Spain moves away from Europe with inflation above the average, more expensive prices, higher pension costs, and less purchasing power.

Spanish inflation is nine tenths above the eurozone while the Government raises the reduction of diesel by 20 cents in September; prices have accumulated several years of increases and inflation is again putting pressure on households, companies, and public accounts.

11 minutes

Add DEMÓCRATA to Google

Ask FREN

Published

Last updated

11 minutes

Most read

Spain becomes more expensive compared to Europe: its inflation is above the average and erodes purchasing power

The CPI has climbed to 3.6% in the month of July, its highest rate since May 2024, while the HICP reaches 3.9%, one point above the eurozone. The rise in prices increases the cost of pensions, reduces purchasing power, and decreases the competitiveness of Spanish companies

Inflation is gaining ground again in Spain. This Thursday, the INE reported how the CPI stood at 3.6% year-on-year in July, four tenths above the rate recorded in June and at its highest level since May 2024. Core inflation also increased by one tenth, to 3%.

The Spanish figure is above that recorded in the eurozone as a whole. To compare both territories, the HICP, the harmonized indicator used by Eurostat, must be utilized. In July, the Spanish HICP reached 3.9%, compared to 2.9% in the eurozone. The differential, therefore, stands at one percentage point.

The distance is also relevant regarding the target of the European Central Bank, set at 2%. The general Spanish CPI is 1.6 points above that reference, and the HICP, used for European comparison, is 1.9 points above. Core inflation, moreover, remains at 3%, indicating that price pressures are not limited to the energy component.

The Government raises the diesel discount to 20 cents

The increase in fuel prices has forced the Government to activate the safeguard clause included in its latest package of measures. Diesel prices increased by 15.7% year-on-year in July, while gasoline rose by 7.3%. The increase in the former above the established threshold allows for raising the tax reduction on hydrocarbons to 20 cents per liter in September.

Transport increased its annual rate to 6.2%, mainly due to the behavior of fuels and lubricants for personal vehicles. Housing recorded an annual rate of 5.7%, one point more than in June, mainly due to the evolution of electricity prices.

The measure on diesel may contain part of the rise in fuel prices, but it does not change the behavior of the rest of the consumption basket. Inflation, moreover, has a characteristic that explains much of its impact on households: prices do not return to the starting point when the inflation rate moderates.

ChatGPT Image 13 ago 2026, 16 30 50
Effects of inflation: Infographic: DEMOCRAT.

Inflation accumulates on already higher prices

A rise in the CPI of 3.6% means that prices are, on average, 3.6% higher than a year before. But that percentage is applied to a price level that already incorporates the increases from previous years.

Inflation does not work like a counter that resets to zero every year. If prices increase by 3% and the following year they rise again by 3.6%, the second increase is applied to the prices that have already been raised during the first year. Therefore, a future decrease in inflation does not mean that the shopping basket will recover previous prices: if it goes from 3.6% to 2%, prices will continue to rise, albeit at a slower pace.

This is one of the reasons why inflation has a particularly relevant impact on households with lower income. The expression “tax on the poor” is used to describe this effect because those who allocate a larger proportion of their income to food, housing, energy, and transportation have less margin to absorb the increases.

Pensions rise, but their cost also increases

Inflation also has a direct effect on pensions because their evolution is linked to prices. Contributory pensions increased by 2.7% in 2026, according to Social Security.

The mechanism aims to preserve the purchasing power of pensioners, but maintaining the purchasing capacity from one year to the next does not mean that the pensioner can buy with their benefit the same as they could several years ago. If prices have accumulated over several years, the pension is updated on a base that has also changed.

Inflation also affects public accounts. When pensions are revalued, the new amounts are incorporated into the benefits and serve as a reference for subsequent updates. The monthly payroll of contributory pensions exceeded 14.25 billion euros in January 2026, with more than 10.4 million benefits paid.

