Why does Morocco not have the right to adhere to Ceuta and Melilla?

With the available parliamentary information, there is currently no legislative initiative in process in the Cortes Generales whose main objective is the sovereignty or political status of Ceuta and Melilla (issues of ownership, territorial integrity, or potential claims by Morocco). There are several active initiatives affecting their economic and tax regime, as well as a general bill proposal on illegal occupations of territories, but none of them directly raise a debate on the sovereignty of both cities. Therefore, as of today, the “sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla” is not the subject of a specific law nor is it in the Plenary phase as an autonomous matter.

1. Absence of specific initiatives on the sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla

In searches focused on the XV Legislature, no bill or bill proposal appears whose title or declared purpose is to modify, safeguard, or redefine the sovereignty or political status of Ceuta and Melilla, nor to directly address hypothetical Moroccan claims over these cities.

The located initiatives affecting Ceuta and Melilla do so in terms of economic regime, Social Security bonuses, or sectoral regulation, not as a matter of territorial integrity. Nor among the general territorial or urban planning projects, such as the Bill to amend the consolidated text of the Land and Urban Rehabilitation Law (121/000019), already withdrawn on 05/31/2024, is there a specific reference to their sovereignty, according to the text published in Congress (land bill and initial version at [link]).

2. Active initiatives on Ceuta and Melilla (economic and social dimension)

2.1. Recovery of the employer Social Security contribution bonus in Ceuta and Melilla

There is a very relevant legislative line that specifically focuses on Ceuta and Melilla, but from the perspective of the economic-tax regime and employment, not sovereignty.

On one hand, in Congress, the Bill Proposal for the recovery of the employer Social Security contribution bonus for entrepreneurs in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla (122/000134), presented by the Popular Group, is in process. After being taken into consideration and referred to the Labor Commission, the amendment period has been extended and is currently open until September 2, 2026, placing the initiative in a phase of committee processing, pending amendments. Details can be consulted in the Congress record (bill proposal record 122/000134) and its publication in the BOCG (text of the proposal).

At the same time, this same initiative has its origin in the Senate as the Bill Proposal for the recovery of the employer Social Security contribution bonus for entrepreneurs in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla (15)622/000020. In the Upper Chamber, the amendment period has also been extended until September 2, 2026, which also keeps it in the phase of committee amendments. Its text was initially published in the Senate Bulletin (initial publication in the Senate) and there have been subsequent publications, such as the most recent one collected in (updated text) and another on the extension of deadlines (extension of amendments). This initiative also appears in Congress with code 124/000005 (processing 124/000005).

Although its statement of reasons mentions the strategic position of Ceuta and Melilla, their land border with a third country, and difficulties arising from border management, the focus is mainly socioeconomic and labor; it does not propose changes in sovereignty status nor open a legal debate on this issue.

2.2. Ports and Merchant Marine Bill

The Bill to amend the Consolidated Text of the State Ports and Merchant Marine Law (121/000034), submitted by the Government, includes a new Special Registry of Ships and Recreational Boats with management offices in the Maritime Captaincies of Ceuta and Melilla, reinforcing their operational role in maritime traffic. Procedurally, the amendment period closed on 11/19/2025 and the amendments to the articles were published on 12/4/2025, placing the text in the phase of work in committee with full legislative competence, after the amendments were registered. The project can be consulted in the BOCG (published amendments and initial version at [link]).

Again, this is a sectoral regulation initiative (merchant marine and ports) that uses the position of Ceuta and Melilla but does not raise an explicit debate on their sovereignty.

3. General initiative on illegal occupation of territories

In Congress, the Bill Proposal on compliance with international obligations of non-recognition and non-assistance to situations of illegal occupation of territories (122/000199), presented by the Plurinational Sumar Group, has been admitted for processing. The Board admitted it on 09/19/2025 and it is pending consideration in Plenary, according to the official record (bill proposal record 122/000199). Its full text was published in the BOCG (text of the proposal).

The initiative refers to international obligations regarding illegal occupations (Palestine, Western Sahara, Crimea, Cyprus, etc.), but does not mention Ceuta and Melilla nor propose a change in their status. It may have indirect relevance in terms of foreign policy and international law, but it does not open a specific file on the sovereignty of the autonomous cities.

