The soft power, silent diplomacy or soft power -as this Anglo-Saxon term is popularly known- could have serious consequences for Spanish companies.
The Americans -explains to Demócrata the economist Javier Santacruz- are very prone to this type of diplomacy. In fact, the Treasury Department practices it every day. It is, in essence, a form of pressure that does not seek so much to definitively cut commercial relations as to warn the affected country of the consequences that not aligning with the White House.
From that point of view, and always with that criterion, the courtesy of the US Administration also involves suggesting to the country's exporting companies that they look for other suppliers and that, in our case, ignore Spain.
The discretionary capacity of the White House
It is about placing obstacles in procedures, regulations, customs, mergers or acquisitions. In short, to toughen all types of regulations: phytosanitary, environmental or sanitary, in addition to permits and licenses.
“The discretionary capacity of the American Administration -explains Santacruz to our medium- is enormous”.
This practice -recalls the economist- already occurred with black olives, when specific tariffs were imposed back in 2017 and 2018. "Then, the consequences were clear: the trade of this product was practically paralyzed".
Situations like that one could be repeated now. Companies like Santander, Grifols or the large oil companies would be exposed, in some of their operations, to the decisions that Donald Trump may take at this moment regarding commercial relations with Spain.
Recently, Santander has bought Webster Bank in the United States for 12.2 billion dollars with the aim of growing in the North American market. Under normal circumstances, the regulatory procedure could last around seven months, economic sources state. However, with the less flexible hand of the Trump Administration, that period could be extended up to twelve.
Ultimately, this would be a way to put obstacles and for companies and, above all, countries, to think twice before making certain public statements.
“In the specific case of Banco Santander, the entity would be waiting for them to authorize this purchase and to know what conditions they impose on it,” points out Santacruz. For this economist, the reason for a hypothetical soft power, is not because it is an American subsidiary, "it is enough for it to be the main Spanish entity for them to put obstacles."
The purchase of a United States company from an American bank
Other economic sources consulted assure, however, that this casuistry, partly surrounded by speculation, would hardly occur. In this commercial operation, it has been the company that Santander has in the United States, and that therefore possesses American nationality, the one that buys another American bank.
Furthermore -they explain to Demócrata- these operations are highly standardized by the Supervisory Office and the Department of Justice, which monitors competition practices. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that Trump will make things difficult for an American company.
Even more -adds another economic source-, when the relationship between Ana Botín and Donald Trump is good, as could already be seen at the Davos forum.
On the other hand, the good relationship between the CEO of Repsol, Josu Jon Imaz, also seems a guarantee of tranquility for this energy company with interests in the US, even more so when alliances have been strengthened in Venezuela after the departure of Nicolás Maduro.
Barriers and more expensive prices
Grifols is also in the spotlight. The company has divisions both in the United States and in Spain.
Regarding the large oil companies, it was the president of the Junta de Andalucía himself who, last Monday, on El Hormiguero on Antena 3, anticipated that if Trump decides to impose barriers on oil -80% of Spanish olive oil comes from Andalusia- that measure would end up harming some 250,000 families who live directly or indirectly from this key product for the Spanish economy.
Other companies like Navantia, Telefónica or Indra, with public participation in their capital, would not be affected in the same way -details Santacruz- because their business model consists more of buying from the United States than selling to it. In that case, what could happen is that they would end up paying for materials at higher prices.
The scenarios of Spain
Demócrata has interviewed three other economists to analyze the potential economic scenarios that Spain could face in this new context of tension in the Middle East.
For Rafael Pampillón, Professor of Economics at CEU San Pablo University, it is understandable that the Government has decided to take some time to analyze the situation. Spain already experienced a similar situation during the oil crisis of the seventies, when it was decided to lower the price of fuel. That decision ended up unleashing enormous inflation from which it took the country a long time to recover.
Hence, it is fundamental to assess that, if revenue collection ceases through savings measures in energy products, the final cost can be high. Subsidies reduce market signals, consumption increases, companies reduce their incentives and that ends up generating more demand with less supply, which translates into higher inflation rates.
A situation that worries -Pampillón underlines- because, if the worst-case scenario is prolonged, inflation in Spain could exceed 3.5%, with the consequent loss of competitiveness.
Scenarios of economic risk
For his part, Lorenzo Bernaldo de Quirós, president of Freemarket Corporate Intelligence and academic at the Cato Institute, and expert in international geopolitics draws three possible scenarios and one additional, even more worrying.
The first -the one many institutions and think tanks— contemplates a duration of the conflict of between two and five weeks. In that case, the impact would be relatively mild, with a loss of Spanish GDP of around 0.4%, that is, about 7,000 million euros. Inflation could increase by about half a point.
The real problem appears when the conflict exceeds the four-month barrier. From there, GDP could fall by up to 1.5% and inflation could be around 4%. This would imply serious problems of energy supply and other raw materials.
The most worrying scenario contemplates the entry into the conflict of the Houthis, a Shiite armed group known for its participation in different conflicts in the Middle East and that could become a lifeline for a potentially weakened Iranian army.
To this is added another factor: Spain has a very reduced fiscal margin of maneuver, which would transfer a good part of the impact to prices and to the production costs of companies.
A fiscal margin in question
Precisely about fiscal fragility speaks for Demócrata Santiago Calvo, doctor in Economics and professor at Hespérides University.
In his opinion, a crisis like this would seriously test Spanish public finances, in a context of debt close to 100% of GDP and with a still considerable deficit.
Calvo insists that “Spain is not prepared to face an energy crisis with public debt —underlines— half of which is in the hands of international investors, including American and Jewish ones, which could precipitate a rise in the risk premium”.
Therefore, this economist recommends -in line with the also economist José Carlos Díez- “prudence, budgets, certainty, and avoiding unnecessary conflicts”. To this, Pampillón and Santacruz add, agreeing on the need to recover fiscal margin, something that —he concludes— “has not been done and, for now, does not seem like it will be done either”.