More salary does not necessarily mean more purchasing power

The same mechanism affects workers. If a salary increases by 3% while prices rise by 3.6%, the worker receives more euros, but can buy fewer goods and services in real terms.

The underlying inflation of 3% shows, moreover, that the pressures on prices are not concentrated exclusively on energy. Funcas places its average inflation forecast for 2026 at 3.2% and for 2027 at 2.3%, which points to a gradual moderation, but still with rates above the ECB's target.

The difference between inflation and wages is especially important for households that do not have automatic adjustment mechanisms. A rise in income equivalent to the CPI allows approximately to maintain purchasing power; a lower one implies a loss of purchasing power and a higher one allows to increase it.

The effect on personal income tax: when raising the salary is not enough

Inflation can also affect taxpayers through what is called cold progression. If wages increase nominally to compensate for the rise in prices but the brackets of the personal income tax are not updated in the same proportion, part of that increase may be subject to a higher effective taxation.

The problem is that the worker may not have really improved their economic capacity. A salary increase equivalent to inflation allows maintaining purchasing power, but if the nominal increase in income causes a higher tax bill, disposable income may grow less than the salary.

The deflation of personal income tax allows adapting the brackets and certain parameters of the tax to the evolution of prices. Without that update, inflation can raise the collection on nominal income increases that do not represent an equivalent improvement in real economic capacity.

Spain becomes more expensive than its main partners

The differential with Europe introduces a second issue: competitiveness. In July, Spain recorded a HICP of 3.9%, compared to 2.9% in the eurozone. Among the large economies, Germany stood at 2.8%, France at 2.4%, and Italy at 2.9%.

This is not a minor difference if it is maintained over time. Spain shares currency with a good part of its main trading partners, so it cannot resort to a devaluation of its currency to regain competitiveness against them. If Spanish costs systematically grow more than those of other countries, companies may be forced to reduce margins or pass on the increases to their prices.

Eurostat data of the IPCA/HICP for the month of July

Inflation in July 2026 — IPCA/HICP

  1. Romania: 9.2%

  2. Lithuania: 5.6%

  3. Bulgaria: 4.1%

  4. Cyprus: 4.0%

  5. Spain: 3.9%
  6. Croatia: 3.6%

  7. Belgium: 3.5%

  8. Luxembourg: 3.4%

  9. Ireland: 3.1%

  10. Portugal: 3.1%

  11. Poland: 3.0%

  12. Slovenia: 3.0%

  13. Slovakia: 3.0%

  14. Italy: 2.9%

  15. Netherlands: 2.9%

  16. Germany: 2.8%

  17. Greece: 2.7%

  18. Austria: 2.6%

  19. Finland: 2.6%

  20. Latvia: 2.5%

  21. France: 2.4%

  22. Hungary: 2.1%

  23. Malta: 2.1%

  24. Estonia: 2.0%

  25. Denmark: 1.8%

  26. Czech Republic: 1.1%

  27. Sweden: 1.0%

The source that compiles the data from Eurostat also places the average of the European Union at 2.9% and that of the eurozone also at 2.9%.

Spain, with 3.9%, would be the fifth country in the EU with the highest inflation in July, only behind Romania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Cyprus. It is one point above the European average of 2.9% and also one point above the eurozone.

In addition, Spain surpasses the four major economies of the eurozone:

  • Spain: 3.9%

  • Italy: 2.9%

  • Germany: 2.8%

  • France: 2.4%

Rafael Pampillón: 

“When prices rise more than our salaries, our money buys less”

Rafael Pampillón, professor of Applied Economics at CEU-San Pablo University and professor at IE Business School, argues that “inflation has an effect that anyone understands: when prices rise more than our salaries, our money buys fewer things.”

In recent months —he explains to DEMÓCRATA—, “salaries have grown around 3%, below inflation. So workers are losing purchasing power. But there is another less visible and perhaps more dangerous effect in the medium term: if in Spain prices rise faster than in the countries we compete with, our companies lose competitiveness.”

