General elections survey: Vox skyrockets after Ceuta and gains 9 seats while the PP loses 8 and the PSOE 2, according to GAD3

The first national survey by GAD3 after the Ceuta crisis transforms the balance between the major parties compared to its previous measurement in May: Vox goes from 60 to 69 deputies and gains 2.1 points, while the PP drops from 141 to 133 seats and the PSOE from 107 to 105.

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The sum PP-Vox barely varies, from 201 to 202 deputies, which shows that the great movement occurs within the right block. Against the 23J, Abascal would have gained 36 seats, while Feijóo would lose four and Sánchez 16.

The crisis in Ceuta does not substantially alter the size of the majority that the polls have been attributing to PP and Vox, but it does strongly change who weighs more within it.

The new barometer of GAD3 for ABC, conducted between September 1 and 3, places the PP as the first force with 31.1% and 133 deputies, the PSOE at 26.1% and 105 seats, and Vox at 19.2% and 69 representatives. Sumar would reach 7% and nine deputies and Podemos 3.1% and two.

The relevant comparison is with the previous national survey from the same polling company, whose fieldwork was conducted between May 26 and 28, before the crisis in Ceuta erupted. Then GAD3 granted the PP 33.1% and 141 seats, the PSOE 26.8% and 107, Vox 17.1% and 60, Sumar 5.9% and seven, and Podemos 3.1% and two.

The before and after photograph is very striking.

  • Vox: +9 seats.
  • PP: -8.
  • PSOE: -2.
  • Sumar: +2.
  • Podemos: no changes.

The clearest effect after Ceuta: Vox gains nine seats and the PP loses eight. Vox is, by far, the party that improves the most between the two measurements of GAD3.

In May it obtained 17.1% and 60 deputies. Now it reaches 19.2% and 69.

The increase is 2.1 points and nine seats.

The PP travels practically the same parliamentary distance in the opposite direction. Feijóo goes from 33.1% to 31.1%, two points less, and from 141 to 133 deputies.

That is eight lost seats.

The movement leaves a reading especially relevant for Genoa: the PP-Vox majority practically does not decrease, but the PP has less weight within it.

In May, of the 201 deputies that the two parties summed, 141 were from the PP and 60 from Vox.

Now, of the 202, 133 would be popular and 69 would correspond to Abascal. Vox thus goes from representing approximately 30% of the joint majority to exceeding 34%.

PP and Vox go from 201 to 202: the right does not grow, it redistributes

This is probably the most interesting data from the entire survey.

Before Ceuta, GAD3 granted PP and Vox 201 seats. After Ceuta, it attributes them 202. Therefore, the survey does not show a large global transfer towards the right. What it fundamentally records is an internal redistribution of the conservative vote from the PP to Vox.

In percentage, something similar happens. PP and Vox added up to 50.2% in May. Now they reach 50.3%. But within that sum, PP loses two points and Vox gains 2.1.

Vox reaches 69 deputies, more than double than on 23J

The comparison with the general elections of 2023 further expands the dimension of Vox's growth. Abascal obtained 12.4% and 33 deputies then. GAD3 now places it at 19.2% and 69. That's 6.8 points and 36 seats more.

Vox would therefore have more than double the representatives than in the current Congress.

The transformation is especially significant because PP does not experience parallel growth. Feijóo obtained 137 seats on 23J and would now remain at 133.

PP loses eight seats since May and four compared to 23J

Feijóo would still clearly win a general election, but he would do so with a lower percentage of votes and fewer deputies than in the last elections.

GAD3 attributes him a 31.1%. In May he was at 33.1%. And on 23J he also obtained around 33.1%.

PSOE also drops, but much less than PP

PSOE loses ground compared to the previous GAD3, although the movement is much more limited.

In May it had 26.8% and 107 deputies. Now it appears at 26.1% and 105.

The drop is 0.7 points and two seats. Therefore, the result does not show a socialist collapse after Ceuta.

Sánchez worsens, but less than Feijóo.

