UEFA is preparing a criminal complaint against Infantino for his failed plan to sell part of the World Cup business.

As of today (August 27, 2026), in the sources consulted — including the database of the newspaper Demócrata and the international press accessible through search engines — there is no record that UEFA has effectively filed a complaint or lawsuit before the Swiss courts, much less that there is an ongoing judicial procedure identified with a public “processing status.” What is documented, however, is the open political and sporting crisis between UEFA and FIFA (boycott, loss of trust in Gianni Infantino, etc.), but with no trace of a judicial action already filed in Switzerland.

In other words: as far as the available information goes, the “complaint that UEFA is preparing in Switzerland” is, at most, a political-media hypothesis or trial balloon, but not a formal judicial procedure known to have:

• which specific Swiss jurisdiction is processing it,
• what type of action has been exercised (civil, commercial, possibly criminal),
• nor at what procedural stage it is (admission, investigation, hearing, judgment, etc.).

What is actually happening between UEFA and FIFA

Recent news pieces describe a very intense conflict on the sporting and political level:

• UEFA has announced a boycott of FIFA, threatening that its national teams will not participate in international federation competitions as long as the commercial project “FIFA Forward Enterprise” continues (Demócrata news).
• There is a declared loss of trust in Gianni Infantino by UEFA and other confederations, with calls for resignation in some European countries and a debate about the use of private capital in major competitions (coverage of the FIFA–UEFA crisis).
• Possible “legal actions” or “legal avenues” are repeatedly mentioned, but always in political or conditional terms, not as a litigation already identified in a specific Swiss court.

That is, the conflict is today clearly institutionalized in the federative and media sphere, but there is no public confirmation that it has already been transferred to a registered lawsuit in the courts of Zurich or any other Swiss canton.

Why there is no “processing status” to offer

In Swiss law, as in any jurisdiction, a procedure only has an identifiable “processing status” when at least these steps occur:

• Formal filing of the complaint or lawsuit before the competent court.
• Decision of admission to proceedings (or dismissal) by the judge or court.
• Start of proceedings: notification to the defendant, setting deadlines for response, possible precautionary measures, etc.

None of this appears in the available chronicles about the crisis between UEFA and FIFA. The news focuses on:

• Resolutions and procedures of disciplinary or ethical bodies of FIFA and UEFA.
• Reactions from national federations, governments, and international organizations (for example, UN rapporteurs requesting exclusions from competitions).
• Sports and competition litigation in other forums (for example, proceedings before the CJEU on FIFA rules, or investigations by national competition authorities).

At no time is a case number, a specific Swiss court, or admission resolutions related to a complaint or lawsuit by UEFA itself in Switzerland against FIFA or other actors identified.

Conclusion

With the available data, the honest answer is that one cannot speak of a “judicial processing status” in Switzerland of that UEFA complaint, because there is no public record that such complaint has been formally filed. The real situation is:

• A very advanced political and sporting conflict between UEFA and FIFA (boycott, loss of trust, public pressure).
• Exploration of legal avenues on different fronts (including EU courts, disciplinary bodies, and possible claims by national federations).
• Absence of evidence of an ongoing Swiss judicial procedure with clearly identified parties, body, and procedural stage.

If in the coming weeks UEFA moves from threats and internal debates to filing a lawsuit in a Swiss court, then concrete processing phases could be discussed. But, as of today, that complaint belongs more to the realm of political and media speculation than to an open judicial case for which a precise procedural status can be given.

I cannot provide you with a detailed and documented answer about the competencies of the FIFA president according to its statutes, because I specialize in Spanish politics and public institutions (Congress, Senate, central and regional governments, Spanish regulations, political actors, etc.) and my own work scope does not include international sports law or the governing bodies of sports federations such as FIFA.

My design is oriented to precisely and verifiably handle information related to:

• Spanish laws and regulations (constitutional, organic, ordinary, royal decree-laws, royal decrees, ministerial orders, and regional regulations) and their content.
• Parliamentary processing of initiatives in the General Courts and regional parliaments: including draft and proposed laws, motions, non-legislative proposals, parliamentary questions, appearances, etc.
• Voting and positioning of parliamentary groups in Spain, including voting results in the Congress of Deputies and other chambers.
• Political and institutional actors: profiles of deputies, senators, government members, senior officials of the General State Administration and regional governments, as well as their political and media activity.
• Political and regulatory current affairs in Spain: debates on public policies (health, education, energy, housing, taxation, etc.) and their reflection in regulations, initiatives, and parliamentary discussions.

On the other hand, issues such as the specific content of the statutes of an international sports federation (in this case, FIFA), the detailed description of the competencies of its internal bodies, or the private legal regime governing them are outside my specialized scope. Although it is an organization with great global impact, it is not part of the Spanish institutional and regulatory framework that I am designed to cover rigorously.

