The Council of Fiscal Policy approves the reform of autonomous financing with the "no" of half of the autonomies

The reform of the regional financing system is not regulated by a single specific procedure but is structured by combining political negotiation, government decisions, and usually one or more state laws (and, if applicable, statutory or even constitutional reforms). Below is a description of the typical itinerary of administrative and parliamentary procedures that it should overcome before being considered definitively approved.

1. Prior governmental and technical phase

Before reaching the Cortes, a long political and administrative phase usually takes place, which is not always legally predetermined but is practically essential:

• Internal technical work: the Ministry of Finance (and other involved parties) commissions its technical and study services to carry out simulations, impact reports, and draft models (distribution formulas, funds, equalization guarantees, etc.). This phase does not have a formal closed procedure but is key to shaping a viable proposal.
• Bilateral and multilateral political negotiation: the central government maintains contacts with regional presidents and finance ministers, usually in parallel with parliamentary negotiations supporting the government or the Budgets. These are political decisions, not regulated, but they condition the subsequent legal content.
• Fiscal and Financial Policy Council (CPFF): this State-CCAA body is the natural forum to discuss the model. Its agreements do not replace the law but can be:
  • Advisory or political: declarations of principles or reference frameworks.
  • More substantial commitments: agreements on specific variables (funds, indicators, transitional periods), which must then be reflected in norms with the force of law.
• Bill draft: when there is minimum internal consensus, the Government prepares a bill draft or reform of several financing laws, which is submitted to:
  • Internal reports (Technical General Secretariat, State Attorney).
  • External reports, where mandatory: Council of State, Bank of Spain, or other advisory bodies, depending on the scope of the text.
• Approval in the Council of Ministers: the Government, by agreement of the Council of Ministers, approves the bill and sends it to the Congress of Deputies. This decision is adopted by a simple internal majority of the Council.

2. Ordinary parliamentary processing (state bill)

Once registered in the Congress, the reform follows the common legislative procedure:

• Qualification and admission for processing by the Congress Board and publication of the text. As it is a government bill, there is no vote of “taking into consideration.”
• Amendment period: groups may submit total amendments (with alternative text) and amendments to the articles. The former are debated in the Plenary; their rejection requires a simple majority for the bill to continue.
• Committee and subcommittee: the text goes to a subcommittee and then to the competent committee, which debates the articles and amendments and approves a report. Decisions are made by simple majority.
• Congress Plenary: the Plenary debates the report and reserved amendments and votes on the entire bill. For an ordinary law, a simple majority of votes cast is sufficient; if any part requires organic law status, those provisions would require an absolute majority in a final vote on the organic part.
• Referral to the Senate: the Senate may approve the text, propose amendments, or issue a veto. The veto is approved by absolute majority or, after two months, by simple majority.
• Second round in the Congress: the Congress:
  • May accept or reject the Senate's amendments by simple majority.
  • May override the Senate's veto by absolute majority in a first vote, or by simple majority after two months.
• Sanction, promulgation, and publication: once the final text is approved, it is sent to the King for sanction and promulgation and published in the Official State Gazette (BOE). The law comes into force on the date set in its final provision or, failing that, after 20 days.

3. Role of the Autonomous Communities

Besides their political participation in the CPFF and bilateral negotiations, they may intervene in other ways:

• Mandatory or optional reports: if the norm intensely affects regional competences, reports may be requested from regional bodies (Consultative Councils, regional parliaments), generally non-binding unless specific statutory provision exists.
• Legislative initiative: regional assemblies may approve proposals for law before the Congress proposing an alternative or complementary model, which would follow the same procedure as any bill proposal.
• Subsequent control: the Autonomous Communities may raise competence conflicts or constitutional challenges if they consider the reform violates their competences or the principle of financial autonomy.

4. Possible statutory or constitutional reforms

If the new model requires modifying Statutes of Autonomy or even the Constitution, additional procedures would be activated:

• Statutory reforms: usually initiated within the Autonomous Community itself, requiring approval by its Parliament and by the General Courts through an organic law (absolute majority in each chamber), and in some cases, an autonomous referendum.
• Constitutional reform: if relevant constitutional provisions are affected (e.g., basic principles of territorial organization), the procedure of Title X of the Constitution must be followed, with reinforced majorities and, in certain cases, dissolution of the Cortes and referendum.

