How many children does the generational change require: Spain would have to double its fertility rate

As of August 19, 2026, the Government's Families Bill (file 121/000011, process process_ini_216343) remains in the Congress of Deputies in the amendment phase to the articles in committee, with the amendment deadline successively extended until September 2, 2026. It has not yet moved to the subcommittee nor is there a report or Plenary date, so the processing is de facto frozen in Congress.

1. Identification and progress so far

The bill was approved by the Council of Ministers within the Recovery Plan (C22, R3) and sent to Congress:

• 02/27/2024: Council of Ministers agreement “FAMILIES BILL” (Moncloa reference).
• 02/29/2024: Registration of the initiative in Congress.
• 03/05/2024: Qualification and admission for processing by the Congress Board.
• On the same March 5, the Board agreed to:
  • entrust its approval to the Committee on Social Rights and Consumption with full legislative competence and
  • process it by urgent procedure, according to the agreement published in the BOCG (Bulletin 15-A-11-1).
• 03/08/2024: Publication of the Families Bill text in the BOCG.
• Initial amendment deadline: eight working days, until 03/18/2024.

From there, according to the official schedule of process process_ini_216343, the Board has agreed to extend the amendment submission deadline repeatedly, setting it at the final date of 09/02/2026, with around 90 successive extensions. The institutional database bulletin itself summarizes that “the amendment deadline was extended (...) extended 90 times.”

Specialized press describes the same phenomenon: Demócrata already noted in 2024 that the Families Bill was in the “amendment phase (...) extended until March 27” in its overview of initiatives in process in the XV Legislature (Demócrata article) and later that the bill “dozes in the warmth of successive amendment extensions” in Congress (Conciliation week in Congress).

2. Exact status of processing in Congress

With this information, the current status can be summarized as follows:

• Chamber: Congress of Deputies.
• Competent committee: Committee on Social Rights and Consumption, with full legislative competence.
• Procedure: urgent (theoretical deadlines halved).
• Phase: amendment phase to the articles, with the amendment deadline formally open until 09/02/2026.
• Not yet recorded:
  • constitution of the subcommittee to negotiate the articles,
  • nor preparation of a committee report,
  • nor inclusion of the bill in the Plenary agenda.

In practice, this means the bill is “stuck” in committee: it remains legally alive, but without visible progress beyond deadline extensions.

3. Deadlines and steps remaining for approval

From the current point, the steps and margins are these:

• Closing the amendment deadline: until the Board stops extending it and effectively closes it, the subcommittee work cannot start. There is no maximum deadline set in the Rules: the real limit is the end of the legislature, because if the Cortes dissolve the bill lapses.
• Subcommittee in the Committee on Social Rights and Consumption: once the deadline is closed, the Committee appoints a subcommittee that:
  • negotiates the registered amendments,
  • can agree on transactional amendments, and
  • submits a subcommittee report to the Committee.
• Committee report with full legislative competence: the Committee itself approves the final text as a report. Having full legislative competence, that report can equate to approval by Congress, unless a referral to the Plenary is agreed.
• Senate: the approved text is sent to the Senate, which generally has two months (one month if urgency is maintained) to:
  • approve it without changes,
  • introduce amendments, or
  • issue a veto.
• Return to Congress (if the Senate modifies or vetoes): Congress can:
  • override the veto by absolute majority (or simple majority after two months), and
  • accept or reject the Senate's amendments.
• Sanction and publication: after final parliamentary approval, the law is sanctioned, promulgated, and published in the BOE.

4. Realistic time horizon

From the moment the Government and its partners decide to unblock the Families Law (closing the amendment deadline and starting the subcommittee), experience with other bills indicates that:

• A fast but plausible schedule would require at least:
  • several weeks for subcommittee and committee report,
  • 1–2 months for the Senate process, and
  • a final Congress session to resolve amendments/veto, if any.
• In aggregate terms, this means about 3–4 months from effective unblocking in Congress until entry into force, provided there are stable majorities and no new blockages.
• The determining limit is not an internal regulatory deadline, but the remaining legislative term: if the dissolution of the Cortes approaches without closing the amendment phase and sending the text to the Senate with sufficient margin, the law may end up lapsed.

