My capacity for surprise, bewilderment, and resignation has no limits in the face of the debate within the EU about its participation in the peace negotiations in Ukraine and, more importantly, the search for a compromise to achieve a security architecture in Europe.
Up to now the EU has behaved as in the master script of the film "Bienvenido Mr. Marshall": the mayor of Villar del Río, at the coming of the Americans, disguises the entire town as what it was not, decorates the streets, squares, and houses, rehearses a laudatory—when not submissive—speech from the balcony of the Town Hall, and stands there to wait with the town assembled in the square, prepared for the arrival of the happy ending of the comedy. But the cars pass without stopping; they do not even slow down or turn their heads. Berlanga recreates in a few frames the great comedy of dependence: that of someone who devotes more energy to seeming like what someone else wants than to knowing what they need.
The same thing happens seventy years later in Abu Dhabi: others negotiate while Europe rehearses the sevillana while it continues to decide who will be the mayor. The EU has attended as a stone guest, sending a team "alongside its partners"—what sarcasm!—to negotiations where it has no seat of its own, where it is sidelined and, quite a number of times, disregarded. And when a window of opportunity opens to be an active subject, under pressure from Zelensky and Trump’s geopolitical interest, the leaders in Ireland debate whether it should be represented by Kallas, an envoy of the European Council, or by one, or several, heads of government. Come on, a fight over competencies, egos, and photos, in which every capital wants to appear in the image and none wants to be stuck with the outcome.
To agree on what has already been agreed
The Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, has put on the table in a letter sent to the president of the European Council, António Costa, the urgent need to reach a consensus on who should represent the European Union in the conversations that are starting to follow one another. A proposal that has practically hovered over every summit since Donald Trump returned to the White House and that, in a certain way, seeks to avoid the embarrassment produced by the kindergarten-like photograph of European leaders in the Oval Office.
In fact, the leaders have already agreed that the Union’s external representation should rest with the community institutions themselves. The allocation of institutional responsibilities was established in 2024 and both Kallas and the president of the European Council, Costa, have responsibilities in the Union’s external representation. But agreements within the Union bear the mark of the lowest common denominator: so broad that everyone signs them and so vague that they allow each person to interpret them their own way.
Three alternatives were put forward. The first is represented by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. As could not be otherwise, she asserts her institutional role, relying on the competences attributed to her by the Treaty on the Union. There are two reservations to assuming this representation: the first, of an institutional nature, is that these negotiations do not affect only the Union’s foreign policy but, and this is most important, defense and more specifically the design of a lasting architecture of European security.
The second, of a political nature, and for me the most important, is due to her belligerent stance toward Russia and her lack of commitment to seeking a permanent agreement on security by affirming that Europe already has a security architecture and the problem is that Russia violates it without recognizing that, perhaps, we, to a greater or lesser extent, also.
The second, António Costa, presents himself as the most reasonable and convenient interlocutor when representing politically the heads of State and Government of the Twenty-Seven. In addition, his track record, temperament, and steps in favor of negotiation and of opening communication channels with Russian authorities make him a perfect representative of the Union’s interests.
The Europe of the acronyms and of the "I’ll go myself"
On the one hand, Berlin and Paris defend the formula of the so-called E3 (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) based on the fact that the three countries assume the leadership role in the negotiations by taking advantage of their diplomatic and military weight. Such a proposal raises the typical question when one is faced with an obvious political problem: how to ensure that the interests of the Twenty-Seven are represented if the negotiating leadership is left in the hands of three countries?
And, on the other hand, we move to the second of the typically European possibilities, agreeing on one thing and, a few months later, on another: if it’s a matter of photos, let’s put more actors on the stage. Thus, the European leaders in Dublin have decided to appoint a team of ¡seven members!, the E7: France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Commission and Council and, so that no one is left out and as a cherry on top, the United Kingdom, which precisely ceased to be a partner. Will it represent Norway, Switzerland, Serbia, Montenegro, Moldova, Turkey or Albania?
It is true that, on the one hand, European security is not an exclusive matter for the Twenty-Seven and also affects countries that are not part of the European Union and that the United Kingdom, the second-largest European nuclear power, constitutes the most obvious example. On the other hand, it is also true that pretending that the European Union can take it upon itself, by itself, to represent Europe in a negotiation about the future architecture of continental security poses a problem of legitimacy and political scope. But does the United Kingdom represent the countries that are not within the Union? With what mandate? Do they have совпiding interests? I have a hunch that they don’t. In short, a ship’s cabin of the brothers Marx that, at this rate, will end up needing a conference room in order to agree on who gets to speak.
As expected, in this photo Spain neither is nor is expected to be. Could it be that, apparently, for our foreign policy, according to the famous Albares doctrine, what is important for the future of Europe is not so much its security as its languages? A matter of priorities.
The struggle between the combative Kaja Kallas, the measured António Costa and the various formulas for collective representation is, in reality, a reflection of a much deeper difficulty: Europe has not yet managed to agree on its own identity as a geopolitical actor. As I have stated in other articles published in this newspaper, the real problem is not so much who should represent Europe in negotiations about Ukraine, but the repeated absence of a common political position on what it wants to achieve and what role it intends to play in the future architecture of European security.
A security architecture without consensus
To this institutional division another is added, of a strategic nature. While the central, Nordic and Baltic countries bordering Russia consider it a priority to maintain a position of firmness vis-à-vis Moscow, others bet on restoring channels of dialogue and the search for agreements that would allow a return to a future of peace and security like those reached after Helsinki, Paris, the NATO-Russia Founding Act or the Istanbul Charter for European Security at the end of the last century. An architecture that was built on principles of cooperation, indivisible security, respect for the borders and for the sovereignty of the signatories. Commitments that, for different reasons, probably shared blame and dependence on interests foreign to them, have been allowed to deteriorate without there having been an autonomous European debate on how to recover them within an updated framework suited to the new demands of a changing world.
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Nor is there a shared vision on how to reconcile Ukraine’s right to decide its future with the need to build a continental security framework that does not exclude Russia in advance and that takes into account strategic, geographic, political and cultural balances that will avoid, in the long term, new confrontations. A Russia that has historically been part of Europe’s political and cultural history within a European security framework, even though today its leaders seem determined to keep it away from that space. None of this justifies the invasion, but it explains why peace will not be possible without discussing it.
A seat at the table does not guarantee influence
In short, Europe—and within it the European Union—demands a central seat at the negotiation table, without intermediaries or errand-runners, that guarantees on the one hand its security and on the other its compliance. The big problem is that, out of sloth, complacency, or internal rivalries, it is not clear who represents it and what proposal it wants to put on top of it. That is perhaps its greatest weakness: confusing presence at the negotiations with the ability to influence their outcome.
A lasting peace will not depend on who feels like being at the table, but on whether Europe is capable of formulating its own security proposal for the continent. In the end, Europe runs the risk of achieving something truly extraordinary: that everyone is represented, that no one feels excluded and that, when the time comes to decide, there is no one who can do it.
And meanwhile, Europe continues in Villar del Río: adorning the streets, rehearsing the speech, and waiting for this time the cars to stop. The bad thing is that, as in Berlanga’s film, when the Americans pass by there may no longer be anyone who knows what to ask them for.