General elections survey: the crisis in Ceuta causes Vox to set a record while the PSOE falls to 24.9%, according to NC Report

At this moment, there is no “major” comprehensive ordinary constitutional reform in an advanced decisive phase, but there are partial reforms using the ordinary procedure of article 167 CE. The most relevant currently open is the draft reform of article 43 of the Constitution to safeguard the right to voluntary termination of pregnancy, which is processed via art. 167. Another recent reform —that of article 69.3 CE so that Formentera elects its own senator— has already concluded and has been in force since 05/21/2026.

Current parliamentary status

According to the parliamentary database, in the XV Legislature there is only one open constitutional reform file:

• File 102/000001 – Draft reform of article 43 of the Spanish Constitution (safeguarding abortion as a health system service).
• Origin chamber: Congress of Deputies.
• Status: under processing in the Constitutional Commission, with extended deadline for amendments to the articles (latest extension agreements from early September 2026).
• Procedure: partial reform that does not affect the “aggravated” contents, so it follows the ordinary procedure of article 167 CE.

In parallel, the reform of article 69.3 CE promoted by the Balearic Parliament to grant Formentera its own senator was approved by the Cortes via art. 167 (three-fifths of Congress and Senate) and has already completed its entire cycle, including publication and entry into force, so it is not part of the currently open procedures.

Consequently, the “possibility” of an ordinary constitutional reform today is mainly embodied in the draft on article 43 CE, whose processing is still in the internal phase of the Congress (commission and amendments), without having yet reached the final vote of the Plenary of the Lower House.

What happens after reaching three-fifths in the Congress

Article 167 CE regulates the steps to follow once the Congress achieves the reinforced majority:

• 1. Approval by three-fifths in the Congress
  The reform text must be approved in Plenary by three-fifths of the deputies (art. 167.1 CE). In practice, this would be 210 favorable votes out of 350 seats. In the case of the draft on article 43, parliamentary chronicles emphasize that without the support of the PP those numbers are unattainable, given its weight in both Chambers.
• 2. Referral to the Senate
  Once that three-fifths majority is reached in the Congress, the text is sent to the Senate, where it is also processed in commission and Plenary. The general rule is that the Senate must approve the reform with the same three-fifths majority.
• 3. If Congress and Senate agree
  If both Chambers approve the same text by three-fifths, the reform is considered approved by the Cortes Generales. From there, only the possible call for a referendum remains, if requested under the terms of article 167 itself.
• 4. If there is no agreement: Joint Commission
  If the Senate does not reach three-fifths or introduces changes that prevent agreement with the Congress text, art. 167.1 provides for a Joint Congress–Senate Commission, which drafts a new compromise text. That text is submitted again to a vote in both Chambers, again seeking three-fifths support.
• 5. Closing route by two-thirds of the Congress
  If, despite the Joint Commission, disagreement persists, art. 167.2 CE allows the Congress to close the procedure by approving the text by a two-thirds majority, provided the Senate endorses it by at least an absolute majority. In that case, the Senate is no longer required to reach three-fifths.
• 6. Possible referendum
  Once the reform is approved by the Cortes (either by the three-fifths route in both Chambers or by the combination of two-thirds of the Congress / absolute majority of the Senate), art. 167.3 CE provides that if one-tenth of the members of either Chamber (35 deputies or 26 senators) request it within 15 days following the approval, the reform must be submitted to a ratifying referendum. If not requested, the reform is promulgated directly.
• 7. Sanction, promulgation, and entry into force
  Once, if applicable, the referendum is passed, the King sanctions and promulgates the reform, which is published in the Official State Gazette (BOE). It will come into force on the date provided in the reform text itself or, if none is provided, twenty days after publication.

In contrast to this scheme, the aggravated procedure of article 168 CE (for reforms affecting fundamental rights, the Crown, or the Preliminary Title) adds dissolution of the Cortes, new elections, second approval by two-thirds, and mandatory referendum. The current draft on article 43 CE, being under the ordinary procedure, does not include these additional phases, but it does depend on the qualified majorities described and a possible optional referendum.

In the Spanish legal system, the powers of the Prime Minister are clearly defined in the Constitution and implementing legislation. In contrast, the leader of the opposition is primarily a political-parliamentary figure, with much more diffuse legal recognition based on the Congress Rules and constitutional practice.

Prime Minister: main powers and attributions

The Spanish Constitution (arts. 97 and 98) and Law 50/1997, of the Government, establish the core functions of the Prime Minister, which can be grouped into several blocks:

• Direction of Government action The Prime Minister directs and coordinates the action of all ministers. Sets general political priorities, promotes the Executive's legislative projects, and ensures unity of criteria among the different ministerial departments.
• Direction of domestic and foreign policy It corresponds to the Prime Minister to determine the broad lines of domestic policy (economic, social, territorial, security, etc.) and foreign policy, defense, and national security, always within the constitutional and legal framework.
• Representation of the Government He is the main political representative figure of the State internally (relations with the Cortes Generales, autonomous communities, social agents) and internationally (summits, bilateral meetings, international organizations).
• Appointment and dismissal of ministers Proposes to the King the appointment and dismissal of ministers and can reshape the Government structure (create, suppress, or reorganize ministries and senior positions within legal limits).
• Confidence relationship with the Cortes Generales The Prime Minister must obtain the confidence of the Congress in the investiture session and can:
  • Raise the question of confidence to reaffirm parliamentary support.
  • Be subject to a motion of censure, which if approved implies his dismissal and the investiture of a new Prime Minister.
• Dissolution of Chambers and calling elections Can propose to the King the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or the Cortes Generales and the calling of general elections, within the conditions and temporal limits established in the Constitution.
• Direction of civil and military Administration Under his authority is the General State Administration and, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense, the direction of defense policy and the Armed Forces, within parliamentary control.
• Signing and countersigning normative acts and key decisions The Prime Minister countersigns, together with the competent ministers, certain acts of the King; promotes the approval of royal decree-laws and royal legislative decrees, and approves, with the rest of the Government, the draft laws submitted to the Cortes.