In summary, today the Families Bill is formally under processing in Congress, but frozen in the amendment phase by political decision of the majority of the Board. The “deadlines remaining” for its approval are not so much legal as political: while the amendment deadline is not closed and the subcommittee constituted, the real clock does not start, and the risk is that the legislature ends before the full Congress–Senate–Congress process can be completed.

The Ministry of Housing and Urban Agenda (MIVAU) is the department of the General State Administration responsible for the proposal and execution of the Government's policy on housing, Urban Agenda, building quality, and land, according to Royal Decree 829/2023, of November 20, restructuring ministerial departments (BOE). This responsibility is further detailed in its organic development by Royal Decree 208/2024, of February 27 (cited in various BOE resolutions and orders).

1. General framework of powers

Housing is a shared competence: autonomous communities hold the main competence in housing and urban planning, but the State (and thus the Ministry) can:

• Set the basic conditions of equality in exercising the right to housing (Law 12/2023, of May 24, on the right to housing).
• Define the state housing policy and its financing through state plans and aid programs.
• Promote and manage the state public housing stock and major financial instruments (ICO, SEPES/Casa 47).

Many aids for access to housing and rent are managed and called by the autonomous communities, but are designed, largely financed, and coordinated from the Ministry.

2. State plans and coordination with the Autonomous Communities

The core instrument of the Ministry's powers regarding access to housing and family aid are the State Housing Plans:

• State Plan for Access to Housing 2022‑2025, with 13 programs (rent aid, youth, vulnerable groups, housing in small municipalities, etc.), cited in Moncloa notes as the framework for the Youth Rent Voucher and rent aids (note 07/09/2024).
• State Housing Plan 2026‑2030, approved by the Council of Ministers in 2026, with up to 7 billion euros, tripling the previous allocation and distributing funds in three major blocks: increase of protected housing (40%), rehabilitation (30%), and rent/emancipation aid and action in pressured areas (30%) (summary in Demócrata).

Through these plans, the Ministry:

• Defines the rent aid, rehabilitation, and public housing stock programs, as well as the basic access criteria.
• Finances a majority part of the cost (approx. 60%) and distributes funds among Autonomous Communities in the Sectoral Conference (note 10/30/2025).
• Can condition or even suspend transfers if the Autonomous Communities do not provide rental and execution data, reinforcing policy evaluation (Demócrata, 04/21/2026).

3. Rent and family aid programs

Among the powers most directly linked to access to housing and family support are:

• Youth Rent Voucher: state aid of 250–300 euros/month for young people, financed by the State and integrated as a structural measure of the State Housing Plan. The Ministry:
  • Defines the common bases and distributes funds among Autonomous Communities (200 million in 2024‑2025, according to Moncloa and Demócrata).
  • Foresees increases in amount and expansion of groups in the 2026‑2030 Plan.
• General rent aids for households and vulnerable groups (low-income families, victims of gender violence, evicted persons, homeless, etc.), channeled through specific programs of the State Plans.
• ICO guarantee line for first home purchase by young people and families with minors: the Ministry of Housing, through an agreement with the Official Credit Institute, assumes the management fees of these guarantees (Ministry of Finance note of 05/27/2025: link).
• Specific aid programs for families in pressured residential market areas, supporting Autonomous Communities in declaring these areas and financing affordable rental supply in them (Resolutions on pressured areas published in the BOE in 2025).

4. Rehabilitation and improvement of the residential stock

The Ministry also has key powers in rehabilitation of homes and buildings, both with funds from the State Plan and the Recovery Plan:

• Designs rehabilitation subsidy programs (structural, accessibility, energy efficiency), with aids that can exceed 20,000–35,000 euros per home when subsequently destined to affordable rental, according to drafts and notes of the 2026‑2030 Plan.
• Coordinates with Autonomous Communities the “rehabilitation wave” financed with European funds, including entire neighborhoods and individual homes (note 10/03/2024).

5. Public housing stock and affiliated entities

Another essential competence area is the creation and management of state-owned public and affordable housing stock:

• Promotion of the Affordable Rental Housing Plan (PVAA), in collaboration with SEPES/State Housing Entity, to build and manage affordable or social rental housing (Order PJC/785/2025, BOE-A-2025-15293).
• Conversion of SEPES into Casa 47, State Housing Entity, attached to the Ministry, responsible for managing the state public housing stock, buying private homes to allocate to affordable rental, and tendering new developments (Demócrata, 12/11/2025).
• Agreements with ICO and financial entities to mobilize billions in loans and guarantees aimed at social or affordable rental housing and rehabilitation (note 08/07/2024).