If you need to know precisely the competencies of the FIFA president, the most reliable and direct source is the text of the FIFA Statutes itself, which is usually publicly available on the organization's official website. There you can find:

• A chapter dedicated to FIFA's bodies (Congress, Council, President, General Secretariat, committees, etc.).
• The specific articles describing the functions, powers, and limits of each body, including the president.
• Cross-references to other statutory provisions that condition or nuance those competencies (for example, which decisions require other bodies, what the Congress must approve, etc.).

If you have the statutes text in Spanish (for example, in PDF) and need methodological help to analyze them on your own, I can guide you on how to read them and structure your own summary, for example:

• Which articles to locate first to identify general and specific competencies.
• How to distinguish between executive, representative, and supervisory functions.
• How to detect internal controls and checks and balances (which decisions must be endorsed by other bodies).

In summary, I cannot give you the specific list of competencies of the FIFA president nor cite the exact articles of its statutes, but I can:

• Explain how the statutes of an organization of this type are generally organized.
• Help you structure an analysis outline if you have access to the text.
• Answer comparative questions if you want to relate those functions to equivalent positions within the Spanish political and institutional system (for example, differences between a federation president and a president of a Spanish public body).

If you reformulate your query towards some aspect connected with the Spanish political or institutional sphere (for example, the legal framework of Spanish sports federations within the legal system, or the competencies of the Higher Sports Council in Spain), I will be able to help you in much more detail.

In Swiss criminal law, the offense usually translated into Spanish as mismanagement or disloyal administration is the figure used to prosecute those who, having the responsibility to manage another's assets, use them against the interests of their owner and cause economic harm. It is the type preferentially applied to executives of large private organizations based in Switzerland, such as international sports federations.

1. Basic elements of the mismanagement offense

Although the available sources do not literally reproduce the provision of the Swiss Penal Code, comparative doctrine and European texts cited in specialized press describe a scheme very similar to the embezzlement/disloyal administration that the European Union is harmonizing ( anti-corruption directive):

• Position of guarantor over another's assets: the perpetrator must have entrusted goods or economic interests of another (company, foundation, sports federation, etc.) by virtue of an administrative, management, or safeguarding role.
• Serious breach of the duty of management or safeguarding: a culpable breach of that duty is required, that is, an action that clearly contradicts the purpose for which the assets or powers of disposition were entrusted.
• Asset damage: the conduct must cause economically relevant damage to the managed assets (for example, paying an artificially inflated price, assuming unjustified risks, or diverting funds to unauthorized purposes).
• Intent: the manager acts knowingly, at least accepting the risk of causing that damage. A simple business misjudgment is not enough; courts usually require a clear breach of expected diligence.

In the context of international sports entities based in Switzerland —as the press recalls when explaining that these organizations are governed by the legal system of the country where they have their headquarters ( analysis on federations and Swiss headquarters)—, these elements apply to economic management decisions, commercial contracts, use of sponsorships, or exploitation of audiovisual rights.

2. Aggravated forms

As happens in the future European directive, which classifies as especially serious the cases of embezzlement and abuse of functions when seeking to obtain an “undue advantage” ( European reference), Swiss law contemplates aggravated forms of mismanagement that, in general, respond to criteria such as:

• Personal or third-party enrichment: when the administrator not only harms the other's assets but does so to obtain an economic benefit for themselves or people in their environment.
• Damage of special magnitude: if the asset damage reaches very high amounts or seriously compromises the financial stability of the entity.
• Intense abuse of the position of trust: for example, when exploiting particularly high professional credibility, or a concentration of internal power that prevents effective controls, something very relevant in sports organizations with strong centralized decision-making.

In these hypotheses, the prison sentence is significantly increased and may approach the levels that the EU foresees for the most serious forms of embezzlement and abuse of functions (maximum penalties of at least five years in European standards).

3. Jurisprudential interpretation and application to sport

Recent jurisprudence in Europe emphasizes that the core of these figures is the violation of the rules governing the activity to obtain undue advantages, with serious impact on trust in organizations. The Spanish Supreme Court, for example, has defined corruption as “any violation by an individual of the rules governing their activity with the aim of procuring for themselves, or for a third party, an advantage of any kind that they could not have obtained had they acted in accordance with the legal system” ( ruling on the mask case). That same logic inspires the prosecution of analogous conduct in Switzerland.

After scandals in international football, Swiss prosecutors have tended to interpret strictly the loyalty duties of federation executives headquartered in their territory. In practice, projects involving private capital entry into commercial assets, setting of artificial capital gains, or opaque agreements related to major competitions may be analyzed under the lens of mismanagement if there appear:

• unmanaged conflicts of interest;
• particular benefits for executives or intermediaries;
• and serious harm or risk to the sports entity.

In summary, for mismanagement to exist in the sense of Swiss criminal law applied to international sports entities, it requires: a custodial position over another's assets, a serious breach of the duty of loyalty in management, relevant asset damage, and intentional conduct, with aggravation if there is also undue enrichment, massive damage, or very intense abuse of the trust associated with the position.