“That is what the annual data for July warns again —he highlights—: the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (IPCA), which allows comparing European countries with the same criteria, placed its year-on-year rate in Spain at 3.9%, compared to 2.9% in the eurozone. The distance is one point. One year does not decide the competitiveness of a country. The problem arises when the difference is repeated and accumulates.”

“Let’s think of a Spanish company that sells abroad —he points out—. If for years its costs and prices increase more than those of a German, French, or Italian company, it only has two paths: reduce its margins or compensate for the difference by producing better and cheaper. If it doesn’t achieve the latter, it ends up losing ground. At the same time —he specifies—, for Spaniards it is relatively more attractive to buy foreign products that have increased less in price: our imports increase.”

“So —points out the author of The Spanish Technological Deficit— we need more competition where regulation, entry barriers, or supply shortages facilitate price increases. And, above all, we need productivity. Producing more value for each hour worked allows for better wages without continuously passing that cost onto prices.”

“And the conclusion is simple —points out the professor—. Having one point more of inflation than Europe may seem like a small thing. If it happens one year, it probably is. But if it becomes customary, it stops being so, because the difference accumulates and Spain becomes more expensive silently. In a common currency, we cannot erase that difference later by devaluing. That’s why the best competitiveness policy starts long before exports fall, because it starts by preventing our costs and prices from systematically running higher than those of our competitors and, above all, by ensuring that our productivity runs faster than theirs.”

Daniel Lacalle: “Prices show that Spain is above the average of the euro area”

For Daniel Lacalle, chief economist of Tressis, the data that should be analyzed alongside the general CPI is the IPCA, “because it is the one used throughout the EU.” In his view, the data shows that “the CPI in Spain is already much higher than the average of the euro area” and one of the fundamental reasons is the price of housing, which rises by 5.7% annually.

“Moreover —he elaborates—, electricity prices have risen much more than in the same month of 2025. Transportation has skyrocketed. All the data indicate that in Spain the annual inflation rate, in this case of core inflation, is also much higher. That is, the inflation that is supposed to be more stable and less related to external aspects is at 3%, one-tenth higher than the previous month.”

In Spain —he adds—, "the Government has been unable to implement policies that would facilitate competition, the free market, which would thereby facilitate the reduction of prices or, at least, greater access to goods and services and, with that, a lower inflationary impact".

Furthermore, he adds, "real net wages are not rising, but falling. Net employees, moreover, are falling compared to the average of the EU and the Eurozone. And this means impoverishing the middle class".

Lacalle also links the evolution of inflation with the cost of pensions: "As happens with pensions, where the Government, of course, will say that it is going to raise pensions with the CPI, but in doing so, they will pull from debt, which is what they do, so that, in this way, what is done is to pass more taxes and more inflation and greater pressure to the private sector in the future".

Ultimately —he points out—, "all these factors generate a less competitive economy", and he argues that inflation also affects the reading of certain economic ratios, such as debt over GDP, by raising the denominator through the growth of nominal GDP.

Javier Santacruz Cano: 

“Spain has been facing persistent inflation for five years”

In the opinion of economist Javier Santacruz, "Spain has been facing a phenomenon of persistent inflation for five years, especially pressured by energy, food, and certain services".

And given that in recent years some indexing mechanisms to inflation have been recovered such as collective agreements, pensions, or rental contracts —he explains—, each increase in the inflation rate represents a cost that becomes permanent in the pockets of citizens.

Therefore —he points out—, “indexing wages, pensions, rents, etc. to inflation is always https://www.ceoe.es/esa bad idea because it generates vicious circles that make inflation persistent. However, the only positive thing that should be indexed, which is taxes (correcting taxes for the effect of inflation), is precisely what is not done".

Holidays and more expensive services

The summer adds another visible effect. The increase in prices of services linked to leisure, transportation, restaurants, and accommodations raises the cost of vacations for households. For a family, the result is paying more to maintain a similar level of consumption.

