The CJEU upholds the Amnesty Law and opens the door to Puigdemont's return to Spain

Luxembourg considers that the Spanish norm does not violate Community Law and allows the application of the pardon measure to embezzlement crimes linked to the procés and to the terrorism proceedings of the CDR, a ruling that paves the way for the return of Carles Puigdemont and reinforces the position of the Government of Pedro Sánchez

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The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has confirmed this Thursday that the Organic Law of Amnesty approved by the Government to secure Junts' support for Pedro Sánchez's investiture is compatible with Community law. Specifically, the ruling determines that the measure of grace can be applied both to the crimes of embezzlement linked to the Catalan independence process, which directly affected the former president of the Generalitat Carles Puigdemont, and to the crimes of terrorism attributed to members of the self-styled Committees for the Defense of the Republic (CDR).

The resolution from Luxembourg comes after the Audiencia Nacional (National Court) raised a preliminary question before the European Justice to ascertain whether certain aspects of the Spanish norm could conflict with the obligations derived from the Community legal order. The ruling confirms, in line with what the EU's Advocate General had already defended in November, that there is no direct prejudice to the financial interests of the European Union in relation to the funds used during the 2017 sovereignty process.

The decision has special relevance for Puigdemont, as the European pronouncement removes one of the main legal obstacles that had kept the application of the amnesty to the former Catalan president blocked and opens the door to his eventual return to Spain.

Until now, the Spanish justice system had kept the application of the pardon for the pro-independence leader suspended, awaiting Luxembourg's definitive interpretation on its compatibility with European regulations. The case linked to embezzlement during the illegal referendum of October 1, 2017 was precisely what kept the European arrest warrant against Puigdemont active.

Luxembourg rules out a conflict with the protection of European funds

The EU's Advocate General, Dean Spielmann, had already indicated in his conclusions that "the protection of the Union's financial interests does not oppose the extinction of liability provided for in the Organic Law of Amnesty" for acts that could affect community financial interests.

The European Court shares this interpretation and considers that Union law does not prevent a Member State from adopting an amnesty law, provided that it does not affect the effective fulfillment of European obligations. In this regard, Luxembourg understands that the analyzed facts do not allow concluding that there was direct damage to the community budget that would prevent the application of the clemency measure.

The ruling thus represents legal backing for the interpretation defended by the Spanish Executive, which in recent months has maintained that the Amnesty Law fully respected the limits established by European legislation.

The CJEU also validates the amnesty for terrorism offenses by the CDR

The Court of Justice of the European Union has also ruled on the preliminary ruling requested by the National Court regarding the terrorism offenses attributed to several members of the CDR. In this case, Luxembourg concludes that these offenses may be included within the scope of the amnesty, considering that the facts were not accompanied by serious harm to the fundamental rights of citizens.

Community legislation on terrorism does not expressly regulate the possibility of approving amnesty laws, but rather establishes minimum standards that Member States must guarantee for the prevention, prosecution, and sanction of terrorist conduct.

According to legal sources consulted by Demócrata, European Union law grants Member States a broad margin of action to decide on the granting of clemency measures, as long as these decisions do not compromise the effective fulfillment of community obligations in the fight against terrorism. The European ruling, therefore, does not represent a political validation of the Amnesty Law, but a strictly legal response regarding its compatibility with the Union's regulatory framework.

A ruling with a direct impact on the Spanish political landscape

The European Court's pronouncement was not perceived in Madrid and Barcelona as just another legal procedure, but as a resolution capable of altering the political balances of the legislature.

For Junts, the ruling has a strategic dimension. The pro-independence party is going through a moment of electoral pressure due to the growth of new options within the sovereignist space, such as Aliança Catalana, and the return of Carles Puigdemont could become an element of internal mobilization.

An unfavorable ruling would have placed the party before a difficult decision: to deepen the break with Pedro Sánchez's government or to assume the wear and tear of an investiture agreement whose main counterpart, amnesty, was legally questioned. Luxembourg's endorsement now allows Junts to claim that its negotiating strategy with the socialists has yielded a tangible result.

For the Executive, the ruling represents a political reinforcement after months of wear and tear due to negotiations with the pro-independence parties. Pedro Sánchez's government obtains European legal backing that allows Moncloa to defend the constitutionality and EU compatibility of the law, although the Partido Popular will predictably focus its criticism on the nuances of the ruling and the political interpretations derived from the resolution.

The battle for the narrative will also coincide with the rapprochement movements between the Partido Popular and Junts to explore possible spaces for future political understanding. Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya has already pointed to these approaches as a possible path of convergence between conservative and pro-independence forces.

