What changes, what disappears, and what stays the same after the agreement on Gibraltar

The agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom on Gibraltar is not subject to a formal “treaty authorization” in the Spanish Cortes Generales. It is processed as an agreement of exclusive EU competence, whose ratification corresponds to the Council and the European Parliament, not the Spanish Congress and Senate. In Spain, there is indeed intense political debate and several parliamentary initiatives (questions, motions, and non-legislative proposals) already concluded or pending, but none of them have legal effects on the entry into force of the treaty. As of July 14, 2026, the agreement is about to be signed and provisionally applied, while in the Spanish Parliament only the political debate remains active.

Nature of the agreement and absence of “ratification” in the Cortes

Official and analytical sources agree that the EU–UK treaty on Gibraltar is configured as an agreement of exclusive competence of the Union (“EU-only”). Its processing is explained in the general fact sheet of the agreement on Wikipedia, which details the phases of negotiation, text closure, and the EU's internal procedure for signature, provisional application, and final conclusion of the treaty, without intervention of national parliaments (agreement fact sheet).

The European Commission promoted the signature and provisional application, first with the proposal of February 2026 and then with the political endorsement of the Twenty-Seven, reflected, for example, in reports about Brussels and the new status of Gibraltar (Brussels trusts to activate the agreement; the EU will endorse the signature and provisional application; provisional entry into force on July 15). In parallel, Spain has treated the text as an EU agreement, not as a bilateral State-to-third State treaty, so it has not referred a request for authorization to the Congress and Senate under article 94 CE.

Formal initiatives in Congress and Senate

Instead of a treaty authorization, what exists is a set of control initiatives and motions:

• Congress – Written question 184/006922, “Delay in negotiations between the European Union and the United Kingdom on Gibraltar”: published on 04/22/2024 and answered by the Government on 05/27/2024. Status: concluded (response published).
• Senate – Oral question (15)683/000398, “Question about the procedure for the approval of the Agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom relating to Gibraltar. XV Legislature”: the Government's response was known on 04/14/2026; the initiative is already recorded as answered, although in the database it remains as “pending (Government response)”.
• Senate – Request for information (15)689/000731, “Request for submission of the minutes of the negotiating meetings of the agreement on Gibraltar between the European Union and the United Kingdom”: the Government's response was known on 03/11/2026.
• Senate – Motion (15)661/001952, “Motion regarding the Agreement concerning Gibraltar between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)… (withdrawn)
• Senate – Motion (15)661/001953, with the same object, admitted for processing on 04/29/2017 in the current database but pending final qualification.

Additionally, in 2021 the International Agreement on taxation and protection of financial interests between Spain and the United Kingdom regarding Gibraltar was published, which is a different treaty, already in force and published in the BOE (tax agreement on Gibraltar), and which is not part of the processing of the new EU–UK agreement.

Political debate in the Spanish Cortes

Although there is no formal “ratification,” the agreement has generated intense political debate in Congress and Senate:

• Minister Albares has appeared on several occasions to explain the content and application of the pact, both in the Plenary of Congress and in the Foreign Affairs Committee, as reported by several Demócrata chronicles (announcement of appearance; pact details in committee; Albares celebrates provisional application from July 15).
• PP and Vox demand that the agreement be submitted to a vote in Congress and Senate and that article 94.1 CE be applied, considering that it affects territorial integrity and fundamental rights (PP and Vox demand a vote). Vox has even pushed for a vote to reject the agreement in the Joint Committee for the EU (Vox pushes a vote in the Cortes).
• The Government maintains, however, that approval by the Council and the European Parliament is sufficient and that the Spanish Parliament does not have to authorize the treaty; this position is reiterated in Albares' interventions and in official notes from Foreign Affairs and Moncloa about the “imminent application” of the agreement from July 15 (Moncloa note; Foreign Affairs note).

In parallel, a non-legislative motion rejecting the agreement, promoted by Vox and amended by the PP, has been approved in the Joint Committee for the EU, whose text and processing are recorded in external monitoring of Congress (motion rejecting the agreement). This initiative has political value but does not legally block the signing or application of the treaty.

