Iustitia Europa bursts into the polls with four deputies from Madrid and 11.4% of the votes

With the available information, there is no record that the so-called “institutional reforms” of Iustitia Europa are currently being processed as formal initiatives in the Spanish Parliament. Neither the Congress nor the Senate have registered bills, motions, or constitutional reforms with Iustitia Europa as the promoter or as a recognizable brand of a package of reforms in their headers. There is, however, an intense debate in parallel about reforms of the Justice system and the Spanish institutional system, but those initiatives are driven by the Government or other parties, not by Iustitia Europa.

What it would mean for Iustitia Europa's reforms to be “in process”

In the Spanish system, an institutional reform only enters parliamentary processing when it is formally registered as:

• Government bill (with Council of Ministers agreement and submission to Congress).
• Bill proposal from a parliamentary group, the Senate, or an autonomous parliament.
• Popular legislative initiative (ILP) admitted for processing and published.
• Constitutional reform or Statute of Autonomy opened in the chambers.

These initiatives receive a file number, are published in the Congress or Senate Bulletin, and are assigned to a committee. None of this currently appears explicitly linked to Iustitia Europa in parliamentary databases, neither as a party nor as a platform promoting a “package of institutional reforms.”

What is underway regarding institutional reforms

Meanwhile, the debate on institutional architecture and the rule of law in Spain is materializing in other reforms:

• The Government has promoted a broad judicial reform, including a new Criminal Procedure Law and changes in the organization of Justice, which the European Commission values as part of the system's modernization, according to the official note on the 2026 Rule of Law report (2026 Rule of Law report).
• The Congress has processed organic reforms of the Judicial Power and the Public Prosecutor's Office that require the CGPJ to submit proposals on the system for electing members, as various notes from the Chamber indicate (Commission report and referral to the Senate).
• The newspaper Demócrata has detailed the backlog and accumulation of pending laws in the Justice Commission, including the so-called “Bolaños Law”, and the blockage of the new Criminal Procedure Law, which is in the amendment expansion phase (analysis of the Justice backlog).
• The European Commission has drawn attention to blocked structural reforms and the regulation of lobbies in Spain (article on lobbies).

None of these reforms, however, are attributed to Iustitia Europa or labeled as implementation of its proposals.

Current role of Iustitia Europa: legal and political pressure, not legislative processing

The activity of Iustitia Europa recorded in political and judicial chronicles focuses mainly on the jurisdictional front and public denunciation:

• Complaints before the International Criminal Court Prosecutor against foreign leaders, as Demócrata reports in the piece on Trump and Netanyahu.
• Actions before international bodies regarding the Ceuta migration crisis and accusations against Morocco of using civilians as a “weapon,” according to the report on Ceuta.
• Interventions defending specific judges against the CGPJ, such as in the case of Judge Peinado regarding the order on Begoña Gómez, denouncing possible “frontal interference” (article on the CGPJ and Peinado).

Additionally, Iustitia Europa is beginning to have electoral projection, as shown by the voting intention poll published by Demócrata (poll on Iustitia Europa), but this projection has not yet translated into its own group capable of registering initiatives in Congress.

Conclusion: no identifiable package of “Iustitia Europa institutional reforms” in the Parliament

As of today, the situation can be summarized as follows:

• There is no record of a block of institutional reforms attributable to Iustitia Europa in parliamentary processing.
• The major ongoing institutional reforms (Justice, CGPJ, lobby regulation, etc.) are driven by the Government or other parties and largely respond to European demands, not to initiatives formally registered by Iustitia Europa.
• Iustitia Europa acts more as a legal and political pressure actor (complaints, communications to international courts, campaigns) than as an entity currently having its own legislative initiatives in Parliament.

If specific proposals from that party are identified (for example, a specific model for electing the CGPJ or reforming the electoral system), the next step would be to track each measure in the agendas of Congress and Senate to check if any group has assumed it and under what processing status it is.

Luis María Pardo is a Spanish lawyer specialized in public litigation who serves as president and main spokesperson of the legal and political formation Iustitia Europa. Available sources present him as the architect of the organization's contentious strategy against various administrations, with no record of holding public office or seats in representative institutions. His political activity is mainly channeled through popular accusation in high-impact criminal and contentious-administrative cases. There are no detailed biographical data about his academic background or previous membership in other parties.

Professional profile and competencies

Media repeatedly describe him as a “lawyer” and “lawyer of Iustitia Europa”. In the health field, The Objective's piece on liability for adverse effects of the COVID vaccine identifies him as president of Iustitia Europa and victim's lawyer, and includes his technical-legal argumentation on State patrimonial liability and the solidarity principle, citing Supreme Court and EU Court of Justice jurisprudence (The Objective article). Such interventions position him as a profile with mastery of administrative law, patrimonial liability, and public international law.