In fact, the distance between PP and PSOE in percentage of votes is reduced. In May it was 6.3 points. Now it stands at five.

Sánchez loses 16 deputies since 23J

The comparison with the last general elections remains much more negative for PSOE.

Sánchez obtained 31.7% and 121 deputies in 2023. Now GAD3 places him at 26.1% and 105.

That's 5.6 points and 16 deputies less.

PSOE, therefore, appears practically stabilized compared to its pre-Ceuta measurement, but well below the starting point of the legislature.

Sumar improves two deputies compared to May

Sumar partially breaks the trend.

GAD3 placed it before Ceuta at 5.9% and seven deputies. Now it reaches 7% and nine. The improvement is 1.1 points and two seats.

Podemos remains exactly at 3.1% and two deputies.

This makes the sum PSOE-Sumar-Podemos surprisingly stable in seats between the two GAD3.

The state left does not lose deputies compared to May. Two from PSOE are redistributed to Sumar.

The real problem for Sánchez is the investiture partners

Where arithmetic changes profoundly compared to 2023 is in the rest of the parties that made the investiture possible.

GAD3 now grants 10 seats to ERC, seven to EH Bildu, six to PNV, four to Junts, and two to BNG.

ERC would gain three deputies compared to the 23J; EH Bildu, one; PNV, one; and BNG, one.

Junts, on the other hand, would drop from seven to four. Sumar would also be a fraction of what it was in 2023.

According to the calculation published by ABC, the parliamentary partners of the PSOE go from the 59 deputies they had at the beginning of the legislature to 42 in this projection.

The drop makes it extremely difficult to rebuild an alternative majority, even if Sánchez maintains more than 100 deputies.

ERC overtakes Sumar

One of the striking consequences of the new Congress would be that ERC would obtain more deputies than Sumar.

The Catalan republicans would reach 10 seats. Sumar would remain at nine.

EH Bildu would achieve seven, PNV six, and Junts four.

The rebalancing within the block that made the investiture possible would be very profound: the alternative state left loses strength while ERC and EH Bildu gain relative weight.

Junts falls from seven to four

Junts appears as one of the main losers outside the major parties.

The formation obtained seven seats and 1.6% in 2023. GAD3 now places it at four and 1.2%.

66% want early elections

The survey also includes a question about the electoral calendar.

66% believe that Pedro Sánchez should call general elections before the end of the legislature. 26% think he should complete it. Another 8% do not know or do not answer.

The demand for an advance is practically total among PP voters, with 95%, and very high among Vox voters, with 86%.

But the most interesting data is again within the PSOE.

43% of socialist voters believe that Sánchez should call elections now, compared to 49% who prefer to complete the legislature.

Published in ABC on 7/09/2026

Result of the GAD3 survey and comparison with May and the 23J

The first national survey of GAD3 after the Ceuta crisis leaves Vox as the party that grows the most compared to the previous survey in May: it gains 2.1 points and nine seats. The PP loses eight deputies and the PSOE two, while Sumar recovers two representatives.

Party GAD3 September GAD3 May Change vs. May Result 23J Change vs. 23J
PP 31.1% · 133 seats 33.1% · 141 seats -2.0 points · -8 seats 33.1% · 137 seats -2.0 points · -4 seats
PSOE 26.1% · 105 seats 26.8% · 107 seats -0.7 points · -2 seats 31.7% · 121 seats -5.6 points · -16 seats
Vox 19.2% · 69 seats 17.1% · 60 seats +2.1 points · +9 seats 12.4% · 33 seats +6.8 points · +36 seats
Sumar 7.0% · 9 seats 5.9% · 7 seats +1.1 points · +2 seats 12.3% · 31 seats* -5.3 points · -22 seats*
Podemos 3.1% · 2 seats 3.1% · 2 seats No changes Integrated in Sumar —

* Podemos participated integrated in Sumar in the general elections of 2023. If Sumar and Podemos are compared together, they go from 31 deputies in the 23J to 11 in the current GAD3 survey, a loss of 20 seats.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What stage is the parliamentary processing of a possible reform of the General Electoral Law in Spain at?

