The Congress warms up engines: pending laws, priorities against the clock and the shadow of the elections on the horizon

The Organic Law Project for the protection of minors in digital environments (Congress, no. 121/000052) is, as of August 2026, being processed in the Congress of Deputies, in the committee stage within the Justice Commission. It has not yet been definitively approved by the Cortes, so several key stages remain before it becomes law.

1. What has happened so far

The official and institutional information available shows the following main sequence:

• June 4, 2024: the Council of Ministers approves the draft organic law for the protection of minors in digital environments and authorizes its urgent processing, subsequently opening a public hearing procedure (June 11–28, 2024).
• March 25, 2025: the Council of Ministers approves the Organic Law Project and agrees to send it to Congress, highlighting measures such as default parental control and reforms of the Penal Code.
• March 27, 2025: registration of the initiative in the Congress of Deputies. The text is published in the Official Bulletin of the Cortes on April 11, 2025.
• Between April and November 2025, a broad period for amendments to the articles is opened, extended multiple times until its closure on November 26, 2025, due to the large number of proposals from groups and affected sectors.
• The project has been processed by urgent procedure since May 9, 2025, which allows shortening deadlines, although in practice the volume of amendments has slowed the pace.
• September 10, 2025: the Plenary of Congress holds the totality debate. The Vox return amendment is rejected by 33 votes in favor, 178 against, and 137 abstentions, so the project passes the totality and continues its processing in committee, commission, and Plenary (Congress note).
• Throughout 2025, the Justice Commission holds expert hearings (UNICEF, Save the Children, tech sector, etc.) and partial amendments are closed, with intense debates on parental control, manufacturer obligations, and “loot boxes.”
• In 2026, according to various agendas and parliamentary reports, the committee is constituted to prepare the report and, at least since June, the initiative is formally in the committee phase. The June 24 meeting allows approval of several amendments, but cited parliamentary sources indicate the committee is “on standby,” with no fixed schedule to conclude work.
• As of August 16, 2026, the Minister of Youth and Childhood, Sira Rego, states that the law “is currently in parliamentary processing” and that “the last contributions from the groups” are being incorporated, hoping to approve it “after the summer”, confirming that the text is still alive in Congress and has not yet passed to the Senate.

2. Current status

With this data, the situation can be summarized as follows: the project has already passed the totality phase in the Plenary of Congress, the totality amendments and article amendments have been published, and the commission has heard many actors. The current stage is the preparation of the committee report within the Justice Commission, with ongoing negotiations on transactional amendments (for example, the ban on social networks for under 16s and the criminal treatment of algorithmic manipulation).

There is no record yet of a definitive commission report approved nor a new Plenary of Congress that has voted the text article by article and as a whole, nor, therefore, referral to the Senate. The processing is advanced but still in the first chamber.

3. Next steps until final approval

According to the Congress Rules and the nature of an organic law, the pending path is, in summary, the following:

• Closing of the committee: the committee must finish its report, incorporating or rejecting amendments and, eventually, transactional agreements between groups.
• Report of the Justice Commission: the Commission debates the report, votes on pending amendments, and approves a report. If it does not have full legislative competence (usual in an organic law of this scope), the text must go to the Plenary.
• Debate and vote in the Plenary of Congress: reserved amendments for the Plenary are discussed and the entire project is voted on. Being an organic law, it requires an absolute majority in the final overall vote.
• Referral to the Senate: if Congress approves it, the text passes to the Senate, where a new amendment period opens, it is processed in commission, and voted in Plenary. The Senate may:
  • not introduce changes (the text would then be definitively approved),
  • approve amendments, which require a second reading in Congress, or
  • approve a veto, which Congress can later lift.
• Final vote in Congress (if there are Senate amendments or veto): Congress decides on the amendments and, if applicable, lifts the veto under the established terms (absolute majority or simple majority after two months).
• Royal sanction and publication in the Official State Gazette (BOE): once approved by both Chambers, the law is sent to the King for sanction and promulgation and published in the Official State Gazette, entering into force on the date set in its final provision.

In summary, the project is currently in an advanced but still internal phase within Congress. For its final approval, the committee and commission work must be completed, the final vote in the Plenary of Congress passed, processed in the Senate, and culminated with sanction and publication in the BOE.

