PP and PSOE agree in Brussels before the NATO summit: "Trump and Putin push Europe to the end of the era of innocence"

In a joint conversation with Democrat, the popular Nicolás Pascual de la Parte and the socialist Javi López agree that Europe must assume a leading role in its own defense in the face of the withdrawal of the United States and the growing Russian threat, in addition to urging industry to achieve the necessary scale to take off.

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"This would be impossible in Madrid." This is how the conversation begins between two of the most recognized voices on security matters at the epicenter of community legislative activity, Brussels. More than thirteen hundred kilometers separate Carrera de San Jerónimo from Plaza de Luxemburgo. Far from the spotlight of current events that usually falls on Paseo de la Castellana, in the community capital they are fully aware of the strategic moment that European defense is going through. Threats of a withdrawal of capabilities by the United States in NATO have ceased to be a hypothesis to become a reality on which various diplomatic teams are already working. Meanwhile, Europe is preparing for a scenario in which "open bar" ends and assumes that the time has come to start paying for this round itself.

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, a Member of the European Parliament for the European People's Party and former Spanish Ambassador to NATO, leaves a committee room after speaking at a parliamentary meeting. At the same time, Javi López, Vice-President of the European Parliament and member of the Socialist Group, has just participated in a forum on the evolution of the war in Ukraine. Both take a break from their agendas to talk with Demócrata just days before the heads of state and government of the Atlantic Alliance meet in Ankara for their annual summit. Both share the idea that Europe needs to reduce its dependencies, including in the military sphere, in order to speak with its own voice and strengthen its strategic autonomy, even in its relationship with Russia.

"Europe cannot delegate its own defense," states Pascual de la Parte, who paints a picture of the current state of the European military industry. For his part, López defends the diplomatic efforts undertaken by the President of the European Council to prepare the ground for future conversations with the Kremlin. "We have been demanding for months that Europe have a seat at the adults' negotiation. That it be part of the negotiation, not the menu. This means talking to Russia," concludes the Catalan MEP.

 

Question: Everything indicates that next week's Ankara summit will mark one of NATO's most significant turns in recent years. Are we facing a historic change?

Nicolás Pascual (EPP):  I wouldn't expect that much from the summit in Ankara either. In fact, the draft final communiqué is one page. When I was ambassador to NATO, I remember that the conclusions of these summits were 15 / 16 pages. Now it's one page. Why? Because everything is to be left very tied up at the ambassadorial level so that the summit debate at the head of state and government level is not opened, and the President of the United States is not left with much room for maneuver to change things. The more reduced the final communiqué is, the better. That final communiqué basically includes three three things.

First, to review NATO's military position and see how progress is being made on the commitments made at the Hague summit regarding Defense spending. Whether the commitments on capability objectives have been achieved or not, or if acceleration is needed.

Secondly, to consolidate or reiterate our unconditional support for Ukraine in the war against Russia, releasing the necessary funds, a loan of about 150 million euros over two years will be approved,

This must be put in connection with the promised review of the military presence in Europe by the United States that the Secretary of War announced for the next 6 months. We do not know what the result of this American review will be, but we fear that it will be less American presence. In any case, in Ankara what we have to renew is our transatlantic commitment, modernize it, update it and try to move forward together and at the same time reinforce the commitment to a European pillar of NATO.

Javi López (S&D): It is true that the relationship between the United States and NATO is changing.

The Atlantic commitment must be protected, it is unwavering, but at the same time the United States has clearly and explicitly stated that its presence on European soil will decrease. This is a substantial change in the relationship between the United States and Europe, and therefore we will have to take charge of our security autonomously and fully. This means strengthening European capabilities and having a strong European pillar of NATO capable of having sufficient and own decision-making power against the threat of Russia.

Over the last 4 years we have seen an explosion in defense spending in European countries, including Spain. All European countries have taken a very significant leap forward. Germany spends more than Great Britain in absolute terms. You have a good part of the Eastern European countries that are already spending 5%. Spain has tripled its defense spending in absolute terms in a few years, to give just a few figures. Well, an analysis of capabilities will be carried out.

Nicolás Pascual (EPP): 

“We cannot be waiting every four years to see who occupies the White House to know if Europe can defend itself”

I think it is correct, especially because beyond the fetish figures where we should place the emphasis is on how we develop the capabilities we need and how we develop European capabilities to have a deterrent force that is of a European character and to develop this European pillar of NATO.