…NEWS IN PROGRESS…

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AI-GENERATED CONTENT

At what parliamentary stage is the effective application of the Amnesty Law, and what judicial procedures are pending in Spain?

The so-called Amnesty Law is the Organic Law 1/2024, its parliamentary process is completely finished and the law has been in force since its publication in the BOE in June 2024. The law was definitively approved by the Congress at the end of May 2024 and later validated by the Constitutional Court, which in June 2025 endorsed its constitutionality. From there, the “phase” is no longer parliamentary, but rather judicial application case by case and constitutional and European control. Today, the main open fronts are: appeals for protection (amparo) in the Constitutional Court due to the non-application of the amnesty to the embezzlement of the ‘procés’ and several preliminary rulings in the CJEU, whose ruling is scheduled for July 16, 2026.

Parliamentary situation of the Amnesty Law

The Organic Law 1/2024 of Amnesty was published in the BOE as text in the BOE, after its approval in the Cortes in spring 2024, in a session of maximum political tension covered by media such as RTVE and AS. Strictly on the parliamentary level:

  • Draft and approval: the Organic Amnesty Law proposal was negotiated after the 23-J elections, processed urgently and approved by Congress and Senate, as contextualized by RTVE, this live coverage, another follow-up and analyses such as those from El País and Orain.
  • Entry into force: once promulgated and published in June 2024, the law began to take effect, with a reference period of two months for judges and courts to review cases, as explained by BBC Mundo and Amnesty International.
  • No additional parliamentary phase: there is currently no “second parliamentary phase” of the application; what exists are political debates, oversight initiatives, and some symbolic proposals, such as the one the PP took to the Constitutional Commission and which was rejected, as reported by the newspaper Demócrata in this piece.

Therefore, the effective application no longer depends on Parliament, but on the decisions of judicial bodies and, ultimately, the Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the EU.

Constitutional control and pending appeals in the Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court has declared the law globally in accordance with the Constitution (ruling of June 26, 2025, covered by RTVE and analyzed in this article). From there:

  • Unconstitutionality appeals: those filed by several PP-led communities (Andalusia, Murcia, Valencian Community, Castilla y León, La Rioja, Cantabria) and by the Madrid Government of Isabel Díaz Ayuso have been dismissed or inadmissible due to “loss of object,” as reported by this report and this one. Unconstitutionality questions from the TSJ of Catalonia and the Madrid Court of Appeal have also been rejected (link).
  • ‘Procés’ embezzlement: the Constitutional Court has declared that the inclusion of embezzlement as an amnestied crime is “fully in accordance” with the Constitution, without yet ruling on the specific cases of Puigdemont and Junqueras (analysis).
  • Pending appeals for protection: appeals against the Supreme Court’s decision not to amnesty the ‘procés’ embezzlement, filed by Carles Puigdemont, Oriol Junqueras, and other former ministers, are still in process, which the Constitutional Court has admitted for processing (report, detail, other information).
  • Arrest warrants: the Constitutional Court has so far maintained the national arrest warrants for Puigdemont, Comín, and Puig, rejecting urgent precautionary measures (link), and the Prosecutor’s Office and State Attorney request that Puigdemont’s appeal for protection be granted to apply the amnesty (analysis).

Preliminary rulings in the CJEU

Several Spanish courts (mainly the National Court and the Court of Auditors) have raised preliminary questions about the compatibility of the law with EU law, particularly regarding embezzlement and EU financial interests and terrorism (CDR). Advocate General Spielmann issued reports essentially favorable to the law, dismissing, for example, that it affects EU financial interests (article and analysis in Demócrata, as well as the political assessment in this report).

The Grand Chamber of the CJEU will issue its first rulings on the amnesty on July 16, 2026, based on four preliminary questions, as explained in this information and this preview. Demócrata details the key points at stake in this legal analysis, this political piece, and this commentary. The Judas operation (CDR case) is suspended in the National Court pending this ruling (detail).

Internal judicial application: which procedures remain open

On the ground, Spanish judges and courts are applying the amnesty “case by case”:

  • Courts and tribunals: dismissal and archiving orders have been issued, for example in the Tarragona Court regarding former councilors for the 1-O (Tarragona case). Bodies such as the TSJ and investigating courts are reviewing cases, administrative fines, and accounting procedures.
  • Number of affected persons: according to data cited in Congress by ERC, of 726 people with criminal cases linked to the procés, only 178 would have been amnestied; dozens of files remain pending, some unprocessed and others conditioned on Europe, as covered in this parliamentary debate.
  • Supreme Court: the Supreme Court maintains a restrictive interpretation regarding the embezzlement of the procés, denying amnesty to Puigdemont and others, which has triggered appeals before the Constitutional Court and has been the subject of political and legal controversy, explained in this news and analyses by media such as El País.