As of September 2026, there is no "major comprehensive reform" of the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG) at an advanced stage of processing, but there are several partial reforms. Some have already been completed and are in force, and two other relevant initiatives remain open in the amendment phase in the Cortes Generales.

1. LOREG reforms already approved in this legislature

The most recent and clear reform is the one that adapts the LOREG to the constitutional reform that recognizes Formentera its own senator:

  • Organic Law Proposal to modify the LOREG (Formentera as its own constituency): initiative of the Socialist Group, processed in Congress and Senate (files 122/000280 in Congress and (15)624/000010 in Senate).
  • Its purpose is to modify articles 161.2 and 165.2 of the LOREG so that Ibiza and Formentera become separate constituencies in Senate elections, so that each island elects one senator.
  • Congress approved it and sent it to the Senate in spring 2026, according to the press release from Congress "Congress agrees to process in a single reading the reform of the electoral law to regulate the election of a senator for Formentera" (Congress note).
  • The Senate definitively approved it in Plenary on June 24, 2026, by 252 votes in favor and 5 abstentions, with the reform approved by the Cortes Generales (Senate note).
  • The reform has already been published in the Official State Gazette (BOE) and has come into force, so its parliamentary processing is concluded.

This is a specific and very limited reform of the LOREG (constituency and election of a senator) that does not reopen the entire electoral system, but adapts the law to the new wording of article 69.3 of the Constitution.

2. Main LOREG reforms still in processing

In parallel, there are partial LOREG reforms still underway. Two initiatives stand out:

  • Government Organic Bill to modify the LOREG (121/000063, Congress).
    • Author: Government of Spain.
    • Purpose: to modify the LOREG, among other things, to:
      • Make it mandatory to hold at least one electoral debate on public media in each call.
      • Regulate in more detail the participation of "significant political groups" in those debates.
      • Strengthen the transparency of polls, including the publication of anonymized microdata, as emphasized by both specialized press and the Government's own communication (Ministry of Presidency note, and analysis in Demócrata).
    • Current phase: Congress has published the bill and it is in the amendment submission phase in the Lower House. The deadline for amendments has been extended and, as of the last update, remains open with an extension until September 16, 2026.
    • This means the text has not yet moved to the committee work or report phase: it is at a relatively early stage, where groups outline their proposed changes.
  • Organic Law Proposal on causes of ineligibility originating from the Senate (15)622/000048 – 124/000028.
    • Political authorship: Popular Group in the Senate; it was taken into consideration by the Senate Plenary in May 2025 and then sent to Congress.
    • Purpose: to modify the LOREG regarding causes of ineligibility (who cannot be a candidate), strengthening certain cases.
    • Current phase: in processing in Congress, the deadline for submitting amendments has also been extended until September 16, 2026, so it is also in the amendment phase, without having entered the committee or report phase yet.

Therefore, the two "live" reform lines are partial: one driven by the Government (debates and polls) and another, of parliamentary origin, on ineligibilities. Both are at the same procedural stage: open to amendments in Congress.

3. Other LOREG initiatives rejected or lapsed

It is important to distinguish these reforms in processing from other LOREG proposals that have already failed in this legislature:

  • Organic Law Proposals from Vox to strengthen the prevention of electoral fraud through postal voting (for example, 122/000074 and 122/000200), which Congress rejected at the consideration phase, ending their processing.
  • A proposal from the Popular Group in Congress (122/000110) also on causes of ineligibility, which was rejected in October 2024.

These initiatives are no longer part of the parliamentary agenda; what remains active are the Government's bill and the proposal on ineligibilities in the amendment phase, and the Formentera reform, which is already approved and in force.

Can you explain in more detail what the Government's project to regulate debates and polls during the campaign within the LOREG consists of? What specific changes does the already approved LOREG reform on the Formentera constituency introduce and how will it affect the next elections? What positions have the different parties (PSOE, PP, Vox, Sumar) defended regarding these partial reforms of the Electoral Law?

