Jorge Buxadé (Patriots): "To despise your neighbor is to tell them to come live in Europe without papers"

Direct answer

As of 13-06-2026, there is no specific legislative initiative clearly identified as the implementation or adaptation of the new Return Regulation of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum in the Spanish General Courts (neither in the Congress nor in the Senate). Therefore, no specific “parliamentary phase” (consideration, committee, plenary, etc.) can be assigned to this implementation in Spain. At the EU level, the Pact comes into effect in June 2026 and the Return Regulation has reached a political agreement within the ordinary legislative procedure, but this has not yet translated into a specific parliamentary process in Spain. The Spanish adaptation is currently being carried out in a very limited way through executive regulatory norms and administrative adjustments, not through a major transposition law in the Courts.

European context of the Return Regulation

The Return Regulation is part of the new European Pact on Migration and Asylum, whose deployment was planned around June 2026. Unlike directives, EU regulations are directly applicable in Member States, so legally they do not require a classic “transposition law.” This does not prevent States from adjusting their internal law (for example, in immigration, administrative procedures, detention, or police coordination) to make it fully compatible. According to available information, in 2026 the Council and the European Parliament have reached a political agreement on the Return Regulation within the ordinary legislative procedure, in parallel with the other parts of the Pact, pending its final publication and phased entry into force.

Situation in Spain: absence of a specific parliamentary initiative

With data available as of 13-06-2026, there is no Government bill nor parliamentary group proposal in the Congress of Deputies whose declared purpose is the implementation of the Return Regulation or, more broadly, the global adaptation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum. Nor is there any ratified royal decree-law or one in the process of being converted into a bill explicitly presented as a norm applying the Pact or the Return Regulation. Consequently, there is no file in the Congress to which a specific phase (registration, consideration, committee report, Senate amendments, etc.) can be attributed regarding the implementation of that regulation.

In the Senate, the situation is equivalent: no own initiative appears (project sent by the Government, proposal from the Senate itself, or processing of a royal decree-law) whose title or explanatory statement clearly identifies it as the adaptation of the Pact or the Return Regulation. Political debates on migration are recorded, but they have not materialized into a norm labeled as such. For example, in a control session on June 9, 2026, a motion urging the Executive to take measures to implement the Pact was debated, but this is a political statement, not a law in process.

Government actions and indirect regulatory adjustments

Although there is no “implementation law” in parliamentary phase, the Government has started to move pieces on the regulatory and administrative level. The Royal Decree 316/2026, of April 14, which modifies the Immigration Regulation, is justified in the Official State Gazette as an adaptation linked to the upcoming entry into force of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum, but it is a regulatory norm approved directly by the Executive, outside the Courts. This route allows adjusting immigration procedures and return management without going through a full legislative debate.

Additionally, in January 2026 the Government has promoted a royal decree in urgent processing for an extraordinary regularization of migrants, and other labor and flow management measures have been approved, but these actions, although linked to the migratory context, do not equate to the parliamentary implementation of the Return Regulation. The press, including coverage by Demócrata, records criticism for the delay of Spain and other States in presenting the necessary national reforms, emphasizing that the Pact begins to apply while in several countries there are still no adaptation laws presented.

Implications regarding the “parliamentary phase”

Since there is no identifiable initiative of a “Law implementing the Return Regulation” or similar, the strict answer to your question is that, in Spain, the implementation is not in any parliamentary phase because it simply has not started as such in the General Courts. What exists is, on the one hand, the progress of the ordinary legislative procedure at the European level (political agreement on the Return Regulation in the European Parliament and the Council) and, on the other, a partial adaptation start via regulations and executive decisions within the Spanish legal system.

Politically, this places Spain in a phase of preparation and technical adjustment, but not full legislative processing. It is foreseeable that, as the Return Regulation and the rest of the Pact are applied more intensely, the Government will end up submitting bills to amend the Immigration Law, asylum regulations, or other related norms; when that happens, then specific parliamentary phases (general debate, amendments, committee, etc.) can be discussed. Until 13-06-2026, however, that phase has not opened in the Congress or the Senate.

Initial summary

Jorge Buxadé, MEP for Vox since 2019, exercises in the European Parliament the same formal competencies as any MEP: legislative function (laws and budgets), political control over European institutions, and participation in international agreements, always within the procedures established by the Treaties and the internal Rules. In the current legislature, he is part of the Patriots for Europe group and focuses his work on key committees such as Civil Liberties (LIBE) and Environment (ENVI), as well as several delegations with Mediterranean countries. Added to this is his organic role as a European leader of Vox and member of the Council of the European Conservatives and Reformists Party (ECR), which grants him the capacity for political dialogue and negotiation within the conservative-reformist family. Although he is not listed as a “chief negotiator” or formal coordinator in specific committees, he acts de facto as a reference and head of the Vox delegation in articulating positions on issues such as immigration, security, sovereignty, and the green agenda.