International status of the agreement

At the European and international level, the legal text of the treaty was closed in December 2025 and published on February 26, 2026, as reported by negotiation chronicles and specialized analyses (text completion; Gibraltar Government endorsement; signature and removal of the fence). The formal signing is scheduled for July 13 in Brussels and provisional application will begin at midnight on July 15, while the ratification process continues in the European Parliament and the British Parliament. All this is accompanied by intense discussion in Spain about the content of the agreement (Schengen controls, removal of the fence, partial customs union, etc.), explained in context pieces such as “Gibraltar fence: what really changes” or “Goodbye to the Gibraltar fence”.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation combines the general powers of any member of the Government with specific material functions in foreign policy, the European Union, and development cooperation. Its general framework is provided by Law 50/1997, of November 27, on the Government, and by Law 40/2015, of October 1, on the Legal Regime of the Public Sector, while the specific fit of the department is established by Royal Decree 829/2023, of November 20, on the restructuring of ministerial departments. Added to this are royal decrees and orders of organization and delegation of powers within the Ministry itself.

General framework: functions of ministers

Law 50/1997, on the Government generally regulates the powers of ministers as members of the Government and heads of a ministerial department. Among these powers are, summarized, the direction of the department's policy, the proposal and execution of Government decisions within their scope of competence, and the exercise of regulatory power within that scope, as well as the management of dependent services and agencies.

On the other hand, Law 40/2015, on the Legal Regime of the Public Sector establishes the general regime of the senior bodies of the General State Administration, including ministers. This law articulates principles such as hierarchical direction over the department's bodies, responsibility for management, and the possibility of delegating powers (article 9, explicitly cited as a basis in several subsequent delegation orders).

Material scope of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU and Cooperation

Royal Decree 829/2023, of November 20, which restructures ministerial departments, creates and defines the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation as the department specialized in these matters. According to available information, this royal decree places in this Ministry the scope related to:

• Spain's foreign policy and its bilateral and multilateral relations with other States and international organizations.
• Relations with the European Union, in coordination with the Presidency of the Government and other departments competent in community affairs.
• International development cooperation, including the planning and coordination of Spanish cooperation policy.
• Spain's external projection and presence, including the diplomatic and consular network and certain instruments of external action.

The official link to the Royal Decree can be consulted in the BOE: Royal Decree 829/2023.

Organic development and internal distribution of functions

The fine detail of the minister's powers is completed through the basic organic structure regulations. In the case of this department, the key text is Royal Decree 139/2020, of January 28, which establishes the basic organic structure of ministerial departments, modified several times, and Royal Decree 431/2020, of March 3, which develops the basic organic structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation. These texts distribute specific functions among the Secretariats of State, the Undersecretariat, the Technical General Secretariat, and other bodies, under the minister's direction. No further information is available in the consulted sources about the detailed content of those articles.

Delegation and exercise of powers

The minister not only exercises powers directly but also delegates them to other senior and managerial bodies of the department. Several recent orders illustrate this scheme:

• Order AUC/1239/2023, of November 2, on delegation of powers, redistributes certain faculties of the Ministry's holder to other bodies, in accordance with article 9 of Law 40/2015.
• Order AUC/462/2021, of April 28, sets limits for managing expenses and delegates powers of economic and contractual management, showing that the minister is the ultimate senior body responsible for the department's budget and contracting, although he delegates its ordinary exercise.
• Order AUC/1531/2021, of October 25, also on delegation of powers, again relies on article 9 of Law 40/2015 to distribute powers in administrative management.

These regulations reflect two key ideas: first, that the minister is the original holder of broad powers of direction, management, and decision in the external, European, and cooperation fields; and second, that a relevant part of those powers is exercised in a decentralized manner through delegation to secretaries of state, undersecretary, general directors, and even specific contracting bodies (such as the Board and Contracting Committee created by Order AUC/1227/2018).

Conclusion

In summary, according to Spanish legislation, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation is the senior body that directs and assumes the political and legal responsibility of foreign, European, and development cooperation action, within the general framework of ministerial functions established by the Government Law and Law 40/2015. Royal Decree 829/2023 formally places this scope in his department, while the organic structure royal decrees and delegation orders distribute specific functions internally, without altering that the ultimate ownership of powers resides in the minister.

