It has been a long wait, but it is finally here. The Secretary of State for Energy has released for public consultation and information (until September 3rd) the proposal to develop the new model of independent aggregator. The text specifies the rules that consumers, marketers, and aggregators must follow to participate in this scheme.
The figure of the independent aggregator is already contemplated in the European regulations and was incorporated into the Spanish legal framework as a subject of the electricity sector. The Royal Decree 88/2026 introduced its rights, obligations, and requirements and left some of the necessary elements for its effective functioning pending development. The proposal now submitted for public consultation addresses those aspects.
1. How the reference consumption will be calculated
One of the central elements will be the Base Reference Program (PRB), which represents the consumption that would have occurred if the independent aggregator had not activated the flexibility of the consumers.
The proposal establishes a declarative model with adjustment based on the actual measurement. The System Operator will calculate the PRB based on the consumption forecast sent by the independent aggregator and will adjust it with the real difference observed between that forecast and the measurement recorded in the period immediately prior to activation.
This, according to sources in the sector, reinforces the integrity of the system by anchoring the baseline to the actual meter reading just before the event, making it difficult for forecasts to be inflated to simulate a flexibility that has not actually been provided.
2. 100% compensation of the daily market price
The proposal sets the compensation price for the energy mobilized by the independent aggregator at 100% of the daily market price when that energy has already been scheduled by the marketer. The compensation coefficient is therefore established at K=1.
The measure aims to avoid distortions and ensure that the activity of the independent aggregator does not economically affect marketers and direct consumers. Marketers fully recover the value of the energy that a third party alters in their scheduling, say those from the independent marketers' sector, which prevents economic losses and distortions on their purchases in the wholesale market.
3. How activations affect the position of marketers
The proposal establishes a centralized settlement scheme at the System Operator, which affects the independent aggregator and the marketer whose scheduled energy has subsequently been mobilized by the former in the wholesale markets.
The text expressly rules out a mutualized compensation system. With that model, the cost of the deviations generated by the aggregator's activity would have fallen on the set of settlement subjects and, ultimately, on demand and final consumers.
The design assumes that the cost of each activation falls on who originates it and who suffers it, not on the entire system, say the operators consulted by Demócrata. In this way, the final consumer does not finance with their tariff the profitability of third-party activations.
4. Information exchanges between aggregators, marketers, and the System Operator
The model also establishes new rules for the exchange of information among participants. One of the main decisions is that the System Operator will not send the Base Reference Program of the independent aggregators to the marketers during activation periods. The proposal argues that this information is not necessary for marketers to develop their activity and that its knowledge could alter their future behavior in the market.
Conversely, when the System Operator sends the independent aggregators the individualized measurement of the CUPS they operate on, the values corresponding to the marketer to which each CUPS belongs will be sent in an anonymized manner.
The objective is to protect confidentiality in both directions, say sources familiar with the functioning of the market: the aggregator does not access the marketer's client portfolio and the latter cannot anticipate the aggregator's movements in the market.
5. Multiple marketers at the same supply point
The right of consumers to have more than one electricity supply contract simultaneously at the same supply point is developed, provided that there is a consumption record and the established conditions are met. The consumer may only contract with a single marketer in each settlement period of the production market.
At the operational level, the System Operator will assign to each integration period the corresponding programming unit of the marketer according to the information provided by the distributor. These multi-marketer supplies will be considered with quarter-hourly measurements, of 15 minutes. When the meter does not have the capacity to record this data, the person in charge of the reading will send hourly data and the System Operator will calculate the quarter-hourly measurements through an algorithmic interpolation mechanism.
This configuration opens the door to specialized rates that can coexist in the same household, explain those from the independent marketers. For example, a consumer could contract a specific service to charge their electric vehicle during the early morning and maintain the traditional contract for the rest of the day, which would expand the options available to the consumer.
6. Brake on new registrations in marketers that fail to meet their guarantees
The proposal introduces a mechanism to prevent new registrations or changes of marketer in favor of companies that fail to meet the economic capacity requirement, specifically when they have not deposited the required guarantees with the System Operator.
To apply this measure, the System Operator will make available to the distributors, daily and before 15:00 hours, the list of marketers that do not have economic capacity. From the day following the notification, the distributor will not be able to process new supply registrations or changes in favor of those companies until the Operator communicates the restoration of the guarantees.
The measure represents a mechanism for consumer protection and market cleanup, the aforementioned sources maintain, by preventing operators at risk of insolvency from continuing to attract customers and transferring to consumers and the entire system the cost that could arise from a potential bankruptcy.