A reform of the Adif regulations approved in February 2025 established that, in the event of a failure of the LZB safety system such as the one recorded this Wednesday before the Urda (Toledo) rail accident, the control center can only allow a train to start moving again when the following section is completely clear of another train.
Specifically, Adif’s Instruction COI No. 01/25 establishes that, if circulation must ultimately be resumed after a failure of the BCA (such as the LZB system), this resumption must necessarily be carried out through the Side Signaling Block (BSL).
The text itself then adds that, in order to communicate the resumption of movement with BSL, it is essential that the BSL block canton to be traveled through be free of trains.
On the other hand, the Railway Traffic Regulations, approved by RD 664/2015 of July 17, provide that the person responsible for traffic will implement the BSL by sending the driver the telegram "I authorize the train driver [...] to continue the movement under the protection of the BSL with movement in sight until signal [next entry or exit signal]".
Thus, after the computer incident that caused the LZB system to fail on a 68-kilometer stretch of the Madrid-Andalusia line, the control center was not authorized to allow the AVE to continue moving and, in no case, to do so at a normal speed other than "in sight" travel.
However, according to the information conveyed by the Minister of Transport, Óscar Puente, the control center allowed the AVE to travel at a normal speed that made it reach around 200 kilometers per hour, despite the fact that farther ahead an Iryo train was stopped, to which no order to resume movement had yet been communicated.