In criminal cases linked to the so-called “Badajoz case” against Pedro Sánchez's brother, the newspaper Demócrata reports that he acts as popular accusation and defends, with a very legal discourse, the need to hold accountable for the creation of allegedly arbitrary positions in the Badajoz Provincial Council (complaint about David Sánchez's contract). Other pieces mention him leading Iustitia Europa's strategy in the Grandchildren Law, demanding census transparency before the Supreme Court (appeal on the Grandchildren Law and follow-up in the Supreme Court).

Presidency of Iustitia Europa

Various journalistic reports explicitly cite him as president of Iustitia Europa. In Demócrata's coverage of Iustitia Europa's complaint to the International Criminal Court (ICC) against Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu for the attack on Iran, it is emphasized that the organization's goal is to activate international jurisdiction for alleged war and aggression crimes, and Pardo is quoted explaining that the initiative does not intend a “political trial,” but an autonomous examination by the ICC Prosecutor (ICC complaint).

More recently, Demócrata presents him as president of the formation in the front opened by the Ceuta migration crisis, with complaints before the International Criminal Court and the National Court to investigate whether the massive entry could have been a concerted action by Morocco and whether there were crimes against the peace and independence of the State (opening of proceedings in the National Court and ICC complaint). In these pieces, he appears as the organization's main voice, setting political and legal lines.

Political trajectory through popular accusation

Sources do not confirm a classic trajectory of “internal party positions” or responsibilities in parliaments or governments. His political role is almost exclusively channeled through:

• Popular accusation in major cases: Demócrata details his intervention in the trial against David Sánchez in Badajoz, where he speaks of “moral corruption” and criticizes the Prosecutor's Office's role (Badajoz trial), and his subsequent offensive before the Court of Auditors to demand the return of received funds (claim before the Court of Auditors and opening of accounting route).
• Cases against senior officials and former leaders: he appears linked, as part of Iustitia Europa, to the popular accusation in the Plus Ultra case against José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (Plus Ultra case coverage and disciplinary file for prosecutors), as well as the “Koldo case” procedure, where José Luis Ábalos's defense requests to exclude PP, Vox, and Iustitia Europa from the case (article on the Koldo case).
• Defense of judges and criticism of the CGPJ: in Demócrata's piece on Iustitia Europa's reaction to a possible CGPJ file against Judge Peinado for the Begoña Gómez case, Pardo calls the potential disciplinary action an “assault on the core of judicial independence” and threatens legal actions against the Council members (complaint of interference in the CGPJ). In parallel, other reports point to Iustitia Europa among the popular accusations that Judge Peinado has considered in the Begoña Gómez case (analysis by eldiario.es).

Relationship with Spanish and European institutions

Institutionally, there is no trace of Luis María Pardo as a senior official in official records — unlike other “Luis Pardo” present in European or business bodies, such as the AMETIC representative in DIGITALEUROPE mentioned by this association (AMETIC note), which does not correspond to Iustitia Europa's president. He also does not appear linked to appointments published in the BOE, where other jurists or diplomats do appear (example of royal decree).

His relationship with institutions materializes more through writings addressed to the National Court, the Supreme Court, the Court of Auditors, the International Criminal Court Prosecutor's Office, and European bodies regarding Ceuta, as covered by both Demócrata and other media (order on the hantavirus ship, live on the cruise and subsequent follow-up).

Areas of action and absence of complete biography

The fronts opened by Iustitia Europa under his presidency allow outlining his political priorities: control of public fund use (Plus Ultra, Badajoz Provincial Council cases, public contracting in Madrid), electoral census transparency (Grandchildren Law), defense of Spanish military in foreign missions (case of the sergeant detained in Lebanon), and prosecution of possible international crimes (Iran, Israel, Morocco in Ceuta). He also intervenes in meta-legal debates such as reforming popular action, alongside other organizations like Vox, HazteOír, or Manos Limpias (piece on witnesses in the Badajoz case).

However, the consulted sources — including the extensive profiles and biographies that Demócrata itself dedicates to other political and legal leaders (profile of Víctor Moreno Catena, profile of Guillermo Mariscal, profile of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, profile of Alberto de Gregorio, profile of Gómez de Celis)— do not yet include a systematized biography of Luis María Pardo: it is not detailed where he studied, in which law firms he worked, or if he had formal membership in other parties.

In summary, his political trajectory is, for now, that of a lawyer who has decided to make judicial action — especially popular accusation and strategic litigation — his main tool of intervention in public life, leading an organization that moves on the border between a legal association and a political formation. No further information is available in the consulted sources about possible previous internal positions or party affiliation other than his current leadership in Iustitia Europa.

