As of November 1, 2026, the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has become part of the past. With its dissolution, 35 years after it was created to try to steer a conflict that originated following Spain’s withdrawal from its former colony along a democratic path, an unprecedented scenario is opened that, according to experts, could lead to an escalation between Morocco and the Polisario Front.
The essential objective of the mission, as its very name made clear, was to draw up a census and organize a referendum that would allow the Sahrawi population to exercise its right to self-determination, after Morocco gained control of most of Western Sahara following the Spanish departure in 1976. However, this consultation was never held, and it has precisely been the letter 'R' of its acronym that, in the end, has precipitated its disappearance.
On October 30, the United States submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council in which it described Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara as "the only basis" for negotiating a way out of the dispute and proposed renewing MINURSO, but by removing the word 'referendum' from its name—an initiative that Russia vetoed. In turn, Moscow pushed another text to extend the mission’s mandate for one more year, which was blocked by Washington.
In light of this blockage, the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, stated that on November 1 the mission’s "winding-up period" would begin, while at the same time emphasizing that its end does not imply the disappearance of the Sahrawis’ right to self-determination and calling on the parties to show "maximum restraint" out of fear of a "escalation of hostilities".
General surprise and lost containment role
"It has meant an unexpected change of script that has surprised everyone," says in statements to Europa Press Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, a professor of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Castilla La Mancha (UCLM). Along the same lines, Irene Fernández-Molina, a professor of International Relations at the University of Exeter, agrees that the outcome has been unexpected and that now they are entering "uncharted territory".
Both specialists admit that, in recent years, MINURSO activity had been reduced to a minimum. "It wasn't that it did much, but it was there and served as a containment and moderating effect" especially since the Polisario declared the ceasefire broken in November 2021, Fernández-Molina points out.
"MINURSO has long had no sense," Juan Soroeta likewise argues, a professor of Public International Law and International Relations at the University of the Basque Country (UPV), emphasizing that it had become a "symbolic element," given that it already drew up a census that Morocco never came to accept.
Despite the fact that the nearly 200 personnel it had could barely go beyond mere observation, the concern now is that the absence of the mission offers the parties room to intensify a conflict which, although of low intensity, was resumed six years ago.
The main concern is that Morocco, with clear military superiority, tries to move forward on the territory that remains on the other side of the wall under the control of the Polisario Front (around 20% of what was Spanish Sahara). If this were to happen, "the risk of escalation is enormous," Fernández-Molina warns, who also considers that the Polisario could find "incentives to increase the intensity of its attacks."
For the moment, Morocco, following the instructions of Mohamed VI, has rushed to reiterate its commitment to the ceasefire, assuring that this "will not change with the end of the mandate of the UN mission," whose original task the alauite kingdom considers long surpassed, now focused on strengthening internationally its proposal for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.
The Moroccan strategy and Russia’s role
The three analysts agree that the disappearance of MINURSO was not the outcome Rabat was seeking, as highlighted by the efforts of the new prime minister, Fatima Ezzahra El Mansuri, and of the foreign minister, Naser Burita, who traveled to Moscow days beforehand. Perhaps for this reason, Russia would have had the gesture of warning Morocco in advance of its veto, which allowed the kingdom to prepare "a plan B" and "make a virtue out of necessity," according to Hernando de Larramendi’s interpretation.
This would explain that Rabat disseminated almost immediately, after the Russian veto, a communiqué in which the royal cabinet affirms that “this is an important development and a significant step toward the definitive closure of the file on Western Sahara in the United Nations”.
Although the issue of Western Sahara will no longer be addressed periodically in the Security Council, it will continue to appear on the agenda of the UN General Assembly and of the so-called Fourth Committee, responsible for the territories pending decolonization, among which the United Nations continues to include the former Spanish colony.
Attention now focuses on the debate of November 10 in the General Assembly, where Russia will have to justify its veto and where any Member State may take the floor. “It is possible that Morocco will try to approve a resolution that favors its positions, downplaying the role of the Polisario and speaking of other actors,” says Fernández-Molina.
For the UCLM professor, Rabat’s priority will be to strengthen the play of majorities, seeking to show that the majority of countries supports its autonomy plan, as highlighted this same week by a Moroccan outlet, which raised to 130 the states that would support Rabat’s position. However, Hernando de Larramendi points out that this support presents numerous nuances and that not all of them are at the level of the United States or France, which consider the autonomy plan as the only viable basis for a solution.
Reaction from the Polisario and regional balance
In the field of the Polisario, the movement has celebrated the Russian veto, insisting on the inalienable character of the right of the Sahrawis to self-determination. The alternative, remarks Soroeta, “would have meant losing the ‘R’ of MINURSO and the disappearance of the right to self-determination”, which in practice would be equivalent to the integration of the territory into Morocco.
The UPV professor, like Hernando de Larramendi, argues that Russia has acted driven by its own interests—since it is a traditional ally of Algeria, the main backer of the Polisario—and with an eye on the neighboring Sahel, where it plays a key role in the complex board of jihadism and instability that affects the region.
Both also underline that, if the case arises and if he should consider it necessary, Algeria could intervene to back the Polisario. “The only reason why Morocco no longer controls all of Western Sahara is because there are Algeria and Russia,” says Soroeta, while his UCLM colleague recalls that the Maghreb country has recently reformed its Constitution to be able to deploy troops abroad and has plans to send them to Niger.
In this context, the three experts draw attention to Spain’s silence in the face of the latest developments, especially considering that it continues to be “de iure” the administering power of Western Sahara and the possible consequences of an escalation that could lead to a direct confrontation between Morocco and Algeria, two neighboring countries with a long history of tensions.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not answered the questions raised by Europa Press in this regard. From the department headed by José Manuel Albares, it is not specified whether an escalation is feared, whether it is still believed that the diplomatic path can succeed, or whether the Government would be willing to carry out démarches to bring the positions of the parties closer together.