Trump dismisses extending the agreement with Iran and Brent oil surpasses 90 dollars again.

In the United States, there is no single “parliamentary process” to ratify or extend international agreements as there would be in many parliamentary systems. The U.S. constitutional design distinguishes between various types of agreements, each with a different relationship to Congress. The case of agreements like the memorandum with Iran typically falls under the category of executive agreements, which do not follow the same path as formal treaties.

1. Formal Treaties (Article II Treaties)

The U.S. Constitution, in its Article II, section 2, provides the classic procedure for treaties:

• Negotiation: the Executive Branch (usually the President through the State Department) negotiates the text with the other State or international organization.
• Signing: the President, or an authorized representative, signs the treaty. The signature does not automatically make it binding domestically; it expresses the intention to become obligated.
• Submission to the Senate: the President sends the treaty to the Senate, accompanied by an explanatory message.
• Processing in the Senate: it is referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, which may hold hearings, propose amendments or “reservations,” and make a recommendation to the full Senate.
• Approval by 2/3 of the Senate: the full Senate votes on an advice and consent resolution. A qualified majority of two-thirds of the senators present is required.
• Presidential ratification: with the Senate’s consent, the President issues the instrument of ratification and exchanges or deposits it as provided in the treaty; at that moment it is ratified internationally.

The extension or substantial amendment of a treaty of this type, if legally considered equivalent to a new commitment, usually requires the Senate’s participation again under this same scheme (although in practice more flexible routes have been used through protocols or interpretative agreements).

2. Congressional‑Executive Agreements

Besides formal treaties, there are agreements approved through a regular law of Congress:

• The Executive negotiates the agreement.
• The President submits it to Congress or negotiates a legislative proposal in parallel.
• The House of Representatives and the Senate approve a law that authorizes, implements, or incorporates the agreement, by simple majority in each chamber.
• The President signs the law (or it is approved over his veto).

This route has been used, for example, for many trade agreements. The extension or relevant modification would normally require a new law or amendment of the previous one.

3. Executive Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding

In practice, much of U.S. international cooperation is structured through executive agreements or memoranda of understanding (MoU), concluded by the President without the need for specific parliamentary approval. They are based on:

• The President’s own constitutional power in foreign policy and as commander in chief.
• General authorizations contained in preexisting laws (for example, sanctions laws, security cooperation laws, etc.).

In these cases, Congress’s role is more indirect:

• Establishing the material frameworks (for example, what sanctions exist, under what conditions they can be lifted, what funds can be allocated to cooperation).
• Political oversight through hearings, non-binding resolutions, or conditioning budgets.

The extension of an MoU or executive agreement can usually be done by the Executive itself if the text provides for automatic renewal or extension by exchange of diplomatic notes, as long as it remains within the competences already granted by law. A new specific vote by Congress is not required, except if:

• It involves modifying existing legislation (for example, lifting sanctions that only Congress can definitively remove).
• It exceeds the material or financial limits already authorized.

4. Congressional Control and Framework Laws

For sensitive agreements, Congress can pass laws requiring:

• Mandatory notification of any agreement or extension.
• Deadlines during which Congress can approve a disapproval resolution (sometimes with expedited procedures).
• Periodic reports on the implementation of the agreement.

In summary, in the U.S. only formal treaties require intense and express parliamentary intervention (2/3 of the Senate). Many memorandum-type agreements are made and extended mainly by the Executive Branch, within margins defined by federal legislation and subject to political, budgetary control and, occasionally, to specific framework laws that give Congress oversight or delayed veto capacity.

The President of the United States is constitutionally the central actor in foreign policy and defense, but his powers are balanced by significant powers of Congress, especially the Senate. The Constitution does not systematically list “foreign policy powers,” but distributes functions among branches. Historical practice and jurisprudence have tended to tilt the balance toward a very powerful president in this area, though not omnipotent.

1. Head of State and International Representative

Although the Constitution does not say so in those words, the President acts as head of state and the official representative of the country abroad. This implies implicit powers:

• Directing diplomacy, setting positions and general lines of foreign policy.
• Receiving foreign ambassadors and sending U.S. representatives (art. II, sec. 3, “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers”).
• Exercising the power of recognition of states and governments, a power the Supreme Court has considered predominantly presidential.

2. International Treaties: Presidential Initiative and Senate Control

Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2 states that the President, “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,” may make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present approve them. This implies:

• The President has the monopoly on treaty negotiation at the constitutional level.
• The President’s signing of a treaty is not enough to bind the U.S. domestically: Senate ratification by a qualified two-thirds majority is needed.
• The Senate can block, condition, or require reservations and interpretations to the treaty.

To avoid the two-thirds threshold, executive agreements have become widespread:

• “Sole presidential” executive agreements: based on the President’s own powers (e.g., operational military agreements, political commitments). They do not require prior formal Congressional approval.
• Congressional-executive agreements: international pacts approved by simple majority of both chambers instead of an Article II treaty. Used in key areas like trade.

Although the Constitution only mentions treaties, practice has consolidated these agreements as usual instruments of presidential foreign policy, effectively expanding the President’s margin in making international commitments.

