Economy

Sumar's doubts about the Bank of Spain's accounts

The Plurinational Group calls on Escrivá to reformulate the institution's accounts and to detail the solvency risks they detect in the institution, in a letter to which DEMÓCRATA has had access.

4 minutes

By Álex Moreno

Published

23 JUN, 2026 - 05:00

4 minutes

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In fact, it filed objections to them from the Government's Delegate Commission for Economic Affairs (CDGAE) and from Congress itself. The Group sent the governor a letter, to which DEMÓCRATA had exclusive access, in which it outlines these doubts. And in which, in fact, it calls on the supervisor to reformulate them.

The friction, in any case, dates back to before Escrivá's arrival. They have repeatedly criticized the institution's management during the financial crisis, the lack of assumption of responsibility since then, and the proposed remedies. Also the lack of transparency, even denouncing the Bank's resistance to providing information in court, with the consequent condemnation of the supervisor by the Supreme Court.

Is there a risk of a bailout?

The institution, Sumar assures, faces a clear solvency problem. It presents a ratio of net equity to assets of 6.5% while the Eurosystem as a whole exceeds 20%. The Bank of Italy reaches 30.1% and the Bundesbank 15.6%. Counting unrealized losses, the ratio would stand at 0.75%. This is explained by "having such a comparatively small equity" and by the effects of monetary policy.

The cost of deposits paid to banks has involved interest payments to entities of 7,806 million in 2023, 8,036 million in 2024, and 4,448 million in 2025. The breakdown, bank by bank, of these returns, is the information that Sumar is demanding and that the supervisor still resists providing despite the Supreme Court's ruling.

For Sumar, this very low ratio "makes the Bank of Spain a risk to the State" given the situation of having to capitalize it, since the institution lost the possibility of operating with negative capital. For this reason, it demands that the institution carry out projections for possible crises and define strategies for a relevant eventual deterioration of its assets, as dictated by the experts convened by the institution at the time to improve accountability at the Bank.

The accounting technique

Sumar is not convinced by the way the supervisor presents its accounts. In fact, it points out that any other company would be committing an illegality, as it accuses the Bank of using provisions accumulated in previous years to offset losses in one year and, in more prosperous years, accumulating provisions to modulate annual profit.

"In the capital markets, this type of practice is associated with so-called 'earnings smoothing'," explains this political party, which has doubts about this practice, considering that any type of risk is not covered by accounting provisions, but by hedging instruments or adjustments to the balance sheet structure.

In total, it estimates that since the financial crisis, almost 33,000 million euros have been withdrawn, with 19,000 million currently accumulated in provisions.

The income statement, Sumar argues, does not faithfully reflect the result of the financial year, which is why it calls on the Bank to reformulate the accounts and include a detailed breakdown of the provisions in order to verify what justifies them and what use they have had.

Why are so many banknotes returned?

The Bank of Spain is the only central bank in the Eurozone that withdraws more banknotes than it issues, with the exception of Greece in the last year. But while in that country it reaches 6% of the total assigned, in Spain the return of banknotes exceeds 20%. An anomaly attributed to tourism but which, Sumar laments, is not supported by any analysis or evidence.

While acknowledging that it may be a cause, Sumar points out that other tourist countries such as France or Italy do not suffer from this phenomenon, and demands "a more convincing explanation" for this situation, which it links to the possible involvement of organized crime and money laundering in our country.

In fact, sources from the group assure DEMÓCRATA that this situation would be relatively easy to pursue by tracing the origin of the refunds on the map of bank branches which, they argue, potentially points to Madrid, and not to the locations on the coast, which are more intensive in terms of tourism.

What surveillance is there of 'shadow banking'?

This criticism is not massive but is one of the group's major concerns. They warn that entities, in order to release capital buffers without having to lose asset volume, are transferring risk to other funds, the so-called 'shadow banking'.

Entities could securitize mortgages to remove these risks from the bank, but this would reduce their assets. In order to release part of the capital that European regulations require, they transfer part of the risk to a fund, which undertakes to assume the first losses in the event of default on a loan.

What is the problem? That these funds are not under the radar of the Bank of Spain, which cannot detect if there is a solvency problem. And if a crisis comes and there are defaults, the bank faces these difficulties with less capital.

The risk can become even greater if, in the face of possible difficulties for the funds, they seek financing from other credit institutions, if not with the same ones that have transferred risk to them.

Sumar's concern is that the Bank is not looking at the solvency of these entities and subjecting them to some kind of surveillance, in addition to adopting precautions, such as prohibiting these types of transfers or the refinancing of funds.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the current status of the parliamentary processing of possible reforms regarding the accountability of the Bank of Spain?