The effect also has a business reading. If Spanish prices increase more than those of other European destinations, Spanish tourism may lose part of the price advantage that has contributed to sustaining its international competitiveness.

A specific reduction against accumulated inflation

The tax reduction on diesel can reduce the impact of fuels in September, but it does not reverse the accumulated increases of the overall prices. The Government has activated the clause that raises the reduction of the hydrocarbon tax up to 20 cents per liter after diesel increased by 15.7% year-on-year.

The snapshot left by the July data is, therefore, broader than a simple 3.6%. Spain registers a CPI of 3.6%, a core inflation of 3%, and an HICP of 3.9%, compared to 2.9% in the eurozone.

For households, the difference between earning more and being able to buy more is once again conditioned by inflation. For the taxpayer, the updating or not of the fiscal parameters determines the effect of cold progressivity. And for companies, maintaining a higher inflation than their European competitors for years can ultimately translate into higher costs and lower competitiveness.

CEOE warns of the risk that the war with Iran continues to raise inflation

The CEOE warns that the prolongation of the conflict with Iran is increasing the upward risks on inflation, after the CPI in July rose four tenths, to 3.6%, driven by energy products. The organization maintains for now its forecast of an average inflation of 3.1% for 2026, although conditioned on a gradual normalization of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, which continues to be complicated.

The Government's measures to contain the impact of the war in the Middle East have mostly been withdrawn. According to the CEOE, if they had been completely eliminated in July, inflation would have reached 4.1%. The increase in diesel prices above 15% has also activated the safeguard clause that will allow raising the tax cut in September to 20 cents per liter, compared to the five initially planned. In gasoline, the five cents will be maintained.

The evolution of energy adds pressure to an inflation differential that already places Spain above its European partners. The Spanish HICP rose to 3.9% in July, compared to 2.9% in the monetary union, while Brent, which averaged $83.76 per barrel in July, has continued to rise in August to $89.33. In parallel, unprocessed foods moderated their inflation to 2.3%, chaining five consecutive months of declines.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What parliamentary procedures are necessary to modify fuel taxation in Spain?

Modifying fuel taxation in Spain (for example, tax rates in existing taxes or the configuration of those taxes) requires, from a parliamentary perspective, following the same process as any legislative reform: processing and approving a new law that modifies the current regulations. This reform can be initiated as a bill (at the Government's initiative) or as a legislative proposal (at the initiative of other authorized subjects), debated and voted first in the Congress and then in the Senate, and concludes with the King's sanction and publication in the Official State Gazette (BOE). Throughout this process, parliamentary committees intervene for technical analysis and incorporation of amendments, and the final approval in the Congress is by simple majority.

1. Type of initiative to modify taxation

When modifying fuel taxation requires changing the content of already existing laws, what is processed is a legislative reform. According to the available information:

  • Presentation of the initiative: The reform can be initiated through a bill presented by the Government, or through a legislative proposal presented by parliamentary groups, the Senate, regional assemblies, or, in certain cases, by popular initiative.
  • Object of the reform: This new law can modify specific articles, additional, transitional, or final provisions of the tax legislation affecting fuels, or even partially or totally repeal the previous regulation.

In practice, when any normative aspect affecting taxation (including fuel taxation) is to be changed, this general mechanism is used: approving a new law that alters the text of the previously effective law.