Furthermore, NATO's and European partners' commitment to Ukraine has been reaffirmed in operational terms in recent months; also, Orbán's defeat in Hungary has allowed the desbloqueo of financial aid that was absolutely key for Ukraine. At the same time, we are seeing signs of vulnerability from the Kremlin that we had not seen in recent months. What we must do at the same time is remember that we want to play a role as Europeans in the event that a necessary negotiation is initiated to achieve a just and lasting peace in Ukraine.

Demócrata
Demócrata -

Question: Is Europe really prepared to take over the US withdrawal?

Nicolás Pascual (EPP): It is not a question of detaching ourselves from the United States, it is a question of developing our own capabilities compatible with those of the United States and with other allies, such as Canada or Turkey.

In other words, what Europe has to do is equip itself with the necessary capabilities regardless of who is in the White House. We cannot be waiting every 4 years to see who will be the president of the United States and the positive or negative influence they will have on Europe's ability to defend itself.

We have to return to a normal situation, which is that Europe cannot delegate, nor outsource, its own defense to third countries. The 27 member states of the European Union are among the richest of the richest in the world. We have the capabilities to defend ourselves without depending on anyone. In the short term, we logically have to equip ourselves with what we lack, which is basically satellite intelligence and information, which is fundamental. Without it, it is impossible to maintain a conflict today, because you have neither ears nor eyes to see the enemy.

Javi López (S&D): 

“The United States has clearly and explicitly stated that its presence in Europe will decrease and we will have to fully take charge of our security”

It is also about the development capabilities of autonomous systems, unmanned vehicles, the famous drones and anti-drone systems, long-range precision artillery, logistics, in-flight refueling aircraft, eh those are the capabilities, let's say, eh strategic logistics that we lack. We are not going to do it all at once and in one fell swoop, but we have a period of time. I would say until the end of this decade, until 2030, to make possible and realize these gaps that we have in these strategic capabilities, but at the same time we must be able to insert these capabilities into a global strategy with respect to Russia. One thing is to have credible deterrence capabilities, which is what we are moving towards, another thing is the question, what are those capabilities for? And that debate should start now and I don't hear it in the European Union or even in NATO.

Javi López (S&D): Our capabilities must be at the service of a strategy, beyond completing and complementing them with the United States and not being dependent on key issues characteristic of the new type of warfare. We are talking about intelligence, satellites, drones, long-range artillery... The first step to having a strategy will be negotiation.

It should be clarified that being able to have dialogue is the way to have a seat at the table. We have been demanding for months that Europe have a seat at the negotiation of the major powers. That it be part of the negotiation, not the menu. This means talking to Russia.

Inevitably, to know what is wanted, with what objectives, with a clear mandate. Accepting in any case that we are not neutral in this conflict, we are a party that supports Ukraine, we defend it because we believe it is defending our cause, which is the cause of European values and international law.

Question: Do you fear possible fatigue in Western support for Ukraine?

Nicolás Pascual (EPP): If we realize the evolution of aid since the conflict began, currently we have widely surpassed the United States in economic terms, financial aid, but we have almost always surpassed the United States in financial aid since the beginning.

Financial aid that goes to two objectives, first to directly reinforce the Ukrainian budget and second to joint development programs. On the military level, however, the United States began by supporting more than us, because it had greater capabilities, but now even Europe has surpassed the United States in this area. Right now, Europe supports more than the United States in terms of financing and military matters.

The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, together with EU leaders Antonio Costa and Ursula von der Leyen at a European summit in Brussels. Europa Press/Contacto/Bianca Otero
The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, together with EU leaders Antonio Costa and Ursula von der Leyen at a European summit in Brussels. Europa Press/Contacto/Bianca Otero -

It is a European problem and we have to get more involved than anyone. All aid from the United States is, of course, welcome, but what we have to approve are our aid packages and sanctions against Russia. But not only for the short term, but for the medium and long term, also taking into account that the cost of Ukraine's reconstruction will inevitably fall on the shoulders of the European Union and the United States. Recovering the funds used to pay for reconstruction would be desirable, but legally there will surely be problems. Right now, what we are applying are the interest on assets deposited by the Russian Central Bank in European financial institutions, not the capital.

The most important part of the reconstruction cost will fall into European hands and the best way to undertake it is by offering Ukraine a reasonable horizon of integration into the European Union.

Question: Ankara will also host a business forum with the main players in the sector. What are the barriers that currently prevent the European defense industry from taking off completely? 

