publish from 1:30 p.m. its April Opinion Barometer,” with fieldwork carried out in the first weeks of the month, as detailed in this piece.
In July 2026, the newspaper published the results of the “July 2026 CIS barometer,” with 4,020 interviews, in which the PSOE would obtain 33% and extend its lead over the PP to 7.9 points, according to this July barometer.

This month-to-month linked sequence confirms the regular and monthly nature of the general opinion barometer. Additionally, the CIS also publishes special studies (pre-electoral, post-electoral, or monographic), which have their own schedule, but the “political and social climate” barometer remains the monthly reference series.

Current status of the barometer

As of today (July 18, 2026), the latest general barometer published is that of July 2026, already disseminated and analyzed by Demócrata with the distribution of voting intention among PSOE, PP, Vox, and other forces, and with the corresponding technical sheet of 4,020 interviews (July barometer).

If the pattern described by Demócrata’s coverage and the CIS itself is applied (fieldwork at the beginning of each month and publication at the end of the month or early the next), the August barometer would not yet have started its fieldwork. There is no official communication about this upcoming study in the sources consulted, so it can only be inferred that it will follow the usual scheme unless there is an express decision otherwise.

In summary:

There is no “processing” file for the barometer as there is for a law; only internal phases of preparation and publication.
It is conducted as a monthly opinion barometer, with interviews concentrated in the first/second week of each month and usual publication at the end of that month or the next.
The most recent available barometer is that of July 2026, already published and analyzed by Demócrata.

How is the content and the questions included each month in the CIS barometer chosen? What estimation model does the CIS use in its barometers and why has it been criticized in the Senate? What are the differences between the CIS monthly barometer and the specific pre-electoral surveys also conducted by the organization?

What are the powers and responsibilities of the president of the CIS according to Spanish legislation?

The president of the Sociological Research Center (CIS) is the highest governing body of the organization, with the rank of undersecretary, and concentrates the top management, institutional representation, relations with the Cortes Generales, and the highest budgetary and personnel responsibility. Their powers are mainly regulated in the article on the Presidency of the Royal Decree 1214/1997, on the organization of the CIS, further developed by Law 39/1995. Later modifications, such as Royal Decree 923/2009 and Royal Decree 485/2022, update the general framework but maintain the core of these powers. Additionally, the president may delegate part of their powers to the General Secretariat, as done in the Resolution of September 5, 2022.

Basic regulatory framework

The functions and powers of the CIS president are embedded in this regulatory framework:

Law 39/1995, on the Organization of the CIS (legal text): defines the nature of the organization, its purposes, and principles of action.
Royal Decree 1214/1997, on the organization of the CIS (CIS organization): develops the organic structure and details the statute of the Presidency.
Royal Decree 923/2009 (2009 amendment): adjusts the CIS’s own means regime and grants the president the power to sign collaboration agreements (new articles 10 and 10 bis of RD 1214/1997).
Royal Decree 485/2022 (2022 amendment): updates ministerial assignment and structure, maintaining the Presidency as the highest governing body.
Resolution of September 5, 2022, of the CIS Presidency, on delegation of powers (delegation of powers): specifies which parts of their powers are assigned to the General Secretariat.

Appointment, rank, and institutional position

According to the article on the Presidency of Royal Decree 1214/1997, the CIS is headed by a president whose person is appointed and removed by the Council of Ministers by royal decree, at the proposal of the competent minister (currently, the Ministry of the Presidency, Justice, and Relations with the Cortes). The Presidency has the rank of undersecretary and is configured as the highest governing body of the organization.

In case of vacancy, absence, or illness, the president is substituted by the Directorate General of Coordination and Research, the General Secretariat, and the departments of Information and Communication Technologies, Publications and Research Promotion, and Data Bank, in that order. The acts and resolutions of the Presidency exhaust the administrative route, which underlines its superior hierarchical position within the CIS.

Main management and direction powers

Section 2 of the provision on the Presidency lists its powers in detail. Among the most relevant are:

Top management and promotion of the organization (letter a): globally directs the CIS, promotes and coordinates all services, and chairs the Advisory Council meetings.
Official representation (letter b): holds the representation of the CIS before analogous public or private, national or foreign organizations.
Budget (letters c and d): proposes the CIS budget draft and executes the approved budget.
Annual programming (letter e): prepares the annual activity program and coordinates its execution, according to the functions of article 3 of the Royal Decree and budget appropriations.

Relations with the Cortes Generales and transparency

The president is the key figure in the CIS’s accountability to Parliament:

Annual report (letter f): approves the report on the execution of the previous year’s program and submits it, through the Ministry of the Presidency, to the Congress and the Senate.
Periodic reports and political content surveys (letter g): sends to the Chambers and, where appropriate, to the regional legislative assemblies, the list of works entered in the data bank and provisional advances of surveys on voting intention, party and political leader ratings, in line with other articles of the Royal Decree.

Contracting, agreements, and personnel

In internal management, the CIS president assumes very broad powers:

Computerization (letter h): approves computerization projects and the assignment of computer equipment.
Agreements (letter i): signs agreements on sociological research, consistent with article 10 as amended by Royal Decree 923/2009.
Contracting and expenditure (letter j): contracts on behalf of the organization, authorizes expenses, and orders payments.
Internal appointments (letter k): proposes the appointment of the General Secretariat and departments to the minister of assignment.
Personnel regime (letter l): exercises personnel powers granted by public function and autonomous organization regulations.
Residual clause (letter m): assumes all functions not expressly assigned to other bodies, as the highest authority of the organization.

