The migratory crisis in Ceuta has once again placed in the spotlight a question that transcends border control: the way in which the Alaouite kingdom understands its territorial limits. In this sense, Ceuta has occupied a central place for decades in the tensions between Spain and Morocco.
Moroccan foreign policy cannot be explained solely by the doctrine of Greater Morocco, but it remains an indispensable reference for understanding the dispute over Western Sahara, the claims over the Spanish territories in North Africa, Ceuta and Melilla, and the importance that Rabat grants to its so-called territorial integrity.
What happened in Ceuta will mark a before and after in Spanish-Moroccan relations. For now, Pedro Sánchez is already denouncing the violation of Spanish territorial integrity. It remains to be seen how the international dispute will be resolved.
The map that was supposed to correct colonization
The idea of Greater Morocco was developed during the decolonization process by Allal al-Fassi, founder of the Istiqlal Party and one of the main figures of Moroccan nationalism. His approach argued that the borders inherited from France and Spain had fragmented a political community that, historically, would have recognized the religious or political authority of the sultan.
The maximalist map disseminated by al-Fassi during the 1950s included, in addition to present-day Morocco, all of Western Sahara and Mauritania, areas of western Algeria, and territories in northern Mali. Some formulations extended that historical continuity even further south.
The doctrine mixed anti-colonial nationalism, references to the ancient Moroccan dynasties, and links of tribal or religious obedience. The legal problem is that the historical existence of relationships with a sultan does not necessarily equate to territorial sovereignty in the contemporary sense.
The International Court of Justice examined precisely that argument in 1975. It recognized that there had been certain legal and loyalty ties between the sultan and some Sahrawi tribes, but concluded that the documentation presented did not demonstrate Moroccan territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara nor annulled the right to self-determination of its population.
From nationalist doctrine to state policy
After the independence of Morocco in 1956, Greater Morocco ceased to be merely a proposal of the Istiqlal. The monarchy incorporated part of its logic into the construction of the new State: independence would not be complete until recovering the territories that Rabat considered artificially separated by colonialism.
However, the original map was reduced for diplomatic and strategic reasons. Morocco finally recognized the independence of Mauritania in 1969, after having questioned it for almost a decade. It also signed with Algeria a convention to delimit the common border, signed in 1972 and subsequently came into force.
What has survived is its fundamental principle: the borders established during colonization would not have yet completed Moroccan territorial unity.
Western Sahara, the central cause
The main territory on which this doctrine is projected today is Western Sahara. Morocco considers it an inseparable part of the kingdom, officially calls it its southern provinces, and offers a limited autonomy regime for the territory under Moroccan sovereignty.
The position of the United Nations is different. Western Sahara remains included in the list of non-self-governing territories and its final status is still pending resolution. The organization maintains the MINURSO mission, originally created to prepare a referendum that has not taken place.
Rabat has made the recognition of its sovereignty or support for the autonomy proposal a cross-cutting priority of its diplomacy. The monarchy, the parties, and Moroccan institutions present the issue as a matter of national unity, not as a border dispute susceptible to partition. In October 2025, Mohamed VI again placed autonomy within a unified Morocco as the framework for any solution.
The clash with Spain: Ceuta, Melilla, and the plazas of sovereignty
The Moroccan irredentist policy also conflicts with Spain. Rabat has historically claimed Ceuta, Melilla, the Chafarinas Islands, and the rocks of Vélez de la Gomera and Alhucemas, territories it considers remnants of European colonial presence in Africa. Spain, on the contrary, maintains that they are an integral part of its national territory.
The controversy is not legally identical to that of Western Sahara. Ceuta and Melilla are integrated into the Spanish constitutional system, have their own population and administrations, and do not appear on the list of territories pending decolonization by the United Nations. The Sahara, on the other hand, remains subject to an inconclusive international process.
The bilateral normalization initiated in 2022 introduced commitments to respect, stability, and permanent communication. Pedro Sánchez assured at that time that Spanish territorial integrity was guaranteed. However, the joint declaration did not include an express renunciation by Morocco of its claims over Ceuta and Melilla.
Is Morocco still an irredentist state?
The answer requires nuances. Morocco does not intend today to execute the entire map of Greater Morocco, as it has recognized Mauritania and legally accepted its border with Algeria. But it has not closed all the territorial controversies inherited from that doctrine.
Its actions regarding Western Sahara maintain an unequivocal objective: to achieve international recognition of Moroccan sovereignty. Regarding Ceuta and Melilla, Rabat alternates periods of diplomatic silence with statements or actions that remind that the dispute has not disappeared.
Greater Morocco no longer functions as a literal program of annexations. It survives as a historical narrative that allows presenting certain territorial expansions not as conquests, but as the recovery of a supposedly incomplete national unity. This difference explains why irredentism continues to influence Moroccan foreign policy even when the original map has ceased to be viable.