In the available information, there is no specific and monographic reform of the law regulating the accountability and parliamentary control of the Bank of Spain in the XV Legislature. However, there are several initiatives already approved or underway that expand its supervisory and user protection functions, which de facto increase the areas on which it must provide explanations to Parliament. Additionally, there is at least one non-legislative motion that directly questions the role of the Bank of Spain in macroprudential policy and the management of bank deposits. The current status is, therefore, of "indirect" reforms already enacted into law and growing political debate, but without a structural reform of the appearance and accountability regime of the Bank of Spain.

1. Absence of a specific reform of the parliamentary control regime

Among the initiatives located, there is no bill or legislative proposal whose central and explicit object is to modify the accountability statute of the Bank of Spain before the Cortes (for example, its frequency of appearances, the content of the reports it must submit to Parliament, or the publicity regime of its decisions). This means that, as of today, there is no open processing exclusively aimed at redesigning its parliamentary control.

No further information is available in the consulted sources pointing to a specific file for a global reform of the Bank of Spain's accountability framework. The debate is taking place, rather, through sectoral regulations that expand its functions and strengthen its exposure to political and social scrutiny.

2. Already approved regulatory initiatives affecting its accountability

2.1. Organic Law on the efficiency of the Public Justice Service

The Organic Bill on measures regarding the efficiency of the Public Justice Service (121/000016 in Congress; (15)621/000009 in Senate) has been definitively approved. On 12/19/2024, Congress voted to lift the Senate veto with a very close result of 177 votes in favor and 170 against, and on 01/16/2025 a correction of errors was published, so the text has already become an organic law.

This regulation introduces a key mention: it considers the procedural requirement fulfilled to go to court when the user of financial services has filed complaints with the Bank of Spain, the CNMV, or the DGSFP, or has used alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. This consolidates the role of the Bank of Spain as a quasi-para-judicial channel to resolve financial conflicts and, consequently:

• They increase the real impact of its complaint resolutions.
• They reinforce the demand for transparency and public explanation on how these files are managed, as they condition access to justice.

The processing can be followed, among others, in the official bulletins of Congress and Senate: BOCG Senate – Justice efficiency and BOCG Congress – Justice efficiency.

2.2. Organic Law on equal representation

The Organic Bill on equal representation and balanced presence of women and men (121/000001, XV Legislature) was definitively approved on 07/23/2024, and its official approval was published on 07/31/2024, so it is an organic law already in force. The full file of the initiative is available in Congress: File 121/000001 – Equal representation law.

Although its central axis is gender equality, it has direct consequences on financial supervisors:

• It assigns to the Bank of Spain, the CNMV, and the DGSFP the responsibility of “promotion, analysis, monitoring, and support for compliance” with balanced representation obligations on the boards of directors of public interest entities under their supervision.
• The regulation itself states that it “makes sense” for the Bank of Spain to verify these obligations, as it is already the supervisor of financial entities.

This expands the material scope on which the Bank of Spain can be called to account (not only solvency or financial stability, but also equality in governing bodies), and does so with organic rank, which legitimizes more intense monitoring by Congress and Senate.

2.3. Law of the Accident Investigation Authority (model reference)

The Bill for the creation of the Independent Administrative Authority for the Technical Investigation of Railway, Maritime, and Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents (121/000010; (15)621/000003) was also definitively approved on 07/23/2024. Its most recent publication is in the Senate: BOCG – Accident Investigation Authority.

Although it does not affect the Bank of Spain, its relevance lies in the model of an independent authority highly subject to transparency obligations: article 16 links its information access regime to the Law 19/2013 on transparency, and the objective of “improving transparency and access to information” is expressly emphasized. This standard serves as a political reference for the demands posed to other independent authorities, such as the Bank of Spain itself.

3. Political orientation initiatives regarding the Bank of Spain

There is a Non-Legislative Motion in Congress with a more direct focus on the Bank of Spain, although without immediate normative effects:

• NL Motion on the need for Spanish banks to allocate funds obtained from the remuneration of Bank of Spain deposits to reduce their undercapitalization (161/000640), from the Plurinational SUMAR Group.
• Status: listed as pending after its publication on 04/23/2024; no debate or voting data appear in the consulted information, so it is not possible to assess its real support.
• It proposes greater use of macroprudential tools (AMCESFI) in which the Bank of Spain participates and questions the impact of deposit remuneration on the accounts of the monetary authority and the Treasury.

Although it does not reform the Bank of Spain's appearance regime, it increases political pressure for it to explain its decisions and coordination with other supervisors.