Javi López (S&D): We have a problem of European scale. By having a very fragmented defense market among twenty-seven major consumers, we end up having a very fragmented production and industry that is not capable of utilizing the efficiency that scale provides, which is something that the United States, evidently, uses with great intensity. 

That is why it is important to combat fragmentation, it is a way to build European capabilities, it is a way to be more efficient in our eh spending and it is the way to develop a true European industrial base, right? Not national. There have already been warnings from the Defense Commissioner, Kubilius. 

Javi López (S&D): 

“Our worst enemy is ourselves”

We do not see that the increase in spending in recent years is translating into a proportional increase in production as it should. And it has to do with scale, therefore, compacting our industry more, having joint purchases, having European capabilities, is the way to strengthen this European industry. 

Question: The failure of the project for the so-called "European fighter jet" may have been an example of this. 

Nicolás Pascual (EPP): It has clearly been a resounding failure. We must not hide the reality. It is especially painful because it was not only the European fighter jet, the combat air system that integrated the plans for an aircraft, but also complementary combat systems, such as drones, sensors, radars to create an entire small digital cloud that was going to be the sixth-generation aircraft in Europe. 

It seems that it has basically failed because an agreement has not been reached on the distribution of the workload. France wanted the aircraft to respond to national tactical needs. Now we Spaniards and Germans have to see how we integrate into some European project. The possibility of joining the "joint air system" project led by the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy is being considered. 

Nicolás Pascual (EPP): 

“What we need to renew in Ankara is our transatlantic commitment, but strengthening an authentic European pillar of NATO”

Sweden is also approaching and we have already been taking common steps with the Germans. Six Spanish companies and eight German companies have agreed to start negotiations with a view to exploring the possibility of collaborating on that project. 

Spain must commit to being at the forefront of any substitute project that has signs of short and medium-term viability.

Javi López (S&D): It is a reminder that our worst enemy is ourselves. In this case, a form of French nationalism has ended up boycotting a first-rate European project for European security and defense and for the development of our capabilities.

That is the reality, in its raw form.

And, secondly, all opportunities, spaces and instruments of integration at the European level that the current ecosystem allows us must be used to build European capabilities. Also in the industrial field, of course.

Democrat
Democrat -

Question: Are we building a Europe of Defense or simply filling the gap left by others?

Nicolás Pascual (EPP): They are two sides of the same coin. We are building a Europe of defense because we need it, but, as we said before, also as a consequence of the war in Ukraine for four years and the partial decoupling of the United States from its commitments to European defense.

We are reacting to reality. Could we have done it before? Well, yes. Shouldn't we have waited for this conflict in Ukraine to react? Well, also.

But it's not worth crying over spilled milk, but rather trying to make up for lost time and react. There is a political will among all parliamentary groups, at least among the central groups of the European Parliament, to move forward with this construction of the Europe of defense. Now the question being debated is whether this transition will be an orderly or disorderly transition. It will be orderly if we can do it in agreement with the United States, in coherence with them, within NATO, creating what we said before: a powerful European pillar of defense.

Javi López (S&D): Trump and Putin are pushing Europe towards the end of the era of innocence. Towards strategic maturity and taking charge of our destiny. This means, first and foremost, taking full and autonomous responsibility. They have been external unifiers. It has happened before. There were others, some from the East, who strengthened European integration.

Now they are forcing us to take charge of our destiny, our security, and our defense. That is the current context and what circumstances are pushing us towards. We must be capable of ordering this strategic emancipation, which inevitably—not solely, but inevitably—involves taking charge of your security.

And not only that. Because when we talk about our security, we are talking about having a European defense and defense industry with European capabilities.

But we have not discussed today—and it would be enough for another interview—digital sovereignty and our enormous dependencies in the digital sphere, our industrial capabilities, especially in strategic areas of our economy, which remain dependencies that can be used as a weapon; our energy dependence... In all these areas, which are sources of dependence, we need to build our own capabilities. Probably the most sensitive of all is defense, especially the nuclear dimension, but there are many more layers and Europe must be capable of developing them in the coming years.

OFF the record

The conversation with Nicolás Pascual de la Parte and Javi López reflects that the debate on European defense has ceased to be a theoretical discussion and has become a matter of primary political and strategic importance. From different ideological positions, both agree on a fundamental diagnosis: Europe must strengthen its military capabilities, reduce its dependencies, and assume greater responsibility for its own security in a context marked by the war in Ukraine, the evolution of the transatlantic relationship, and the progressive withdrawal of the United States.

