The CNI warned Delegation and Civil Guard a day before the assault on Ceuta: "Attempt to enter by swimming and jumping over the fence for tomorrow"

The messages included in the documents declassified by the Government show that the Center alerted on July 29 about calls on Facebook and WhatsApp to enter Ceuta by sea and by the fence taking advantage of the Throne Festival.

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Elecciones 29N · Encuestas

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Media a 13 de noviembre de 2026 · 15 institutos

  • PP31,4 %
  • PSOE26,8 %
  • Vox19,1 %
  • Frente Amplio6,3 %
  • ERC2,4 %
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Elecciones generales del 29 de noviembre · Demócrata

The documents declassified by the Government about the migration crisis in Ceuta allow reconstructing the warnings that the National Intelligence Center (CNI) conveyed in the hours prior to July 30. The communications show that the CNI alerted in writing both the Government Delegation in Ceuta and the Civil Guard one day before the massive entry occurred. "We have information of an attempt to enter by swimming and jumping the fence for tomorrow," it communicated to the UCE-3 of the Armed Institute.

The messages, sent via WhatsApp, also show that the CNI had identified calls on social networks that urged to take advantage of the Moroccan Throne Festival to try to access the autonomous city.

The Center even warned the Delegation that two of the detected groups summed up to 180,000 followers, a figure that was conveyed so that its interlocutor could "get an idea of the extent of the dissemination."

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The warning to Delegation: "Assault by fence and sea tomorrow"

The most explicit communication with the Government Delegation occurred at 1:52 PM on Wednesday, July 29. The CNI informed via WhatsApp: "On social media, there is a call for an assault by fence and sea tomorrow at 8 PM."

The following message pointed directly to the reason why the promoters of the call had chosen that day: "Taking advantage of the throne festival and that their FCS will be busy", referring to the Moroccan security forces.

The CNI also focused on the dissemination capacity of those calls. "There are two different groups with a total of 180,000 followers", it indicated. It then emphasized the relevance it attributed to the data: "So you can get an idea of the extent of the dissemination".

The figure does not imply that 180,000 people were willing to participate in the entry attempt. What the documentation certifies is that the CNI had located two groups that, together, reached that number of followers and considered it relevant to convey it to the Delegation.

Hours later, a new contact between both is recorded. At 21:34 hours, already during the night prior to 30-J, the documentation records a 11-minute call from the Delegation. The declassified documents do not include a transcript of that conversation and, therefore, do not allow knowing what information was exchanged during it.

One minute later, the CNI notified the Civil Guard

The CNI did not limit the warning to the Government Delegation. At 13:53 hours, barely a minute after the previous warning, it tried to contact the UCE-3 of the Civil Guard by phone.

The first call went unanswered, so the Center documented in writing the reason for its attempt to contact: "XXXX I am calling you about the situation in Ceuta".

Next came the warning: "We have information about an attempt to swim in and jump the fence for tomorrow, the day of the Throne Festival".

The CNI also specified where the signals it had detected were coming from: "We have several groups on Fb and WhatsApp encouraging these entries."

The UCE-3 later returned the contact and at 14:41 hours a call of seven minutes and 38 seconds is recorded. Also in this case, the provided documentation does not include the content of the phone conversation.

Delegation had already met urgently about the swimmers

The documents show that the concern about swimming entries was prior to the warning of July 29. Two days earlier, on Monday the 27th, the Government Delegation itself had informed the CNI that it was holding a meeting to address precisely that problem.

"Urgent meeting with city, cnp, and gc regarding swimmers", the Delegation communicated at 11:20 hours. When the CNI asked if the meeting had already taken place, their interlocutor replied: "we have been here since 09:30".

The Center revisited the matter the following morning. At 10:00 hours on Tuesday, July 28, it asked: "How was the meeting yesterday??". The reproduced declassified documentation does not include a response nor does it allow knowing what the conclusions of that meeting were.

On that same July 28, at 17:07 hours, the CNI also sent the Delegation the poster for the concentration "CEUTA RAISES ITS VOICE", called for August 2, due to its possible consequences on public order.

The warnings that preceded 30-J

The sequence of declassified communications allows us to establish that The Government Delegation and the Civil Guard received written notices from the CNI on July 29 about a call to try to access Ceuta the next day, both by swimming and by jumping the fence.