Gibraltar can only implement a “VAT-type” consumption tax within the framework of the new EU–UK Treaty on Gibraltar, which creates a specific customs union and obliges the Rock to align with the EU's indirect taxation standards. This tax does not make Gibraltar a territory of EU VAT, but it does eliminate fiscal advantages compared to the Campo de Gibraltar and allows almost full access to the internal market for goods. Legally, the agreement sets minimum rates, joint supervision mechanisms, and safeguard clauses for the EU and Spain. As of July 2026, the legal text is closed and its provisional application is set for July 15, 2026, pending full ratification.

Legal framework: EU–UK Treaty on Gibraltar

The future agreement is presented as a mixed treaty between the EU and the UK, with central participation of Spain, completing the framework left by Brexit. The joint declaration of June 11, 2025 details that the objective is to eliminate “all physical barriers, checks, and controls on people and goods” between Spain and Gibraltar, while preserving Schengen, the Single Market, and the Customs Union, and setting principles on indirect taxation to avoid competition distortions (Commission statement; Moncloa note).

According to the newspaper Demócrata, the treaty foresees a customs union between Gibraltar and the EU, which integrates the Rock into the European system of customs rules, state aid, indirect taxation, and labor and environmental standards, strengthening cooperation against money laundering and tax evasion (analysis on the fence). This customs union is the legal basis requiring Gibraltar to modify its indirect tax regime.

Requirements of the new VAT-like tax

Demócrata news agree that the agreement obliges Gibraltar to establish a general indirect tax, similar to VAT, with these main characteristics:

• General rate: starting at 15% from the treaty's entry into force, with a gradual increase up to 17% within three years (Albares' appearance, Spain-Gibraltar pact, key points of the pact).
• Objective scope: tax on products manufactured or imported in Gibraltar; the rate cannot be set below the minimum in EU Member States (economic article).
• Supervision mechanism: creation of an independent Spain–UK consultative body with capacity to detect distortions; if the UK does not adjust the rate to its recommendations, Spain can activate a safeguard clause allowing the EU to apply, for a maximum of 30 days, the VAT corresponding to the disputed product ([link], [link]).
• Excise taxes: the treaty also requires new specific taxes on hydrocarbons, alcohol, and tobacco, with reinforced traceability, to prevent Gibraltar from being a fraud hotspot (Congress debate, [link]).

In parallel, the Spanish Ministry of Finance has explained that Gibraltar has committed to comply with European and Spanish fiscal standards within this tripartite Spain–UK–EU agreement, which has allowed it to be removed from the Spanish list of non-cooperative jurisdictions (Finance note; coverage in Demócrata).

Access to the internal market, customs union, and current situation

The treaty does not make Gibraltar a Member State or an EU VAT territory, but it gives it a functional status very close to that of the internal market for goods:

• Liberalization of goods: the customs union will allow free movement of goods between Gibraltar and the EU, with centralized customs controls in La Línea, Algeciras, and Sagunto, and the possibility of an additional point in Portugal ([link], [link]).
• People and Schengen: Schengen controls are moved to Gibraltar's port and airport and will be assumed by the National Police, with the physical fence disappearing (provisional entry into force, Albares' intervention, [link]).

In 2026, the EU and the UK have already finalized the legal text of the treaty (Demócrata; [link]), and the Twenty-Seven have endorsed its signature and provisional application from July 15, 2026 ([link], [link]). Minister Albares himself has presented the agreement as “historic” in his visits to the Campo de Gibraltar and informative seminars with local authorities and business sectors (Moncloa note, Foreign Affairs note, [link]).

As a complement, the agreement is valued and criticized from different political and social perspectives in Spain and Andalusia ([link], [link], [link]), but legally it sets the essential framework: without this treaty and without the new convergent indirect tax, Gibraltar would continue to be, in the eyes of the EU, a third country without privileged access to the internal market or the customs union.

Other cited informative references: [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link].