4. Conclusion

In summary, as of today, the Cortes Generales are not processing any law or bill proposal whose core is the sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla. Parliamentary activity focuses on strengthening or correcting their economic regime (Social Security bonuses) and adjusting sectoral frameworks (ports, merchant marine), in addition to a general proposal on illegal occupations of territories. Any debate on Spain's territorial integrity affecting Ceuta and Melilla is therefore channeled indirectly and politically, but not through a specific legislative initiative on their sovereignty in the current phase of the XV Legislature.

The Spanish Constitution does not contain a specific “catalog” of foreign policy competencies for the President of the Government, but it does assign him the direction of the Government's action (art. 98 CE). Since foreign policy corresponds to the Government as a whole (art. 97 CE), the president concentrates, in practice, the political leadership of the Executive's international relations. Additionally, he coordinates the involved ministers (especially Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Economy) and politically represents the Government before other heads of State or Government. Much of his powers in this area derive, therefore, from his hierarchical position over the rest of the Government, rather than from explicit mandates article by article.

General constitutional framework: Government and president

Foreign policy, in the Constitution, is attributed to the Government as a collegiate body:

• Article 97 CE: “The Government directs domestic and foreign policy, the civil and military administration, and the defense of the State.”

From this, it follows that the competence in international matters belongs to the Government, not the president alone. However, the Constitution itself configures the president as the center of that direction:

• Article 98.2 CE: the president directs the Government's action and coordinates the functions of its other members.
• Article 98.4 CE: the president is appointed and dismissed by the King, and the other members of the Government are appointed and removed at his proposal.

In foreign policy, this translates into the president setting the Executive's major strategic lines, deciding who occupies key portfolios, and coordinating their international actions.

Constitutional competencies directly linked to foreign policy

Although the Constitution does not list “international competencies” of the president, it grants him, by his position, a decisive role in several foreign policy functions that formally correspond to the King or the Government:

1. Diplomatic relations and treaties

The formal functions of international representation are attributed to the King, but always “at the proposal of the Government” or “with its countersignature,” which places the president at the center of the decision:

• Article 63.1 CE: the King holds the representation of the State in international relations, “especially with the nations of its historical community.”
• Article 63.2 CE: it corresponds to the King to express the State's consent to be internationally bound by treaties, “in accordance with the Constitution and the laws.”
• Article 63.3 CE: it also corresponds to the King, with prior authorization from the Cortes Generales, to declare war and make peace.

In all these cases, the real political initiative and decision come from the Government, led by the president. It is the president who promotes or halts treaty negotiations, decides the orientation of alliances, validates the submission of ratification proposals to the Cortes, and agrees with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the diplomatic line. Legally, the competence is “of the Government,” but the leadership corresponds to the president.

2. Treaties and parliamentary control

Several provisions link treaties and the Cortes Generales:

• Article 94 CE: subjects certain treaties (political, military, affecting territorial integrity, fundamental rights, financial obligations, etc.) to prior authorization by the Cortes.
• Article 95 CE: requires reinforced constitutional authorization if a treaty contains stipulations contrary to the Constitution.

Again, the Constitution refers to the Government, but it is the president who decides whether to initiate the negotiation of such treaties, when to submit them to the Cortes, and what negotiation margin to grant. His competence is not personal signature, but political direction of the Executive vis-à-vis the Chambers.

3. Participation in the European Union and other organizations

Although the Constitution does not detail the president's position in the European Councils or international summits, from articles 93 and 97 CE it follows that:

• The transfer of competencies to supranational organizations (art. 93 CE) is made by the Cortes, but promoted and negotiated by the Government.
• The president, as director of foreign policy, acts as Spain's main political representative in the European Council and multilateral summits, on behalf of the Government.

This presence does not derive from an article that expressly names him, but from his constitutional condition as head of the Executive.

Summary differentiating president, Government, and Cortes

• Government (art. 97 CE): direct holder of foreign policy and defense. Negotiates treaties, defines positions in international organizations, and directs diplomatic action.
• President of the Government (art. 98 CE): directs and coordinates that foreign policy, sets major strategic lines, appoints and dismisses key ministers, and acts as the main international political interlocutor.
• Cortes Generales (arts. 93, 94, 95 CE): authorize or control the most relevant treaties and sovereignty transfers.