In the case of the Delegation, the notice expressly warned of a "call for assault by fence and sea", indicated that it intended to take advantage of the Throne Festival, and alerted that two of the groups in which it was being disseminated totaled 180,000 followers. To the Civil Guard, the Center communicated that it had information about "an attempt to enter by swimming and jumping the fence for tomorrow" and about the existence of Facebook and WhatsApp groups that were "incentivizing these entries".

The messages therefore certify the existence of a prior alert and that this was communicated to both agencies. By themselves, however, they do not allow us to conclude that the CNI was aware in advance of the scale that the events of July 30 would ultimately reach. That distinction is relevant because the documents reflect what information the intelligence services had before the crisis, but do not attribute to these communications a specific forecast about the number of people who would ultimately try to access Ceuta.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the process of action and coordination between the CNI, the Government Delegation, and the Civil Guard in response to national security alerts?

The process of action and coordination between the National Intelligence Center (CNI), the Government Delegations, and the Civil Guard in response to national security alerts is supported by a regulatory framework that sets levels of political decision-making, strategic planning, and operational response across the territory. There is no single “closed protocol,” but rather a tiered system that adapts to the type and severity of the threat.

1. Legal framework and National Security system

Law 36/2015, on National Security defines the National Security System as the set of bodies, resources, and procedures that allow directing and coordinating the response to risks and crises, under the leadership of the President of the Government and the National Security Council. This law:

  • Designates the competent bodies as the Government, President, Ministers, National Security Council, and Government Delegates in the Autonomous Communities.
  • Provides for crisis management and the possible declaration of a “situation of interest for National Security,” which strengthens coordination without resorting to states of alarm, exception, or siege.

Law 11/2002 regulates the CNI as the body responsible for providing intelligence to the President and the Government to prevent risks and threats. Organic Law 5/2005, on National Defense places the President at the head of crisis management affecting defense, and Law 8/2011 and its development by Royal Decree 704/2011 articulate the critical infrastructure protection system, in which the Civil Guard and the Ministry of the Interior play a central role.

2. From intelligence alert to political activation

According to Law 11/2002, the CNI:

  • Obtains, evaluates, and interprets information, and disseminates strategic intelligence to prevent and neutralize threats against State security.
  • Acts under principles of efficacy, specialization, and coordination, with objectives set in the Intelligence Directive approved by the Government.

When the CNI detects a relevant threat (terrorist, cyber, hybrid, against critical infrastructures, etc.), after its analysis:

  • Informs the President of the Government and the competent bodies (National Security Council and, where appropriate, specialized committees).
  • Shares intelligence, with the precautions of classified information, with the intelligence services of the Ministry of the Interior (Civil Guard and National Police) and other bodies that must act.
3. Strategic coordination: National Security Council and committees

According to Law 36/2015, the National Security Council:

  • Assists the President in directing National Security policy.
  • Issues guidelines for planning and coordination and directs crisis management in situations of special severity.
  • Relies on specialized committees (for example, against terrorism, cybersecurity, critical infrastructures), where Interior, Defense, CNI, and other departments are represented.

In scenarios of increasing risk, the Council may activate the crisis management structure, intensifying information exchange between CNI, Interior, and other actors, without yet requiring a formal declaration of a situation of interest.

4. Territorial command and role of the Government Delegation

The Government Delegates, recognized in Law 36/2015 as competent bodies in National Security, are the key coordination piece on the territory:

  • Receive directives from the Government and Interior (and, when appropriate, from National Security crisis bodies).
  • Coordinate the actions of the Civil Guard and National Police in the autonomous community.
  • Articulate cooperation with regional authorities (integral regional police and civil protection) and local authorities.

Based on the strategic intelligence provided by the CNI and police intelligence services, the Government Delegate convenes operational devices and coordination centers, adjusting the response to the type of threat.