What are the specific powers of the President of the Government in calling general elections according to the Spanish Constitution?

The Spanish Constitution assigns the President of the Government a central role in the dissolution of the Cortes Generales and the calling of general elections, but always framed within a system of checks and balances where the King and the Congress itself intervene. The power is neither absolute nor personal: it is subject to very precise material and temporal limits.

1. Core of the competence: initiative and countersignature

Article 115 of the CE establishes that the King may dissolve the Congress, the Senate, or the Cortes Generales and call elections at the proposal of the President of the Government, after deliberation of the Council of Ministers. From this derive two specific powers of the president:

  • Political initiative for early dissolution: it is up to the president to decide whether it is advisable to end the mandate of the Chambers early and hold elections. Without his proposal, the King cannot dissolve them voluntarily.
  • Countersignature of the decree of dissolution and call: the formal decree is issued by the King, but it must be countersigned by the President of the Government. It is the act of countersigning that assumes the political and legal responsibility of the call.

Furthermore, the decree must set the date of the elections, within the deadlines established by the Constitution and the electoral law, which implies a relevant power of the president (and the Government) in determining the exact timing of the electoral event.

2. Coordination with the King and the Cortes Generales

The Constitution distributes functions to prevent the dissolution power from being purely presidentialist:

  • The King always acts in a regulated manner: he does not decide politically; he is limited to dissolving and calling according to the proposal of the President of the Government (art. 115) or, where appropriate, according to the automatic mandate in investiture matters (art. 99.5), where the Congress has the leading role.
  • The Congress indirectly limits this power through the motion of censure (arts. 113 and 115.2). While a motion of censure is being processed, the president cannot propose dissolution, so the Chamber retains the possibility of replacing the Government without elections.
3. Material and temporal limits

The presidential power to propose dissolution and, thus, the calling of elections, is subject to three major types of limits:

  • Motion of censure in process: if a motion of censure has been presented and is being processed by Congress, the president cannot promote dissolution (art. 115.2). First, it must be resolved whether the Government maintains the confidence of the Chamber.
  • Minimum interval between dissolutions: at least one year must elapse from the last dissolution at the president's initiative before a new one can be proposed (art. 115.3). This prevents abusive and recurrent use of early elections.
  • States of constitutional crisis: while a state of alarm, exception, or siege is in force, the Cortes cannot be dissolved and elections cannot be held (art. 116.5). In fact, if an election date had already been set, the state of exception or siege suspends the electoral process. Therefore, the president lacks the possibility to initiate a new call during these periods.
4. Early dissolution vs. natural expiration of the mandate

It is key to distinguish between:

  • Early dissolution (discretionary): occurs before the four-year mandate foreseen for the Congress (art. 68.4) and the Senate (art. 69.6) is completed. Here the president exercises a discretionary political power: he decides to bring forward the consultation to the citizens, within the limits explained.
  • Natural expiration of the mandate (automatic dissolution): when four years have passed since the election, the Chambers are automatically dissolved. Elections must be called to be held between 30 and 60 days later, and the new Chambers meet within 25 days after the elections. In practice, the Government and its president still issue the call decree, but here there is no margin for political discretion: the dissolution is imposed by the Constitution.
5. Special case: investiture failure

When after an election no president is invested within two months from the first investiture vote, article 99.5 CE provides for the automatic dissolution of both Chambers and the calling of new elections. In this case:

The President of the Government no longer has a decisive role, because he has not been invested (or has ceased) and the Constitution assigns the King the dissolution and call with the countersignature of the President of the Congress. Here, the power to activate or not the elections is no longer with the Executive, but anchored in Parliament itself.

Overall, the powers of the President of the Government regarding general elections combine a great capacity for political initiative (to bring forward or not the elections) with a strong constitutional framework, which protects both the stability of the legislature and the central role of the Cortes Generales and the King in the system.

