Just six months ago, I was writing in this very same medium that Europe had awakened, at last, from the illusion of a perpetual peace and was beginning to face the challenge of its own defense. The diagnosis was clear: more military spending, more European programs, and an increasingly insistent discourse on the so-called "strategic autonomy." In these months, the international scenario has done nothing but confirm it with a forcefulness difficult to ignore.
Wars, like poorly extinguished fires, rarely remain confined where they begin. They expand, contaminate entire regions, and force all actors to take a stand. The war in Ukraine remains open, the Middle East periodically tenses up again, and global geopolitical rivalry -from Washington to Beijing, passing through Moscow- continues to intensify. Europe responds with a mix of strategic concern, bureaucratic prudence, and institutional rhetoric. In other words: the continent continues to speak solemnly of “strategic sovereignty” while trying to define what it means in practice.
It would not be fair to deny that something is moving. The European Commission has accelerated its defense initiatives, promoting financial instruments, industrial programs, and cooperation mechanisms that just a decade ago would have seemed unthinkable. Funds, loans, joint projects, technological strategies: the community machinery works with intensity. The problem is that the European strategic reality is not decided solely in Brussels, but in the national capitals, where the reflexes of sovereignty continue to be decisive.
It is also advisable not to lose sight of a structural limitation: the European Union does not have full competencies in defense nor a budget commensurate with its ambitions. In the absence of a reform of the treaties -unlikely in the short term- any significant progress in common armament must be articulated through flexible intergovernmental formulas, coalitions of countries, or ad hoc mechanisms, whose governance and decision-making processes remain undefined.
And that is where the real problem begins.
The European market that never was European
In theory, Europe speaks of a common defense market. In practice, that market remains a sum of carefully protected national markets.
Unlike other economic sectors, defense has never really been a free market. It is a political market, conditioned by national sovereignty. Companies do not compete only for efficiency or innovation, but within frameworks defined by States. They do not really live in a continental ecosystem, but in national systems. They depend on their Ministries of Defense, which finance programs, set needs, award contracts and, no less importantly, control exports. The result is predictable: industrial decisions respond to national interests more than to a European logic.
Each country protects its industrial champions, maintains employment and capabilities within its borders, and each European program is the result of political balances more than of strategic planning.
Europe proclaims the need for a common industrial base, but acts as if each country could sustain its own. The result is a known paradox: the continent has considerable resources, but disperses them with admirably low efficiency.
In this context, it is worth highlighting a key element: the true instrument of a European armaments policy is not so much R&D programs or subsidies, as public procurement. In defense, whoever buys defines the market. The creation of joint procurement mechanisms at European level -still embryonic- poses complex challenges: from the definition of common requirements to industrial distribution among countries, probably through “fair return” formulas that balance interests without blocking programs.
At the same time, recent wars are transforming the nature of military power. Although Europe maintains solid capabilities in conventional systems, current conflicts underscore the growing importance of technologies such as drones, intelligence systems, and cyber defense. Developing them will require not only investment, but new forms of cooperation and learning, in some cases relying on the operational experience of countries that are already on the front line of these conflicts.
France: the strategy as state policy
France remains the only European country that addresses defense with true strategic coherence worthy of that name.
Paris has understood for decades that the military industry is not just an economic sector, but an instrument of national power. Its large companies -Thales, Dassault, Naval Group- function as extensions of its foreign policy. When France sells weaponry, it also sells influence and strategic presence.
Furthermore, it has a consolidated strategic culture, reinforced by its nuclear deterrence and by a tradition of military autonomy that is part of its political identity. France does not speak of strategic sovereignty; it practices it.
Germany: the industrial giant in search of strategy
Germany, for its part, is an indispensable and at the same time ambivalent actor.
It has a formidable industrial base and financial resources that could transform European defense. However, its historical relationship with military power remains complex. For decades, it has exercised economic leadership while delegating security within the transatlantic framework.
The war in Ukraine has forced a review of that balance. The extraordinary defense fund announced by the German government is a clear signal, but transforming resources into strategic power requires more than budgets: it demands a sustained political vision. Germany is trying to build it, though still with caution and disguised suspicion from neighbors.
Furthermore, the increase in spending has not necessarily translated into a commitment to the European industry. Germany -like other countries- continues to largely rely on American equipment, which introduces an evident tension with the objective of strategic autonomy.