Formal competencies of any MEP

Buxadé’s competencies and powers are primarily determined by the general statute of members of the European Parliament. According to the Parliament’s competency sheets and its internal Rules, an MEP:

• Participates in the EU’s legislative function: intervenes in the approval, modification, or rejection of legislative acts in the ordinary legislative procedure together with the Council, and in other special procedures when provided by the Treaties (EP competency sheet).
• Exercises an “indirect” political initiative: can urge the Parliament to request the Commission to present legislative proposals, and the Parliament itself has direct initiative in internal matters such as its organization, committees of inquiry, or the Ombudsman’s Statute (Internal Rules).
• Participates in the approval of the EU budget and the multiannual financial framework, with amendment and final approval powers (institutional explanation).
• Performs political control functions over the Commission and other institutions: questions, debates, committees of inquiry, and monitoring delegated and implementing acts.
• Participates in the appointment and control of the European Commission and in the approval of certain international agreements and EU enlargements.
• May be appointed as rapporteur or shadow rapporteur of legislative files, coordinator in a committee, or member of negotiation delegations, according to the internal rules of their group and the Parliament’s Rules.

Specific parliamentary functions of Jorge Buxadé

Based on this general framework, Buxadé’s profile and trajectory allow specifying in which bodies he exercises these competencies:

• He has been an MEP since 2019 and is currently part of the Patriots for Europe group, originating from Vox (official European Parliament profile, profile at El Demócrata).
• He is a full member of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Committee on Environment, Climate Change and Food Safety (ENVI), two of the committees with the heaviest legislative workload on matters such as immigration, fundamental rights, internal security, and the European Green Deal (El Demócrata).
• He is a full member of the Delegation for relations with the Maghreb countries and the Arab Maghreb Union (including the EU–Morocco, EU–Tunisia, and EU–Algeria joint parliamentary committees) and of the Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean, where he participates in the parliamentary component of the EU’s foreign policy towards its southern neighborhood.
• He is a substitute member of the Committee on Security and Defence and the Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the EU, which allows him to intervene when called upon and replace full members of his group.

In all these committees and delegations, his formal role is that of “member” or “substitute,” without recorded positions of chair, vice-chair, or coordinator. However, as these are central bodies in debates on immigration, security, energy sovereignty, or environmental regulation, his participation carries significant political weight for Vox’s and the Patriots for Europe group’s line in Brussels and Strasbourg.

Role as negotiator and European political leader

Beyond the specific committee, Buxadé combines his role as MEP with organic positions that give him negotiating projection in the European conservative space:

• He is vice president of Vox’s political area and a member of the National Executive Committee, which means he conveys the party’s strategy to Brussels and coordinates the delegation’s actions (El Demócrata, Vox).
• He has been a member of the Council of the European Conservatives and Reformists Party (ECR) since 2020, holding a prominent position in that European political family (European Parliament, biography).
• The press and political profiles describe him as a figure with the capacity for dialogue and alliance-building with like-minded parties in Europe around immigration, security, national sovereignty, and criticism of the dominant climate agenda (profile in El Crític, El Demócrata).

From a strictly regulatory perspective, a “negotiator” in the European Parliament is usually the rapporteur or the shadow rapporteurs of a legislative file, or the designated members of an interinstitutional negotiation delegation. In the information consulted, there is no record that Buxadé holds a stable position as rapporteur, shadow rapporteur, or group coordinator in a specific committee; his negotiating functions are rather expressed in:

• Leading the Vox delegation in the Patriots for Europe group, participating in defining the group’s line on sensitive issues.
• Heading or being part of political delegations in European missions and events (for example, meetings and forums like “Europa Viva 25”) where alliances with other right-wing parties are woven, as highlighted by El Demócrata.
• Regularly representing Vox in key debates of his committees (immigration, internal security, environment), articulating amendments and positions aligned with the party’s strategy and the bloc to which it belongs.

In summary, his formal competencies are those of any MEP, but his combination of presence in strategic committees, organic positions in Vox, and participation in European conservative structures makes him one of the main political negotiators of the Spanish radical right in the European Parliament, although without a specific regulatory title of “chief negotiator” in a particular file.