2. Processing in the Congress of Deputies

Once the initiative is presented, the parliamentary phase opens in the Congress. Generally, the procedure follows these stages:

  • Admission and initial debate: The Congress admits the bill or legislative proposal for processing and holds a first debate in Plenary (general debate or consideration, depending on the case). At this point, it is decided whether the text continues its processing or is rejected outright.
  • Referral to the competent committee: Once the initiative's continuation is approved, the text goes to the corresponding parliamentary committee, where technical and detailed work is carried out.
  • Presentation of amendments: Different parliamentary groups can present amendments to the articles to modify the specific content of the tax reform, whether adjusting rates, redefining concepts, or modifying additional and transitional provisions.
  • Debate and voting in committee: The committee studies the text, debates the amendments, and votes on them. This is the key moment when the new normative configuration of the taxes affecting fuels is detailed.
  • Committee report: After voting on amendments, the committee prepares a report, that is, a revised text incorporating the approved modifications. This report is sent to the Congress Plenary.
  • Debate and voting in Plenary: The Plenary debates the report and can introduce additional changes through group amendments. Finally, the resulting text is put to a vote.

For the law modifying fuel taxation to be approved in the Congress, a simple majority is required: the number of votes in favor must be greater than those against, excluding abstentions.

3. Senate intervention

Once the text is approved in the Congress, the initiative passes to the Senate, which follows, in an abbreviated form, a similar structure:

  • The Senate receives the text and can refer it to one of its committees for study and technical debate.
  • Senatorial groups can present amendments, which are debated and voted on in committee and/or Plenary.
  • The Senate can approve the text as it comes from the Congress, introduce amendments, or issue a veto.

If the Senate does not issue a veto and limits itself to approving or amending, the text returns to the Congress, which decides ultimately: it can accept or reject the Senate's amendments or, if applicable, override the Senate's veto according to the required majorities.

4. Final approval, sanction, and publication

Once both Chambers have completed their intervention and the Congress has approved the final text of the law modifying fuel taxation, the final phase begins:

  • Royal sanction: The text is sent to the King for sanction, a formal act confirming parliamentary approval.
  • Promulgation and publication: The law is promulgated and published in the Official State Gazette (BOE). The law itself usually sets its effective date; if not, the general term applies, so it comes into effect 20 days after publication.

From that moment, the new tax regulation contained in the law becomes applicable to fuels in Spain, replacing or complementing the previous regulation. If new modifications are required in the future, a new legislative reform procedure with the same general structure described must be initiated. No further information is available in the consulted sources about specific procedures different from this general law processing.

What differences are there between processing the fuel taxation reform as a Government bill or as a legislative proposal from parliamentary groups? At what specific phase of the parliamentary procedure is the technical detail of the applicable tax rates on fuels usually defined? What political implications can a proposal to modify fuel taxation have in the Congress and the Senate?

What are the European Central Bank's competences regarding inflation control?

The European Central Bank (ECB) has as its central competence in the euro area to maintain price stability, which in practice means trying to keep inflation around 2% in the medium term, as recalled in several Demócrata reports, for example on the evolution of inflation in August 2025 and the interest rate decisions of the Governing Council (inflation in the eurozone, interest rate decision in 2025). To fulfill this mandate, the ECB directs the monetary policy of the euro area, mainly using official interest rates and other tools on the liquidity of the financial system. The cited journalistic sources explicitly state that this price stability objective is its main mandate and that any additional function, such as competitiveness or growth, can only come "after" fulfilling it (statements by Sharon Donnery, requests from Spanish banks).

Price stability mandate

In practice, ECB decisions are evaluated based on whether they help keep inflation near 2%. Demócrata reports that the institution sets this target as a "symmetric" medium-term reference, allowing only "small temporary deviations," as explained by Vice President Luis de Guindos (Guindos and the 2% target). When inflation is around that level, as occurred with 2% year-on-year in several months of 2025 (August 2025), the ECB tends to keep rates stable, insisting that its objective is "practically achieved," as reflected in decisions to maintain the deposit rate at 2% in 2025 and early 2026 (fifth rate hold, September 2025 decision, international coverage).

When prices deviate from that target, the ECB acts by tightening or loosening monetary policy. Demócrata documents rate hikes, such as the 0.25 percentage point increase approved in June 2026 to respond to inflationary pressures derived from the war in the Middle East (0.25 point hike), or the decision to maintain rates despite an inflation uptick due to the war in Iran, in a "data-dependent" approach (pause due to the war in Iran, Lagarde's signals, call for "cool head").

