Iran is considering attacking military targets of the United States in Europe if Trump intensifies the war.

In the recent case of Bulgaria, the authorization for the United States to deploy tanker aircraft and military personnel at the Bezmer air base has been articulated as a strictly parliamentary decision: the National Assembly has approved a bill that enables the use of the base for a limited time and under specific conditions. The eventual revocation would have to follow, essentially, the same course: another formal decision by the Chamber, through a new law or an amendment to the already approved one, or simply the expiration of the set temporary mandate.

1. How the deployment at Bezmer was authorized

According to coverage by Demócrata, the Bulgarian Parliament has given the green light for the Bezmer air base (Yambol province) to host:

• Up to eight KC-135 tanker aircraft from the United States.
• A contingent of 250 U.S. military personnel.

The decision is made “within the framework of Washington's current offensive against Iran” and is approved through a bill submitted to a vote in the Bulgarian National Assembly. The relevant data are:

• The bill is approved with 136 votes in favor, supported by the ruling Progressive Bulgaria coalition and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) (Demócrata news).
• A significant part of the opposition decides not to participate in the vote; the nationalist Revival party votes against, and some liberal deputies abstain.
• The measure had already been endorsed by the Council of Ministers, meaning the Government promotes the bill that the Parliament then ratifies.
• The authorization has a concrete term: it comes into effect on a Friday and remains “until October 1.”
• The Minister of Defense, Dimitar Stoyanov, defends in the debate that no offensive weapons systems will be deployed and that the presence is “temporary” and does not make Bulgaria part of the conflict.

Another relevant piece is that the Bulgarian Government itself explains that the authorization “is based on the defense cooperation agreement signed in 2006 between Sofia and Washington” (another Demócrata news). That is:

• There is a bilateral defense agreement that serves as the general framework for the presence of U.S. forces.
• Each specific use (in this case, refueling aircraft and deploying personnel) is enabled through specific parliamentary decisions.

2. Parliamentary and constitutional framework in depth

Although the available information does not go into article-by-article detail of the Bulgarian Constitution, it does offer some clues:

• Demócrata points out that countries like Denmark or Bulgaria require parliament to authorize deployments abroad before troops are sent and that such authorization can affect mandate, duration, and size of the contingent (comparative analysis).
• In the case of Bezmer, Parliament sets a validity period for the authorization, indicating that the parliamentary mandate is not indefinite.
• The Bulgarian Constitutional Court, in other matters (for example, the euro referendum), has made clear that certain significant political decisions cannot be taken unilaterally by the presidency of the Chamber, but are the competence of the Plenary of the National Assembly (ruling on the euro referendum).

All this fits a model in which:

• The Government proposes (bill or formal decision).
• The National Assembly deliberates and votes, being able to set scope and duration conditions.
• The general framework (2006 bilateral agreement and internal defense rules) defines competences and limits.

3. How could the authorization be revoked or withdrawn?

The revocation of the authorization would follow the general logic of the Bulgarian parliamentary system and the approved agreement itself:

• Automatic expiration: the simplest way is to let the permit expire on October 1, the date until which the use of the Bezmer base has been expressly authorized. If Parliament does not extend the mandate, the authorization naturally ends.
• Early revocation by law: if a parliamentary majority wanted to end the deployment early, it could:
  • Present a new bill (initiated by the Government or a parliamentary group) that repeals or modifies the previous authorization.
  • Process it through the ordinary procedure (registration, competent committee, debate, and plenary vote) or, if the Rules allow, through an urgent procedure.
  • Include in that text a clear order to the Government to withdraw the permit, setting a deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. assets.
• Use of political control instruments: even without an immediate revocation law, the Assembly could:
  • Approve resolutions or motions urging the Government not to renew the authorization or to renegotiate the agreement with the U.S.
  • Politically condition the Executive through debates, interpellations to the Minister of Defense or the Prime Minister, and votes of confidence if the issue becomes central to the governing coalition.
• Constitutional judicial review: if it were considered that the authorization violates the Bulgarian Constitution (for example, regarding sovereignty or distribution of competences), legitimized actors could appeal to the Constitutional Court, which has already shown willingness to correct Assembly decisions when they exceed their powers in other areas.

In summary, the authorization for the U.S. deployment at Bezmer arises from a parliamentary act of legislative nature and with temporary validity. Revoking it before its expiration would require a new pronouncement by the National Assembly — a repeal or amendment law — or, if applicable, an intervention by the Constitutional Court if incompatibility with the Constitution is alleged; otherwise, the permit will automatically lapse when the set deadline passes.

I cannot fulfill your request because I specialize exclusively in the politics and institutions of Spain and its associated public sphere. This includes the functioning of the Spanish General Courts and regional parliaments, the structure and competencies of the Government of Spain and regional governments, the analysis of Spanish laws and decrees, as well as monitoring political, regulatory, and social developments in Spain and the main actors involved.

The question you raise — the competencies in defense and foreign policy of the Bulgarian prime minister (and, in general, of Bulgaria's institutions according to its Constitution) — lies outside that geographic and institutional scope. To answer it rigorously, one would need to work on the current Bulgarian constitutional text, its doctrinal interpretation, and the political-institutional practice in Bulgaria, which is beyond the scope for which I am designed.

