World economy: the five risks that will mark the second half of 2026

The latest reforms of the EU's international trade policy are mostly at very advanced stages or already concluded in the ordinary legislative procedure. The new foreign investment screening framework and the revision of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) have closed the Parliament–Council cycle and are in the publication and phased implementation stage. The modernization of the trade agreement with Mexico is currently at the plenary voting and signing stage, while other trade defense adjustments are being implemented via Commission implementing regulations. Overall, the "open strategic autonomy" agenda is moving from the parliamentary phase to implementation and political oversight.

1. Foreign investment screening (FDI screening)

This is the clearest reform block procedurally:

• In April 2025, the European Parliament's International Trade Committee approved new investment screening rules, expanding sectors subject to mandatory screening (media, critical raw materials, transport, etc.) and strengthening coordination between Member States and the Commission, according to the Parliament note “New screening rules for foreign investment in the EU”.
• In June 2025, the Council (Coreper) set its negotiating position and authorized the start of trilogues with the European Parliament, according to the Council note on the FDI screening revision, and the Commission confirmed the start of interinstitutional talks in this communication.
• In May 2026, the Parliament plenary approved the new regulation with 508 votes in favor, sealing an agreement with Member States on mandatory controls in sensitive sectors; the note “Protecting EU strategic sectors from risky foreign investments” indicates that only formal Council approval was pending.
• That approval has now taken place: in June 2026, the Commission reported that the EU strengthens its foreign investment screening framework, with mandatory mechanisms in all Member States and expanded coverage, according to this note. The text is therefore out of the parliamentary phase and in the entry into force and application phase (18 months later, according to Parliament).

In other words, the FDI screening file has completed the Commission → Parliament (position and report) → trilogues → Parliament and Council approval circuit, and now enters its implementation phase.

2. Reforms of trade preferences and policy towards developing countries

In parallel, the revision of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) has also concluded the legislative procedure:

• On May 22, 2026, the Council formally adopted the revised GSP regulation, which strengthens the link between preferential access to the EU market and respect for human, labor, and environmental rights, and introduces for the first time a link with cooperation on migrant readmission, according to the Council note “Trade: Council signs off reinforced rules on trade preferences for developing countries”.
• The text is already in the signing and Official Journal publication phase and will apply from January 1, 2027.

From the parliamentary perspective, this means the file is closed: Parliament has already given its consent and the Council has adopted the regulation.

3. Modernization of trade agreements (Mexico as a typical case)

The modernization of "new generation" trade agreements combines several legislative phases depending on the content:

• With Mexico, the Commission and Member States have closed the new Modernized Global Agreement (MGA) and an Interim Trade Agreement (ITA), distinguishing the strictly commercial part (exclusive EU competence) from the political and cooperation part, as reported by the newspaper Demócrata in various pieces (analysis of the “split” model and Council green light).
• On July 6, 2026, Parliament announced plenary votes on both texts, followed by a press conference, according to the note “Press conference: EU-Mexico agreements”. This places the agreement in the full European Parliament plenary phase.
• Once approved by the European Parliament, the ITA can be provisionally applied (without national parliaments), while the MGA will require national ratifications, as also explained in Demócrata chronicles (EU–Mexico trade and political pact).

In sum, the commercial part with Mexico is in the final parliamentary stretch; the mixed part opens a subsequent cycle of national ratification outside the EU ordinary legislative procedure.

4. Trade defense and anti-coercion instruments

The latest reforms in trade defense instruments are not articulated so much as "major new laws" in parliamentary phase, but as adjustments to existing regulations and executive decisions:

• The Commission has strengthened the use of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy regulations by automatically registering imports of products under investigation to apply retroactive measures, as detailed in the 2024 communication on import registration in trade defense investigations ([link]).
• In parallel, the Anti-Coercion Instrument, frequently mentioned in Demócrata analyses and news in a political key (legal response to Washington's trade threats, Strasbourg debate on zero tariffs), is already an approved and operational regulation, i.e., out of the parliamentary phase and in a possible activation phase by the Commission.