The text can be consulted at: BOCG – SUMAR NL Motion on bank funds and Bank of Spain.

4. General assessment of the state of the matter

Overall, the current landscape can be summarized as follows:

• There is no reform in processing specifically aimed at reorganizing the accountability of the Bank of Spain before the Cortes Generales.
• There are already approved laws (justice efficiency; equal representation) that expand the weight of its decisions on citizens and on the governance of financial entities, which de facto increases the matters on which it must inform and be accountable before Parliament.
• The votes show a polarized climate in part of these reforms (177–170 in the justice efficiency law), compared to a greater capacity for transaction in the parity law, where amendments from the Popular Group were incorporated, although without complete data on the final vote.
• The political debate on the role of the Bank of Spain in the distribution of banking profits and financial stability is articulated, for now, through non-legislative motions and ordinary control (appearances, questions, interpellations), rather than through a structural reform of its accountability regime.

What specific information obligations to Parliament does the Bank of Spain currently have and in which regulations are they established? Which parliamentary groups have demanded deeper changes in the control of the Bank of Spain and what political proposals have they put forward? How has the frequency and content of the Governor of the Bank of Spain's appearances in Congress and Senate changed in recent years?

What are the powers and attributions of the Governor of the Bank of Spain according to Spanish legislation?

The Governor of the Bank of Spain is, according to current legislation, the highest single-person body of direction and representation of the institution, the Spanish representative in the bodies of the European Central Bank (ECB), and the central piece in the articulation between the Bank, the Cortes, and the Government. His powers are structured around internal management (presidency of governing bodies and organization), legal and international representation, participation in the Eurosystem, oversight of supervisory and sanctioning functions, and a reinforced personal independence statute. All this is mainly set out in Law 13/1994, on the Autonomy of the Bank of Spain (BOE-A-1994-12553), amended, among others, by Law 66/1997 (BOE-A-1997-28053) and Law 12/1998 (BOE-A-1998-10047). Below, his attributions are systematized by major blocks.

Institutional direction and representation

Law 13/1994 establishes the Governor, the Deputy Governor, the Governing Council, and the Executive Commission as the governing bodies of the Bank of Spain (BOE-A-1994-12553). Among them, the Governor occupies the central position: he is responsible for “directing the Bank and presiding over the Governing Council and the Executive Commission,” according to the wording given by Law 12/1998 (BOE-A-1998-10047). This presidency places him at the head of strategic decisions: the Governing Council approves the general guidelines of the Bank's actions, the internal regulations, budgets, annual accounts, profit distribution, personnel policy, and sanctions within the Bank's competence (BOE-A-1994-12553).

In the representative sphere, “it corresponds to the Governor to hold the legal representation of the Bank for all purposes,” especially before courts, as well as “authorize contracts and documents and carry out other activities necessary for the performance of the functions entrusted to the Bank of Spain” and “represent the Bank of Spain in institutions and international organizations in which its participation is foreseen” (BOE-A-1994-12553). The Deputy Governor substitutes him in case of vacancy, absence, or illness in his senior management and representation functions, and also assumes delegated powers.

Relationship with the Cortes, Government, and Fiscal Policy Council

The Law channels the institutional relationship of the Bank with the Cortes Generales through the Governor. Parliamentary access to information subject to secrecy duty is articulated “through the Governor of the Bank of Spain, in accordance with the provisions of parliamentary regulations,” who may request secret sessions or the application of classified matter regimes (BOE-A-1994-12553). Likewise, he may be summoned by the Chambers to report on monetary policy and matters within the Bank's competence, respecting ECB secrecy, under the terms introduced by Law 12/1998 (BOE-A-1998-10047).

Within the Executive branch, the Governor may be summoned to meetings of the Council of Ministers or its Delegated Commission for Economic Affairs when it concerns information on monetary policy, and also to the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council of the Autonomous Communities to report on matters within the Bank's competence, to facilitate territorial financial coordination (BOE-A-1998-10047).

Participation in the ECB and the Eurosystem

Following integration into the Eurosystem, Law 13/1994, amended by Law 12/1998, expressly attributes to the Governor the status of member of the Governing Council and the General Council of the European Central Bank (BOE-A-1998-10047). His actions in these bodies are governed by the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB and are marked by two notes: independence and professional secrecy. This is reflected when the Law states that the Governing Council of the Bank of Spain, when debating monetary policy and supervising the Bank's contribution to the implementation of the ESCB policy, must respect “the guidelines and instructions of the ECB and the independence and secrecy obligation of the Governor as a member of the ECB governing bodies” (BOE-A-1994-12553).