Instruments to control inflation

The ECB's competences are concretized in several tools, which Demócrata articles repeatedly describe:

  • Official interest rates: the ECB sets the deposit facility rate (DFR), the main refinancing operations rate (MRO), and the marginal lending facility rate (MLF). By modifying these rates, it makes credit more expensive or cheaper, affecting the cost of mortgages and loans, as explained in educational pieces about the relationship between inflation, rates, and the real economy (difference between CPI and inflation, core inflation, oil price and mortgages).
  • Liquidity management and market operations: although news focuses more on rates, they also refer to the general orientation of monetary policy, the cycle of cuts or hikes, and its transmission to the financial system (easing cycle, pause at 2.25%).
  • Supervision and financial stability: the ECB acts as a banking supervisor and argues that financial stability is a necessary condition for price stability, as emphasized by Sharon Donnery (competitiveness and mandate). Other pieces link these functions to the banking union framework and capital and liquidity regulation (banking reform, capital buffers, CECA's position, private credit).

Legal framework and mandate limits

The user specifically asks about the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and the Statutes of the ESCB and the ECB. The consulted sources do not provide the literal text of the relevant articles nor a technical summary of those Statutes. It is indirectly noted that the ECB is part of the European System of Central Banks and that certain "basic" functions are attributed to it by the Treaty, for example in the ECB's own opinion on the gold of the Bank of Italy (Bank of Italy gold). It is also mentioned that the current mandate is "single," focused on price stability, and that there is political debate about adding competitiveness or growth, something the ECB resists considering it would "blur" the objectives (Donnery, Spanish banks and dual mandate).

Regarding the details of the specific articles of the TFEU or the ESCB/ECB Statutes, no further information is available in the consulted sources. What is consistently reflected is the idea that any other economic consideration (growth, employment, competitiveness) can only be addressed insofar as it does not conflict with the priority objective of keeping inflation controlled around 2% ("What the ECB decides today...", Lagarde's warnings, Bundesbank projection).

How this power over inflation translates today

In recent Demócrata articles, it is seen how the ECB uses these competences to respond to inflation shocks: the war in the Middle East, oil volatility, or energy changes (upward inflation revision, renewable energy and inflation, energy tension). The Governing Council adjusts or maintains rates to prevent these spikes from becoming a structural problem (imminent action, expectations of a rate hike, preparation for the move).

At the same time, the institution insists it can no longer be the sole "engine" of economic stability and calls for structural reforms from national governments, as reflected in a specific analysis of the impact of ECB decisions on millions of Spaniards (impact in Spain). This combination of a strict legal mandate on inflation and a growing political dimension in its discourse defines today the ECB's role in price control in the eurozone.

What exactly does the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU say about the mandate of the ECB and the ESCB? How do recent ECB decisions on interest rates affect the Spanish economy and politics? What is the relationship between the future implementation of the digital euro and the ECB's price stability mandate?

What results did the current Government obtain in the last general elections regarding the evolution of inflation?

The current Government (coalition of PSOE and Sumar) emerged from the general elections of July 23, 2023, with a close result: the PP was the leading force with 137 seats, but the sum of PSOE (121) and Sumar (31) reached 152 and was able to renew the investiture with nationalist and separatist support. All this after a cycle of very high inflation in 2021‑2022 and more moderate in 2023, but with a cumulative price increase since 2020 of 16.6%, which eroded household incomes. The consulted sources do not offer a direct causal analysis between inflation and electoral result, although they do depict a context of strong wear on purchasing power during the mandate that Pedro Sánchez renewed.