Concise answer

Spain can only sign return agreements with third countries if it simultaneously respects three legal frameworks: EU law (especially the TFEU and the Return Directive), national immigration regulations, and the protection of fundamental rights (Constitution and international Conventions such as the ECHR). This implies that agreements cannot violate the principle of non-refoulement, must guarantee fair procedures and dignified conditions in the return, and be compatible with the competencies and agreements already assumed by the European Union. Additionally, the signing procedure requires internal controls: Government authorization, possible parliamentary ratification, and, if applicable, Constitutional Court review. In practice, agreements usually take the form of bilateral readmission treaties or police cooperation, always subordinated to the current European regulations.

European legal framework

EU competencies and Member States’ margin

In immigration and return matters, the starting point is the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which grants the Union shared competencies in border control, asylum, and immigration policy. This means Spain can only subscribe return agreements with third countries to the extent that:

1) They do not encroach on areas already regulated or reserved for the EU. The Union has concluded readmission agreements with various third countries; where an EU agreement exists, Spain’s capacity to sign a parallel agreement is very limited and, in any case, must be fully compatible with the European agreement.

2) They are compatible with the common return regulations. Directive 2008/115/EC (Return Directive) sets minimum standards on return and expulsion of third-country nationals in irregular situations: procedure, guarantees, voluntary departure periods, detention, appeals, treatment of minors, etc. Any Spanish bilateral agreement:
– Cannot lower those minimum guarantees.
– Must respect the principle of proportionality in return measures.
– Cannot allow practices incompatible with European rules on detention, legal assistance, or deadlines.

Fundamental rights and non-refoulement

EU law is linked to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Applied to return agreements, this requires that:

1) The principle of non-refoulement is respected. No person can be returned or readmitted to a country where there is a real risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, or serious human rights violations.

2) Especially vulnerable groups are protected. Minors (especially unaccompanied), asylum seekers, sick persons, or trafficking victims require enhanced safeguards. European regulations and the European Court of Human Rights’ case law prevent “automatic” or collective returns without individualized examination.

3) An effective remedy is guaranteed. There must be a real possibility to challenge the return, with adequate legal assistance and, when appropriate, suspensive effect, so that the international agreement does not empty these guarantees of content.

Requirements in Spanish regulations

Immigration regime and constitutional principles

Internally, the Immigration Law and its implementing regulations govern expulsion, return, and cooperation with third States. A return agreement must:

1) Comply with the Spanish Constitution. Article 10 CE (human dignity) and Article 15 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) require that any return respects minimum human rights standards. Also, Articles 24 (effective judicial protection) and 13 (regime of foreigners) prevent designing procedures that effectively block access to justice.

2) Be compatible with international treaties ratified by Spain. Conventions such as the ECHR, the Geneva Convention on refugees, or the Convention against Torture prevail over contradictory internal norms. A return agreement allowing chain expulsions or without safeguards against torture would be unconstitutional and contrary to international obligations.

3) Respect the Immigration Law itself. The Organic Immigration Law establishes the framework for detention, expulsion orders, border returns, and international protection procedures. The agreement’s content cannot create a “parallel circuit” that bypasses these guarantees, for example, through automatic returns without identification, without access to an interpreter, or without information on the right to seek asylum.

Signing procedure and agreement control

Formally, Spain must follow the constitutional treaty-making regime:

1) Negotiation and signing by the Government. The Executive Branch is responsible for negotiating and signing the text with the third country, usually through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the competent departments (Interior, Migration).

2) Control by the General Courts when appropriate. If the agreement affects fundamental rights, significant financial obligations, or implies modification or repeal of any law, parliamentary authorization or at least information and political control by Congress and Senate is required.

3) Possible control by the Constitutional Court. If there is doubt about the agreement’s compatibility with the Constitution, a prior constitutional review can be requested and, if applicable, challenged once in force.

Minimum material conditions in the agreements

In summary, for Spain to sign a return agreement with a third country, the text must include or allow, at minimum:

– Express guarantees of respect for human rights and the principle of non-refoulement.
– Mechanisms for individual identification, with attention to asylum seekers and minors.
– Cooperation procedures (documentation, acceptance of nationals, police coordination) compatible with the Return Directive.
– Provisions that do not contradict existing EU agreements with the same country.
– Clauses allowing suspension or review of the agreement if a serious deterioration of human rights in the return country is detected.

Any substantial deviation from these requirements could place the agreement in conflict with European regulations, the Spanish Constitution, or the State’s international commitments.