General elections survey: in the midst of the Ceuta crisis, Vox rises and the left does not reach 35%, according to NC Report

The NC Report survey for 'La Razón', conducted between July 31 and August 4 during the Ceuta crisis, places the PP at 34.2% and between 145 and 147 seats. Vox rises to 18% and would reach between 61 and 63 deputies, while PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos would total only 34.6% of the vote. The majority of PP and Vox would remain between 206 and 210 seats.

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encuesta elecciones crisis ceuta

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The Ceuta crisis does not alter the advantage of PP and Vox, but it does consolidate Santiago Abascal's formation at its highest level within the right-wing bloc. According to the survey by NC Report for La Razón, conducted between July 31 and August 4, Vox rises to 18% of the votes and would obtain between 61 and 63 seats if general elections were held now.

PP would win again with 34.2% and a range of between 145 and 147 deputies. The sum of PP and Vox would reach between 206 and 210 seats, well above the absolute majority, set at 176.

In the other bloc, PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos would remain at 34.6% of the vote. PSOE would obtain 25.2% and between 101 and 103 seats; Sumar would drop to 5.9% and would move between eight and 10 deputies; and Podemos would reach 3.5% and between two and three representatives.

The survey was published by La Razón this Monday and was conducted in the midst of the Ceuta crisis, after the massive entry of immigrants into the autonomous city and the political debate about the Government's response, Morocco's pressure, and border security.

What changes compared to the previous NC Report: Vox rises, PP cedes a few tenths, and PSOE improves slightly

The comparison with the previous NC Report survey allows for a more precise reading. There is no new sinking of PSOE compared to July. In fact, the socialists improve slightly: they go from 25% to 25.2% and from a range of 99-100 seats to another of 101-103 deputies.

The most relevant movement is in Vox. In July, Abascal's party appeared with 17.8% and between 60 and 62 seats. In the new measurement, it rises to 18% and is positioned between 61 and 63 deputies. The rise is small, but politically significant because it occurs in the midst of the Ceuta crisis and because it reinforces Vox as an essential partner of PP.

PP, for its part, drops slightly. In the previous NC Report, it appeared with 34.5% and between 146 and 148 seats. Now it is at 34.2% and between 145 and 147. Feijóo cedes three tenths and one seat in the range, but remains clearly as the leading force and maintains a wide advantage over Sánchez.

The sum of PP and Vox remains practically intact. In July, NC Report placed the bloc between 206 and 210 seats. In August, it repeats that same range. The reading is clear: although PP loosens a few tenths, Vox compensates for the movement and the majority of the right remains stabilized above 200 deputies.

For the PSOE, the data allows them to exit the psychological zone of less than 100 seats, but it does not change the substance of the problem. Sánchez would still be far from the 121 deputies obtained in 2023 and the sum of PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos would barely reach 34.6% of the vote.

PP and Vox maintain a wide majority of up to 210 deputies

The main conclusion of the survey is the strength of the block formed by PP and Vox. The PP would obtain between 145 and 147 seats. Vox would reach between 61 and 63. Together, both parties would sum between 206 and 210 deputies.

Even at the lower end of the range, the majority would exceed the absolute majority by 30 seats. At the upper end, the margin would reach 34 deputies.

The data confirms that, according to NC Report, the right would not depend on nationalist or regionalist parties to form a Government. Feijóo would need Vox, but the sum would be sufficient for an investiture and for a very comfortable parliamentary majority.

Vox doubles its representation compared to 23J

Vox is the party that improves the most in seats compared to the general elections of 2023. Then it obtained 33 deputies. Now, according to NC Report, it would move between 61 and 63. That is, it would practically double its representation in Congress.

In percentage of vote, Vox would go from 12.4% in the last general elections to the current 18%. The growth is 5.6 points. This advance changes the internal balance of the right-wing block. The PP would continue to be the leading force and would have more than 145 seats, but Vox would have a parliamentary weight much higher than that of the current legislature.

The PP wins clearly, although it drops compared to July

The PP would win the general elections with 34.2% of the votes. The figure represents a slight drop compared to the previous NC Report, when the popular party appeared at 34.5%. The range of seats also drops: from 146-148 to 145-147.

The fall is limited and does not alter the first position of Feijóo's party. The PP would still be above its parliamentary result from 23J, when it obtained 137 deputies.

