The workers of Airbus decide to maintain the indefinite strike

In Spain, the suspension or cancellation of an indefinite strike is not regulated with the same detail as its call, but the same legal framework is applied by analogy: those who have the capacity to call it are those who can suspend or end it, through formal communication to the employer and, when appropriate, to the labor authority.

1. Who can suspend or cancel the strike

• Calling trade unions: if the strike was called by one or more unions, the body or persons who made the strike decision (usually the competent union leadership) are those who can decide its suspension, cancellation, or termination.
• Works council / staff delegates: if they were the callers (possible when there is no union or it does not assume the call), the representative body itself can adopt the suspension agreement by majority according to its internal rules.
• Non-unionized workers: when the strike was called by a workers' assembly, the suspension agreement is adopted in the same way: convened assembly, debate, and vote, with the majorities established for the call.

In all cases, the principle is: the strike can only be modified (suspended, cancelled, resumed) by those who called it or by the body that legitimately replaces them.

2. Cancel, suspend, and end: practical differences

• Cancel: to nullify a strike before it begins or very early on. It is communicated that the strike will not take place or is withdrawn. This is most common when an agreement is reached before the effective start.
• Suspend: to temporarily interrupt an indefinite strike, expressly leaving open the possibility of resuming it. It makes sense in negotiation contexts: the "conflict is paused" to facilitate an agreement or evaluate proposals.
• Declare ended: to state that the strike concludes definitively. This implies closing the collective conflict in that specific format, although other means of pressure may be considered in the future.

Legally, the key is the communication made to the company and the labor authority and how it is formulated (temporary suspension or definitive termination).

3. Basic legal and administrative steps

• Formal agreement of the callers: the union, committee, or assembly must adopt an express agreement of suspension, cancellation, or termination. It is advisable to draw up a written record stating the date, body, majority, and scope of the decision.
• Communication to the company or employing Administration:
  • It must be done in writing (certified email, burofax, registry, etc.).
  • It must clearly indicate: type of decision (suspend/cancel/end), date and time of effect, and affected center(s) or scope.
  • In case of suspension, it is advisable to foresee whether it will automatically resume if negotiations fail or if a new notice will be required.
• Communication to the labor authority:
  • Although the law focuses more on the communication of the call, in practice the suspension or cancellation is also notified to the labor authority that received the prior notice.
  • This allows closing the administrative file and coordinating information about minimum services, mediations, etc.

4. Coordination with minimum services and work organization

• Minimum services: in essential services, the authority sets minimum services linked to the strike call. If the strike is suspended or ended:
  • They cease to apply from the moment of suspension or termination.
  • It is important that the suspension communication is immediate and clear to prevent the company from continuing to organize shifts as if the strike continued.
• Reintegration: the agreement must clarify whether reintegration is immediate from a specific time or at the next shift.

5. Effects on payroll and contributions

• During the days of effective strike, no salary or contributions accrue for the hours not worked.
• From the communicated date and time of suspension or termination, time is again remunerated and contributed normally.
• It is advisable that the workers' representation reviews subsequent calculations (deductions and adjustments) and that, in case of conflict, mediation or claim channels are used.

6. Specific role of trade unions

• They negotiate with the company or Administration the agreements that make suspension or termination possible (salary increases, guarantees, schedules, etc.).
• They decide internally, according to their statutes, the opportunity to suspend or not the strike and consult the membership and often the entire workforce through assemblies.
• They handle the documentary formalization: drafting minutes, official communications, and, if applicable, registration or deposit of the agreements reached (for example, if they translate into a collective agreement or modification of the collective bargaining agreement).

In summary, the formal suspension of an indefinite strike involves a clear agreement of the callers and precise written communications to the company and labor authority, with an essential role of the unions when they lead the conflict.

The Interconfederal Mediation and Arbitration Service (SIMA) is the main state body for autonomous resolution of collective labor conflicts in Spain when the conflict exceeds the scope of a single autonomous community or is linked to sectoral collective bargaining at the state level. Its action is based on mediation, voluntary arbitration, and other mechanisms to promote negotiation, within the framework set by interprofessional agreements signed by unions and employers under the Workers' Statute.