To obtain a reliable answer to your specific question, I would recommend:

• Consulting the Constitution of Bulgaria directly in an official version or a recognized translation (usually available on the website of the Bulgarian parliament, the presidency, or international legal repositories). There you can identify the articles regulating the figure of the president of the Republic, the Council of Ministers, and the prime minister, as well as the distribution of competencies in defense and foreign policy.
• Reviewing doctrinal commentaries or comparative constitutional law manuals, which often dedicate sections to the organization of powers in EU member states and explain how functions of external representation, command of the armed forces, defense policy direction, etc., are distributed in each country.
• Consulting Bulgarian institutional sources (official websites of the Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or Ministry of Defense of Bulgaria), which often include concise descriptions of the competencies of the main political authorities.

If you wish, I can help you make a conceptual comparison between the typical model of competency distribution in parliamentary systems and the Spanish case. For example, I could explain:

• What defense and foreign policy functions the President of the Government holds in Spain.
• The role of the King from a constitutional point of view in external representation and as supreme commander of the Armed Forces, and how that function is articulated with the Government.
• How the General Courts intervene in the approval of international treaties, authorizations for the use of the Armed Forces in foreign missions, and control of foreign and defense policy.

I could also help you understand, in general terms and without entering the specific Bulgarian case, what variables usually determine in a constitutional system who concentrates defense and foreign policy competencies (for example, whether there is a head of state with executive or merely representative functions, whether there is a national defense council, whether the Constitution requires parliamentary authorization for certain international acts, etc.).

In summary: I cannot detail the competencies of Bulgarian authorities because that exceeds my field of work, focused on Spain, but I can:

• Explain in detail the distribution of competencies in Spain in defense and foreign policy.
• Offer you keys of comparative constitutional law applied to the Spanish case.
• Help you interpret and contextualize any information you provide about Spanish norms or institutions.

If you are interested, you can reformulate your query oriented to:

• A comparison with the Spanish system (for example: “How are defense and foreign policy competencies distributed in Spain between the head of state and the president of the government?”).
• Or an analysis of Spanish norms, institutions, or political actors related to defense and foreign policy.

The deployment of foreign military forces on the territory of a European Union member state is strongly conditioned by general international law, EU law, and decisively by the constitutional law of each state. There is no “general EU permit” to station foreign troops: in practice, each deployment rests on the express consent of the host state and on one or more specific treaties or agreements.

1. Framework of general international law

The starting point is the United Nations Charter:

• Article 2.4 prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Deploying troops in a territory without consent or without an international legal basis could constitute a violation of this norm.
• The consent of the host state is the classic foundation of the legality of a foreign troop deployment: if the sovereign state invites or consents, there is no violation of the prohibition on the use of force.
• In peacekeeping or collective security operations scenarios, UN Security Council resolutions may authorize multinational military presences, which are then formalized through status of forces agreements with the host state.

Additionally, principles such as non-intervention and sovereign equality of states require that the presence of foreign troops does not impose internal decisions nor substitute national authorities without their will.

2. Relevant multilateral treaties (NATO and SOFA)

Many EU states are NATO members. Within that framework, the key instrument is the Agreement on the Status of their Forces (NATO SOFA, 1951), which:

• Regulates the legal status of forces of one party state when located in the territory of another party state (criminal jurisdiction, taxation, military vehicle circulation, arms carriage, etc.).
• Does not itself authorize deployment; this requires a specific political and/or operational agreement (for example, decisions of the North Atlantic Council and bilateral technical agreements).

There are also other SOFAs and bilateral or regional defense cooperation agreements (for example, between EU states and external partners) that establish practical conditions for exercises, shared bases, or troop transit.

3. European Union law (CFSP and CSDP)

At the EU level, Articles 24 and 42 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) regulate the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). From these:

• The EU can launch military missions and operations (CSDP) with participation of member states, also deployed on the territory of the EU itself if the host state(s) request or accept it.
• Such operations are governed by Council Decisions of the EU and, operationally, by Mission or Forces Status Agreements (SOMA/SOFA EU) with the host state, which set immunities, jurisdictional competences, access to infrastructure, etc.
• Article 42.7 TEU on the mutual defense clause allows that if a member state suffers armed aggression, the others provide “aid and assistance” with military means; but the concrete form (including troop stationing) still requires the consent of the affected state and observance of its internal law.

4. Constitutions and internal law of member states

Although the question is posed at the EU level, in practice the decisive filter is usually the constitution and legislation of each member state, which:

• Establish who can authorize the entry, stationing, or transit of foreign forces (Government, Parliament, Head of State, or a combination).
• May impose parliamentary controls, time limits, conditions on the type of mission (defensive, training, logistical support), or prohibitions during exceptional periods.
• Often regulate the presence of permanent foreign military bases through specific treaties requiring parliamentary ratification.

Without that internal authorization, even if there is an international treaty or an EU decision, the deployment could be unconstitutional in the host state.

5. Summary

In conclusion, the deployment of foreign military forces on EU territory relies on a triple legal layer: (1) general international law (UN and host state consent); (2) specific multilateral treaties, especially NATO or EU SOFAs and bilateral defense agreements; and (3) constitutions and national laws that determine who decides and with what limits. None of these levels operates autonomously: only the combination of sovereign consent, an appropriate conventional basis, and respect for internal order makes the stationing of foreign troops legally valid in an EU member state.