On the eve of the NATO summit in Ankara, the Alliance faces a new era in which strengthening the European pillar is no longer a future aspiration but an immediate necessity. The capacity of member states to translate this political consensus into investments, industrial integration, and strategic autonomy will set the course for European defense over the next decade.

 

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the status of the processing of the reinforcement of the European pillar in NATO within the EU institutions?

Currently, there is no "law on the European pillar in NATO" as such in the EU, but rather a set of political decisions, communications, and legislative files whose practical objective is to strengthen the European weight within the Alliance. The Commission is deploying the Defense Roadmap 2030 and preparing additional proposals; the European Council has set the political mandate for Europe to take on more military responsibility, always complementing NATO; and the European Parliament has approved strategic resolutions and opened a key legislative file on military mobility ("military Schengen") already in the negotiation phase with the Council. Therefore, the reinforcement of the European pillar is not processed as a single dossier but as a package of measures on capabilities, financing, industry, and mobility.

1. General framework: EU-NATO cooperation, not organic integration

Formally, the EU is not processing the creation of a "European pillar" within NATO as a new legal entity; the Treaties continue to clearly separate both organizations. The reinforcement is articulated through the EU's defense policy, with the idea that "a stronger and more capable European Union in the field of security and defense [...] is complementary to NATO, which remains [...] the basis of collective defense" for the member states belonging to the Alliance, as repeatedly recalled in the conclusions of the European Council of June 2025 and June 2026 (26-06-2025, 18-06-2026).

2. European Commission: roadmap and capabilities

At the executive level, the core of the processing is the "Preserving Peace – Defense Preparedness 2030" Roadmap, presented by the Commission and the High Representative in October 2025 (16-10-2025). This roadmap defines objectives and milestones until 2030 to close capability gaps, strengthen the defense industry, and create, among others, a military mobility zone at the EU scale coordinated with NATO.

The Commission has emphasized that these initiatives are designed to contribute directly to NATO's capability objectives, with flagship projects such as surveillance of the eastern flank, the European Air Shield, and the space defense shield. In parallel, President von der Leyen, in her joint statement with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, highlighted the need for interoperable capabilities, more joint acquisitions, and a "fast and scaled" European defense industry, advancing the "2030 preparedness roadmap" (30-09-2025).

According to the analysis collected by Demócrata, the Commission's political communication of April 2026 emphasizes the "essential" relationship with NATO and outlines a future concrete proposal to reinforce the European pillar, focused on strategic autonomy, mobility, and logistical capabilities, still in preparation.

3. European Council: political mandate and financing

The European Council has been building the political framework. In its June 2025 conclusions, it calls for a "substantial" increase in defense spending, coordination of commitments made at the 2025 NATO summit, and acceleration of work on priority capabilities "in full coherence with NATO," urging the swift conclusion of the European Defense Industry Program (EDIP) and the "defense preparedness" package (26-06-2025).

According to Demócrata, the conclusions of the January 2026 summit request the Commission to present a detailed proposal for the institutional and financing framework for a European defense that reinforces the European pillar of NATO, in light of uncertainty about the United States' commitment. These Council decisions are not legislation per se but set the political mandate that conditions future Commission proposals.

4. European Parliament: resolutions and "military Schengen"

At the parliamentary level, there are two lines: political resolutions and a key legislative file.

In March 2025, the Parliament approved a resolution that "urges the EU to ensure its own security" and calls for the development of "a fully capable European pillar in NATO that can act autonomously whenever necessary." The resolution was adopted by 419 votes in favor, 204 against, and 46 abstentions (12-03-2025).

In June 2026, another resolution on Russian drone incursions again calls for a "genuine European Defense Union" and the reinforcement of the EU and NATO's eastern flank, with 412 votes in favor, 63 against, and 53 abstentions (18-06-2026).

The legislative file most directly linked to the European pillar is military mobility. On June 23, 2026, the Transport and Security and Defense Committees adopted their position on the new military mobility regulation, by 49 votes in favor, 9 against, and 4 abstentions, opening the door to negotiations with the Council in July (23-06-2026). The text foresees a digital permit system, accelerated deadlines, an emergency response mechanism (EMERS), and, above all, guarantees interoperability and complementarity with NATO.

Politically, Demócrata interprets this regulation as the first piece of a "military Schengen" explicitly designed to reinforce the European pillar of the Alliance.

