Armenia celebrates legislative elections this Saturday in which Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan seeks to renew his mandate amid ongoing peace negotiations with old adversaries like Turkey and Azerbaijan, following the 2023 military defeat in the Azerbaijani offensive to reintegrate the Armenian-majority region of Nagorno-Karabakh, and amidst its rapprochement with the United States and the European Union (EU) after years of close political-military cooperation with Russia.
The elections, considered the most significant in the South Caucasus since the 2018 'Velvet Revolution'—a wave of protests led by Pashinyan against then-Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan and the Republican Party, in power since 1999—center on the post-war scenario, making the vote a plebiscite on the head of government following the setback in Nagorno-Karabakh and his subsequent diplomatic strategy.
The last parliamentary elections were held in 2021, making Saturday's vote the first since the traumatic loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, which allowed Azerbaijan to regain control of the enclave and triggered the exodus of the entire Armenian population, in what Yerevan described as "ethnic cleansing."
The region, approximately 4,400 square kilometers and with 100,000 inhabitants before the Azerbaijani offensive, was the scene of several wars between 1992 and 1994—which concluded with an Armenian victory—after years of guerrilla warfare, and several months of fighting in 2020, although it was Azerbaijan's latest offensive that definitively altered the balance of power and ended the separatist aspirations that emerged with the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
This new scenario forced Pashinyan to face harsh internal criticism for the defeat in a territory with strong symbolic weight for Armenians and pushed him to opt for a diplomatic path through which he claims to pursue lasting peace and stability to foster the country's economic and social development.
The core of this shift lies precisely in the peace talks with Azerbaijan—with detractors accusing the prime minister of making excessive concessions to Baku—and with its great ally, Turkey, with whom Armenia has a historical dispute over the Armenian genocide during the Ottoman Empire, events that Ankara refuses to recognize and which have conditioned bilateral relations for decades.
The official break of ties occurred in 1993, when Turkey severed relations with Armenia precisely because of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and the proclamation of the Artsakh Republic, a move harshly censured by Ankara, which provided military and diplomatic support to Baku and maintained it, reinforcing it in view of the reconquest of the territory in 2023.
Russia's Distancing and Turn Towards the West
The elections will also serve to measure Pashinyan's gamble to move away from Russia, the traditional guarantor of Armenian security, a process accelerated after the defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, when Yerevan raised its tone against Moscow for its passivity in the face of the Azerbaijani offensive.
After the conflict, Pashinyan called for "not turning a blind eye" to the "failure" of the Russian contingent to monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreed in 2020 -- which included the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces -- and argued that the situation demonstrated that "external security systems that are involved are not effective."
Moscow responded by denouncing the "unacceptable attacks" by the Armenian prime minister and accused him of "trying to shift responsibility for failures in his national and international policy by blaming Moscow," as well as suggesting that Pashinyan had been preparing for years for a turn towards the West, in contrast to the markedly pro-Russian line of the Republican Party.
Pashinyan, who in January 2024 decided to freeze Armenia's participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) -- led by Russia -- has advocated for redefining Yerevan's relationship with the European Union (EU), to the point of presenting a bill in January 2025 to put accession to the community bloc to a referendum, although a date has not yet been set.
In this context, the EU and Armenia held their first bilateral summit on May 5, in which they signed a connectivity agreement to strengthen cooperation in transport, energy, and digitalization, and elevated their relationship to deepen economic and security collaboration. These steps have caused growing unease in Russia, which has threatened to suspend or challenge energy agreements with Yerevan and has imposed a temporary ban on the import of certain products from the South Caucasus country.
The Role of the United States and the Strategic Corridor
To this geopolitical rearrangement is added the growing involvement of the United States in the region, where it has intensified its presence in recent years, including a visit in February to Armenia and Azerbaijan by US Vice President JD Vance, who became the highest-ranking American official to travel to the South Caucasus in a long time.
The intervention of US President Donald Trump dates back to August 2025, when he organized a meeting at the White House between Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to give an additional boost to the peace process, which was already advanced then --although with issues still to be resolved--, thus consolidating Washington's emergence in an area traditionally under Moscow's influence.
The rapprochement received a new impetus last week, when Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan signed a strategic partnership agreement and defined the framework for a strategic corridor project that will connect Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan through southern Armenia.
The corridor, christened the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), grants the United States "exclusive development rights" for this route through the Armenian region of Syunik, with the intention of meeting one of Baku's main demands for territorial continuity with Nakhchivan.
In recent weeks, these moves have led to a crossfire of accusations about alleged disinformation and interference campaigns by Russia to influence the electoral outcome, while Trump has openly expressed his "total" support for his "great friend" Pashinyan ahead of the election.
Turkey and Azerbaijan, for their part, have avoided commenting on an eventual preference for Pashinyan's victory -- partly due to the fear that explicit support would generate rejection among Armenian voters --, while a survey by the NGO International Republican Institute, based in Washington, indicates that 38% of those consulted would lean towards the ruling Civil Contract party, although 23% refused to answer and 20% declared themselves undecided.
The poll places three pro-Russian opposition parties far behind, including the Strong Armenia bloc, led by Russian-Armenian billionaire Samuel Karapetyan, currently under house arrest accused of instigating a coup by supporting the Apostolic Church in a confrontation between its hierarchy and Pashinian.
In any case, Strong Armenia appears with 7% of voting intention, ahead of the Armenian Alliance of former President Robert Kocharyan --which would obtain 4% of the votes-- and Prosperous Armenia --linked to the official Russian party United Russia--, founded by businessman Gagik Tsarukyan and which would secure 2% of the support.