5. Civil Guard and operational response

Based on Organic Law 2/1986 (Security Forces and Corps) and Law 8/2011:

  • The Civil Guard assumes functions in citizen security, fight against terrorism, organized crime, and protection of critical infrastructures in much of the territory.
  • Participates in the Critical Infrastructure Protection System (CNPIC, operator security plans, and specific protection plans) activating physical and operational measures when an alert is received.
  • Integrates intelligence from the CNI and other services into its decisions, channeled through Interior commands and the Government Delegation.
6. Escalation of response and multilevel coordination

If the threat reaches a national or cross-cutting dimension, the President may:

  • Declare a situation of interest for National Security, by royal decree, defining scope, duration, and, if applicable, the functional authority that will direct actions under Government leadership.
  • Order the highest level of coordination among Government Delegations, Civil Guard, National Police, and, when appropriate, Armed Forces, always within the framework of ordinary legislation.

Throughout the entire process:

  • The CNI feeds political and operational decisions with strategic and signals intelligence.
  • The Government Delegation translates that strategic direction into concrete territorial coordination.
  • The Civil Guard, together with other forces, executes protection, prevention, surveillance measures, and, if applicable, threat neutralization.

What legal powers does the Government Delegate in Ceuta have regarding immigration and border security?

The Government Delegate in Ceuta is the highest representative of the General State Administration in the city and, therefore, the key figure in implementing the state policy on immigration and border security in that territory. Their powers derive mainly from the Spanish Constitution (representation of the Government in the territory), Law 40/2015, on the Legal Regime of the Public Sector (peripheral state administration and Government Delegations), Organic Law 2/1986, on Security Forces and Corps, Organic Law 4/2000 and its reforms (immigration), and Organic Law 4/2015, on citizen security protection, as well as various royal decrees on ministerial structure and Government Delegations.

As a peripheral body of the Government of Spain, the delegate in Ceuta exercises the ordinary representation of the Executive in the city and directs the General State Administration within its territorial scope. This generally implies:

  • Ensuring compliance with laws and execution of Government and State Administration decisions in Ceuta.
  • Directing and coordinating state services and bodies located in the city (except those organically dependent on other powers, such as judicial bodies).
  • Acting as the institutional channel of communication between the central Government and the Autonomous City of Ceuta, especially in matters of security and management of migratory flows.
  • Promoting inter-administrative coordination in emergency or crisis situations affecting the territory, including civil protection and critical infrastructure management.

In immigration and foreign affairs, the delegate's position is mainly supported by Organic Law 4/2000, its regulatory development, and ministerial orders delegating competencies from the Ministry of the Interior. Without being the “legislator” or the body that issues the rules, the delegate is responsible for their application in the territory. In summary, their role includes:

  • Political and administrative direction of the State immigration services in Ceuta (Foreigners Office and competent National Police units), within the framework set by the Ministry of the Interior.
  • Supervision and coordination of the management of irregular entries through the land border and by sea, in coordination with National Police, Civil Guard, and other state services.
  • Participation, through administrative resolutions and delegation of functions, in processing immigration files (e.g., sanctioning or regularization), always according to the internal distribution of competencies established by ministerial orders.
  • Responsibilities in the organization and administrative control of foreigners' internment centers and reception devices under state dependency, although internment and expulsion decisions ultimately correspond to judicial authority and competent central bodies.

In citizen security and border security, the Government Delegate operates mainly through Organic Law 2/1986 on Security Forces and Corps, Organic Law 4/2015, and the Ministry of the Interior's structural regulations. Broadly, their competencies are:

  • Exercising the ordinary direction and coordination of the State Security Forces and Corps deployed in Ceuta (National Police Corps and Civil Guard), within the framework of strategic instructions from the Ministry of the Interior.
  • Presiding over or promoting the Local Security Boards and other police coordination bodies that also include Autonomous City authorities, to harmonize responses to crime, public order, or migratory pressure issues.
  • Promoting and coordinating specific border security plans and devices, both on the land perimeter and at the port, airport, and adjacent waters, articulating joint action of the various state services.
  • Contributing to the practical application of the border rejection regime and access control provided in Organic Law 4/2015 for Ceuta and Melilla, always within the limits set by that law and constitutional jurisprudence.

In migratory crisis management, the Government Delegate in Ceuta becomes the main political-administrative coordinator on the ground. Based on immigration legislation, citizen security, civil protection, and Council of Ministers decisions, they usually assume functions such as:

  • Activating and directing, at the state level, emergency devices and contingency plans against massive arrivals of migrants or asylum seekers.
  • Coordinating security forces, rescue services, and other state bodies with health or assistance competencies.
  • Serving as the Government's interlocutor with the Autonomous City and other autonomous communities when derivation and reception of people, especially unaccompanied minors, is necessary under royal decrees of subsidies and distribution agreements.
  • Reporting to the central Government information and proposals on the border situation and needs for human and material resources.