5. Summary of the processing status

In summary, the reinforcement of the European pillar in NATO is at an advanced stage of political and regulatory construction but dispersed across several files:

• The Commission has already presented the Defense Roadmap 2030 and is working on additional proposals for capabilities and financing.

• The European Council has set the goal of a "more sovereign" and "more responsible for its own defense" Europe, complementary to NATO, and has commissioned new proposals.

• The European Parliament has approved resolutions explicitly calling for a fully capable European pillar in NATO and is negotiating with the Council the military mobility regulation, a central piece of the future "military Schengen."

No further information is available in the consulted sources about a unique and closed initiative that formally "creates" the European pillar within NATO; the process advances through the accumulation of measures that, together, make Europe more autonomous and militarily more relevant within the Alliance.

What powers and functions does the Vice-President of the European Parliament have according to the Parliament's Rules of Procedure?

The Vice-President of the European Parliament is, according to the Parliament's Rules of Procedure, a member of the Bureau who assumes functions of substituting the President, directing parliamentary work, and managing the institution's administration and budget. Together with the President and the rest of the Bureau, they share responsibility for the internal organization of the Parliament and its General Secretariat. Additionally, they perform institutional representation tasks when delegated and may receive specific competences in particular areas (technology, buildings, security, etc.). Their role is therefore both political (conducting debates) and administrative (internal governance).

Election and institutional position

The Parliament's Rules of Procedure establish that Vice-Presidents are elected by the Plenary at the start of the legislature or when a vacancy occurs. Their number and order of precedence are set at that time, and this order is important because it determines who substitutes the President and in what sequence. All Vice-Presidents are part of the Bureau, a collegiate body that directs the internal life of the institution, along with the President and the Quaestors (the latter with voice but no vote).

Substitution of the President and direction of debates

One of the most visible functions is described in the rules on presiding over plenary sessions. When the President is absent or cannot perform their functions, the Plenary chair is occupied by a Vice-President, following the order of precedence set at the time of their election. In this role, the Vice-President:

  • Presides over debates in the Hemicycle and ensures the application of the Rules of Procedure during the session.
  • Grants and withdraws the right to speak, decides on the order of interventions, and on the admissibility of amendments and motions of order.
  • Maintains order in the chamber, being able to call Members to order and, in serious cases, apply the disciplinary measures provided.
  • Declares the result of votes, following the rules on counting and verification.

In these circumstances, the Vice-President acts with the same authority as the President but always within the limits set by the Rules of Procedure.

Functions in the Bureau and internal management

The most substantive part of the Vice-President's competences derives from their membership in the Bureau, regulated by the Rules of Procedure. The Bureau is the body responsible for decisions on:

  • The internal organization of the Parliament and its services (structure of the General Secretariat, rules of operation, human resources).
  • The preparation and execution of the European Parliament's budget (administrative expenses, buildings, technology, services to Members).
  • The financial and management rules applicable to the institution and to the MEPs themselves (allowances, indemnities, staff regime).
  • Security policies, access to buildings, accreditation of visitors and journalists, as well as transparency measures.
  • Issues related to language policy and interpretation and translation services.

Within this framework, each Vice-President may receive, by decision of the Bureau or the President, a thematic portfolio: for example, supervision of real estate policy, digitalization matters, internal environmental strategy, relations with political groups regarding resources, etc. The Rules of Procedure allow this internal distribution of tasks, which is concretized in decisions of the Bureau itself.

Representation and external relations

The Rules of Procedure also foresee that Vice-Presidents assume representation functions of the Parliament when delegated by the President. This includes:

  • Attending, on behalf of the Parliament, official acts, ceremonies, and institutional missions.
  • Presiding over parliamentary delegations in interparliamentary dialogues or international conferences when so decided.
  • Participating in meetings with other EU institutions (Commission, Council) on administrative and budgetary matters affecting the Parliament.

These representation tasks are generally regulated in the Rules of Procedure (which attribute the institution's representation to the President) and are materialized through express delegations to certain Vice-Presidents.

Guarantee of the Rules of Procedure and disciplinary functions

When presiding over sessions in the President's absence, the Vice-President has the responsibility to guarantee the correct application of the Rules of Procedure and the interpretative decisions of the Bureau. This grants them specific disciplinary powers: they can call Members to order, withdraw the floor, or even suspend the session if circumstances require, according to the articles regulating order in the Plenary and sanctions. All these actions are exercised with the same limits and guarantees as if the President intervened.