The advantage over the PSOE would be nine points in vote and between 42 and 46 seats, according to the extreme of the range.

The PSOE improves a few tenths, but remains far from 2023

The PSOE stands at 25.2% of the votes and between 101 and 103 deputies. The comparison with the previous NC Report survey offers a slight improvement: two tenths more in vote and a slightly higher range in seats. However, the comparison with the general elections of 2023 remains very negative.

The PSOE obtained then 31.7% and 121 seats. With the current data, it would lose 6.5 points and between 18 and 20 deputies.

The poll also reflects low loyalty: only 67.8% of those who voted for the PSOE in 2023 would repeat now. 10.7% would go to the PP, 6.2% to Vox, and 10.5% would abstain.

The state left remains at 34.6%

The hardest figure for the progressive bloc is the sum of PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos. Together they would reach 34.6% of the vote. The PSOE would contribute 25.2%, Sumar 5.9%, and Podemos 3.5%.

La Razón emphasizes that this percentage is below other historical lows of the state left space, such as the results of 2000 and 2011.

The comparison has a clear political reading: the PSOE resists somewhat better than in the previous measurement, but the entire bloc remains in a very weak position.

Sumar still does not rebuild its space

Sumar would be at 5.9% of the votes and between eight and 10 seats. The formation remains very far from the 31 deputies obtained in 2023 by the candidacy that then also included Podemos.

The loyalty data is especially low: Sumar would only retain 37% of its voters. 24.5% would go to Podemos, 15.1% to the PSOE, and 19.8% would choose abstention. The fragmentation of the space to the left of the PSOE remains one of the main problems for converting votes into seats.

Podemos improves, but does not compensate for Sumar's setback

Podemos would obtain 3.5% of the votes and between two and three deputies. This result allows the formation to maintain presence in Congress, but does not compensate for the accumulated loss of Sumar nor rebuild the space that in 2023 ran united.

The sum of Sumar and Podemos would be between 10 and 13 seats, far from the 31 achieved by the joint candidacy in the last general elections. The alternative left maintains enough votes to influence some provincial distributions, but appears very weakened as a necessary partner of a progressive majority.

The PSOE loses votes to PP, Vox, and abstention

The transfer matrix is one of the keys of the poll. NC Report estimates that 10.7% of those who voted for the PSOE in 2023 would now lean towards the PP. Another 6.2% would vote for Vox and 10.5% would remain in abstention.

The flight to the right is greater than that which occurs in the opposite direction. Only 0.3% of PP voters would now move to the PSOE.

The data reflects that the socialist problem is not only one of demobilization. There is also a direct transfer to the right-wing bloc.

The PP better retains its electoral base

The PP maintains a voting fidelity of 83.8%. This means that more than eight out of ten Popular voters from 2023 would repeat now. The main leakage from the PP occurs towards Vox, with 11.1%.

Abstention among former PP voters stands at 3.6%, well below the 10.5% recorded among those who voted for the PSOE.

This difference helps explain the advantage of the right-wing bloc: its voters remain more mobilized and less undecided.

Vox has the most loyal electorate

Vox retains 88.4% of those who voted for it in the 2023 general elections. It is the highest loyalty among the main parties. Only 5.5% of its former voters would return to the PP, 3% would opt for SALF, and 3.1% would abstain.

The high retention of Vox explains why the party continues to grow even in a scenario where the PP remains the leading force.

The result confirms that Vox does not appear only as a receiver of discontented votes, but as a party with a very consolidated base already.

Participation would drop four points

The survey estimates a participation of 62.6%. In the 2023 general elections, it was 66.6%, so the drop would be four points. Abstention would rise to 37.4%.

NC Report calculates that this would mean more than 1.7 million fewer voters compared to the last election. The drop in participation particularly harms the left, as the PSOE and Sumar show significant leaks towards abstention.

Young abstention exceeds 50%

The age analysis leaves another high-impact data. Among young people aged 18 to 29, abstention would exceed 50%. According to NC Report's segmentation, in that age group, abstention would reach 50.7%.

The young vote appears very fragmented. In that group, Vox would stand at 11.8%, the PSOE at 10.4%, the PP at 9.7%, and Sumar at 6.9%.

The data is relevant because it breaks an automatic reading of the young vote as a progressive space. Abstention overwhelmingly dominates, and Vox appears ahead of PSOE and PP in that segment.

