The Republican March will depart tomorrow from Puerta del Sol to demand "no to war"

Current status of the parliamentary debate on the republic in Spain

Currently (June 2026) there is no formal process underway in the Cortes Generales to establish a republic in Spain or to reform the Constitution regarding the Head of State. The only recent constitutional reforms, such as that of Article 49 on the rights of persons with disabilities, do not affect the form of State nor Title II of the Constitution BOCG Congress and BOCG Senate. The debate on the possible republic occurs fragmentarily within other parliamentary debates and, above all, in the programmatic, media, and social spheres. Therefore, the “parliamentary debate” on the establishment of a republic today is political and discursive, but not procedural or legislative.

1. Parliamentary initiatives and formal situation

In the documentary bases of the Congress and the Senate, there are no initiatives in process this legislature explicitly aimed at establishing a republic or reforming the Constitution to abolish the monarchy. Searches for recent constitutional reforms only yield, as relevant text, the Proposal to Reform Article 49 of the Spanish Constitution, jointly promoted by the Socialist Group and the Popular Group, definitively approved on 01/25/2024 and published in February 2024, which is limited to updating language on disability and strengthening rights, without affecting the Head of State BOCG Congress and BOCG Senate.

Nor are there, in the 2023–2026 period, reforms in the Senate aimed at Title II of the Constitution or the form of State. Mentions of the republic and the monarchy appear in scattered interventions, questions, or general political debates, but do not materialize in bills, legislative proposals, or constitutional reform proposals that have reached a monographic debate in Plenary on replacing the monarchy with a republic. In summary, the Congress and the Senate are not currently processing a regime change.

2. Recent debates on monarchy, republic, and the Crown

Between 2023 and 2026, the session diaries record several sessions in which the monarchy is discussed or monarchy and republic are explicitly contrasted, but always within other matters. For example, in the Investigation Commission on the “Operation Catalonia” of May 5, 2025, deputies from the Plurinational Sumar Group, such as Gerardo Pisarello, openly raise the monarchy/republic dichotomy and the need for a referendum on the form of State, linking it to accountability and democratic equality (Session Diary, 05/05/2025).

In other plenaries and commissions — for example, the Plenary of May 13, 2025, with interventions from Sumar and the Republican Group, or the Plenary of November 19, 2024, with interventions from Junts, Vox, and Sumar — criticisms of the monarchy are reiterated (corruption, lack of democratic control, Francoist origin) and references to a “republican horizon,” contrasted with the firm defense of the Crown by PP and Vox (Plenary 13/05/2025; Plenary 19/11/2024). None of these discussions are formulated on a concrete constitutional reform text.

In the Senate, significant debates have also taken place on the legitimacy of King Felipe VI in Catalonia, with interventions that go as far as stating that “Catalonia has no king” and criticizing the role of the Crown in the Catalan conflict, but without this translating into a regime change initiative (Senate, 07/17/2024).

3. Party positions and nature of the debate

At the party level, the map is clear: PP and Vox defend the parliamentary monarchy as a central piece of the 1978 pact and reject opening the republican debate; the leadership of the PSOE accepts the monarchy as the current constitutional framework, although it coexists with internal currents (Socialist Left) that demand a referendum between monarchy and republic. Spaces such as Sumar, Podemos, ERC, EH Bildu, or BNG openly declare themselves republican and demand, with different nuances, the holding of a referendum or a constituent process; in the case of ERC and Junts, the republic is mainly linked to the aspiration of a Catalan republic.

However, this alignment of positions has not translated into a “republican bloc” capable of promoting a constitutional reform. Reforming the form of State would require reinforced majorities in both Chambers and, presumably, a referendum, something politically unfeasible today. The press and think tank analyses between 2023 and 2026 indicate that the debate on the republic is basically programmatic and media-based, supported by republican marches, symbols (flags, April 14 events), and public statements, but without a formal procedure having been opened either in the Government or in the Congress and Senate Boards.