In conclusion, the Constitution configures the president as the political head of foreign policy, but always within the collegiate framework of the Government and under the control of the Cortes Generales.

The available information allows explaining, in general terms, what the Spanish legal system requires to change the legal status of a territory, but it does not provide specific details about Ceuta and Melilla nor about the specific articles of the Constitution that regulate them. With the existing data, only an abstract reconstruction can be made: any profound modification of their territorial status would require, at a minimum, the approval of organic laws (because it affects territorial organization) and, likely, a constitutional reform. From there, different scenarios can be distinguished (turning them into autonomous communities, integrating them into another community, or altering their sovereignty) as hypotheses subject to those general procedures.

General framework: how the legal framework of a territory is changed

To modify the legal regime of a territory within Spain, there are two major normative levels that may be involved:

• Ordinary or organic laws, which are modified through a legislative reform processed as a new law.
• Constitution, which can only be changed through the constitutional reform procedures provided therein.

According to the available information on legislative reform, any modification of an existing law requires:

• Submitting an initiative (government bill or bill proposal from parliamentary groups, Senate, regional parliaments, or, in some cases, popular initiative).
• Parliamentary processing in Congress and Senate, with the possibility of amendments.
• Approval by both Chambers and subsequent sanction and promulgation by the King.
• Publication in the BOE, the moment from which the reform comes into force on the date indicated by the law itself.

Additionally, certain matters—including the territorial organization of the State, statutes of autonomy, or the electoral regime—are regulated by organic law and require a reinforced majority. According to the information on laws with qualified majority, organic laws need an absolute majority in Congress in a final vote on the whole text.

Constitutional reform: formal requirements

In deeper changes, the available information emphasizes that constitutional reform follows special procedures:

• Ordinary procedure (art. 167 CE, according to the general description): three-fifths majority in both Chambers; if no agreement, a mixed commission and, ultimately, two-thirds of Congress.
• Aggravated procedure (art. 168 CE, also generally collected): two-thirds majorities in both Chambers, dissolution of the Cortes, new elections, and ratification in a referendum.

There is no specific information on which exact provisions of the Constitution regarding Ceuta and Melilla would be subject to one or the other procedure, nor on their current detailed fit (provisions, article numbering, etc.). It can only be stated that any alteration of the territorial model affecting the basic distribution of competencies or the definition of fundamental territorial units could require constitutional reform, according to this general logic.

a) Turning Ceuta and Melilla into full autonomous communities

With the available data, only an abstract formulation is possible:

• It would be necessary, at a minimum, to approve or modify organic laws regulating the autonomous regime (statutes, distribution of competencies, electoral regime, etc.), as it fits into matters that, according to the consulted information, require organic law and absolute majorities in Congress.
• If the change implied altering structural principles of the Constitution on territorial organization, a constitutional reform would be necessary, with the majorities and, if applicable, the referendum provided in the articles on reform (ordinary or aggravated procedure, depending on the part of the text affected).

b) Integrating them into another autonomous community

Also in abstract terms, this option would affect the autonomous map and, likely, one or several statutes of autonomy. According to the available information:

• The reform of the involved statute(s) of autonomy would have to be processed as organic laws, with an absolute majority in Congress and the additional requirements that each statute provides.
• If the integration required modifying basic principles of territorial organization set in the Constitution, it could again require constitutional reform with three-fifths or two-thirds majority and, eventually, a referendum.

c) Change of sovereignty in favor of another State

The available information does not address this specific issue, but from a general procedural point of view, a change of sovereignty would be one of the most intense decisions possible in terms of territorial organization:

• It would affect the territorial integrity of the State, so it can only be conceived, abstractly, through a constitutional reform almost certainly using the aggravated reform procedure (two-thirds majorities, dissolution of the Cortes, and a state referendum), according to the general scheme described.
• Additionally, any law-level norm executing that change should be processed respecting the ordinary legislative procedure and probably take the form of an organic law, given the subject matter (territorial organization and rights of the affected citizens).

No further specific information on Ceuta and Melilla is available in the consulted sources; therefore, it is not possible to detail specific articles nor quote their literal text, and the previous answers are based on the general structure of legislative and constitutional reform described in those sources.