In summary, the final approval of a regional financing reform combines intense prior political negotiation with an ordinary or reinforced legislative procedure, in which parliamentary majorities (simple, organic, or even constitutional) give legal validity to the agreements reached in interterritorial forums.

The competencies and functions of the Minister of Finance in Spain are generally defined by the regulations on the Government and the General State Administration, and specifically by the royal decrees organizing the ministries. The key references are the Law 50/1997, of November 27, on the Government and the Royal Decree 829/2023, of November 20, restructuring ministerial departments, as well as the royal decree on the basic organic structure of the Ministry of Finance itself.

1. General functions of any minister

The Government Law configures the minister as a member of the Government and head of a ministerial department. According to the law text, ministers:

• Have competence and responsibility in the specific sphere of their department's activity. That is, they are the highest political and administrative authority in their material scope.
• Must develop the Government's action in their scope, in accordance with the agreements of the Council of Ministers and the guidelines of the Prime Minister.
• Exercise regulatory power in matters pertaining to their department, issuing norms of lower rank than law (mainly ministerial orders) and proposing royal decrees to the Council of Ministers.
• Exercise all other competences attributed to them by laws and the organization and functioning rules of the Government and the General State Administration.
• May countersign the acts of the King regarding matters within their competence, assuming the corresponding political responsibility.

All this is inserted in the general structure fixed by Law 50/1997: the Prime Minister directs the Government's action and coordinates the ministers, while the Council of Ministers approves bills, the General State Budget Bill, royal decree-laws, royal legislative decrees, and regulations developing laws. The minister participates in all these collegiate decisions and executes those affecting their department.

2. Specific competencies of the Minister of Finance

Royal Decree 829/2023, in its regulation of the current ministerial structure, expressly establishes that:

• The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the proposal and execution of the Government's policy in matters of public finance, budgets, and expenditures, in addition to other competences and attributions conferred by the legal system.
• The Ministry is structured, as superior bodies, into the State Secretariat for Finance and the State Secretariat for Budgets and Expenditures, which depend on the minister and through which much of the management is channeled.

Based on this legal foundation, and in connection with the set of financial and budgetary norms, the material functions of the Minister of Finance include, among others:

• The direction and coordination of the State's budgetary policy, including the preparation, promotion, and defense of the General State Budget Bill, which is then approved by the Council of Ministers and sent to the General Courts.
• The formulation and execution of the public revenue policy, particularly tax policy (design, proposal, and management of state taxes) and other financing figures of the state public sector.
• The direction of the expenditure policy and its control, through budgeting, monitoring, and budgetary stability mechanisms provided by legislation.
• The organization and supervision of the management of the Public Treasury and State debt, including proposals to the Council of Ministers on public debt issuance and credit operations when allowed by law, in accordance with the Government Law.
• Participation in the financing of autonomous communities and local entities, within the framework of laws regulating territorial financing.

3. Normative capacity and initiative of the Minister of Finance

Regarding legislation and regulation, Law 50/1997 establishes that the Government exercises legislative initiative and regulatory power. On that basis:

• The Minister of Finance may promote bill drafts in matters within their competence (tax, budgetary, financial, etc.), which are processed internally and, once approved by the Council of Ministers, become bills sent to the General Courts.
• May propose royal decrees to the Council of Ministers that develop laws in the fiscal and budgetary field, in accordance with the regulation drafting procedure provided in the Government Law.
• In direct exercise of their regulatory power, issues ministerial orders in matters proper to Finance (tax management, budgeting, accounting, Treasury, etc.), always within the framework of laws and regulations approved by the Government.

In summary, according to current legislation, the Minister of Finance is the highest responsible for public finance, the State budget, and expenditure, with broad political and administrative leadership functions, and significant capacity for initiative and regulatory development within the framework set by the General Courts and the Government itself.

Based on the information available from consulted sources (mainly news from Demócrata, regional press, and some national media), a reasonably detailed picture of the results and parliamentary composition in several communities governed by the Popular Party (PP) can be drawn, although only in some cases are complete seat figures by party available. Below is a summary, community by community, of what is explicitly documented and the type of majority with which the PP governs.