Results of July 23 and Government force balance

Articles of surveys and analyses published by the newspaper Demócrata systematically cite the official results of July 23 as a reference:

  • PP: 33.1% of the vote and 137 seats.
  • PSOE: 31.7% of the vote and 121 seats.
  • Vox: 12.4% of the vote and 33 seats.
  • Sumar: 12.3% of the vote and 31 seats (with Podemos integrated).

These data are used, for example, in comparisons of polls collected in pieces like the Sigma Dos survey, which recalls that "in the 2023 general elections, PP and Vox reached 170 seats: 137 from PP and 33 from Vox," while Sánchez obtained 7,821,718 votes and 121 deputies (Sigma Dos survey).

In terms of governability, Demócrata summarizes the new legislature as follows: PSOE and Sumar add up to 147 seats and depend on a broad investiture bloc (ERC, Junts, EH Bildu, PNV, BNG, Podemos, and CC) that raises the Government's majority to 179 seats, compared to the 171 gathered by PP, Vox, and UPN (analysis of the investiture bloc). That is, the current Government renewed its mandate with fewer own seats than in 2020, but with a parliamentary majority rebuilt over several partners.

Inflation evolution before and during July 23

For the price evolution in the years before and around the 2023 elections, the most systematic reference is the presentation of macroeconomic projections by the Bank of Spain, which summarizes the recent cycle of the harmonized consumer price index (HICP) for Spain (Bank of Spain presentation):

  • 2021: average HICP inflation around 3.0%.
  • 2022: strong surge, with average inflation of 8.3%, driven mainly by energy and food.
  • 2023: moderation, with an average of 3.4%, although on a price level already very high due to previous increases.

The Bank of Spain itself emphasizes that "general inflation has risen appreciably in recent months, from 2.9% in February to 3.8% in May," but core inflation (excluding energy and unprocessed food) followed a gradual deceleration process throughout 2023‑2024. That is, when the July 2023 elections were held, Spain came from a very high inflation peak in 2022 and a 2023 with lower but still above ECB target rates.

From the citizen's pocket perspective, an economic analysis published in Demócrata quantifies the accumulated effect: "The cumulative price increase since 2020 is 16.6%, which reduces families' purchasing power and per capita income in our country, which is still 2.7% below the pre-pandemic level" ("A fiscal policy for the vast majority"). It is in this context of income devaluation via inflation that the current Government is renewed.

What relationship do the sources depict between inflation and electoral result?

The consulted sources provide, on one hand, the economic framework (very high inflation in 2022, more moderate but persistent in 2023 and following years) and, on the other, the political and electoral map after July 23. However, they do not offer a specific study quantitatively relating inflation to voting behavior in those elections.

In subsequent analyses, a background narrative is appreciated: Demócrata talks about "a true devaluation of incomes and wages via inflation" while the Government boasts that Spain is among the fastest-growing countries in the EU (economic opinion article), and various averages of later polls show how, over time, PP and Vox consolidate a potential majority well above the 170 seats they obtained in 2023 (general poll tracking).

With all this, strictly answering your question, it can only be affirmed with support from the sources that: the current Government renewed its mandate in 2023 in a context of very intense cumulative inflation since 2020 and still high rates in 2023; and that this inflation implied a clear loss of purchasing power for households. No further information is available in the consulted sources to quantify how much of that economic wear translated directly into the July 23 results.

Can you break down exactly how the sum of seats of Sánchez's investiture bloc compared to the PP‑Vox bloc after July 23? How did inflation evolve month by month in Spain during 2022 and 2023, especially in the months immediately before July 23, 2023? What do polls after the 2023 elections say about citizens' perception of the Government's economic management and inflation?

Play

Test your knowledge with FREN!

How much do you know about this topic? Answer the following 3 questions.

What percentage did the CPI reach in Spain in July 2026?

Question 1 of 3

What is the difference between the inflation measured by the HICP in Spain and in the eurozone in July 2026?

Question 2 of 3

What measure did the Government take regarding diesel in response to the rise in fuel prices in July 2026?

Question 3 of 3