From the alleged fictitious invoices of María Gertrudis Alcázar Jiménez to the instrumental use that, supposedly, the plot of former Government president José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero exercised over the mercantile company Whathefav SL, jointly administered by his daughters Laura and Alba Rodríguez Espinosa.
Thus can be summarized the investigative journey reflected in the 85 pages of the order signed by judges José Luis Calama Texeira and Ana Isabel Meras Santiago, presented last Monday before the Administration of Justice.
A document that places José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero as investigated and that starts, apparently, from a work activity developed under parameters of formality. However, the account of allegedly criminal acts exposed as a result of the proceedings carried out so far —as indicated by the order to which Demócrata has had access— “evidences the existence of a stable and hierarchical structure of influence peddling, led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, whose purpose would have been the obtaining of economic benefits through intermediation and the exercise of influence before public bodies in favor of third parties, mainly the company Plus Ultra”.
“The action of this network —adds the judicial brief— would be developed under a formal appearance of advice, institutional representation or strategic consulting, actually concealing an operation aimed at obtaining favorable administrative decisions in exchange for economic considerations”.
At the center of the investigation is the rescue of the airline Plus Ultra for a value of 53 million euros by the Spanish Government. For this, the order relies on a report prepared by the expert Pedro Martín Molina who, as a final conclusion, maintains that the company Plus Ultra did not comply with the condition established in Order PCM/679/2020, of July 23, by which the Agreement of the Council of Ministers of July 21, 2020, is published, relating to determining “whether the company was, or was not, in a crisis situation as of December 31, 2019”, in the terms established by article 2.18 of European Commission Regulation 651/2014, of June 17, by which certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market are declared in application of articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty.
Martín Molina's expert report also warns of the existence of a participatory loan in the case of the airline, the absence of provisions derived from certain contingencies, the cancellation of debt from the so-called "bathers," and the possible existence of a situation of insolvency. All of this, together with the other points developed in the expert report and "without prejudice to the existing scope limitations" —the order emphasizes—, "raises more than reasonable doubts about the company's asset situation on that date and, consequently, about compliance with the essential conditions for granting public aid."
With all these premises, the so-called "ZAPATERO GROUP," as the judicial reasoning states, allegedly set out to mediate with the Government —through SEPI and the Ministry of Transport— to facilitate the rescue of Plus Ultra.
The order expressly alludes to this and states that "the financial analysis confirms that José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and his circle are the ultimate beneficiaries of the operation." According to the judicial document, "the company Análisis Relevante receives funds from Plus Ultra, Sofgestor, Grupo Aldesa, and Inteligencia Prospectiva for more than 941,000 euros, subsequently sending significant amounts to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (490,780 euros) and the company Whathefav (239,755 euros). In turn, Inteligencia Prospectiva channels almost 1.2 million euros to Análisis Relevante, Whathefav, and Gate Center, and these entities redistribute funds to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and his family circle. Relevant transfers to his daughters' accounts, asset acquisitions, and early loan repayments are also detected, reaffirming the personal use of the obtained funds."
But how did this network operate? How were payments made whose traceability appeared and disappeared like the Eyes of the Guadiana? How did the money end up fattening commissions linked to non-existent services? What was the internal functioning of the network attributed to Zapatero and his team?
The investigations maintain that, allegedly, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero acted as the decision-making and strategic core of the network. His leadership would not be manifested publicly or formally, but through his capacity for direction, coordination, and supervision, avoiding direct execution of the most compromised tasks as much as possible.
That role stems, according to the order, from multiple pieces of evidence, including wiretapped conversations in which his decision-making capacity is referenced: “our pal Zapatero behind” (07.22.2020); “Grupo Zapatero has it since this morning. They were already on it (they say)” (07.04.2020); “the gowair guys know everything we do, even that Zapa is our contact” (09.09.2020); “I don't know if it would be good for them to give him a technical touch from above or for Zapatero to talk to someone at SEPI” (09.16.2020); “what I want is for him or Zapatero to talk to SEPI, and for them to get, even verbally, that they grant us the aid with 100% certainty. With that answer, they can look for a bank for the bridge loan” (09.22.2020); or “tomorrow Zapatero intervenes directly. He is going to try to get us the permits without the Spanish Embassy having to intervene” (01.29.2021).
The network—the order points out—would present a hierarchical structure, in which each member would assume differentiated functions. Thus, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero would exercise direction and control functions, followed by Julio Martínez Martínez, who would act as the main lieutenant and visible figure of the network.
Julio Martínez Martínez would assume direct contact with clients, execute instructions from José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, and formally head the corporate structure used to channel funds both in Spain and in offshore territories. This position would be reflected in expressions such as “I don't talk to the boss, I talk to a lackey”—conversation between Roberto Roselli and Rodolfo Reyes, dated 05.18.2020—, used to refer to Julio Martínez Martínez in relation to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.
Likewise, the order identifies Manuel Aarón Fajardo as another of the lieutenants, with a specific area of operation in Venezuela, being described by the investigated parties themselves as “ZP's man in Venezuela” (04.28.2020).