4. Conclusion: a lively but non-binding debate

In summary, the debate on the establishment of a republic in Spain is today alive in political discourse, in the streets, and in certain parliamentary interventions, but it has not become a true parliamentary debate on regime reform with texts, reports, and articulated majorities. The Cortes have focused on other reforms (such as Article 49) and sectoral legislative agendas, while the form of State remains intact in the Constitution. Until a constitutional reform proposal on Title II is registered or an explicit agreement of the main groups is reached, the republican debate will remain, above all, political and symbolic rather than legal and institutional.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation (MAEUEC) is the Government department responsible for the State's foreign policy, Spain's position before the European Union, international development cooperation, and consular protection of Spaniards abroad. These functions are framed within the general framework set by Law 40/2015 for all ministries and are specified through the royal decrees of departmental structure (such as Royal Decree 139/2020, with its subsequent modifications). Additionally, the MAEUEC directs the State's foreign service (embassies, consulates, and missions) and assumes a central role in the negotiation and monitoring of international treaties. Overall, it acts as the coordinating body of Spain's external action in its diplomatic, consular, European, and development cooperation dimensions.

General functions of ministries (framework of Law 40/2015)

Law 40/2015, on the Legal Regime of the Public Sector, establishes the common functions of all ministries, which also apply to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Among them are:

Firstly, the design, execution, and evaluation of public policies within their material scope of competence, which in the case of Foreign Affairs involves defining foreign, European, and cooperation policy. Secondly, the direction and coordination of the administrative bodies dependent on the department, including central bodies in Madrid and the entire foreign network. Likewise, it represents the Government in its specific area before other public powers and third parties, and exercises normative initiative in its field (bills, regulations) along with managing the human, financial, and material resources assigned to the department.

Specific competences of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Government structure royal decrees, such as Royal Decree 139/2020, assign the MAEUEC a set of specific competences. In the field of foreign policy, it is responsible for formulating, coordinating, and executing Spain's foreign policy, as well as defending the State's interests on the international stage. In the European Union sphere, it coordinates the Spanish position on community matters and participates in preparation and representation in EU bodies.

Regarding international development cooperation, it designs and manages Spanish cooperation policy, including humanitarian aid and official development assistance. It also assumes the direction of consular affairs (protection and assistance to Spaniards abroad, passports, visas) and the management of international treaties (negotiation, signing, processing for ratification, and monitoring). Finally, it promotes the external projection of Spanish culture and language as an element of foreign policy.

Role in the State's external action

Within the external action system, the MAEUEC acts as the central body for promotion and coordination. It defines diplomatic priorities and Spain's international insertion strategy, including bilateral relations with other States and participation in international organizations and multilateral forums. It coordinates the external action of other ministries and public administrations to ensure coherence of the Spanish position.

Additionally, it leads the political representation of the State abroad, contributing to the defense of economic interests, cultural projection, and Spain's image. This function extends both to classical diplomacy and to areas such as public, cultural, and economic diplomacy, always under the general regulatory framework and the distribution of internal competences.

Management of the State's foreign service

The Ministry directs and organizes the State's foreign service. This includes embassies, general consulates, consulates, and permanent missions to international organizations, as well as any other official representation of Spain abroad. It exercises authority over diplomatic and consular personnel, responsible for representing and defending Spanish interests outside the national territory.

It also coordinates abroad the actions of other public services operating from embassies and consulates (cooperation, commercial, cultural, or tourist offices), to ensure integrated and coherent external action aligned with the foreign policy objectives defined by the Government.

Development cooperation

In the field of international development cooperation, the MAEUEC designs Spanish sustainable cooperation policy, in line with international commitments. It manages official development assistance, channeling funds and programs to priority countries and regions, and coordinates collaboration with multilateral organizations and non-governmental organizations.

Likewise, it promotes development projects, humanitarian aid programs, and institutional strengthening actions, aiming to contribute to poverty reduction, democratic consolidation, and sustainable development of partner countries.

Consular affairs and citizen protection

One of the Ministry's most visible functions is managing consular affairs. Through the consular network, it protects and assists Spanish citizens abroad, especially in emergencies, conflicts, or disasters. It processes the issuance and renewal of passports and other travel documents.

It also manages the issuance of visas and other documents for the entry of foreign citizens into Spain, in coordination with other departments competent in immigration and security matters. It maintains consular records of births, marriages, and deaths of Spaniards abroad, ensuring the legal-administrative link with the State.

International treaties and agreements

Finally, the MAEUEC plays a central role in international treaties. It negotiates and signs, on behalf of Spain and within the Government's instructions, treaties and agreements with other States and international organizations. Subsequently, it coordinates their processing for ratification by the Cortes Generales when required by the Constitution.

Once in force, it supervises compliance and correct application of these instruments, in coordination with ministries competent by subject matter, and maintains the registry and archive of international commitments assumed by Spain, ensuring coherence of external action with international law.