Legal framework and nature of SIMA

SIMA is organized through the SIMA Foundation, which acts as the management body of the Interconfederal Mediation and Arbitration System. Various state collective agreements – for example, those of Bimbo or Radio Popular, published in the BOE – expressly adhere to the Agreement on Autonomous Resolution of Labor Conflicts (ASAC) and designate the SIMA Foundation as the competent body in mediation and, if applicable, arbitration for collective conflicts within their scope.

This ASAC (currently in its sixth version, VI ASAC) is adopted under article 83.3 of the Workers' Statute, which allows state-level union and employer organizations to sign interprofessional agreements on matters such as autonomous resolution of labor conflicts. The VI ASAC text itself regulates in detail:

• The types of conflicts that can be submitted to SIMA.
• The mediation and arbitration procedures, their deadlines and requirements.
• The organization and functioning of the SIMA Foundation.

Material competencies: what conflicts it addresses

According to collective agreement resolutions published in the BOE and information from the organization itself collected in specialized media, SIMA intervenes in:

• Conflicts arising from sectoral collective bargaining, when there is a prolonged deadlock in negotiating a state agreement. Article 14.2.c) of the VI ASAC, cited by SIMA, allows that if the deadlock persists after five months from the constitution of the negotiating table, either party may request mediation with the support of the majority of its respective representation.
• Conflicts of interpretation and application of collective agreements with a scope larger than an autonomous community, once the joint committee of the agreement has been exhausted. Several state agreements expressly provide that if the joint committee does not reach an agreement, the procedure before SIMA regulated in the ASAC will be used.
• Collective conflicts linked to strikes, ERE or other collective processes, when the parties opt for mediation before SIMA to try to reach an agreement that avoids or modulates conflict (as shown by numerous recent cases in sectors such as service stations, insurance, or large industrial companies).
• In general, any collective labor conflict of supra-autonomous scope to which unions and employers have adhered to the ASAC or include submission clauses to SIMA in their agreements.

Mediation functions

SIMA's central function is mediation. According to information provided by the organization itself to specialized media:

• Mediation introduces a neutral figure that facilitates rapprochement between the parties (union and employer representatives).
• Once the formal request is submitted, no more than ten days may elapse between the start of processing and the holding of the first mediation meeting.
• The meeting includes delegations of the parties, one or more mediators appointed, and a SIMA lawyer who records the entire process.
• If no agreement is reached but the parties want to continue negotiating, a postponement record is signed to continue mediation in new sessions, with no predetermined maximum duration for the procedure.
• Mediation can coexist with ordinary negotiation of the agreement, functioning as a parallel channel that promotes dialogue.

Arbitration functions and other avenues

Besides mediation, SIMA can manage voluntary arbitration procedures. In these cases:

• The parties agree to submit to an independent arbitrator appointed according to ASAC rules.
• The arbitrator issues an arbitral award whose effectiveness may be binding if the parties have previously accepted this effect, similarly to an agreement reached in a collective agreement or a registered collective pact.

SIMA also has a procedure to promote negotiation, less formal than classic mediation, in which a facilitating figure accompanies the parties to reactivate dialogue and redirect negotiation without replacing their autonomy.

Territorial scope and coordination

Various collective agreements distinguish between conflicts of autonomous and supra-autonomous scope. When the conflict is limited to a single autonomous community, autonomous mediation and arbitration services are usually used; if it affects several centers in different communities or a state agreement, the interconfederal system managed by the SIMA Foundation is activated, under the terms of the VI ASAC and its implementing regulations.

The precedents of strikes and labor conflicts at Airbus in Spain over the last two decades show a recurring pattern of tension around wages, work organization, and job stability, usually resolved through collective agreements combining wage increases, telework regulation, and employment commitments. The available information focuses mainly on the most recent cycle (VI and VII agreements and the 2026 strike), but allows extracting useful trends to understand what usually happens in these conflicts.