In any case, the Government Delegate in Ceuta always acts by delegation of the Government and competent ministries, subject to the Constitution, the cited organic laws, and regulatory norms. They have no legislative or jurisdictional powers, and their decision-making margin is framed narrowly by European Union law, international border control agreements, and acts of the Council of Ministers.

What have been the results of the latest regional elections in Ceuta and which parties have representation in the Assembly?

The latest elections to the Assembly of the Autonomous City of Ceuta were held on May 28, 2023, coinciding with the cycle of regional and local elections throughout Spain. They resulted in the current Assembly, with 25 seats, which remains in force in 2026.

General results and parties with representation

Based on data collected in the electoral analysis on Ceuta published by the newspaper Demócrata (which in turn uses official 2023 results and sources such as RTVE.es as reference), the basic distribution of votes and political representation in the Assembly is as follows:

  • People's Party (PP)
    • Vote percentage: 34.37 %
    • Votes: 11,738
    • Seats: 9 deputies
  • Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)
    • Vote percentage: 20.96 %
    • Votes: 7,158
    • Seats: 6 deputies
  • Vox
    • Vote percentage: 20.64 %
    • Votes: 7,050
    • Seats: Available journalistic information indicates that Vox has sufficient representation for a potential PP–Vox agreement to reach an absolute majority, but the accessible text does not fully and directly detail the exact number of Vox seats in 2023; it explicitly mentions that the PP governs with 9 deputies and that there is an “alternative absolute majority” by adding PP and Vox seats.
  • Movement for Dignity and Citizenship (MDyC)
    • Vote percentage: 11.24 %
    • Votes: 3,839
    • Seats: The Demócrata analysis notes that MDyC has three deputies in the outgoing 2023 Assembly, but this is in the context of a comparison with polls after the migratory crisis; the text does not reconstruct a fully tabulated seat distribution party by party.
  • Ceuta Ya!
    • Vote percentage: 10.03 %
    • Votes: 3,428
    • Seats: The same source indicates that Ceuta Ya! obtained two seats in the 2023 regional elections (and that in later polling scenarios it could increase from two to three), although again this information appears more as political evolution than as an official results table.

In summary, the parties with representation in the Ceuta Assembly after the 2023 elections are:

  • PP
  • PSOE
  • Vox
  • MDyC (Movement for Dignity and Citizenship)
  • Ceuta Ya!

All of them surpass the electoral threshold and hold seats in a chamber of 25 deputies. The absolute majority is set at 13 seats. According to the consulted journalistic information, the PP governs with 9 deputies and the rest of the chamber is divided among PSOE, Vox, MDyC, and Ceuta Ya!, with a balance of power that makes any combination between PP and Vox relevant on one side, and the role of local formations MDyC and Ceuta Ya! on the other.

It is important to emphasize that the figures of votes and percentages by party for 2023 come from explicitly cited official data (11,738 votes and 34.37 % for PP; 7,158 votes and 20.96 % for PSOE; 7,050 for Vox; 3,839 for MDyC; 3,428 for Ceuta Ya!). The same source clearly fixes the 9 seats of PP and the 6 of PSOE, and describes the current composition of MDyC and Ceuta Ya! in terms of number of deputies, although the text does not offer a single synthetic table of the complete seat distribution party by party. For caution, the answer strictly adheres to what those references allow to affirm with certainty.

In any case, from a political point of view, the key fact is that no party holds an absolute majority alone and that the city's governability is articulated around the leadership of Juan Jesús Vivas's PP, the PSOE's position as the main state opposition party, Vox's weight in the right-wing bloc, and the pivotal role of the local forces MDyC and Ceuta Ya!, which bring a specifically local agenda to the Assembly.

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What event did the promoters of the massive entry into Ceuta take advantage of according to the CNI warnings?

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How many followers did the two groups detected by the CNI spreading the call on social networks have?

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How did the CNI inform the Government Delegation and the Civil Guard about the possible assault?

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