There are also procedures where the application of the amnesty is still being claimed, such as the boycott of an event at the University of Barcelona (piece 1 and piece 2), illustrating that the application is not automatic. The broader context — including academic and parliamentary assessments, such as the session in the Parliament of Navarre (link) — confirms that, with the parliamentary phase closed, the amnesty battle is now fought in Spanish and European courts.

To complete the picture, general coverage on the law and its political impact can also be consulted at Demócrata, as well as broader context pieces, although not focused on Spain, available at this article, this other, this analysis and this report, as well as general information and contextual videos at this video, this other, and political analyses such as those from Antena 3 or this piece.

What exactly can the CJEU ruling of July 16 change regarding the application of amnesty to embezzlement and terrorism? What do the appeals for protection by Puigdemont and Junqueras before the Constitutional Court consist of, and what legal scenarios open up for them? How is the amnesty being applied in lower courts (Provincial Courts and investigating courts), and what differences in criteria are being seen?

What are the competences and powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the interpretation of Community Law?

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the supreme body responsible for ensuring the correct interpretation and application of Union Law in all Member States. Its competences are structured into several types of procedures that mainly seek to ensure the uniform interpretation of Community Law and respect for the Treaties. The interpretative function is primarily exercised through preliminary rulings, but it is also articulated through infringement actions, annulment actions, actions for failure to act, and other complementary powers.

1. Central function: the preliminary ruling (Art. 267 TFEU)

The most characteristic competence of the CJEU regarding the interpretation of Union Law is the preliminary ruling procedure. Through this mechanism, national courts can — and in some cases must — raise questions about:

  • The interpretation of the Treaties and other Union Law.
  • The validity of acts of the institutions, bodies, or agencies of the Union.

The objective is to avoid divergent interpretations among Member States. The national court raises the question, the CJEU responds by judgment or order, and the national judge applies that interpretation to the internal dispute. The CJEU’s response is binding not only for the referring body but de facto for all judges of the Union, because it sets the authentic interpretation of Community Law.

Courts of last instance generally have the obligation to refer preliminary questions when there is reasonable doubt about the interpretation or validity of Union Law, except in very exceptional cases (the “acte clair” or “clarified act” doctrine).

2. Control of compliance with Union Law

a) Infringement action (Arts. 258–260 TFEU)

The CJEU hears infringement actions brought by the European Commission (and, in certain cases, by other Member States) when it is considered that a State has breached Union Law. Although the main object here is to establish a breach, the Court, when ruling, often has to specify the scope and interpretation of the allegedly infringed Community rules.

If it declares the breach, the State must take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment; if it does not, the CJEU can impose financial penalties.

b) Annulment action (Art. 263 TFEU)

Through the annulment action, Member States, institutions, and, under strict conditions, individuals can challenge Union acts for being contrary to the Treaties or other higher norms. In these proceedings, the CJEU (or the General Court at first instance) must interpret Union Law to determine whether the challenged act complies with the Community legal order.

The annulment of an act may be accompanied by a detailed interpretation of its provisions, which directly affects its practical application and that of similar norms.

c) Action for failure to act (Art. 265 TFEU)

When a Union institution fails to act where the Law requires it to do so, States or institutions (and, in certain cases, individuals) can bring an action for failure to act. Again, the CJEU must interpret the provisions establishing the obligations to act, specifying the scope of the powers and duties of each institution.

3. Union’s patrimonial liability and other competences

The CJEU also hears actions for non-contractual liability of the Union (Arts. 268 and 340 TFEU). To decide whether compensation is appropriate, the Court must interpret applicable Community Law, both regarding the conduct of the institution and the right invoked by the individual.

Additionally, the CJEU exercises:

  • Control over certain international agreements of the Union, issuing opinions on their compatibility with the Treaties.
  • Competences in internal disputes of the Union’s public service and in appeals against judgments of the General Court, where it often again clarifies the interpretation of applicable Law.
  • A guarantor role in specific areas such as the area of freedom, security and justice, competition, data protection, or State aid, in which it consolidates interpretative criteria later followed by all national authorities.

4. Effects of the CJEU’s interpretation

The CJEU’s interpretative decisions have a erga omnes effect in practice: they guide all administrations and courts of the Member States. Moreover, the interpretation usually has retroactive effects, clarifying the correct meaning of the norm since its entry into force, unless the Court itself modulates those effects for reasons of legal certainty.

Overall, the CJEU’s competences configure a system in which the interpretation of Union Law is centralized in a single judicial body, thus ensuring the unity, primacy, and effectiveness of Community Law throughout the European Union.

What has been the political and professional trajectory of Carles Puigdemont and which party does he currently belong to?

Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó is a Catalan politician and journalist born in 1962, whose career has ranged from local journalism to the presidency of the Generalitat and leadership of the independence movement in exile. Professionally, he trained in the field of communication and directed several media outlets before dedicating himself exclusively to politics in 2006. Institutionally, he has been a councilor and mayor of Girona, president of the Generalitat, MEP, and today is a deputy in the Parliament of Catalonia. He currently belongs to the party Junts per Catalunya, of which he is president and political leader, as recorded both by the Parliament and his profile on Demócrata.

Professional stage: journalist and cultural manager

Puigdemont began his career as a journalist at the newspaper El Punt in the early 1980s, where he worked as an editor and proofreader, according to biographies such as Spanish Wikipedia, the Catalan version, and the entry in the Treccani encyclopedia. Later he was director of the Catalan News Agency (1999–2002) and head of the Girona House of Culture.

He also founded and directed the English-language newspaper Catalonia Today (2004–2006), a stage described in profiles such as RTVE and various biographical analyses, for example in AS or Testimonios para la Historia. In 2006 he left journalism to devote himself fully to politics.

Start and consolidation of political career

A member of Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) since the 1980s, he made the institutional leap in 2006 as a deputy in the Parliament within the CiU federation, something recorded in the official Parliament of Catalonia profile (Parliament deputy) and in summary profiles such as those of Gran Enciclopèdia Catalana or Portuguese Wikipedia.

Locally, he was a councilor in Girona (2006–2016) and, from 2011, mayor of Girona, breaking more than three decades of socialist hegemony. At the same time, he presided over the Association of Municipalities for Independence (AMI) (2015–2016), organizing a municipal network favorable to the referendum, as recalled by several reports and the Parliament itself. This stage of local power and municipal activism was the springboard for his national projection.

President of the Generalitat and leadership of the ‘procés’

In January 2016, the Parliament invested him as the 130th president of the Generalitat of Catalonia, replacing Artur Mas, as recorded in entries from Wikipedia, Occitan, Lombard, and CNN in Spanish, as well as multiple analytical profiles, including ElNacional.cat. His mandate was marked by the confrontation with the State culminating in the October 1 referendum and the subsequent declaration of independence in October 2017.

After the application of Article 155 and his dismissal, he moved to Belgium and settled in Waterloo, a situation widely described in the newspaper Demócrata, for example in pieces about his current influence as leader of Junts (Feijóo’s offer, challenge to Feijóo, or break with the PSOE). His status as “exile” also appears in coverage of the impact of the CJEU ruling on the amnesty.

MEP, Consell per la República, and partial return

In 2019 he was elected MEP and served as non-attached until 2024, representing the Junts brand, according to main biographies and European media such as Euronews. Since 2018 he has promoted the Consell per la República from Belgium, conceived as a political structure in exile.

In the Catalan sphere, he returned as a deputy in the 15th legislature of the Parliament for Junts and is listed, according to the official profile and political actors database, as a member of the European Union and Foreign Action Commission. At the same time, his possible definitive return to Catalonia depends on the application of the Amnesty Law, a matter analyzed in depth by Demócrata in pieces about the CJEU and the Prosecutor’s Office of the Constitutional Court (arrest warrant).

Current party and leadership in Junts per Catalunya

Regarding his party evolution, he moved from CDC/CiU to PDeCAT after the reconversion of Convergència, and finally to Junts per Catalunya, a project he ended up leading. Biographies agree in placing him as one of the founders of Junts and that, since 2024, he holds the party presidency (Demócrata profile, as well as the different versions of Wikipedia and CNN). Today he is, therefore, the leader of Junts per Catalunya, a key figure both in state governance and Catalan politics, as reflected in numerous Demócrata analyses about his ability to influence the legislature (political agenda, negotiations in Brussels, the Sánchez–Puigdemont “Classic”).

To complete the picture about his figure and the political context around him, other Demócrata pieces about his role in the legislature and the independence movement can also be consulted: call to “raise sovereignty”, the 1-O anniversary (cohesion strategy), the Perpignan conclave (questions and answers), his meetings with the PSOE and the Government (meetings in Brussels, meeting with Illa) or the controversy over the use of his image by other actors (AI video).

Other general references to his figure and the context of the ‘procés’ can be found in Euronews, RTVE, or various linguistic editions of Wikipedia (Lombard, Occitan).

How has the Amnesty Law affected Puigdemont’s judicial situation and what can change after the CJEU ruling? What role does Puigdemont have today in the governance of the Spanish Government and in the relationship between Junts and the PSOE? What have been the main strategic differences between Puigdemont and ERC in the direction of the Catalan independence movement?

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