The Permanent Deputation of the Congress of Deputies is the body that guarantees the continuity of the Chamber when the Plenary is not convened or the Cortes have been dissolved. Its functions and powers are mainly regulated in articles 56 to 59 of the Congress Rules, complemented by other provisions that mention it in relation to extraordinary sessions, the Journal of Sessions, and the validation of decree-laws.

1. Nature and composition

According to the Rules, the Permanent Deputation:

• Is presided over by the President of the Congress.
• Is composed of a minimum of twenty-one members, representing parliamentary groups in proportion to their numerical importance.
• Each group appoints its full members and an equal number of substitutes.
• Elects within itself two Vice Presidencies and two Secretariats, following criteria similar to the election of the Congress Board.
• Is convened by the Presidency, ex officio or at the request of two parliamentary groups or one fifth of its members.

Regarding its operating regime, the Rules establish that the same applies to the sessions of the Permanent Deputation as to the Plenary: debate regime, publicity of sessions, voting, Journal of Sessions, etc. That is, it acts as a "mini-plenary" with equivalent rules.

2. Functions during ordinary session periods

During ordinary session periods (February-June and September-December), the spotlight normally belongs to the Plenary and commissions. The Permanent Deputation, strictly speaking, has a latent institutional guarantee function: it remains constituted, but its own powers are mainly activated when the Chamber is not convened or dissolution or expiration of the mandate occurs.

However, even in these periods its existence ensures that if the Plenary could not meet for some extraordinary circumstance, there is already a constituted body capable of acting quickly in constitutionally foreseen cases (for example, regarding decree-laws or exceptional states).

3. Functions between session periods and during parliamentary recesses

Outside ordinary periods, the Rules specify two types of functions:

• Calling extraordinary Plenary sessions: when the Chamber is outside the ordinary period, it can only meet in extraordinary session at the request of the Government, the Permanent Deputation itself, or the absolute majority of deputies. The Deputation is therefore one of the constitutionally empowered subjects to force the convening of the Plenary with a determined agenda.
• Initiative to call extraordinary sessions (art. 73.2 CE): specifically, the Rules attribute to the Permanent Deputation, "in the intervals between session periods," the power to exercise the initiative provided in article 73.2 of the Constitution, that is, to request the holding of those extraordinary sessions.

In practice, this means that during recesses and "parliamentary vacations" the Permanent Deputation acts as a hinge between the Government and the Plenary, ensuring that if necessary, parliamentary activity is formally reactivated through the convening of extraordinary sessions.

4. Functions during dissolution of Congress or expiration of the mandate

This is the most characteristic core of its powers. The Rules establish that, in case of dissolution of Congress or expiration of its mandate, the Permanent Deputation is responsible for:

• Safeguarding the powers of the Chamber, that is, preserving the continuity of its essential functions until the new Congress is constituted.
• Assuming all powers of Congress regarding decree-laws (art. 86 CE): debate, validation or repeal, and, if applicable, decision on their processing as a bill by urgent procedure.
• Exercising Congress powers related to states of alarm, exception, and siege (art. 116 CE), that is, their authorization, extension, or control under constitutional terms.
• Processing decree-laws issued by the Government "during periods between legislatures" as bills by urgent procedure.

Once general elections have been held and the new Congress constituted, the Permanent Deputation must report to the Plenary on the matters it has dealt with and decisions made during the dissolution.

5. Government control powers

Although the Rules do not detail a specific and exclusive catalog of control instruments of the Permanent Deputation, since the same regime applies to its sessions as to the Plenary, it can, within constitutionally enabled areas, exercise government control functions linked to:

• The validation, repeal, and possible further processing of decree-laws.
• The examination and control of government decisions regarding exceptional states.
• The convening of the Plenary in extraordinary sessions, which allows forcing debates and votes on urgent matters even outside the ordinary calendar.