The vote by age favors the PP from 45 onwards

The PP obtains its best data in the older age brackets. Among voters aged 45 to 64, it reaches 23.2% of the electorate, ahead of the PSOE, which stands at 17.3%. Vox registers 10.1% in that group and Sumar 2.5%.

 Among those aged 30 to 44, PP and PSOE tie with 17.3% and 15.3%, respectively, while Vox reaches 13.7%.

The pattern confirms a generational advantage for PP in the adult age groups and a better performance of Vox among those under 45.

Party Estimated vote Estimated seats
PP 34.2% 145-147
PSOE 25.2% 101-103
Vox 18% 61-63
Sumar 5.9% 10
Podemos 3.5% 2-3

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What stage of parliamentary processing is the current Electoral Law reform in?

Right now, there is no single "major" reform of the Electoral Law in a final stage, but rather several partial reforms of the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG) at different points in the process. The main government initiative, an organic bill to regulate electoral debates and polls, is in the Congress in the article amendment phase, with the deadline extended until September 2, 2026. Additionally, there is a bill originating from the Senate regarding causes of ineligibility also in the amendment phase, and several bills from groups (Vox, Sumar, Mixed) still pending consideration. In parallel, a specific reform of the LOREG – the one adjusting Formentera's representation in the Senate – has already been definitively approved by the Cortes.

1. Government Project to Reform the LOREG

The Government has promoted the Organic Bill modifying Organic Law 5/1985, of June 19, of the General Electoral Regime, registered in the Congress under number 121/000063. This text develops the draft presented in 2025 and described by the newspaper Demócrata in this Council of Ministers report and in the analysis on mandatory debates and polls.

According to the parliamentary file, the project:

  • Is processed in the Congress of Deputies.
  • Has passed the initiative publication phase.
  • Is currently in the amendment submission period, successively extended until September 2, 2026.

In procedural terms, this means the reform is still in an initial-intermediate phase: no working group has been formed, nor is there yet a Commission report or Plenary debate on the specific text. The project develops, among other points, the obligation of at least one electoral debate in public media and a strengthening of poll transparency (including the publication of microdata), as detailed in the Congress Bulletin itself and in the Ministry of the Presidency's notes on the Democracy Action Plan, available at Moncloa and on the ministerial Presidency website at Presidency.

2. Bill on Causes of Ineligibility

Alongside that government project, there is an Organic Bill to modify the LOREG regarding causes of ineligibility, promoted by the Popular Group in the Senate and processed in both Chambers:

  • In the Senate: initiative (15)622/000048, whose text was published in the Bulletin on October 24, 2024.
  • After being taken into consideration by the Senate Plenary on May 21, 2025, it was sent to the Congress according to article 89.2 CE.
  • In the Congress it is processed as 124/000028, assigned to the Constitutional Commission, with an open amendment period also extended until September 2, 2026.

Therefore, this specific LOREG reform is also in the amendment phase in the Congress, without a working group or Commission report yet.

3. Other Ongoing Electoral Reform Initiatives

Besides these two main pieces, there are several organic bills addressing specific aspects of the electoral regime:

  • Vox's bill to include fugitives from justice as ineligible (122/000065) was admitted for processing and is pending consideration by the Congress Plenary.
  • Sumar's bill on simulations of images and voices with artificial intelligence (122/000073) adds a new article 144 bis to the LOREG to typify crimes linked to deepfakes in campaigns, and is also pending consideration.
  • The Mixed Group's bill on right to truthful information and fight against disinformation (122/000107) includes a new specific title for elections to the Information Rights Council and multiple LOREG modifications; it is likewise admitted and awaiting consideration debate.

In parallel, Demócrata has followed other reform attempts that were rejected at the consideration stage, such as Vox's bill to separate postal votes into different ballot boxes, whose inadmissibility is detailed in this piece and in this other analysis.

4. Completed Reforms: The Formentera Case

It is important to distinguish these ongoing initiatives from reforms that have already been completed. The most recent example is the reform granting Formentera its own senator, which involved modifying the LOREG following the reform of article 69.3 of the Constitution. The Congress gave the green light to the text, as Demócrata explained in this report, and the Senate subsequently approved it by 252 votes in favor and 5 abstentions, according to the official note accessible on the Senate website. Therefore, this reform is already completed and out of the parliamentary phase.