Leader of the opposition: essentially a political-parliamentary figure

By contrast, the leader of the opposition is not explicitly defined in the Constitution with a closed catalog of powers. In practice, it is understood as the leader of the party or parliamentary group with the greatest representation that is not part of the Government.

His attributions derive mainly from his position in Parliament and the internal rules of the Chambers:

• Political leadership of the government alternative Heads the main political project alternative to the Government's, articulating alternative proposals and programs and coordinating the parliamentary strategy of his group.
• Control and oversight of the Government Has a central role in:
  • General policy debates (debate on the state of the Nation, major thematic debates, etc.).
  • Government control sessions, where he usually enjoys preferential turns to question the Prime Minister.
  • Presentation of bills and alternative amendments.
• Participation in the Chamber's governing bodies Usually leads the largest opposition parliamentary group, which grants him presence in the Congress Board and the Spokespersons' Board through his representatives, influencing the agenda and organization of parliamentary work.
• Institutional and media interlocution Without being regulated in the same detail as the Prime Minister, practice attributes him a prominent role as interlocutor with the Government in major State agreements (constitutional reforms, foreign policy, security, etc.) and a preferred media visibility as main critic and alternative.

In summary, while the Prime Minister is a fully regulated figure with very specific executive and political leadership powers, the leader of the opposition is a more flexible and political figure, whose influence capacity depends on his parliamentary strength, the internal rules of the Chambers, and established political practice.

In the general elections of November 10, 2019 (the 10N), the three parties you mention were configured as the main actors of the left and right blocs. The sources explicitly recall that Vox then reached its first major ceiling: it obtained 52 seats and around 15.2% of the votes, becoming the third force in the Congress. For PP and PSOE, the reviewed news do not reproduce the exact numerical data of votes and seats, but they do clarify the basic distribution: the PSOE won the elections and remained the first force in the Congress, while the PP was the main opposition party, with a more modest representation than it has today and still with open wounds after the April 2019 collapse.

From that 2019 starting point to the elections of July 23, 2023, an important reconfiguration of the right and center-left space occurred. In 2023, electoral analysis news agree that:

• The PP recovers strongly and becomes the first force in seats, with 137 deputies and 33.1% of the votes. That is, it significantly improves its parliamentary weight compared to 2019.
• The PSOE obtains 121 seats and around 31.7% of the vote. It loses some ground compared to its 2019 victory but maintains a very broad bench and the capacity to build majorities with other forces.
• Vox, which had 52 deputies in 2019, drops in 2023 to 33 seats and 12.4% of the votes. This is a relevant setback compared to its 2019 peak, although it remains a third force with weight.

The 2019–2023 comparison allows tracing the first part of the “representation evolution”:

• The PP goes from being a punished party in 2019 to recovering leadership in seats in 2023, supported by the disappearance of Ciudadanos and the concentration of center-right votes.
• The PSOE suffers moderate wear: loses some seats and some vote percentage but remains the main left-wing force and second party in the Congress.
• Vox experiences an inverse cycle: peak in 2019 (52 seats), and setback in 2023 to 33 deputies, thus still necessary for the right but with less negotiating power than at its peak.

From 2023 onwards, evolution is no longer marked by new general elections (until September 2026), but by polls and surveys. There the data point to another turn:

• National averages and barometers published in 2025 and 2026 consistently place the PP above the 23J results, around 140–150 seats and about 33–35% of the vote, according to various institutes (Sigma Dos, Sociométrica, NC Report, etc.). That is, it would maintain leadership and widen its gap with the PSOE compared to 2023.
• The PSOE appears in those polls below the 121 seats it obtained in the last elections, with frequent ranges around 100–110 deputies and vote percentages in the 25–28% range. Many pieces highlight that it is “below the 2023 result” and that it suffers voter leakage towards PP and Vox.
• Vox is, in most surveys, the party that grows the most compared to 2023: it is often attributed between 54 and 62 seats and vote percentages around 16–19%. The news emphasize that it would clearly surpass the 33 deputies it had in 2023, and even approach or slightly exceed its historical 2019 vote highs.

Looking at the whole, the trajectory from 2019 to today can be summarized as follows:

• PP: from a weakened second force in 2019 to first force in 2023 (137 seats) and, according to 2025–2026 polls, with room to keep growing in representation if elections were held today.
• PSOE: from 2019 winner to second party in 2023, and currently in polls below its 121-seat result, although still clearly above the rest of the left.
• Vox: from massive breakthrough in 2019 (52 deputies and ~15% of the vote), to setback in 2023 (33 seats and 12.4%), and again strong rise in recent polls, to ranges that roughly double its current representation.

In terms of blocs, the articles agree that, taking as reference the 2025–2026 polls, the sum of PP and Vox would be clearly above the absolute majority (more than 190–200 seats), while the left bloc (PSOE and Sumar, mainly) would be far below the capacity to renew the 2023 investiture arithmetic. That is, to date, the major trend in the evolution of PP, PSOE, and Vox representation since the 2019 general elections.