Internal organization and personnel

Although many organizational decisions formally correspond to the Governing Council or the Executive Commission, the Governor's presidency grants him decisive influence. The Council, which meets at least ten times a year and whenever convened by the Governor, may delegate to him, the Deputy Governor, or the Executive Commission the powers it deems appropriate (BOE-A-1994-12553); in case of a tie in votes, the president's vote decides, reinforcing his leadership (BOE-A-1998-10047).

The Bank of Spain's personnel are selected under the principles of equality, merit, capacity, and publicity, and are bound by an employment relationship (BOE-A-1994-12553). The Governing Council, under the Governor's direction, approves personnel policy guidelines and ratifies appointments of general directors, so the Governor is the highest political and institutional responsible for the Bank's organization and human resources.

Supervision and sanctions

Supervisory and sanctioning powers are attributed to the Bank of Spain as an institution and, organizationally, to the Governing Council. This body is responsible for “imposing sanctions whose adoption is within the Bank of Spain's competence,” “approving sanction proposals that the Bank must submit to the Minister of Economy and Finance,” and “resolving appeals or claims” against Bank resolutions, with the possibility of delegating these functions to the Governor, the Deputy Governor, or the Executive Commission (BOE-A-1994-12553). The Governor is not, therefore, a single sanctioning body by definition, but presides over the body that decides sanctions and may assume delegated powers, in addition to directing all supervisory policy (including payment systems and compliance with financial discipline regulations).

Appointment, term, dismissal, and incompatibilities

The Governor is appointed by the King, at the proposal of the President of the Government, among Spaniards with “recognized competence in monetary or banking matters.” Before the appointment, the Minister of Economy and Finance must appear before the competent Commission of Congress to inform about the candidate (BOE-A-1994-12553). The term is six years non-renewable, and the preamble emphasizes that the causes for dismissal are “strictly limited,” reinforcing his independence (BOE-A-1994-12553). The consulted excerpts do not literally detail the incompatibility regime nor a special responsibility statute, beyond that guarantee of stability and subjection to legality and controls by the Cortes, Government, and ECB, in line with the requirements of the Treaty on the European Union and the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB (BOE-A-1997-28053).

In which specific articles of Law 13/1994 are the appointment, term duration, and causes for dismissal of the Governor of the Bank of Spain regulated? What real margin does the Governor of the Bank of Spain have in monetary policy decisions vis-à-vis the Governing Council of the ECB? What parliamentary control mechanisms exist in practice over the actions of the Governor of the Bank of Spain?

Which laws regulate the supervision and control of 'shadow banking' in Spain?

In Spain, there is no "shadow banking law" as such, but rather a framework of sectoral and macroprudential regulations that subject the different components of the shadow banking system to supervision: investment funds and alternative vehicles, financial credit establishments, securitizations, crowdfunding platforms, and other non-bank intermediaries. The regulatory core relies on Law 22/2014 (venture capital and alternative funds), Law 35/2003 and its regulation (IIC), Law 5/2015 (business financing, EFC and PFP), and Law 6/2023 (new Securities Markets Law). Added to this is the macroprudential pillar (Royal Decree-Law 22/2018 and Royal Decree 102/2019, which creates AMCESFI) and the stability and resolution framework (Law 11/2015), all strongly anchored in EU regulations such as AIFMD, UCITS, CRR/CRD, the Securitization Regulation, and the Crowdfunding Regulation. Together, these rules seek to prevent credit intermediation outside the banking perimeter from being without regulatory control or systemic risk management.

1. Non-bank financial entities and non-bank financing

The first pillar of the regulation of "shadow banking" is the rules that govern non-bank financial entities and alternative financing channels:

Investment funds and alternative funds. Law 22/2014 regulates venture capital entities and other closed-end collective investment entities and their managers, under CNMV supervision. Its Preamble explains that it transposes Directive 2011/61/EU, the AIFMD, "relating to alternative investment fund managers," which includes free investment IICs, real estate funds, and venture capital. Thus, a regime of authorization, prudential requirements, risk management, leverage limits, and transparency is articulated for vehicles typically associated with shadow banking. This law coordinates with Law 35/2003 on IIC and its implementing regulation, Royal Decree 1082/2012, which fit harmonized UCITS funds and free investment IICs into a CNMV supervision framework.

Financial credit establishments (EFC) and other non-bank lenders. Law 5/2015, on the promotion of business financing, aims to "strengthen sources of direct corporate financing or non-bank financing in Spain." Its Title II redefines the regime of EFCs: after Law 10/2014, they lose the status of credit institutions but "maintain intact their inclusion within the financial supervision and strict regulation perimeter." This avoids a significant channel of consumer and SME credit operating completely outside the prudential framework. This law relies on technical regulations from the Bank of Spain, such as Circular 6/2016 (Financial Information-SME, BOE-A-2016-6606), which standardizes information to facilitate access to alternative financiers.