According to the investigation, Manuel Aarón Fajardo would also facilitate contacts at the highest institutional level. This would be inferred from messages in which he invites Plus Ultra executives to contact Julio Martínez Martínez, indicating that “in the friend's team, it's him and me” (conversation between Julio Martínez Sola and Manuel Aarón Fajardo, dated 05.15.2020).
In a third tier would be María Gertrudis Alcázar and Cristóbal Cano, responsible for administrative and financial support. Both would be in charge of providing formal and documentary coverage for the operations, coordinating the issuance of invoices, the concepts to be included, and the corresponding amounts.
This is observed in emails in which María Gertrudis Alcázar asks Cristóbal Cano if she should issue one or several invoices for 20,000 euros and what concepts should be included, later receiving precise instructions on amounts, quarters, and specific descriptions (email of 09.22.2021).
Gertru's invoices
Therein lies another of the keys to the crimes attributed to Zapatero: the role of Gertrudis Alcázar, known as "Gertru," who, according to the ruling, would play "an essential operational role within an organized network aimed at the illicit exercise of influence," also appearing as the main user of the account presidentezapatero@presidentezapatero.com and a key player in the coordination, preparation, and formal coverage of the documentation that would support the economic and financial activity of the network.
The analysis of the intercepted emails reveals that, in coordination with Cristóbal Cano and following direct instructions from José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, Gertrudis Alcázar would actively participate in the generation of fictitious invoicing, agreeing on concepts, amounts, and temporal periods of invoices with no real underlying service.
This is evident, among other elements, from exchanges dated 09.22.2021, 03.21.2022, and 03.29.2022, in which María Gertrudis Alcázar Jiménez expressly asks if she should issue one or several invoices, requests instructions on the concepts to be included, and even asks if certain amounts should be increased, later committing to send the invoices for signature once the corresponding instructions were received.
This pattern, according to the ruling, would evidence a stable and repeated modus operandi, aimed at providing documentary appearance to financial movements lacking real economic cause.
Zapatero's daughters
And from Gertrudis' alleged fictitious invoices—linked, according to the investigation, to financial movements lacking real economic support—we move to the instrumentalization of the company administered by Zapatero's daughters.
The economic analysis contained in the order reveals that Whathefav SL would allegedly act as a financial flow redistribution center. Thus, it appears as the main provider of Inteligencia Prospectiva, a company that would have paid it 561,440 euros, while Análisis Relevante would have received another 380,208 euros from Inteligencia Prospectiva.
In turn, Análisis Relevante —linked to Julio Martínez Martínez— would have sent 490,780 euros to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and 239,755 euros to Whathefav, which, according to the judicial reasoning, would evidence a circular flow of funds between clients, companies in the network, and final beneficiaries.
Whathefav would have also received payments from Pickashop, Agropecuaria Lucena, Danilo Alfonso Diazgranados Manglano —apparently declared by Agropecuaria—, as well as transfers from Gate Center (171,727 euros) and Thinking Heads Group (12,297 euros), entities also linked, according to the order, to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.
The circumstance that the former president appears as an authorized person on the bank accounts of his daughters —recipients of significant amounts transferred by Whathefav— would reinforce, according to the investigation, the indications that the company would act as a financial channel for the network.
All this set of indications would allow concluding, as the order states, that Whathefav SL would act as the "final element of the network," receiving funds from both clients of the network and the organized structure itself.
The company would operate, according to the investigators, as a redistribution center for economic flows, channeling payments to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and his circle. It would also have generated ad hoc invoicing intended to provide formal cover for financial movements lacking real economic activity.
Furthermore, the order maintains that Whathefav participated in the dissemination of reports prepared by Sergio Sánchez for Análisis Relevante, without contributing its own technical value, which would evidence its instrumental nature.
These circumstances, taken together, allow us to state —according to the judicial document— that the headquarters of Whathefav SL constitutes a physical space directly linked to the illicit activity under investigation, where accounting documentation, invoices, contracts, and drafts used to create the appearance of activity could reasonably be found; digital files, electronic devices, and internal communications that allow for the reconstruction of the chain of instructions; client lists, diaries, notes, and supporting documents that prove Whathefav's participation in the redistribution of funds; elements that allow for the determination of the traceability and authenticity of communications sent from accounts with the @whathefav.com domain; and information that allows for the comparison of declared activity with the company's actual activity.
“In light of the foregoing” —the order concludes— “the requirements for authorizing the requested search are met”: rational indications of criminality derived from the seized documentation, economic flows, and detected operations; direct relationship between the place to be searched and the investigated facts, as the headquarters of Whathefav SL constitutes “a crucial point of the documentary and financial activity of the network”; suitability and necessity of the diligence, as the search is “the only means to access documentation not sent by email, devices used for transmitting instructions, and files that are not in the possession of the judicial authority”; and, finally, proportionality, “as it is an indispensable measure for the clarification of serious facts linked to crimes of influence peddling, document forgery, and criminal organization”.