A stablecoin linked to the ruble has become one of the tools with which Russia is trying to reduce its dependence on Western financial circuits. A7A5 has accumulated nearly 140 billion dollars in operations since its creation in February 2025, according to figures provided this August by Pyotr Fradkov, president of PSB, the Russian bank that participates in the infrastructure supporting the project.
The data comes from the A7A5 ecosystem itself and reveals the accumulated volume of operations, not the money currently deposited in the currency. Its dimension, however, shows the speed with which Russia is developing alternative systems for making international payments after Western sanctions restricted part of its financial system's access to traditional channels.
A7A5 is part of the A7 payment infrastructure, a cross-border payment platform developed by PSB, a Russian entity sanctioned by the West and closely linked to the defense sector. According to Fradkov, A7 has about 15,000 regular business clients and processes up to 2,000 payments daily.
The platform itself claims that around 90% of its international operations are conducted with Asian countries, with China as the main market.
What is A7A5 and why is it different
A7A5 is a stablecoin, that is, a digital asset designed to maintain its value linked to another asset. Unlike USDT or USDC, referenced to the US dollar, A7A5 is linked to the Russian ruble.
The currency is issued by Old Vector, a company registered in Kyrgyzstan, and its backing comes from ruble deposits held in PSB accounts.
The operation allows converting rubles into an asset that circulates through blockchain infrastructure. In this way, certain payments can be made without directly depending on some of the Western financial intermediaries over which the United States and Europe exert greater pressure capacity.
This does not mean that A7A5 is immune to sanctions. Authorities can block companies participating in the system, prevent other entities from operating with them, or pursue the points where digital assets are converted into other currencies. But intervening in an infrastructure based on blockchain poses difficulties different from blocking a conventional bank account.
Infrastructure designed to withstand sanctions
PSB does not hide that one of the reasons for A7's existence is to guarantee the continuity of Russian international payments against external restrictions.
Fradkov explained this August that the goal was to create its own infrastructure capable of carrying out international operations independently of external restrictions. The network, as explained by the president of PSB, combines settlement centers, associated financial entities, and commercial and legal structures distributed among different jurisdictions.
The architecture aims to prevent an entire payment from depending on a single bank, country, or intermediary that could be blocked. Ilan Shor, co-owner and CEO of A7, also assured Reuters in June that the platform aims to expand internationally despite the sanctions from the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom.
Who is Ilan Shor and what role does PSB play
Behind the project are two fundamental names. The first is Promsvyazbank, known as PSB, a bank controlled by the Russian state that provides services to the defense sector and is subject to Western sanctions.
The second is Ilan Shor, a Moldovan businessman and politician sanctioned by both the United States and the European Union.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury maintains that A7 and its subsidiaries are owned by Shor and PSB. Washington explicitly links that structure to the creation of a cross-border payment platform used to evade sanctions.
The European Union has also imposed sanctions against the A7 network and last July tightened measures against this type of structure, expanding the transaction ban to 14 crypto asset service platforms.
In the crosshairs of the United States
Washington acted against this infrastructure in August 2025. The Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Treasury (OFAC) then sanctioned A7, A71, A7 Agent, and Old Vector, the Kyrgyz company that issues A7A5, as part of a broader operation against a network of cryptocurrency platforms accused of facilitating illicit activities and evading sanctions.
The U.S. investigation also connected A7A5 with Garantex, a Russian cryptocurrency exchange platform originally sanctioned by Washington in 2022.
In March 2025, an operation coordinated by U.S. authorities with German and Finnish participation intervened in the computer infrastructure of Garantex and froze more than 26 million dollars in cryptocurrencies under its control.
After that operation, Grinex appeared, a platform created by Garantex employees to continue providing services, according to the U.S. Treasury.
From Garantex to Grinex: A7A5 as a way to recover funds
The Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Treasury maintains that, after the intervention against Garantex, its leaders transferred clients and funds to Grinex. Users of Garantex who had lost access to their money received the equivalent of those balances in A7A5 tokens, according to the United States.
Washington claims that Old Vector worked with Garantex and other participants to develop A7A5 and that representatives of Ilan Shor had previously met with officials of the exchange to introduce the trading of the token on the platform.
The case shows one of the difficulties faced by sanctions when applied to digital infrastructures. Blocking a company or intervening in an exchange does not necessarily mean that the assets, users, or the technology it used disappear.
Europe also tightens the noose
The United States is not the only one that has tried to isolate the infrastructure. The United Kingdom sanctioned Grinex and Old Vector in 2025, among other entities related to the cryptocurrency networks used to evade restrictions on Russia.
The European Union has also advanced against the network. Community authorities consider that companies linked to A7 contribute to thwarting restrictive measures against Russia and have been incorporating components of the network into their successive sanction packages.
Why sanctioning a 'stablecoin' is not enough
The conventional financial system operates through identifiable intermediaries. Banks maintain accounts, need relationships with other entities to carry out international payments, and depend on infrastructures over which the United States and the European Union have significant regulatory instruments.
Digital assets allow for the construction of different routes. Sanctioning the issuer of a stablecoin does not automatically equate to eliminating the asset from a blockchain. Authorities can prohibit operations with certain entities, block assets under their jurisdiction, and pressure intermediaries that allow converting cryptocurrencies into conventional money, but the technological infrastructure can continue to exist.
The Russian objective goes beyond A7A5
PSB presents A7 as something more ambitious than a temporary solution to sanctions. Fradkov argues that the world is progressively moving away from a single universal payment system and advancing towards national and regional infrastructures that compete with each other. In that strategy, conventional banking, digital assets, stablecoins, and other settlement mechanisms fit.
A7A5 would be a piece of that system. The Russian platform claims that its network is already profitable and intends to use it also for operations between third countries. The declared objective is to turn an infrastructure born under the pressure of sanctions into a permanent alternative for international trade.