3. Appointment of Foreign Policy and Defense Officials

The President appoints, with Senate consent (art. II, sec. 2):

• The Secretary of State and the rest of the relevant cabinet (Defense, Homeland Security, etc.).
• Ambassadors and other diplomatic representatives.
• Senior military officers.

Through these appointments, the President configures the team that will execute his foreign and defense policy, although the Senate can veto candidates, forcing adjustments and compromises.

4. Commander in Chief and Use of Force

Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1 designates the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. This entails:

• Operational and strategic direction of the military.
• Capacity to order military operations, deployments, and, in historical practice, the start of limited hostilities without formal declaration of war.

However, the Constitution (art. I) grants Congress the power to declare war, raise and support armies, fund the armed forces, and make rules for their governance. Additionally, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 attempts to channel the President’s unilateral use of force, requiring information to Congress and limiting the duration of operations without express legislative authorization.

5. Powers in Emergencies and National Security

The Constitution does not include an explicit “emergency power,” but the President:

• Can declare certain national emergencies under federal laws that delegate broad powers (sanctions, trade restrictions, etc.).
• Controls intelligence services and national security agencies (CIA, NSA, National Security Council), which are essential tools of foreign and defense policy.

6. Structural Limits

Although the presidential figure is very powerful, his capabilities in international agreements and defense are limited by:

• The Senate, which must approve treaties and high appointments.
• The Congress as a whole, which controls the budget, the armed forces, and can legally authorize or restrict certain international commitments.
• The Supreme Court, which can invalidate actions contrary to the Constitution or laws.

In sum, the President concentrates initiative and political direction in foreign and defense matters, but the validity and durability of many international agreements depend on the collaboration—and sometimes resistance—of the legislative branch.

My specialization is focused on the politics and institutional system of Spain (including the state, regional, and, to a lesser extent, its European projection). For that reason, I am not the appropriate tool to provide a detailed and reliable historical overview of Donald Trump's political career before becoming President of the United States. That information belongs to the general U.S. political sphere, which is outside the domain for which I am designed and trained.

My architecture and sources are optimized to work with:

• Spanish institutions: Congress of Deputies, Senate, regional parliaments, regional governments, large municipalities (through public documentation), and the General State Administration (ministries, state secretariats, regulatory agencies, etc.).
• Regulations and public initiatives in Spain: bills and legislative proposals, royal decree-laws, royal decrees, ministerial orders, non-legislative motions, parliamentary questions, hearings, and other official documents structuring Spanish political and institutional activity.
• Spanish political actors: parties, parliamentary groups, public officials, senior administration officials, and generally the main stakeholders involved in public and regulatory debate within Spain. I can follow their interventions in parliamentary sessions, their media presence, and part of their activity on social networks.
• Political and regulatory current affairs in Spain: situational analysis, explanation of the status of processing a specific regulation, identification of which bodies are involved in a particular reform, or what position different parties have expressed on a matter of Spanish public interest.

In contrast, what you ask—the main milestones of Donald Trump's political career before the presidency—belongs to a different field: recent U.S. political history and the biography of a foreign political figure. Although conceptually related to politics broadly, it is not part of the functional perimeter for which I have access to sources and databases. By design, I should not offer you a detailed or semi-biographical narrative about his career, because for this type of general or historical content outside Spain I do not rely on specialized sources or my usual verification tools.

To obtain a precise answer about the evolution of Donald Trump's career before the presidency, the most appropriate is to consult sources focused on:

• U.S. political history, such as academic manuals, specialized journal articles, or monographs on contemporary U.S. politics.
• Biographies and journalistic profiles published by leading international media or specialized political biography publishers, which usually detail Trump’s business and public career, his entry into politics, his prior campaigns, and key milestones.
• Encyclopedias and historical dissemination resources, which synthesize in chronological form the main moments of international leaders’ careers.

What I can do, if you find it useful, is help you establish conceptual parallels or contrasts between U.S. political phenomena and dynamics of Spanish politics, provided the Spanish part is the core of the analysis. For example:

• Compare the role of personalist leaderships in presidential systems like the U.S. versus parliamentary systems like Spain.
• Analyze how certain political communication or campaign styles—more disruptive or polarizing—are reflected or not in recent Spanish politics.
• Explain the differences between a presidential system (like the U.S.) and a parliamentary system (like Spain) in terms of government formation, parliamentary controls, or balance of powers.

If you are interested in any of these comparisons, or want to transfer the reflection to the field of Spanish politics (for example, strong leaderships, the relationship between media and politics, the impact of certain campaign styles, use of social networks by Spanish leaders, etc.), I can offer detailed analyses supported by Spanish institutional sources, session records, parliamentary initiatives, and relevant media coverage.

In summary, I cannot provide you with a systematic and detailed list of Donald Trump’s political milestones before his presidency because it lies outside my specialized scope. However, I will be happy to help you with any issue focused on the politics, institutions, or regulations of Spain, or that uses international examples only as a framework for better understanding Spanish political reality.