Other links cited in the documentation, relevant as general context about the political and legal ecosystem in which Iustitia Europa operates, include: Demócrata's coverage of the Kitchen case (Kitchen case), the conflict around the CGPJ and popular action (Mattarella's speech), profiles and news about other institutional and economic actors (Spanish ambassadors, PP foundation, Caamaño's entry into Enagás, reference to Bettino Craxi, new law firm linked to Alvise, among others).

Outside Demócrata, there are also official notes and institutional news illustrating the role of other jurists and European bodies, although they do not refer directly to Pardo: the Ministry of the Presidency's note on the European Law Institute (European Law Institute events), or various documents on careers of jurists and senior European officials published by other institutions (Xunta de Galicia note, activity in the Extremadura Assembly).

Modifying the system for electing the President of the Government in Spain is not, in principle, a simple “technical” reform: the current investiture model is directly supported by the Constitution and can only be supplemented within its margin by organic laws and parliamentary regulations. Minor adjustments regarding the development of the debate or the form of voting can be made by reforming the Congress Rules or, if applicable, the electoral regulations. But any change that alters the basic logic that the president results from the confidence of the Congress (for example, a direct election by the citizens) would require a constitutional reform with reinforced majorities and, in certain cases, a referendum. What can or cannot be done therefore depends on whether a procedural tweak or a model change is intended.

Current legal framework for the president's election

The Constitution establishes that the President of the Government must obtain the confidence of the Congress of Deputies, through the investiture procedure expressly referred to in Article 99 (mentioned in the Congress Rules themselves). The detailed development of this mechanism is contained in the Congress Rules, whose text was published by Resolution of February 24, 1982, and was reformed in 2025.

These Rules provide that, upon receiving the proposal of a candidate for the Presidency of the Government “in compliance with the provisions established in Article 99 of the Constitution,” the Presidency of the Congress convenes the investiture Plenary. In the session:

• The proposal is read.
• The candidate presents their program “without time limitation” and requests the confidence of the Chamber.
• Parliamentary groups intervene, with regulated turns and replies.
• A first vote is held, requiring an absolute majority of the Congress members.
• If there is no absolute majority, a second vote is held 48 hours later, requiring a simple majority.

Votes for investiture “shall in any case be public by roll call,” according to the Congress Rules, distinguishing this from other cases where secret voting is allowed. Additionally, the Rules provide that if within two months from the first vote no candidacy has obtained the confidence of the Congress, the Presidency shall submit to the King's signature the decree dissolving the Cortes and calling elections.

The election of deputies and senators who make up the Cortes is regulated, on the other hand, by the Organic Law 5/1985, of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG). This law develops the right to suffrage and contains a “Title II” with “special provisions for the election of Deputies and Senators,” based on constitutional principles such as provincial constituency and proportional representation. But the LOREG does not regulate the direct election of the president, only the election of the Chambers that then grant or deny confidence.

What could be changed without reforming the Constitution

Within the current framework, there are margins for “subconstitutional” reform that do not alter the parliamentary essence of the system:

• Congress Rules: elements such as intervention times, debate structure, intervals between sessions, or technical voting details can be modified through regulatory reforms like those approved in 2023 and 2025 and published in the BOE. These reforms are processed and approved by the Congress itself, according to its internal rules.
• LOREG: changes can be introduced in the electoral system of the Cortes (for example, candidacy requirements, financing rules, or some aspects of representation) through an organic law that modifies the LOREG. The law's preamble itself recalls that it develops Article 23 of the Constitution (right to political participation) and sets “common provisions for elections by universal direct suffrage.”
• Senate Rules: although the Senate does not intervene in investiture, its Rules regulate, among other things, political control relations with the Government and the president's relationship with the Upper Chamber, which can also be reformed without touching the Constitution.

All these changes, even if they indirectly affect the political context of investiture (for example, the Congress electoral system), do not modify the basic constitutional rule: the President of the Government is appointed based on the confidence of the Congress, not by direct citizen election.

Changes that would require constitutional reform

When “reforming the system for electing the President of the Government” is proposed in a strong sense — for example:

• Introducing a direct election of the president by universal suffrage.
• Altering the role of the Congress so that the Chamber does not grant confidence or has a merely confirmatory role.
• Changing the constitutional position of the president within the system of powers.

one enters matters directly fixed by the Constitution (relations between King–Government–Cortes and parliamentary confidence mechanism). In that case, regulatory reforms or LOREG modifications are not enough: the Constitution itself must be reformed through the procedures it provides for reform, which involve qualified majorities in Congress and Senate and, depending on the scope of the revision, possible dissolution of the Cortes and calling of a constitutional referendum.

In summary: today, a profound change in the system for electing the President of the Government is only legally possible if addressed as a constitutional reform in form, with the reinforced guarantees the Constitution requires, while detail adjustments can be processed via Congress Rules and organic laws such as the LOREG.