Without an instruction manual, this is how the campaign for the first elections was designed

Brief answer

After the June 1977 elections, the Cortes elected as Constituent followed a relatively classic parliamentary procedure, but adapted to the transition situation: the Chambers were constituted, their constituent character was agreed upon, and a committee of seven deputies was created to draft a first preliminary draft. That text was then passed to a constitutional commission of the Congress, which modified it and submitted it to the Plenary for an intense debate and vote article by article. Once the project was approved in the Congress, it was sent to the Senate, which made numerous amendments, and finally a Joint Congress-Senate Commission was convened to reach a consensus on a final text. This was approved by the Cortes and submitted to a referendum on December 6, 1978, completing the constituent cycle initiated with the 1977 elections.

1. From the 1977 elections to the Constituent Cortes

The general elections of June 15, 1977, resulted in a Congress of Deputies and a Senate that, in addition to acting as ordinary Cortes, formally assumed the function of Constituent Cortes. That character was not predefined in a previous Constitution, but was articulated through political agreements and parliamentary resolutions, which enabled the new Chambers to draft and approve a new fundamental norm. The first key procedure, therefore, was the constitution of the Chambers, the approval of their provisional Rules, and the recognition of their constituent power.

2. Creation of the Constitutional Committee

The initial decisive parliamentary step was the appointment, within the Congress, of a Constitutional Committee, a small body responsible for drafting the first draft text. This committee, made up of seven deputies from the main represented forces, acted similarly to a legislative subcommittee: it worked behind closed doors, negotiated each title, and prepared a preliminary draft Constitution. From a procedural perspective, the committee performed the function that the Government would have with a bill in an ordinary law: producing a base text on which amendments would later be articulated.

Once completed, the committee's preliminary draft was submitted to the Commission on Constitutional Affairs and Public Liberties of the Congress (constitutional commission), marking the transition to a broader debate phase within the Lower Chamber.

3. Work in the Constitutional Commission of the Congress

In the commission, parliamentary groups registered amendments to the articles, very similar to the procedure of any bill. The commission held hearings, debates, and negotiation sessions to integrate, negotiate, or reject those amendments. The result was a commission report, that is, a revised text of the Constitution that incorporated some of the proposals from the different groups and nuanced the committee's draft.

This report was sent to the Plenary of the Congress for final debate, accompanied by the amendments that the groups kept alive for their defense in plenary session. The logic of the procedure essentially followed the scheme of a bill: base text from the commission, live amendments, and debate in Plenary.

4. Debate and approval in the Plenary of the Congress

The Plenary of the Congress opened a broad debate on the entirety and, above all, on the articles, in which the different provisions and titles were successively discussed and voted on. Modifications were still introduced, often through transactional amendments agreed upon by several groups to ensure broad majorities, reflecting the purpose of a consensus Constitution rather than a partisan one. Once this procedure was concluded, the Congress approved the Constitutional Project, which became the official text to be sent to the other Chamber.

5. Procedure in the Senate

Upon receiving the project, the Senate also followed a procedure with features of an ordinary law: assignment to a commission (constitutional commission), presentation of amendments by senators, and debate in commission and Plenary. The Senate introduced a significant number of amendments, both technical and political in content, so that the resulting text did not fully coincide with that approved by the Congress. This point was crucial because it required the use of a specific reconciliation mechanism between both Chambers.

6. Joint Congress-Senate Commission and final text

Faced with differences between the Congress text and the Senate amendments, a Joint Congress-Senate Commission was established, envisaged as a harmonization body. Its function was twofold: to decide which Senate amendments were accepted, which were rejected, and how to integrate all this into a single text; and, at the same time, to close the last political commitments among the main parliamentary forces. The result of this joint commission was a consensual project, which was again submitted for approval by both Chambers in plenary session.

Once the text was approved by the Congress of Deputies and the Senate, the constituent parliamentary phase was considered concluded. The Constitutional project then proceeded to the final political procedure provided: its ratification by popular referendum on December 6, 1978, followed by sanction and promulgation by the King and publication in the Official State Gazette, whereby the Constitution formally came into force.

Brief answer

The 1978 Spanish Constitution configures the President of the Government as the head of the Executive Power, responsible for directing the Government's action and coordinating its ministers. His main powers are mainly set out in articles 97, 98, 99, and 112 to 115 of the Constitution. Among them stand out: proposing and dismissing ministers, setting the general political orientation, raising the question of confidence, proposing the dissolution of the Cortes to the King, and directing internal and external policy, the civil and military Administration, and the defense of the State. Additionally, he is politically accountable before the Congress, which can force him to resign through a motion of censure or by denying confidence.

Constitutional basis of the office

The Constitution establishes in article 97 that the Government directs internal and external policy, the civil and military Administration, and the defense of the State, and exercises executive function and regulatory power. Within this collegiate body, the president is the central figure: article 98 identifies him as the one who directs the Government's action and coordinates the functions of the other members. This means that all Government powers, in practice, are articulated through the president's capacity to set political lines and organize the rest of the Executive.

Access to the office is also part of its constitutional configuration. Article 99 regulates the investiture procedure: the King proposes a candidate for President of the Government, after consulting with representatives of political groups, and that candidate must obtain the confidence of the Congress of Deputies. Without that initial confidence, the proposed person cannot assume the office or exercise their powers.

Political direction and organization of the Government

The president's core power is directing the Government's action. This implies defining political priorities, coordinating ministers, resolving conflicts between departments, and, in practice, deciding the legislative and regulatory agenda of the Executive. Although the Government is a collegiate body, the Constitution reinforces the president's position as the apex of that collegiality, with the capacity to guide and, if necessary, reorganize the ministerial team.