General framework: agreements and conflict resolution mechanisms

The VII collective agreement of Airbus Defence and Space, Airbus Operations, and Airbus Helicopters Spain, registered in 2025 (text in the BOE), incorporates much of the accumulated experience from previous conflicts. Its preamble emphasizes that, after the VI Agreement, employment levels similar to those before COVID-19 had been recovered and that the shared objective is workforce stability, linked to the competitiveness of Spanish plants.

The agreement includes:

• Internal tools to manage crises (cyclical or structural) within collective bargaining, aiming to avoid traumatic layoffs.
• A joint monitoring committee and referral to autonomous conflict resolution systems (ASAC, SERCLA, ILCM, SMAC), activated when there is no internal agreement.
• Detailed regulation of professional categories, bonuses, shifts, special working hours, and work reorganization mechanisms, which are often the background of many conflicts.

This regulatory framework shows that, compared to previous conflicts, Airbus and the unions have institutionalized mediation and arbitration channels to channel strikes, ERE/ERTE, or restructurings via employment plans and collective agreements, rather than only unilateral decisions.

The recent cycle of conflicts and the 2026 strike

The most intense documented episode is the 2026 conflict, which crystallized in a strike starting on July 1 called by the SIPA union and later joined by UGT, CGT, ÚTIL, and later CCOO. The strike affected the main Spanish plants (Getafe, Illescas, Albacete, San Pablo, and Tablada, with participation also from Cádiz), becoming an almost generalized conflict in all plants nationwide, as reported by Demócrata (analysis of the strike's key points).

The main triggers were:

• A wage proposal that unions considered insufficient to recover the accumulated loss of purchasing power, estimated around 10-11% since the pandemic.
• Airbus's decision to reduce telework from two days a week to one starting in September, interpreted as a unilateral alteration of conditions.
• The treatment of temporary disability and the use of the Bradford system for absenteeism control, subject to judicial litigation.

The conflict escalated to an indefinite strike starting August 25, 2026, approved in assemblies at key centers (Demócrata; news about the indefinite strike). Thousands of workers mobilized, especially in Getafe and Andalusian centers, with marches and large demonstrations.

Typical results of previous conflicts

Although the consulted documentation does not provide a year-by-year list of all strikes since the early 2000s, it does show the results obtained in the most recent conflicts and how that experience has been transferred to the 2024-2026 agreement and accords:

• Staggered wage agreements: in the pre-agreement reached with CCOO in 2026, a raise of around 12% until 2027 was agreed, linked to the CPI and with additional components for promotions and individual reviews (pre-agreement with CCOO). In subsequent mediation, Airbus proposed increases linked to the real CPI plus an additional 7.6% until 2030 and an extraordinary payment to compensate accumulated differences (Airbus salary offer).
• Guarantees on telework and work organization: after protests, the company committed to maintain the current telework agreement and respect individual agreements, as well as preserve vacation regimes and open commissions on transport, canteen, and flexible hours.
• Correction of unilateral decisions on temporary disability and absenteeism: Airbus withdrew the appeal to the Supreme Court regarding payment of supplements in temporary disability, committed to refund deducted amounts, and to negotiate an alternative absenteeism control system, according to UGT's note (UGT statement).
• Commitments on stability and reindustrialization: within the VII Agreement and projects like the so-called “Bromo Project” and specific agreements for Cádiz, the company guarantees the continuity of agreement conditions, preservation of seniority, and absence of new probation periods for personnel integrated into new companies, as UGT notes in the same statement. These commitments aim to cushion the impact of restructurings on direct employment.

General assessment

Overall, the precedents of conflicts at Airbus Spain in recent years have resulted in a combination of significant wage improvements, consolidation of telework, correction of absenteeism policies, and employment stability commitments recorded in agreements and employment plans. The usual dynamic has been tough conflicts — with prolonged strikes and broad mobilization — resolved at the negotiation table, with mediation from bodies like SIMA and subsequent incorporation of agreements into the collective agreement. Although earlier stages included ERE, ERTE, and plant closures, the analyzed documentation focuses mainly on this more recent phase, where emphasis progressively shifts towards preventive negotiation and internal crisis management mechanisms to avoid traumatic outcomes.