Italy: industrial pragmatism
Italy plays a more discreet but effective game.
Rome has developed an industrial strategy focused on positioning its companies -especially Leonardo- in key sectors: helicopters, electronics, space, and advanced systems. It seeks niches where it can be an essential partner in major European programs.
He/She does not aspire to absolute leadership, but he/she does aim to avoid irrelevance, and he/she is achieving it with considerable skill.
Spain: between ambition and dependence
Spain, in contrast, reflects well the contradictions of European defense.
It has increased its investment, modernized part of its military capabilities, and strengthened its participation in European programs. The effort is real and deserves recognition. However, the country continues to face a structural limitation: its defense industry continues to depend largely on national decisions and on industrial alliances dominated by more powerful partners.
The temptation to focus exclusively on creating “national champions” is politically attractive in discourse, but it ignores an uncomfortable reality: the future defense market will necessarily be European, not national. Making that logic the core of the strategy means losing sight of where the game will truly be decided. Building large isolated companies in an increasingly integrated continental ecosystem is, at best, optimistic; at worst, simply anachronistic.
Spain has relevant capabilities -naval, aerospace, and technological- and companies with potential to play a significant role in the European defense ecosystem. But to achieve this, it will need something more than national programs or well-designed industrial plans: it will need a clear strategy for European industrial integration driven by Spanish policy itself. And that strategy demands something that is often scarce in this field: sustained political leadership.
The construction of a true Spanish position in European defense cannot be left solely in the hands of companies nor resolved through technical agreements between ministries. It requires direct and continuous involvement from the Government to define a strategic position for the country and negotiate its place in the future European industrial architecture. Spain must stop limiting itself to participating in projects designed by others and start influencing their conception and management from the beginning.
This implies assuming several concrete political responsibilities; promote, with the main European partners, a true industrial integration, build stable alliances to guarantee its presence in the major European programs of the future and -perhaps the most difficult- contribute to generating trust to share technology, coordinate research, facilitate access to strategic intelligence and accept business concentrations of European dimension.
The European defense will not be built only with community funds nor with strategic documents, but when governments assume that technological sovereignty cannot be the sum of isolated industrial sovereignties. If Spain wants to have weight, it must actively participate in that political design, not limit itself to occupying the space that others decide to leave it.
In European defense, as in international politics in general, countries do not occupy the place they believe they deserve, but the one they are capable of negotiating and building. And that is, probably, the true pending task of Spanish politics in this new strategic stage.
Other actors
To this panorama it is convenient to add countries like Sweden, whose company Saab demonstrates that smaller economies can maintain advanced technological capabilities.
Outside the Union, the United Kingdom remains a relevant military power, with an advanced industry and solid strategic tradition. However, its departure from the EU has complicated its relationship with the new European instruments and has reduced its influence in the continent's industrial architecture.
The true obstacle: political will
Ultimately, the problem of European defense is not technological nor financial, but political.
Europe has resources, companies, and talent. What is missing is the will to convert that potential into a coherent strategy. But of course, that would imply agreeing on issues as trivial as leadership, financing, or control. As long as countries continue to prioritize their immediate industrial interests above European logic, strategic autonomy will largely remain an elegant rhetorical formula.
Building a European defense requires difficult decisions. It means accepting greater industrial specialization, concentrating resources on common programs and moving towards a true European defense market. It implies, ultimately, assuming security as a collective good.
From rhetoric to reality
Europe has advanced more in defense in the last five years than in the previous two decades. However, it remains trapped between the need to act as a strategic power and the persistence of deeply rooted national reflexes.
The European defense will not be built in Brussels, but in the national capitals, where key decisions are made. That does not make European institutions irrelevant, but their role will depend on the capacity of the States to transform ambitions into concrete mechanisms, especially in financing and procurement.
European history shows that integration advances in times of crisis, and defense could be one of them. For Spain, the question is clear: to decide if it wants to contribute to designing the future industrial and technological architecture of European defense and manage its membership in the decision-making bodies or limit itself to occupying the space that others define.
The window of opportunity exists, but it will not be permanent.
In a continent where everyone talks about strategic autonomy, but few are willing to cede industrial sovereignty, converting that concept into real policies requires political leadership, negotiation capacity, and strategic vision.
Because security is not built with speeches nor with carefully drafted strategies: it is built with decisions. And so far, Europe -and also Spain- has demonstrated a notable ability to keep postponing them.