One of the arguments put forward by the President of the United States, Donald Trump, to launch operation 'Epic Fury' on February 28 against Iran was the threat that the ayatollahs' regime would manage to manufacture an atomic bomb. Although this danger has focused a good part of international attention, specialists warn that there is an equally devastating risk that has gone more unnoticed: Tehran's biological weapons program.
For years, Washington has been warning that Iran would be investigating the development of lethal biological agents for military purposes. In a recent report, the office of the Director of National Intelligence went so far as to point out that it is "very likely" that Tehran "continues its research and development of chemical and biological agents for offensive purposes."
In the months prior to the outbreak of the current conflict, information was also disseminated indicating that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard would try to design warheads with biological and nuclear agents to integrate them into its long-range ballistic missiles.
In this scenario, several analysts have focused on the danger that this program poses in the midst of war, when the ayatollahs' regime has been seriously weakened, both by the death of the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and of other high-ranking officials, as well as by the risk that this arsenal ends up out of control and falls into the wrong hands.
Although Dr. Cassidy Nelson, Director of Biosecurity Policy at the Centre for Long-Term Resilience, a British 'think thank', judges it "improbable" that Tehran would make "deliberate use" of this type of weaponry, she does not rule out that it could be resorted to in an extreme situation "to suppress an uprising or stage a false flag attack" within the country.
Nevertheless, according to this specialist in an article by the British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) consulted by Europa Press, the main concern focuses on the chain of command and on the management of the biological program as a whole.
When a regime collapses, personnel working in the biological weapons program "face powerful incentives to defect, flee, or abandon their posts, especially if they fear being prosecuted under International Law," Nelson stresses, noting that "biological agents require safeguarding and careful maintenance, without which their containment can fail."
Risk of accidental leaks and loss of control
The Iranian facilities linked to this program would be spread throughout the territory and, in some cases, they would be dual-use centers, both military and civil. In this context, "an accidental release from any of these facilities, whether due to infrastructure damage, a breach of protocols, or a simple abandonment, is a real possibility in the coming weeks or months," warns the expert.
Nelson also suggests that the regime, if seriously threatened, could try to remove pathogens, key materials, or even its scientists from the country, in order to preserve capabilities, evade detection and possible legal proceedings, or facilitate future operations, by transferring these resources to allied militias in the region. "Transfer during a crisis multiplies the risk of a loss of control," he highlights.
Another option is that the material ends up being stolen by "paramilitary factions, splinter groups or opportunistic actors" who seek to use it "as leverage, collateral or weapons for their own benefit", it adds.
For Nelson, the fact that the release of an agent is accidental or intentional is irrelevant, since "transmissible pathogens do not understand between both and the epidemic consequences are the same in any case." A release of this type in the Middle East "could sow an epidemic that crosses borders in days and that is much more difficult to attribute, detect or contain," he warns.
Difficulty of detection and great capacity of propagation
Along these lines, Ashish K. Jha, a doctor and member of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School, also states, who emphasizes that "biological agents pose a particular challenge since, unlike nuclear material, they do not trigger radiation detectors at border controls."
"Unlike chemical arsenals, they can be small, transportable, and capable of spreading on their own once released," he argues in an article published in 'Statnews', emphasizing that "a vial does not need a missile to become a weapon."
According to Jha, "the consequences of a release, deliberate or accidental, would be like nothing that the disruption of crude oil markets can cause," in allusion to the impact that the blockade imposed by Tehran in the Strait of Hormuz is having on the global energy sector.
It also recalls that "COVID-19, which was not a weaponized pathogen and had not been optimized to be more lethal, erased tens of trillions of dollars from the world economy and changed daily life for years." "That the oil supply is disrupted is painful but recoverable but a biological event is not," he warns.
Demand to secure the Iranian biological program
Given this scenario, experts agree that urgent measures must be adopted to control Iran's biological program. "The international community faces an urgent challenge," states Nelson, since "ensuring the security of biological weapons infrastructure of a state under attack can be more complex than ensuring the security of its nuclear program," largely because biological agents are much easier to conceal.
Nelsen and Jha recall that useful precedents exist. "When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (American) established in 1991 mobilized to secure an enormous and disseminated arsenal of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in fifteen new independent states," thus avoiding "a catastrophic proliferation," the researcher recalls.
That operation was possible, they admit, because Moscow collaborated and there was no active war. Instead, "Iran represents a much more volatile environment and the dual-use nature of its program means there is no clear inventory" to refer to, Nelson emphasizes, while Jha acknowledges that "Iran is neither a stable partner nor willing to collaborate."
In this context, Richard Cupitt, Christina McAllister and Barbara Slavin, analysts from the 'think tank' Stimson, already warned a few weeks ago, after the start of the military offensive by the United States and Israel against Iran, of the urgency of securing both the nuclear program and the possible chemical and biological material that the country would have in the event of a regime collapse.
These specialists consider that, ultimately, the United States will be forced to deploy "boots on the ground", since to verify that Tehran dismantles its nuclear enrichment, missile, and drone programs, as well as to investigate and dismantle eventual chemical and biological weapons programs, "a large number of researchers and inspectors will be necessary".