The communications prior to the Urda railway accident provide new details about the instructions the train drivers received before the collision. According to an exclusive published by EL PAÍS, the Atocha controller authorized the AVE to resume circulation with «normal running». The Iryo driver also received that instruction, but contacted again afterward to warn that she was still stopped and could not get the train moving again.
The sequence includes three conversations: one between the control center and the driver of the AVE that was traveling behind, and two others with the woman driver of the Iryo. The sequence described places a decisive warning five minutes before the tragedy: the train occupying the track was still stopped.
The published content matches the core of the explanation offered during the afternoon by Óscar Puente: the control center allowed the AVE to resume normal running when, according to the minister, the circumstances required keeping it stopped or applying the corresponding restrictions.
The order to the AVE: the driver asks for confirmation
The most relevant passage of the transcript published by EL PAÍS corresponds to the communication with Renfe train 2080. In it, the recipient is identified and the time of 08:36 is recorded.
The controller tells the driver to disconnect and reconnect the LZB system and to resume movement. He then specifies that he must do so under the BSL and with «normal running».
The driver expressly asks whether the instruction is to continue with normal running. The controller's answer is affirmative.
The importance of this exchange lies in the fact that the condition for circulation is expressly confirmed in the transcribed conversation. It is not merely a generic reference to putting the train back in motion: the driver asks for clarification on how he should do it and receives an answer.
According to EL PAÍS's reconstruction, the AVE was about 25 kilometers behind the Iryo. The Government's interpretation is that the authorization violated the procedure applicable to that situation, which required restricted circulation, with a limit of 40 kilometers per hour.
The Iryo receives an order, but cannot get moving
The other two communications provide information about what was happening on the train in front.
According to the exclusive report, the Iryo driver also received authorization to resume normal operation. However, that instruction did not translate into effective movement of the train: seven minutes later she called again because she could not restart the train and remained stopped.
This distinction is fundamental for reconstructing the accident. Authorizing a train to continue does not prove that it has started moving or that the section it occupied has been cleared.
The second call from the Iryo communicated precisely that difference between the order received and the actual situation of the train. According to the published timeline, five minutes remained before the impact.
The alert that places the focus on the final minutes
EL PAÍS maintains that, despite that warning, the AVE was not told to brake. That point concentrates one of the main questions raised by the report: what action followed the communication that the Iryo remained stopped.
The conversations described make it possible to know the instructions and warnings recorded in those exchanges. To fully reconstruct what happened, it will be necessary to compare them with the full set of communications, the traffic records, and the data from the control systems.
The absence of a warning in the published fragments should not be confused, by itself, with an independent verification of all the actions carried out during those minutes. The claim that there was no warning to the AVE is part of the reconstruction offered by the newspaper.
What the audio recordings support in Puente's version
The published communications provide support for a specific claim by the minister: there was an order to resume AVE traffic normally.
Puente had placed that instruction at 08:36 and had pointed out that it was not corrected in time. He also maintained that the Iryo was occupying the track and that traffic should not have been authorized under those conditions.
The exclusive adds detail to that explanation: it describes the confirmation requested by the AVE driver and the subsequent call from the Iryo driver reporting that she could not start moving.
In addition, the published account introduces a relevant element in relation to the previous information that attributed to sources of Iryo the absence of authorization to proceed. According to EL PAÍS’s reconstruction, there was indeed an instruction to resume, although the train was unable to carry it out. The discrepancy will have to be clarified with the complete recordings and the context of each order.
What they do not yet allow us to conclude
The audios described do not by themselves explain the cause of the initial failure of the LZB, all the working conditions of the control center, or the complete functioning of the safety barriers during the incident.
Nor do they automatically turn the minister’s explanation into a definitive conclusion on technical, organizational, or political responsibilities. Supporting the existence of a specific order is different from determining all the causes that made the collision possible.
The novelty of the exclusive lies in documenting two essential moments: the authorization for the AVE to continue at normal speed and the later warning that the Iryo was still stopped. The pending question is to reconstruct what happened between those communications and the impact, and why it was not possible to prevent it.