This is how the parties would arrive at an electoral advance: the PP exceeds 33% and Vox hovers around 18%

The early dissolution of the Spanish Cortes Generales is primarily regulated by Articles 99 and 115 of the Constitution. There are two main routes: 1) dissolution decided at the discretion of the Prime Minister (Art. 115 CE), and 2) automatic dissolution due to investiture failure (Art. 99.5 CE). In both cases, the formal act is the simultaneous dissolution of the Congress and the Senate by the King, countersigned by the Prime Minister, and the calling of general elections.

1. Early dissolution decided by the Prime Minister (Art. 115 CE)

a) Competence and material limits

• The initiative exclusively belongs to the Prime Minister, who proposes the dissolution of the Chambers to the King.
• The King does not decide politically: he is limited to issuing the royal decree of dissolution, which must be countersigned by the Prime Minister. Political and legal responsibility lies with the latter.
• There are three clear material limits:
  • Dissolution cannot be proposed when a motion of censure is underway (Art. 115.2 CE).
  • Dissolution is not allowed during a state of exception or state of siege (Art. 116.5 CE).
  • Dissolution must affect both Chambers simultaneously; the Constitution does not allow, under ordinary regime, dissolving only one.

b) Temporal limits

• A new dissolution cannot be proposed before one year has passed since the previous one (Art. 115.3 CE).
• Outside that annual limit, the Constitution does not set a minimum moment within the legislature: the Prime Minister can propose dissolution at any stage, provided the previous material limits are respected.

c) Formal procedures

• Internal political decision by the Prime Minister, usually adopted within the Council of Ministers, although the Constitution only requires his personal proposal to the King.
• Hearing and formal proposal of the Prime Minister to the King within the framework of the Head of State.
• Issuance by the King of the Royal Decree of dissolution of the Cortes and call for elections, countersigned by the Prime Minister.
• Publication of the royal decree in the Official State Gazette (BOE). From that publication:
  • The Congress and the Senate are dissolved.
  • General elections are called, which must be held within the following 54 days (Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime).

2. Automatic dissolution due to investiture failure (Art. 99.5 CE)

a) Premise: impossibility to invest a Prime Minister

• After elections and the constitution of the Congress, the King proposes a candidate for the Presidency of the Government, who is subjected to the investiture debate in the Congress.
• If no candidate obtains the confidence of the Congress within two months, counted from the first investiture vote, the automatic dissolution mechanism is activated.

b) Automatic consequence and formal procedure

• After two months without investiture, the Constitution establishes that the King will dissolve both Chambers and call new elections with the countersignature of the President of the Congress (not the Prime Minister, who has not been invested).
• A Royal Decree of dissolution and electoral call is also issued, published in the BOE, setting the date of the new elections within 54 days.

3. Role of the Permanent Deputation

Once the Chambers are dissolved, the body that assumes parliamentary continuity is the Permanent Deputation of each of them (Art. 78 CE):

• It is composed of a reduced number of deputies or senators proportionally designated by parliamentary groups before dissolution.
• During the period between dissolution and the constitution of the new Cortes:
  • It safeguards the powers of the Chamber and can be convened in extraordinary session to review and, if applicable, validate or repeal government royal decree-laws.
  • It can require the presence of government members and exercise limited political control functions.
• Once the new Chambers are constituted, the Permanent Deputation reports on the decisions adopted during the interregnum.

4. Effects on the legislature and initiatives

Early dissolution ends the current legislature. As a general rule:

• Initiatives in process expire, except for some specific ones with constitutionally foreseen continuity (for example, certain constitutional procedures or appointments that can be repeated).
• The new Cortes, once constituted, can re-register bills or proposals that resume the content of previous initiatives.

In summary, the early dissolution of the Cortes is a formal act of the King, but politically attributable to the Prime Minister (Art. 115) or to the investiture deadlock (Art. 99.5), and is always articulated through a royal decree that simultaneously dissolves Congress and Senate, calls elections, and activates the role of the Permanent Deputations until the new Chambers are constituted.

The Spanish Constitution assigns the Prime Minister a central role in calling general elections, but always within a very regulated framework and with checks and balances. He does not freely decide to "go to elections" at any time, but acts through a formal proposal to the King and subject to clear constitutional limits.

Constitutional basis of the competence

The core of this competence is found in Article 115 of the Constitution, which regulates the dissolution of the Cortes Generales. General elections are called, in practice, through a decree dissolving the Congress or the Cortes that simultaneously includes the electoral call. That decree:

• Is politically decided by the Prime Minister.
• Must be signed (countersigned) by the Prime Minister and, at the same time, issued by the King, who assumes a formal role.
• Sets the date of the elections within constitutional deadlines.

Therefore, the "competence" to call general elections is not exercised through an isolated act, but through the initiative of the Prime Minister to dissolve and call, which is embodied in that decree.

Power to propose dissolution and call

The Prime Minister has the power to propose the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or both Chambers. In practice, when we talk about general elections, it is the simultaneous dissolution of Congress and Senate to renew the Cortes as a whole. The key competences are:

• Exclusive initiative: only the Prime Minister can propose early dissolution; neither the Chambers nor the King can do so on their own (except in specific cases such as Art. 99.5 CE, which is different and does not respond to a political decision of the Prime Minister).
• Political discretionary character: within constitutional limits, it is a decision of political opportunity (most favorable moment, unlocking situations, etc.), it does not require strict legal justification.
• Determination of the date: in the decree, the Prime Minister proposes the schedule, respecting the time frame: the vote must be held between 54 and 60 days after the call.