How many legislative initiatives on electoral system reform have been presented in Congress during the current legislature?

Based on parliamentary information from the 15th Legislature, and applying a strict criterion of "legislative initiatives on electoral system reform" (that is, organic laws that directly modify the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime —LOREG— or other core elements of the electoral system), 2 legislative initiatives of this type have been presented in the Congress of Deputies during the current legislature.

These two initiatives are Government organic bills submitted to Congress, both focused on modifying the LOREG and on aspects directly linked to the functioning of the electoral system (configuration of candidacies, campaign debates, electoral polls, etc.). Below is a detail of which initiatives have been considered and why.

1. Organic Bill modifying the LOREG (121/000063)

The first identified initiative is the Organic Bill modifying Organic Law 5/1985, of June 19, on the General Electoral Regime, file number 121/000063, presented by the Government in the 15th Legislature and processed in the Congress of Deputies.

This initiative constitutes a direct reform of the LOREG. Among the most clearly electoral elements it addresses are:

  • The modification of article 66 of the LOREG, strengthening the guarantee of political and social pluralism in publicly owned media during electoral periods.
  • The introduction of the obligation to hold at least one electoral debate during the campaign on public media, regulating the participation of political parties and the consequences of unjustified absences, as assessed by the competent Electoral Board.
  • The strengthening of transparency regarding electoral polls, completing the requirements for technical information and publication of microdata to guarantee objectivity, equality, and transparency.

As of the latest available information, the bill is under parliamentary processing, with successive extensions of the amendment deadline. Due to its nature, purpose, and content, it is unequivocally counted as a legislative initiative to reform the electoral system.

2. Organic Bill on parity representation and balanced presence (121/000001)

The second initiative is the Organic Bill on parity representation and balanced presence of women and men, file number 121/000001, also presented by the Government and processed both in Congress and Senate.

Although it is a broader law (parity in constitutional bodies, listed companies, public institutional sector, etc.), its Chapter I is expressly dedicated to modifying the LOREG to introduce structural changes in the rules for presenting candidacies and, therefore, in the functioning of the electoral system. Among others, it provides for:

  • The modification of article 44 bis of the LOREG to require that lists for legislative elections (Congress, municipal, regional parliaments, European Parliament, and other representative bodies) have a parity composition of women and men, ordered alternately (the so-called "zipper lists").
  • The extension of this model also to grouped lists for the Senate and the provision that the Electoral Board does not accept candidacies that do not meet these requirements, which directly affects the rules for configuring the electoral offer.
  • The modification of other LOREG provisions (such as article 187.2 and article 206) to adapt the system of election and proclamation of officials to the new parity logic.

This bill was finally definitively approved in the 15th Legislature, and its content regarding electoral parity implies a substantive reform of the rules for forming candidacies and political representation, so it has also been included as an electoral system reform initiative.

3. Criterion used for the count

In the institutional search, other laws introducing technical or punctual modifications to the LOREG have been found (for example, related to judicial organization or very specific aspects of electoral administration), as well as an Organic Law 2/2026 that adapts the LOREG to a specific constitutional reform. However, to answer your question, a restrictive criterion has been applied:

  • Only legislative initiatives processed as organic bills in Congress during the current legislature are counted.
  • Only those whose main purpose is to reform the electoral system in the proper sense (electoral rules: composition of candidacies, campaign, debates, polls, principles of pluralism and transparency, etc.), not tangential LOREG reforms linked to other sectors.

Under this criterion, the number that most precisely answers your question is that, during the 15th Legislature, two legislative initiatives clearly identifiable as electoral system reforms have been presented in the Congress of Deputies.

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How much do you know about this topic? Answer the following 3 questions.

What is the main change in the distribution of seats within the right-wing bloc according to the GAD3 survey after the Ceuta crisis?

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What percentage of respondents prefer that early general elections be called according to the survey?

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Which party experiences the largest increase in number of seats compared to the previous GAD3 survey?

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