5. General context of common trade policy

All this fits into the Commission's trade policy strategy led by Von der Leyen ("open strategic autonomy", sustainable trade, economic security instruments), described in analytical documents such as the Spanish Ministry of Trade fact sheet on EU trade policy or academic works from CEPC (study on sustainability clauses). According to the legislative agenda report by the newspaper Demócrata “Von der Leyen Agenda”, much of this Commission's priority trade initiatives are already in the execution or political monitoring phase, rather than in initial parliamentary processing stages.

In the US system, trade policy is a shared competence between Congress and the President. The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate foreign trade and set tariffs, but multiple laws have delegated broad powers to the President to negotiate agreements, impose or modify tariffs, and apply trade defense measures. In practice, the President directs the overall trade policy strategy and international negotiations, while Congress sets the legal frameworks and approves the most important agreements. Although I am not specialized in the US legal context (my main focus is Spain), I can summarize the main presidential powers recognized in US legislation.

Constitutional basis and division with Congress

The US Constitution assigns Congress the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations" and to "lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises." However, the President exercises foreign policy competence and acts as head of the federal Executive. This dual basis has led to a "shared power" model: Congress designs the major rules and delegates powers, and the President executes and specifies trade policy day-to-day.

Negotiation of international trade agreements

A central presidential power is negotiating trade agreements with other countries or blocs. In practice:

• Negotiation leadership: the President, through the United States Trade Representative (USTR), defines negotiation objectives and conducts dialogues with third countries for free trade agreements, sectoral agreements, or revisions of existing agreements.
• “Fast Track” or Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): through specific laws, Congress can grant the President authority to negotiate agreements that are then submitted to a yes/no vote without amendments. This strengthens the President's ability to close coherent agreements, although Congress retains the final say.
• Signing and submission to Congress: the President signs negotiated agreements and submits them to Congress for approval and implementation through domestic legislation.

Delegated tariff powers

Various trade laws have conferred on the President the ability to modify tariffs or impose restrictions within certain limits:

• Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (section 232): allows the President to restrict imports (e.g., increase tariffs or set quotas) when determined to threaten national security, following an investigation by the Department of Commerce.
• Trade Act of 1974 (section 301 and following): authorizes the Executive to adopt trade retaliation measures against practices considered unfair or discriminatory by other countries (e.g., subsidies, regulatory barriers), after an investigation procedure.
• Safeguard laws: under certain circumstances, the President can apply safeguard measures (additional tariffs or quantitative limits) to protect a domestic industry seriously harmed by increased imports.

Emergency measures, sanctions, and export controls

Besides purely trade laws, other rules grant the President very broad powers in security or foreign policy contexts:

• IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act): allows, after declaring a national emergency against external threats, to block transactions, freeze assets, and restrict imports or exports with certain countries, entities, or sectors.
• Sanctions laws: the President is usually empowered to impose economic and trade sanctions (e.g., sectoral embargoes, export bans on certain products) as a diplomatic pressure tool.
• Control of sensitive exports: through specific legislation, the President, via departments such as Commerce or Treasury, regulates export licenses for dual-use goods, advanced technologies, or defense material.

Administrative direction and enforcement of regulations

As head of the Executive Branch, the President oversees agencies that design and implement trade policy:

• The USTR leads trade policy formulation and WTO disputes.
• The Department of Commerce, the Treasury Department, and other agencies apply tariffs, anti-dumping measures, sanctions, and export controls under presidential guidelines.

Limits and checks

Although presidential powers in trade matters are broad, they are subject to important limits:

• They come from specific legislative delegations; Congress can modify or revoke them.
• Many acts are reviewable by federal courts, which oversee compliance with law and the Constitution.
• Major trade agreements generally require congressional approval to be fully effective domestically.

In summary, US legislation has made the President the main operational actor in trade policy, but within a framework defined and controlled by Congress and the judiciary.