Communities where the PP governs alone with an absolute majority

Community of Madrid

The Assembly of Madrid is one of the clearest examples of PP absolute majority:

• According to 2025 survey analyses, it is recalled that in the 2023 regional elections, Isabel Díaz Ayuso's PP obtained 70 seats and an absolute majority in the Assembly of Madrid (the majority is 68).
• The same reference indicates that PSOE and Más Madrid obtained 27 seats each in 2023, while Vox had 10 deputies, and Podemos was left out of the Chamber.
• With these data, the PP governs alone: it does not need investiture support to maintain the regional government.

Galicia and other absolute majorities

An analysis of regional parliamentary activity in Spain points out that in Galicia, as well as in Andalusia and Balearic Islands, "absolute majorities predominate," which indicates:

• PP regional governments with a very comfortable parliamentary position.
• In these cases, the PP does not depend on stable investiture pacts with other forces to sustain the Government, although it may occasionally agree on initiatives.
• The consulted sources do not break down the complete seat distribution by party in Galicia; they only point to that PP absolute majority.

Communities where the PP governs thanks to Vox (coalition or investiture agreement)

Aragon

For Aragon, a fairly precise picture is available after the most recent regional elections:

• An electoral chronicle on the February 8, 2026 regional elections sets the seat distribution as follows: PP 26, PSOE 18, Vox 14, CHA 6, Aragón Existe 2, IU–Sumar 1.
• The PP is the most voted force but does not reach an absolute majority in the Aragonese Cortes, so it needs Vox for investiture and governance.
• Various reports point to a government agreement between PP and Vox, making Vox a key partner in Aragon.

Andalusia

After the latest Andalusian regional elections (May 2026), a relevant change occurred:

• Juanma Moreno's PP "won the elections again" but lost the absolute majority it had reached in 2022. It obtained 53 seats in a 109-seat Parliament, "two short of the 55 needed to govern alone."
• Vox achieved 15 seats, so PP + Vox total 68 deputies, above the absolute majority.
• Investiture and health chronicles report that PP and Vox have signed a "Government and Stability Agreement for Andalusia" that leads to a coalition government and allows Moreno's investiture with votes from both parties.
• Therefore, the PP governs Andalusia in coalition with Vox, on a clearly majority parliamentary basis.

Balearic Islands

In the Balearics, the PP government also rests on Vox, although starting from a very strong PP majority:

• A survey recalls that in the 2023 regional elections, Marga Prohens's PP obtained 25 seats and Vox 8 seats in the Balearic Parliament; the absolute majority is set at 30 deputies.
• Prohens reached the Government "propelled" by Vox, and the PP "needs the far right to govern in the Islands," indicating a investiture and government agreement between PP and Vox.
• The rest of the seats correspond to left-wing formations, but the cited sources do not detail the exact number of deputies for each party.

Extremadura, Castilla y León, Valencian Community, and Murcia

Several texts (including Vox statements and press analyses) identify a common pattern in these communities:

• Vox lists Castilla y León, Aragon, Valencian Community, Extremadura, and the Region of Murcia as autonomous communities where there were coalition governments or government agreements with the PP, from which the party decided to withdraw in July 2024.
• Other regional political analyses confirm that in these communities the PP did not have an absolute majority and that investiture and governance depended on Vox (in the form of coalition or stable parliamentary support).
• However, the consulted materials do not provide a complete and explicit breakdown of all seats by party in Extremadura, Castilla y León, Valencian Community, or Murcia after their latest elections; only that the PP governs with a simple majority and that Vox is its essential partner.

Conclusion

In summary, the PP governs a majority of Spanish autonomous communities combining two models: absolute majorities in territories like Madrid and Galicia (without needing partners) and coalition or external support governments with Vox in Aragon, Andalusia, Balearics, Extremadura, Castilla y León, Valencian Community, and Murcia. Where sources provide precise numbers (Madrid, Aragon, Andalusia, Balearics), it is clear that the PP is the leading force, but the sum with Vox ensures the parliamentary majority sufficient for investiture and government stability.