Linked to the above is the power to appoint and dismiss ministers. According to article 100 (in relation to 98), the other members of the Government are appointed and dismissed by the King at the proposal of the President of the Government. Thus, the president configures the Government to his liking, chooses the political and technical profile of the ministers, and can reshape the Executive whenever he deems necessary, without direct intervention from the Cortes in those personal changes.

Relationship with the Cortes: confidence, responsibility, and dissolution

The president's position is strongly conditioned by the confidence of the Congress of Deputies. Article 112 grants him the power to raise before the Congress the question of confidence on his program or a general policy statement. If the Congress denies him confidence, the president must resign, activating the mechanism for a new investiture. This tool is used both to reinforce his leadership and to unblock political deadlocks.

Simultaneously, the Constitution articulates the president's political responsibility through the motion of censure (article 113). Although formally directed against the Government as a whole, its immediate objective is to replace the president with another candidate who obtains the absolute majority of the Congress. If the motion succeeds, the president ceases and the alternative candidate is immediately appointed, making this figure a central mechanism of parliamentary control over the Executive leadership.

Another key power is to propose to the King the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or the Cortes Generales as a whole, according to article 115. The King formalizes the dissolution, but the initiative is the president's, after deliberation with the Council of Ministers. This power allows for calling early general elections, reconfiguring parliamentary majorities, and trying to overcome institutional blockages, although it is limited by certain periods in which it cannot be exercised (for example, while a motion of censure is pending).

Direction of defense policy and functions in crisis situations

In defense matters, the president, as head of the Government, directs the State's security and defense policy, in coordination with the competent minister and the entire Executive. The reference in article 97 to the “civil and military Administration” and to the “defense of the State” places the president at the top of the political leadership of the Armed Forces, always under the constitutional and legal framework. In serious crisis situations, such as the declaration of states of alarm, exception, or siege (article 116), the Government as a whole acts, but the initiative and political coordination fall to the president.

Finally, all these powers are framed within a logic of continuous responsibility: the president is politically accountable before the Congress and, ultimately, before the electorate. His institutional strength is based on parliamentary confidence, from which derive both his capacity to direct the Government and his margin to use powers such as appointing ministers or proposing the dissolution of the Cortes.

Results of PSOE and UCD in the 1977 general elections

In the first democratic general elections on June 15, 1977, the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD), led by Adolfo Suárez, was the most voted force, with around 34% of the votes and just over 160 seats in the Congress, placing it in the range of a relative majority. The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), headed by Felipe González, came in second, with around 29% of the votes and just over 110 seats. This distribution shaped a Parliament dominated by two large blocks, reformist center and social democracy, with UCD in government and PSOE as the head of the opposition. Those results were decisive for the political architecture of the Transition and the subsequent approval of the 1978 Constitution.

Political context of the 1977 elections

The 1977 general elections were the first free ones since 1936 and were held in a context of rapid change after Franco's death in 1975. Adolfo Suárez's government had promoted the Political Reform Law, gradually dismantling the Franco regime from within and legalizing most forces, including the PSOE and, in the final stage of the process, the PCE. In this scenario, the UCD presented itself as a centrist coalition with strong government support and an image of stability, while the PSOE represented the great moderate left alternative, especially after modernizing at the Suresnes Congress and placing Felipe González at the helm.

The chosen electoral system (provincial constituencies with the D’Hondt formula) favored governability through the concentration of votes in the major forces. This was key for both UCD and PSOE to be greatly benefited in terms of seats compared to their actual vote percentage, thus promoting a predominant two-party model that would mark much of subsequent Spanish democracy.

Results of the UCD

The Union of the Democratic Centre obtained first place in votes and seats, with approximately 34% of the valid votes cast nationwide. In seats, this translated into just over 160 deputies, giving it a sufficient relative majority to lead the Government, although not an absolute majority. This result consolidated Adolfo Suárez as a central figure of the Transition, allowing him to lead an Executive capable of negotiating both with moderate nationalist parties and with the main opposition party.

The territorial implantation of the UCD was very broad, with good results in rural and medium-sized provinces, and especially significant performance in Castilla y León, Castilla-La Mancha, Galicia, or Aragón. Support for the party was interpreted as a social endorsement of the negotiated reform process, as opposed to rupture, and as a bet on a centrist option capable of integrating Christian democratic, liberal, and moderate social democratic sensibilities.

Results of the PSOE

The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party was immediately behind the UCD, with around 29% of the votes cast. That electoral base translated into just over 110 seats in the Congress of Deputies, a figure that made the PSOE the main opposition force and the reference of the democratic left, far above other left-wing options and communist parties in representation. The leap was notable considering that the party was emerging from clandestinity and prolonged political exile.

Geographically, the PSOE obtained especially strong results in large urban and industrial areas, as well as in regions with a strong worker and union tradition. Politically, the size of the socialist parliamentary group allowed it to play an essential role in the major consensuses of the Transition, starting with the constitutional negotiation and the Moncloa Pacts, and positioned Felipe González as a clear government alternative in the medium term.

Impact of these results on the Transition

The combination of a majority but not hegemonic UCD and a strong PSOE in opposition generated a balance that favored cross-cutting agreements. UCD needed agreements to advance major reforms, which opened the door to the logic of constitutional consensus and the integration of socialists, nationalists, and other forces into the new democratic framework. The PSOE, for its part, was able to combine its opposition role with a strategy of institutional responsibility, participating in the drafting of the 1978 Constitution and projecting itself as a future governing party.

These 1977 results foreshadowed the party system that would consolidate in the 1980s: a main confrontation between a large center-right force (first UCD, then the space that would be occupied by the PP) and a large center-left force (PSOE), with nationalist actors and other formations as a bridge. Although the UCD would dissolve a few years later, the map that emerged from those inaugural elections set the pattern of Spanish politics for decades.