5. Summary: There Is No Single “Closed” Reform

In summary, as of August 2026, the “Electoral Law reform” translates into a mosaic of initiatives:

  • A government project on debates and polls, in the amendment phase in the Congress.
  • A Senate bill on ineligibilities, also in the amendment phase in the Congress.
  • Several parliamentary group texts, pending consideration.
  • And specific reforms already definitively approved, such as the one regarding Formentera's own Senate seat.

Therefore, there is no single comprehensive LOREG reform in a final phase, but several partial reforms with different degrees of progress, with the government and Senate ineligibility reforms currently the most advanced in their processing.

What specific changes does the Government's project introduce regarding electoral debates and polls in the LOREG? Which parties support and which oppose the main electoral reforms in process? When could the Government's reform be definitively approved if it passes all parliamentary procedures?

What are the main functions of the president of the Popular Party according to the party's statutes?

With the available information, it is not possible to detail, article by article, the functions of the president of the Popular Party “according to the current Statutes,” because the consulted sources do not contain the complete statutory text nor the specific provision related to that figure. However, some general conclusions about the role assigned to the president by the Statutes and how that leadership is exercised in practice can be drawn from the chronicles of the PP itself and Demócrata about the recent Statutes reform and internal organization. Still, any closed enumeration of “statutory functions” would be speculative and not supported by the accessible texts.

What the sources say about the Statutes and PP organization

The Popular Party recently reformed its Statutes at the XXI National Congress held in Madrid in July 2025. The party itself explains that a new Statutes proposal was approved, presented by Fernando López Miras, María Guardiola, Gema Igual, and Dani Sirera, aimed at “defining the organization and functioning” of the PP, according to the official note on the Statutes Proposal and the information about the proposal published by the party in this article.

After the Congress, the PP reported that “consensus Statutes were approved that promote transparency, participation, and listening,” in the words of López Miras, according to the official chronicle of its plenary, which highlights that the text regulates, among other things, new bodies (Compliance Office, Council of Regional Presidents, mayors' committees, etc.) and the distribution of internal functions, as the PP itself states in this reference.

Demócrata, which closely followed the Congress preparation, details that the Statutes proposal promotes a primary model with a single ballot box, strengthens accountability mechanisms, and creates a Compliance Office to guarantee the ethical code, all within the new statutory framework (article on the Compliance Office and analysis on the primary change).

However, neither in those chronicles nor in other contextual pieces — such as Demócrata's Congress guide (Congress guide) or live coverage of the event (live coverage) — is the complete Statutes text or the provision formally listing the national president's powers reproduced.

The role the PP president exercises according to practice described in the news

In the absence of the literal Statutes text, information about the internal structure allows outlining the political and organizational role of the PP president:

  • Leadership of the highest governing body: Demócrata notes that the National Executive Committee is the “highest party body,” composed of 35 members plus other ex officio members, and that the president and his entire Management Committee sit on it, according to the Congress chronicle in this analysis. De facto, the president heads this body and sets its political line.
  • Appointment and configuration of the leadership: several pieces about the “new leadership” describe how Alberto Núñez Feijóo decides the structure of his team (General Secretariat, deputy secretariats, spokespersons) and proposes the specific people who make it up; for example, when it was announced that Miguel Tellado would be secretary general and Ester Muñoz spokesperson in the Congress, it was explained that the president himself “unfolds the changes he will introduce in his Management Committee,” according to this information and the broader chronicle on the team reconfiguration in “New leadership in the PP”.
  • Political direction of the organization: articles like “Who stays and who falls?” or the Congress guide show the president as the figure who sets the party's general strategy, guides the political proposal, and presents his project to renew leadership before the plenary.
  • Participation in territorial coordination bodies: the Statutes proposal commented on by Sirera foresees a Council of Regional Presidents “composed of the national president, the secretary general, and the regional presidents,” as Demócrata notes in its analysis. This places the president as the apex of coordination with the territorial “barons.”
  • Responsibility over the ethical code and internal compliance: the Compliance Office and disciplinary regime are inserted in Statutes in which, as Demócrata recalls regarding the case of deputy Noelia Núñez, falsifying the curriculum is a sanctionable offense (“article 10.2 of the PP Statutes” requires truthfulness; see this piece). Although the president's specific function in this area is not detailed, he is presented as the highest political responsible for compliance with this framework.