Delegation of powers

Finally, the Resolution of September 5, 2022 shows the practical use of the presidential power to delegate: the president delegates to the General Secretariat the management of expenses and income, certain patrimonial and contracting powers up to 950,000 euros, as well as several personnel management functions. This delegation does not alter the ownership of the powers, which remain with the Presidency, but another body exercises them to streamline management.

As additional context, various CIS orders and resolutions are issued “in accordance with” or “by the Presidency” (for example, the rules of the National Sociology and Political Science Award in Order PJC/620/2024, grants and scholarships in regulations such as Order of December 12, 2000, Order of October 31, 2000, Order PRE/593/2016, Order PRA/1004/2017, Order PCI/622/2019, Order PCM/919/2020 or Order PCM/1342/2021), reflecting in practice the exercise of these management, signing, and regulatory execution powers by the Presidency.

Other regulations cited in databases, although not directly regulating the CIS president, are part of the general context of the public research sector or employment and social action: CSIC resolutions (2025, 2024, 2023, 2021), creation of the State Research Agency (Royal Decree 1067/2015), reorganization of public research bodies (Royal Decree 202/2021), regulations on studies and social action (Order TES/1303/2020, social action and intervention agreement 2015‑2017), the Advisory Study Commission (Order TES/1303/2020), the Inclusion Advisory Commission (Order ISM/473/2022), or the statutes of the European Social Survey ESS‑ERIC (ESS ERIC statutes). All these shape the institutional environment in which the CIS operates but do not modify the core powers of its Presidency.

How is the president of the CIS appointed and removed, and what political or technical requirements does the Government usually consider in practice? What parliamentary control mechanisms exist over the CIS’s activity beyond the reports its president submits to the Cortes? In recent cases, when has the president of the CIS used their power to delegate powers to the General Secretariat or other bodies?

What results did the PP and PSOE obtain in the 2019 general elections and how many seats did they then hold?

In the 2019 general elections, there were two rounds. On April 28, the PSOE obtained 123 seats and the PP 66, summing 189 deputies between them. On November 10, the PSOE dropped to 120 seats and the PP rose to 89, so their combined total increased to 209 seats. That is, between April and November 2019, the combined seats of the two major parties grew by 20 deputies, reinforcing the joint weight of bipartisanship in Congress.

Results of April 28, 2019 (28A)

According to official data compiled in media and specialized databases, in the April 28, 2019 general elections to the Congress of Deputies, the results for PSOE and PP were as follows:

PSOE:
- Votes: 7,480,755
- Percentage: 28.68 %
- Seats: 123
People's Party (PP):
- Votes: 4,356,023
- Percentage: 16.70 %
- Seats: 66

In that election, the PSOE was the most voted force and the PP recorded its worst historical result in number of seats. The PSOE+PP total after 28A was 189 deputies (123 for PSOE and 66 for PP), far from the more than 260 seats they held in other bipartisanship stages, but still clearly a majority in the chamber.

Results of November 10, 2019 (10N)

Since no investiture was achieved after 28A, elections were repeated on November 10, 2019. In that second vote of the year, the results of both parties moved in opposite directions:

PSOE:
- Votes: 6,792,199
- Percentage: 28.00 %
- Seats: 120
People's Party (PP):
- Votes: 5,047,040
- Percentage: 20.81 %
- Seats: 89

The PSOE remained the leading force but lost 3 seats compared to April (from 123 to 120) and some votes in absolute terms. The PP, on the other hand, had a significant recovery: it gained 23 seats (from 66 to 89) and more than 700,000 votes, clearly improving its percentage.

In aggregate terms, the PSOE and PP combined seats on 10N were 209 (120 for PSOE and 89 for PP). This represented an increase of 20 deputies over the 189 they held after 28A, consolidating the joint weight of the two traditional major parties against emerging forces.

Comparison between April and November 2019

28A total seats: 189 (PSOE 123 + PP 66)
10N total seats: 209 (PSOE 120 + PP 89)
Difference: +20 seats for the PSOE+PP bloc in November

Politically, April confirmed the PSOE as the central party to articulate progressive majorities but with great difficulties in closing agreements. The November repeat election, although slightly reducing the socialist representation, allowed the PP to rebuild part of its space at the expense of other right-wing forces and increased the overall weight of the two traditional parties in Congress.

References and more information

The numerical data cited can be cross-checked in summaries and electoral databases such as those of El País (28A), EPData, the compilation of Historia Electoral, or chronicles like Europa Press. Interactive summaries from RTVE for those elections can also be consulted at RTVE 2019 results, as well as synthetic sheets from April 2019, the general results annex, and the entry on November 2019. For the political and media context of 10N, the specials from laSexta and coverage from La Vanguardia are also useful.

In the economic and sectoral field, the same period saw numerous campaigns and communications from organizations such as PROVACUNO, for example in outreach pieces like this interview, the note on the change in its presidency [Eliseo Isla], or references to fairs like Salamaq 2019. It also published sectoral and consumption content such as these five reasons, campaigns like Fans del Vacuno, or promotional actions described in this note.

Other references from that European and economic context include the announcement of the 2019 European Recycling Conference and multiple subsequent coverages that can now be consulted in the newspaper Demócrata, such as its analysis on the conflict in Europe in "The business of conflict", digital power rankings in pieces like this analysis, or special data on regional elections such as the 2026 Andalusia results in this special or the 2026 Castilla y León results in this other, among many more contents available in their sections.

How did the November 2019 repeat election affect negotiations to form a Government? Which other parties entered Congress in 2019 and with how many seats? How did the vote for the PP and PSOE evolve by autonomous communities between 28A and 10N?

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What is the main difference between the CIS projection and Target Point's review of the PSOE results?

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According to Target Point's review, which party would surpass the PNV in the Basque Country?

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What is the projected vote percentage for the PP according to Target Point?

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