Summary answer

In the last general elections on July 23, 2023, there were no two separate state candidacies of Podemos and Sumar: Podemos was integrated into the Sumar coalition, which was the only brand presented at the state level for that political space. That joint candidacy obtained 3,014,006 votes, 12.3% of the national total, and 31 seats in the Congress of Deputies, according to official data compiled by media such as RTVE and EPData. Of those 31 seats, four corresponded to Podemos leaders who, during the legislature, left the Plurinational Sumar Group and moved to the Mixed Group. Today, Sumar maintains its own group with just over two dozen deputies, while Podemos has its representatives in the Mixed Group and is not part of the Plurinational Sumar Group.

Electoral results of 23J 2023

Sumar as a state candidacy

In the general elections of July 23, 2023, the political space to the left of the PSOE ran under the Sumar brand, led by Yolanda Díaz. There was no separate state ballot for Podemos; the purple party was integrated into the coalition along with other forces (United Left, Más País, common parties, etc.).

According to official results collected by RTVE, analysis by EPData, and the summary by El País, the key data for Sumar on 23J were:

Sumar (coalition, 23J 2023):
– Votes: 3,014,006
– Statewide percentage: 12.3%
– Seats in Congress: 31

Therefore, in response to the question of “what results did Podemos and Sumar obtain,” it is important to emphasize that, strictly electorally, no separate vote percentage or number of seats can be assigned to Podemos in 2023, because its candidacies were on the joint Sumar list. The votes and 31 seats are counted under the Sumar brand, not under a separate Podemos ballot.

Background and confusion with 2019

Some press reports mix these data with those from 2019, when there was indeed the “Unidas Podemos” or “Unidas Podemos–Izquierda Unida” candidacy as a differentiated coalition, which at the time also obtained 12.3% and 31 seats, a figure that has reappeared in comparative analyses. However, in 2023 the electoral denomination was already Sumar, and the most rigorous sources agree that the 3,014,006 votes and 31 seats correspond to this new coalition, not to Podemos alone.

Current situation in Congress (legislature arising from 23J)

Plurinational Sumar Group

Once the Congress was constituted, the 31 deputies elected on the Sumar lists formed the Plurinational Sumar Group. According to a subsequent political analysis collected in a synthesis piece, within that initial contingent four deputies belonged to Podemos: Ione Belarra, Javier Sánchez, Noemí Santana, and Martina Velarde.

Subsequently, those four deputies decided to leave the Plurinational Sumar Group and move to the Mixed Group, which reduced Sumar's size to 27 deputies initially. The Sumar space itself has since suffered new internal tensions: for example, the deputy from Més Compromís, Àgueda Micó, also left the group to join the Mixed Group, and the possibility of more departures from some allied territorial parties has been noted.

Thus, political reports today place the Plurinational Sumar Group in an approximate range of 25–27 deputies, depending on how the latest departures and internal substitutions are counted. There is no more updated and closed official figure available in the consulted sources, but the relevant data is that the group has gone from an initial 31 seats to just over two dozen due to defections to the Mixed Group.

Podemos deputies

Regarding Podemos, its representation derives from those same seats obtained on the Sumar lists. Initially, its four deputies sat within the Plurinational Sumar Group, but after the political break with Yolanda Díaz and the coalition, all of them joined the Mixed Group.

As of today, therefore:

– Podemos does not have its own parliamentary group in Congress.
– Its deputies (initially four) are assigned to the Mixed Group.
– They are not part of the Plurinational Sumar Group.

There is no more recent official breakdown specifying whether the exact number of Podemos deputies remains four or if substitutions or resignations have occurred in this time. The sources agree, in any case, on the key political element: Podemos broke with Sumar within Congress and operates from the Mixed Group, while Sumar maintains its own group, diminished by the departures.

Final summary of your question

1) Electoral results 23J 2023:
– There was only one state candidacy for that space: Sumar.
– Sumar: 3,014,006 votes, 12.3%, and 31 seats.
– Podemos: no own candidacy; its votes and seats are integrated into those 31 of Sumar.

2) Current number of deputies:
– Plurinational Sumar Group: around 25–27 deputies, after the departures of the four from Podemos and some other allied force.
– Podemos: its deputies are in the Mixed Group and not in the Plurinational Sumar Group; the starting figure is 4 deputies, without the consulted sources offering a more precise and updated figure.

To cross-check the basic data of the 2023 results, summaries from El Independiente, RTVE, EPData, El País, the official Ministry of Interior portal elecciones.mir.es, and the general file of the 2023 general elections can be consulted.