Crowdfunding platforms. Law 5/2015 itself was the first to create a specific regime for crowdfunding platforms. Subsequently, the framework has been Europeanized through Regulation (EU) 2020/1503, on European crowdfunding service providers, and Directive (EU) 2020/1504, which excludes these providers from MiFID II scope. This directive is transposed in Law 6/2023, on Securities Markets and Investment Services, whose Preamble states that it adapts Spanish law to this European reform, setting the boundary between investment services companies and regulated crowdfunding platforms, which thus are not outside the supervisory perimeter.

Other intermediaries and markets. Law 6/2023 replaces the former consolidated text of the Securities Market Law and establishes the general framework of markets, infrastructures, and investment services companies, assigning the CNMV supervision "for the benefit of transparency, proper price formation, and investor protection." It integrates, among others, Directive 2019/2177, 2019/2034 (prudential for ESIs, which in turn modifies AIFMD), and the aforementioned 2020/1504, consolidating the regulated perimeter of non-bank intermediation.

2. Macroprudential supervision and financial stability

The second block is the rules that create tools and architecture for macroprudential supervision, key to monitoring systemic risks of shadow banking:

Macroprudential tools. Royal Decree-Law 22/2018 establishes the catalog of macroprudential tools and modifies Law 10/2014 on the organization, supervision, and solvency of credit institutions, as well as Law 22/2014. This enables the application of capital buffers, sectoral limits, or other measures on banks, investment services companies, and certain closed-end collective investment entities when their growth may represent a systemic risk.

AMCESFI. Royal Decree 102/2019 creates the Macroprudential Authority Financial Stability Council (AMCESFI) and develops its organization and functioning. The Preamble connects this authority with the European Systemic Risk Board, created by Regulation (EU) 1092/2010, and with art. 458 of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR), which provides for macroprudential measures by the designated national authority. AMCESFI coordinates the Bank of Spain, CNMV, and Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds, issues alerts and recommendations, and supervises the use of macroprudential tools, potentially including measures against relevant segments of shadow banking.

Bank prudential regulation based on CRR/CRD. Royal Decree 84/2015 develops Law 10/2014, which adapts Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) and Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR) into Spanish law. Bank of Spain Circular 2/2016 and its subsequent amendments, Circular 5/2021 and Circular 3/2022, complete the adaptation and introduce macroprudential instruments (systemic buffers, etc.). Although focused on banks and ESIs, they are key to preventing arbitrage towards shadow banking through exposures to securitizations or highly leveraged funds.

3. Prevention of systemic risks outside the banking perimeter

Beyond mere sectoral supervision, several rules explicitly seek to contain systemic risks linked to non-bank credit intermediation:

Alternative funds and securitization. Law 22/2014, by incorporating AIFMD, introduces leverage control, liquidity management, and enhanced reporting obligations for alternative investment fund managers. Regarding securitization, although not detailed in the consulted excerpts, the Spanish regime aligns with Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 on securitizations, which requires risk retention, transparency, and STS criteria, mitigating the risk of opaque structures like those that fueled the 2008 crisis.

Crowdfunding platforms. Regulation (EU) 2020/1503, complemented in Spain by adjustments in Law 6/2023 following Directive 2020/1504, imposes organizational, governance, and investor information requirements on platforms. This limits the massive channeling of credit through these platforms from becoming a source of systemic risk without control.

Recovery and resolution. Law 11/2015, on recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment services companies, and its development through Royal Decree 1012/2015, establish the early intervention and resolution framework, aligned with Directive 2014/59/EU (BRRD). Both regulations amend Law 22/2014 and Law 10/2014, reflecting the interconnection between banks, ESIs, and investment and securitization vehicles. This limits contagion to or from shadow banking in crisis situations.

In summary, shadow banking control in Spain is articulated in a "distributed" manner: each piece (alternative funds, EFC, securitizations, crowdfunding, ESIs) has its sectoral law and, above, act a prudential framework (CRR/CRD), a macroprudential authority (AMCESFI), and a resolution regime (Law 11/2015), all deeply integrated with European Union financial regulation.

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How much do you know about this topic? Answer the following 3 questions.

Which parliamentary group has expressed doubts about the management and accounts of the Bank of Spain?

Question 1 of 3

What is Sumar's main criticism regarding the presentation of the Bank of Spain's accounts?

Question 2 of 3

What percentage of banknote returns, relative to the total assigned, does the Bank of Spain exceed according to Sumar?

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