Constitutional limits and conditions

That presidential power is not absolute. Article 115 CE establishes several very important restrictions:

• Prohibition in case of a motion of censure in process: the Prime Minister cannot propose dissolution if a motion of censure is underway. This avoids the Prime Minister "escaping" parliamentary control that could replace him.
• Prohibition during states of exception or siege: while a state of exception or state of siege is declared, dissolution is not allowed. The logic is to avoid using elections as an instrument in a situation of serious constitutional disruption.
• Minimum period between dissolutions by presidential initiative: at least one year must have passed since the previous dissolution decided by the Prime Minister himself. This is to prevent abusive and repeated use of early elections.

These limits define the framework within which the Prime Minister can exercise his competence to call elections through early dissolution.

Ordinary call at the end of the legislature

Besides early dissolution, the Constitution provides for the periodic renewal of the Congress (Art. 68 CE) and the Senate (Art. 69 CE). At the end of the ordinary term (four years from the previous elections, unless early dissolution), the Chambers are considered expired and elections must be called.

In that case, a call decree is also issued, in which the Prime Minister again has a central role, although the margin for political decision is smaller (it is about complying with the constitutional calendar, not deciding an advance). Again, he acts by:

• Promoting the call decree for elections at the natural end of the legislature.
• Countersigning the King's signature on that decree.

Government in office and institutional continuity

After dissolution and the call for elections, the Government goes into caretaker status until the investiture of a new Prime Minister. Although this is mainly developed in ordinary legislation, the Constitution (Art. 101 CE) establishes the principle of continuity: the Prime Minister continues exercising limited functions to guarantee the functioning of the State, but can no longer dissolve the Chambers again or propose new calls while that situation lasts.

Final summary

In short, according to the Spanish Constitution, the Prime Minister has the decisive competence to trigger the call for general elections through the proposal of dissolution of the Chambers and the setting of the election date in the corresponding decree. However, that power is subject to formal controls (intervention of the King, 54-60 day deadlines) and material limits (prohibition during motions of censure, states of exception or siege, and a one-year temporal restriction between dissolutions on his own initiative), which configures a balance between parliamentary stability and the Prime Minister's capacity to resort to the polls as a democratic mechanism to resolve political conflicts.

The last general elections held in Spain were on July 23, 2023 (23J), in which the 350 deputies of the Congress were elected. According to official data collected by the Central Electoral Board and reported by various media and databases, the turnout was around 69.64 % of the census.

The result left a very fragmented Congress, with a slight advantage in votes for the People's Party (PP) over the PSOE, and with a very tight block configuration. Broadly, the distribution of votes and seats of the nationwide parties was as follows:

• PP – around 33.1 % of the votes and 137 seats (first force in votes and seats).
• PSOE – about 31.7 % of the votes and 121 seats, remaining the second force but very close to the PP in vote percentage.
• Vox – approximately 12.4 % of the votes and 33 seats, as the third force in Congress.
• Sumar – close to 12.3 % of the votes and 31 seats, as the fourth force, gathering the space to the left of the PSOE.

Alongside these nationwide forces, several nationalist and regionalist parties completed the parliamentary arithmetic, with lower vote percentages at the national level but decisive due to their territorial concentration:

• ERC – around 1.89 % of the national vote and 7 seats.
• Junts – about 1.62 % and 7 seats.
• EH Bildu – approximately 1.36 % and 6 seats.
• PNV – close to 1.14 % and 5 seats.
• BNG – around 0.62 % and 1 seat.
• Canarian Coalition (CCa) – approximately 0.46 % and 1 seat.
• UPN – about 0.21 % and 1 seat.

Overall, the result meant that:

• The PP won the elections in votes and seats but did not reach an absolute majority (set at 176 deputies) nor a clear majority with natural allies sufficient to govern alone.
• The PSOE, although second, maintained a very significant weight in the Chamber and remained in a similar seat range to the previous legislature, allowing it to aspire to renew an alternative majority through agreements with Sumar and several nationalist forces.
• Vox maintained a relevant representation (33 deputies) but below levels that would have guaranteed, together with the PP, a comfortable majority.
• Sumar, in its first appearance as a new brand of the alternative left space, obtained a result sufficient to be a key partner of a potential progressive Government, although with a contained number of seats compared to the sum of its components in previous cycles.
• The nationalist and regionalist formations (ERC, Junts, EH Bildu, PNV, BNG, CCa, UPN) were in a clearly kingmaker position, as their seats were decisive to tip the balance towards one block or another in forming majorities.

Politically, the 23J consolidated several trends:

• The return to a strengthened two-party system at the top (PP and PSOE together summing around two-thirds of the vote), although neither party can govern without partners.
• The persistence of a very plural Congress, with the simultaneous presence of radical right, alternative left, and diverse nationalisms.
• The centrality of post-electoral negotiation and investiture agreements, far beyond merely counting who comes first in votes.

In summary, the general elections of July 23, 2023 resulted in a Parliament without absolute majorities, with the PP as the most voted force, a PSOE very close in vote percentage, and a balance of blocks that made alliances with forces to the left of PSOE and with nationalist and regionalist parties essential to form a governing majority.