In sum, the sources indicate that the PP president is the figure who leads the party, directs the Management Committee and the National Executive Committee, proposes the structure and names of the leadership, leads the definition of the political line, and is a central part of territorial coordination bodies. However, the complete statutory text that would allow precisely listing the “main functions” of the president as legally stated in the current Statutes is not available. To know that exact enumeration, it would be necessary to consult the official Statutes document approved at the XXI Congress, which the party disseminates through its own channels, such as the communications linked in this note and this other.

Where can I consult the full text of the Popular Party Statutes approved at the XXI National Congress? What differences do the new PP Statutes introduce compared to those approved in 2017 regarding the model for electing the president? How do the PP president, the secretary general, and the National Executive Committee relate in practice according to the party's current internal organization?

How many seats did Vox and the PP obtain in the November 2019 general elections?

I cannot tell you with certainty how many seats exactly Vox and the Popular Party obtained in the general elections of November 10, 2019, because the consulted sources do not contain any numerical data about the seat distribution of those elections. Searches in the Demócrata newspaper archive and other associated references do not return specific results about 10N nor about the seats of PP and Vox. Since the instructions I follow prevent me from providing figures not explicitly in the available sources, I cannot give you a seat number without introducing unverified information within this context. However, I can explain what was found, why the data does not appear, and how you could verify it in official sources.

What the searches yielded

The queries focused on locating the seat distribution of 10N 2019 for the Congress, specifically filtering by “Vox,” “Popular Party,” and “seats” in the period of November 2019 and subsequent months. However, the Demócrata archive does not contain, in the retrieved material, a results sheet nor an electoral chronicle with the breakdown by party of those elections.

Instead, there are news items completely unrelated to electoral results. For example, several press releases from the meat sector: about beef exports to Japan (beef export to Japan), participation in international fairs like Foodex in Saudi Arabia (Foodex Saudi) or Food Africa in Cairo (Food Africa Cairo).

Also, contents about food and health have been retrieved, such as a text on the Mediterranean diet and childhood obesity (Mediterranean diet and childhood obesity), another on the role of beef in environmental conservation (beef and environment), and a piece on Christmas gastronomy (beef at Christmas). There is even a corporate note from the digital sector about a company's joining a tech employers' association (TOTEM joining DigitalES).

None of these texts include any reference to the 10N 2019 results, nor to the number of seats of PP or Vox. That is, from the point of view of the sources used for this answer, “there is no data” on that specific question.

Limitations to provide a concrete figure

The rules governing this FREN tool and the Demócrata newspaper require not incorporating numerical information that is not explicitly contained in the consulted sources. Although the November 10, 2019 general elections are fully documented in Spanish political reality, in this specific context I must strictly adhere to what appears in the retrieved documents.

In that sense, there is no results table nor a parliamentary balance news item indicating the seats obtained by each formation in the analyzed sources. Therefore, I cannot write here “PP obtained X seats and Vox Y” based on this research, as it would introduce data not accredited within the set of consulted texts.

How to verify the data in official sources

If you need the exact number of seats of PP and Vox in 10N, the most reliable way is to consult official electoral results sources, which are public and accessible to any citizen. In Spain, this type of information is published and preserved, among others, by:

  • Ministry of the Interior: official portal of electoral results by constituency and party.
  • Congress of Deputies: files of each legislature with the distribution of seats by parliamentary group.
  • Official State Gazette (BOE): official proclamations of elected candidates by electoral boards.

On any of these platforms, you can locate the general elections history, select the election date (November 10, 2019), and consult the seat distribution, both for Vox and the Popular Party, along with other political forces.

Summary

In summary: with the specific sources used in this answer (Demócrata archive and related documents) the data on how many seats Vox and PP obtained in the November 10, 2019 elections is not found. Therefore, and to avoid providing unverified figures within this framework, I cannot give you a concrete number. For an exact and official figure, the appropriate way is to consult the Ministry of the Interior's results history or the institutional information of the Congress of Deputies.

In which official institutions can I see the complete seat distribution of 10N 2019, constituency by constituency? What consequences did the November 2019 repeat election have on the configuration of parliamentary blocs in the Congress? How has the parliamentary weight of Vox and PP in the Congress of Deputies changed from 2019 to today?

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