Collegiate nature and limits of their powers

Finally, the Rules of Procedure emphasize the collegiate nature of the Parliament's internal leadership. Vice-Presidents do not act as autonomous "ministers" but as members of a collegiate body (the Bureau) and as substitutes for the President. Their most relevant decision-making competences are always exercised within the framework of Bureau decisions, and their acts of representation or direction of the Plenary are subject to the rules and parliamentary traditions established in the Rules of Procedure and in the interpretative decisions adopted by the institution itself.

Which political party won the most seats in Spain in the last European Parliament elections?

In the last European Parliament elections held in Spain on June 9, 2024, the party that won the most seats was the People's Party (PP), with 22 MEPs. This victory positioned the PP as the leading force at the national level ahead of the PSOE, which obtained 20 seats, and Vox, with 6. According to official data and subsequent analyses, the PP achieved approximately 34.18% of the votes cast in Spain, thus consolidating a clear leadership in these European elections.

Main result: the PP as the leading force

The official results of the 2024 European elections in Spain are recorded in the Agreement of June 27, 2024, of the Central Electoral Board, published in the Official State Gazette (BOE). This agreement details the number of votes and seats obtained by each candidacy at the national level. Although the numerical table is extensive, the main conclusion is clear: the People's Party is the list with the highest number of seats.

Media outlets that followed the election night confirmed this result consistently. For example, Gaceta Médica highlights that the PP, led by Dolors Montserrat, became the leading force with 22 seats, nine more than in the previous European elections, placing the PSOE as the second force, two seats behind.

Basic distribution of seats in Spain

Based on the data provided in the consulted sources, the essential distribution of seats among the main forces in Spain in 2024 is as follows:

• People's Party (PP): 22 seats
• Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE): 20 seats
• Vox: 6 seats
(The remaining seats are distributed among other candidacies, including coalitions such as Ahora Repúblicas, Sumar, Podemos, and other nationalist and regionalist formations, according to the same Central Electoral Board agreement published in the BOE).

The nominal proclamation of those elected as MEPs is recorded in a specific agreement of the Central Electoral Board, also in the BOE, where the 61 Spanish representatives to the European Parliament are listed one by one.

Political and European context

From a European perspective, the Spanish PP MEPs integrate into the European People's Party (EPP) Group, which remains the largest group in the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislature. This European dimension can be followed, for example, through the official EU results for Spain on the institutional websites of the European Parliament: national results 2024-2029 and the general portal of Spain results.

The analysis of these elections and their impact on Spanish and EU politics has been the subject of attention by specialized media. The newspaper Demócrata, with which we are associated, addressed the national and EU keys in its piece "European elections: national and EU keys of the results and scenarios to preside over the Commission", where, among other aspects, the weight acquired by the PP delegation within the EPP is explained.

Legal framework and electoral system

Spain elects its MEPs in a single nationwide constituency, as recalled by the Ministry of the Interior in its general information about these elections (Infoelectoral). The Ministry's press release prior to the elections, announcing the official website and app to follow the count, emphasized that in 2024, 61 seats were elected for Spain within the 720 of the European Parliament (Ministry of the Interior note).

Other contextual analyses, such as that of the Elcano Royal Institute on Spain's increase in seats in the European Parliament (Elcano commentary), or databases of results and historical series like EPData, complete the picture of how Spanish representation has been configured and which parties have benefited most from the increase in seats.

Other references and results tracking

To delve into detailed results by municipality or autonomous community, one can consult the Central Electoral Board agreement in the BOE, the EU results tools already mentioned, and informative materials such as those from EPData. Information or general context about the Spanish European elections has also been provided by sources such as El País, the European Parliament's institutional channel in Spain on social media (Facebook post), and other explanatory resources like the Wikipedia entry on the 2024 European elections in Spain.

On a more historical and institutional level, the newspaper Demócrata has addressed issues such as Spain's European integration in "Sánchez claims that joining the European Communities was the best thing that happened to Spain" or debates on possible minimum vote thresholds to access seats in the European elections, discussed in "The European Parliament urges Spain to set a minimum vote threshold to access seats...", which helps better understand the framework in which the PP's 2024 victory took place.

Other general context materials about the European Union and elections, although less focused on the Spanish case, can be found in resources such as the informative video on YouTube, the technical portal of the Region of Murcia on European topics (Econet CARM), or aggregated information on European elections globally offered by various media.

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