6. Functional summary

In short, according to the Congress Rules, the Permanent Deputation is a continuity and guarantee body that:

• Functionally substitutes the Plenary in constitutionally limited matters (decree-laws and exceptional states) when Congress is dissolved or out of ordinary operation.
• Can initiate and force the meeting of the Plenary in extraordinary sessions outside ordinary periods.
• Operates under the same regime of sessions, debates, and publicity as the Plenary, with its actions recorded in the Journal of Sessions.

Thus, it ensures that neither parliamentary control nor urgent decisions requiring intervention of the Cortes are interrupted by recesses or dissolutions between legislatures.

In Spain, the approval of the General State Budgets (PGE) is heavily regulated because they are the main annual economic policy law. The Constitution and budgetary stability legislation set formal and material requirements for the Government to present the project to the Cortes, as well as the consequences of not doing so on time.

1. Basic constitutional and legal framework

• Spanish Constitution: article 134 establishes that the Government is responsible for preparing the PGE and that the bill must be presented to the Congress of Deputies at least three months before the expiration of the previous year's budgets. In practice, this sets October 1 as the reference date.
• General Budget Law: develops the minimum content of the project, the attached documentation, and the internal preparation procedure (phases in the Ministry of Finance, participation of other ministries, etc.).
• Organic Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability (LOEPSF): conditions the PGE project to comply with the approved objectives of stability, public debt, and spending rule.

2. Preliminary requirements: “spending ceiling” and stability objectives

Before the Council of Ministers approves the PGE draft, several milestones linked to the LOEPSF must have been met:

• Stability and debt objectives: the Government proposes deficit/surplus and debt objectives for the State and Autonomous Communities that must be approved by the Cortes.
• Non-financial spending limit (“spending ceiling”): the maximum computable State spending for the following fiscal year is set. The Budget project must fit within this limit.
• Mandatory reports: the Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF) must report on the adequacy of the objectives and, subsequently, on the coherence of the PGE project with them.

Without these steps, the project could incur incompatibilities with budgetary stability, generating legal and political problems (possible correction requests, reproaches from the Court of Auditors, tensions with Brussels, etc.).

3. Approval of the draft and submission to the Cortes

The internal procedure is articulated, in simplified form, as follows:

• Technical preparation coordinated by Finance, with proposals from each ministry and public bodies.
• Draft integrating revenues, expenditures, macroeconomic frameworks, and annexes (reports, impact assessments, previous budget settlement, etc.).
• Consultative reports: in certain specific aspects (e.g., some additional provisions or regulatory reforms included in the Budget Law) reports may be requested from the Council of State or other bodies, although not always mandatory for the entire text.
• Approval by the Council of Ministers of the PGE bill.
• Submission to Congress before the constitutional three-month deadline, accompanied by all economic and financial documentation required by the General Budget Law.

4. Consequences of not submitting the project on time

If the Government does not submit the project before October 1, there is no automatic legal sanction (the Government does not automatically resign nor are the Cortes dissolved). The consequences are mainly:

• Political responsibility: Congress may demand explanations, propose censures, or even a motion of no confidence if considered a serious breach.
• Risk of budget extension: the longer the delay, the more likely it is that parliamentary processing will not be completed before January 1.
• Uncertainty for public and private planning: administrations, companies, and households face greater uncertainty about fiscal policy, public investments, job offers, etc.

5. Failure to approve before January 1: budget extension

If by January 1 no new PGE are approved, the automatic extension of the previous budgets is activated, as provided in the Constitution and developed in the General Budget Law.

This extension implies:

• Repetition of the initial credits of the previous budget, with technical adjustments (e.g., credits linked to already extinguished programs are not renewed).
• Limitations for new policies: the Government has less room to launch new structural spending programs or major economic policy reorientations if a new Budget law is not approved.
• Management through budget modifications (extraordinary credits, supplements, credit transfers), which usually require specific laws or decree-laws later validated by the Cortes.
• Conditioning of investments and public employment: job offers, territorialized investments, public sector salary increases, or major tax changes are usually blocked or very restricted while no new Budgets exist.

In summary, the Government has a constitutional obligation to present the PGE at least three months in advance, respecting stability frameworks and accompanying extensive economic documentation. Non-compliance does not entail automatic sanction but does carry serious political costs and the possibility of having to manage with extended Budgets, which greatly limit the ability to promote new spending and revenue priorities.