Donald Trump had no institutional political career before first reaching the White House in 2017: he never held an elected office nor a position of responsibility in the Administration or Armed Forces. His prior trajectory was that of a real estate developer and media figure, from which he approached politics through donations, public appearances, and candidacy hints. From the mid-1980s he repeatedly expressed his presidential ambition, but only in 2015 did he start a formal electoral campaign that culminated in his 2016 victory. For this reason, he is often described as the first US president without prior government or military experience.

Absence of public office and outsider profile

According to reference biographical profiles, such as Trump's Wikipedia entry Wikipedia and the CIDOB analysis dossier CIDOB, Trump held no elected office (local, state, or federal) nor executive or military posts before 2017. This lack of prior political experience is one of the most emphasized traits of his figure, to the point that he reached the presidency directly from the private sector and media.

Journalist Roberto Montoya summarizes this transition by describing how Trump “went from real estate developer and showman to presidential candidate,” in an interview analyzing the “Trump 2.0” phenomenon after his return to the White House, published in eldiario.es. This outsider character is key to understanding his narrative of confrontation with the “Washington elites.”

Candidacy hints and political activity before 2015

Before the campaign that finally brought him to power, Trump made several attempts to enter institutional politics:

• 1980s and 2004: publicly considered running for president, without formalizing candidacies.
• 1999–2000: joined the Reform Party promoted by Ross Perot, participated in its primaries and won in states like California and Michigan, but withdrew before the national convention, again without holding any office.
• 2006 and 2014: speculated about running for governor of New York, which also did not materialize.
• 2012 cycle: fueled the possibility of contesting the Republican primaries; some internal polls placed him well positioned, but he declined to compete and ended up supporting Republican candidate Mitt Romney, as recalled in chronicles collected by Univision.

In parallel, Trump engaged in public debate with political statements and financial support to both Democratic and Republican candidates, according to biographical summaries from Wikipedia and CIDOB. For years he used that visibility to position himself on issues such as taxation, trade, or immigration and to back figures like Ronald Reagan, John McCain, or Romney himself.

Media platform and political brand building

A fundamental part of his trajectory before 2017 is his role as a media star. The reality show The Apprentice, which aired on NBC for thirteen years, is presented as a key piece in building his public image. A report on MIPCOM 2024 explains how that reality format helped “change the course of US political history,” by consolidating the Trump brand as a strong leader and successful businessman, something analyzed in detail in this MIPCOM report.

The film “The Apprentice. The Story of Trump” precisely recreates those 1970s and 1980s years in New York, with the encounter between a young Trump and Roy Cohn, a lawyer and political operator who taught him the aggressive use of media, litigation, and confrontation as power tools. Although the film is not a documentary, it reflects how, even then, Trump began moving in the political environment from the business and media world.

Other analyses about his relationship with Russia and Vladimir Putin, such as the report from eldiario.es, also place his attempts to do business in Russia and contacts with Kremlin-linked advisors in the 1990s and 2000s, which later had political relevance during the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 elections.

Formal launch of his career and 2016 victory

The transition from media figure to professional politician occurred on June 16, 2015, when Trump announced his Republican presidential candidacy from Trump Tower in New York, a milestone recorded in Wikipedia and also summarized in the educational video on YouTube. From there, he chained victories in primaries against career politicians like Marco Rubio or Jeb Bush and became the official Republican candidate for the 2016 presidential election.

His campaign relied on a populist and nationalist message (“Make America Great Again”), a strong presence in media and social networks—including highly controversial episodes such as promoting conspiracy theories about Barack Obama's origin—and a mobilized base that perceived him as the antithesis of the establishment. Various graphic and chronological materials, such as the gallery from Univision or popular compilations on social media like Instagram, another Instagram piece, or the historical infographic of US presidencies commented by El Orden Mundial, place that 2016 victory as a turning point that brought an entrepreneur without prior government experience to the White House for the first time.

In summary, before his first term Trump had no “political career” in the classic sense of climbing public offices, but rather a combination of frustrated ambitions, activism and political financing, media self-promotion, and finally a late but rapid entry into electoral competition starting in 2015.