In summary, the Ministry does not directly grant all family aids (central role of Autonomous Communities and municipalities), but it is the governing body of the state housing policy: it sets the legal and financial framework, defines and finances major aid programs for rent, purchase, and rehabilitation, and develops its own instruments (Casa 47, agreements with ICO and SEPES) to expand the public and social housing stock and facilitate effective access to housing.

The last general elections in Spain were held in July 2023 (the so-called 23J) and resulted in a highly fragmented Congress, in which no party alone reached the absolute majority of 176 seats. The Popular Party (PP) was the most voted force in number of seats, followed by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), and at a considerable distance were Vox and the Sumar coalition as the third and fourth largest actors in size.

Basic results of 23J in Congress

Contextual information gathered from various analyses and subsequent polls allows reconstructing the main picture of the Congress resulting from 23J:

• Popular Party (PP): 137 seats. Several electoral analysis pieces published after 2023 take this figure as a reference and explicitly speak of the “137 deputies” that PP obtained in the July 2023 general elections, using it as a comparison point for new polls projecting increases or decreases from that result.
• Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE): 121 seats. Various polls cited by Demócrata recall that Pedro Sánchez “obtained 7,821,718 votes and 121 seats” in the 2023 general elections and compare the current PSOE floor with that benchmark.
• Vox: 33 seats. Numerous barometers from 2025 and 2026 indicate that Vox “achieved 12.4% and 33 deputies” in the 2023 general elections and focus on whether their new estimates would double or not that representation.
• Sumar: 31 seats. Articles analyzing the evolution of the space to the left of PSOE emphasize that Sumar, when it ran in 2023 as a unified candidacy including Podemos, obtained around 12.3% of the vote and “31 deputies,” a figure repeatedly used as a reference to measure its subsequent decline.

The remaining seats to complete the 350 in Congress are distributed among several territorial or nationalist parties (ERC, Junts, EH Bildu, PNV, BNG, Canary Coalition, UPN, among others), each with a small group of representatives. Analyses on parliamentary blocs indicate that these parties are decisive for building majorities but do not reach the numerical weight of the four major state formations.

Which parties have the largest parliamentary representation?

If we order the forces by number of seats in the Congress resulting from 23J, the map from largest to smallest representation is as follows:

• 1st PP – With 137 deputies, it is the party with the largest representation. Various subsequent polls indicate it remains the first force in seats and compare their projections with “the 137 achieved in 2023.”
• 2nd PSOE – Its 121 seats place it as the second group in the Chamber. Much analysis quantifies socialist wear relative to that figure, noting the “loss compared to 23J” when polls drop PSOE below 121 seats.
• 3rd Vox – It is the third largest party, with 33 deputies. Demographic studies from 2025 and 2026 highlight that its potential growth would be measured against those initial 33 seats.
• 4th Sumar – The coalition led by Yolanda Díaz occupies the fourth position in Congress with 31 seats. The press emphasizes that the Sumar+Podemos space, when united, had those 31 deputies and that subsequent fragmentation weakens it in seats though it may retain votes.
• Territorial parties – Behind are a bloc of nationalist and regionalist formations (ERC, Junts, EH Bildu, PNV, BNG, Canary Coalition, UPN, etc.), all with a much smaller number of deputies. The sum of these groups, however, is strategic, as it can tip the balance in a Congress where no party alone reaches the absolute majority of 176 seats, a threshold repeatedly cited as a reference to assess majorities.

Political reading of the result

The combination of data used by Demócrata and other media for their subsequent analyses also allows understanding the balance between blocs. Some articles recall that the right-wing bloc (PP and Vox) summed 170 seats in the Congress resulting from 23J (137 from PP and 33 from Vox), while other texts take as reference that PSOE and the Sumar candidacy reached around 152 seats between them. That arithmetic explains why the Government has depended on agreements with several territorial parties to pass the investiture and legislative agenda.

In summary, the last general elections drew a Parliament without clear majorities, with a PP–PSOE bipartisanship still dominant in seats, but forced to understand with a relevant third and fourth force (Vox and Sumar) and a set of territorial parties that, despite their small size, are essential in almost any government equation.