A job offer as a cook, mechanic, sanitary worker, or farmer can end with the candidate signing a military contract and being sent to the front in Ukraine. Russia has intensified its campaigns in recent months to recruit foreign fighters and Spain appears among the countries where these networks are particularly targeting Latin American communities.
The system combines ads on social media, websites that pretend to be recruitment agencies, and direct contacts through WhatsApp, Telegram, or Instagram. In some cases, a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense is offered from the beginning. In others, the military component is hidden behind a supposed job opportunity in Russia or even in Spain.
An investigation published this Saturday by El Español reconstructs the case of Matías Ignacio Amaro Silva, a 36-year-old Uruguayan who was assured he would work as a cook far from the trenches. He arrived in Russia in February and, two months later, died during a military operation in the Ukrainian region of Lugansk.
From a cooking offer to the front in Lugansk
Matías was facing economic difficulties in Uruguay. He had previously served in the Army and worked as a prison officer, but he was unemployed, had debts, and a daughter.
According to the account of his brother Juanma collected by El Español, an intermediary presented him with an opportunity to travel to Russia and work preparing food for the troops, supposedly away from the front line.
He quickly accepted. Between the proposal and his departure from Uruguay, only two days passed. He officially entered Russia on February 18, 2026.
The reality turned out to be very different.
Matías received military training and was sent to the front. A Russian certificate places his death on April 19 in Novolyubivka, in the Lugansk region, as a result of hemorrhaging and multiple traumas caused by explosions and shrapnel during a war operation.
His family continues to try to recover his remains and clarify the circumstances in which he ended up becoming a soldier after leaving his country convinced, according to his relatives, that he would be performing cooking duties.
Spain enters the target of recruitment campaigns
The campaign is not limited to Latin America. The European External Action Service (EEAS) has identified advertising specifically targeted at Latin American communities residing in Spain, as well as Italy, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.
The European investigation has located at least 35 recruitment websites available in up to 40 languages, including Spanish, as well as a campaign of paid advertisements on Meta platforms. Of the 85 ads identified by researchers, 78 subsequently became unavailable.
The mechanism attempts to exploit the economic vulnerability of certain candidates.
Some ads use images generated with artificial intelligence and initially present themselves as generic job offers. Only after the user clicks on them does the military nature of the proposal appear. Others lead to carefully designed pages to look like conventional employment agencies and obtain the phone number and other personal data of the interested party.
From Facebook or TikTok to WhatsApp
The journey usually begins on a social network.
The recruiters use Facebook, TikTok, Instagram, and seemingly professional pages to locate candidates. Once a first response is obtained, the conversation usually moves to private applications like WhatsApp or Telegram.
The EEAS has also detected the use of recently created internet domains used as intermediary pages, a formula that makes it difficult to trace the path to the final recruitment website.
The European investigation links part of this infrastructure to brands that present themselves under names like Military Staff Agency, Work in Russia, IRC Russian Bear, or Work Crew Agency. Several share WhatsApp numbers and connections with an organization registered in Russia and located next to a volunteer training center in Bashkortostan.
Up to 26,000 euros for signing and 2,300 per month
The economic incentives are one of the main hooks.
A document obtained by Matías's brother during his investigation of these networks outlines the procedure of an organization that presents itself as Iron Group / Russian Foreign Legion.
The described offer includes around 220,000 rubles per month —about 2,300 euros—and an initial bonus close to 2.5 million rubles, about 26,000 euros, as well as health insurance, certain social benefits, and the possibility of obtaining Russian citizenship.
In another conversation collected by the investigation, a recruiter offered a Uruguayan resident in the Canary Islands a contract valued at about 30,000 dollars and a monthly salary of 2,600 dollars.
In this case, the interlocutor did acknowledge that the candidate would receive between four and five weeks of military training before being assigned to a region where they could participate in combat missions.
Recruiters looking to close the trip immediately
One of the elements that repeats in these cases is the speed.
The supposed recruitment manual of Iron Group establishes several phases to get the candidate from the first contact to the trip. Recruiters must insist if they do not get a response, find out where the interested party is, what their health status is, if they physically have the passport, and when they would be ready to leave.
When they receive a positive response, the organization can assume the cost of the trip and buy the tickets.
Juanma, Matías's brother and a resident for years in the Canary Islands, argues that the pressure to travel in just one or two days reduces the chances of the family discovering what is happening or that the candidate can adequately check the conditions offered.
Spain is also used as bait
Not all cases consist of directly recruiting a person living in Spain.
The investigation also describes situations in which Spain appears as a supposed work destination to attract Latin American candidates who ultimately end up in Russia.
A Peruvian firefighter, for example, left his country convinced, according to his family, that he had obtained a well-paid job as a paramedic in Spain. He later acknowledged that he found himself in Russia and ended up integrated into their military forces. His family lost contact with him in May.
Another case affects two Colombians who, according to their families, believed they would travel to work in agricultural tasks in Spain with expenses paid.
The credibility of the deception lies precisely in the fact that thousands of Latin Americans move to Spain each year to work in agriculture, hospitality, construction, or transportation. An offer of this type can, therefore, initially not seem suspicious.
A campaign that has spread across several continents
The structure detected by the SEAE has a global reach.
The European researchers point out that the campaigns began focusing on Africa during June, turned towards Latin America and the Latin American communities residing in Europe during July, and subsequently extended to Southeast Asia.
According to the data collected by the European agency, more than 28,000 foreigners from 135 countries would have ended up linked to Russian forces by the end of 2025, although under very different situations: from fully aware volunteers to people attracted by economic promises or deceived about the nature of the employment.
Precisely because of that variety of situations, not all incorporated foreigners can be automatically considered victims of deception.
Colombia warns against false offers
The magnitude of the phenomenon has led several Latin American governments to intervene.
The Embassy of Colombia in Russia has specifically warned its citizens about suspicious job offers that promise high salaries without clearly explaining the conditions and recommends checking any proposal through official channels before traveling.
The Colombian Foreign Ministry reported on September 5 that it had registered 863 requests for consular assistance related to citizens in Ukraine and another 890 linked to Russia. Among the cases are deceased, missing, detained individuals, and people whose relatives are trying to repatriate them.
Bogotá has formally requested both Russia and Ukraine to cease the recruitment of Colombian citizens to participate in the conflict.
Retained passports and difficult-to-break contracts
The risk does not end when the candidate discovers that the offer was military.
The SEAE investigation warns of situations in which foreigners arriving in Russia may find themselves with confiscated passports, pressure to sign contracts, and difficulties in subsequently leaving the Armed Forces.
In Matías's case, his family claims that his passport was taken away after he arrived and that he does not keep a copy of the contract he signed.
Other Latin American fighters have reported problems leaving the units once incorporated, delays in salary payments, and difficulties in making effective the compensations promised for injuries or death. They are individual testimonies that do not allow us to ensure that all contracts work in the same way, but they show the danger of traveling without knowing exactly the conditions.
From a job offer to a war
The detected pattern combines two formulas.
On some occasions, the interested party knows from the beginning that they are being offered to join the Russian Army and the main incentive is economic. In others, researchers have documented advertising that initially hides the military nature of the work or promises civilian occupations that subsequently do not correspond to reality.
Spain has a particular role within this machinery: it is at the same time a territory where advertising is directed at Latin American communities and a labor destination used as bait in some fraudulent offers.
The case of Matías summarizes the risk. According to his family, he left seeking to resolve his economic problems as a cook and ended up on a war front. Just two months after arriving in Russia, a certificate from the Russian Ministry of Defense itself confirmed his death in Lugansk.