Brussels opens the door to dialogue with the Taliban to accelerate Afghan deportations

The new EU Return Regulation is already legally in force, but its full application has not yet begun. According to available information, the regulation was formally adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on December 1, 2025 and was published in the Official Journal of the EU on June 12, 2026, at which point it entered into force. Member States have a 12-month period to adapt their internal frameworks, so the effective application is scheduled for June 12, 2027. In Spain, the Government has made it clear that it will comply with the new framework but refuses to participate in return centers in third countries.

1. Legal status and timetable of the new Return Regulation

According to the information detailed by El Demócrata, the new Return Regulation, which replaces Directive 2008/115/EC, completed its interinstitutional process as follows:

First, the European Parliament approved the text in plenary session (the source places the vote in April 2024) and, after subsequent negotiations with governments, the Council gave its approval in May 2025. The political agreement was consolidated and the formal joint adoption by Parliament and Council took place on December 1, 2025, closing the ordinary legislative procedure.

Second, the Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) on June 12, 2026. That publication marks, according to El Demócrata's own account, the entry into force of the new framework: from that date the regulation exists legally and binds Member States, although most of its provisions are deferred in time.

Third, the text establishes a 12-month adaptation period for Member States to adjust their legislation and administrative practice. This places the start of the effective application on June 12, 2027. Until then:
– The Regulation is in force, but
– Most of its practical effects (returns, use of the new European Return Order, etc.) are in the phase of preparation and regulatory adjustment.

2. Essential content of the regulation and elements already operational

El Demócrata describes several substantive pillars of the new framework:

First, the European Return Order is created, an instrument designed to streamline and harmonize expulsions within the EU. This order allows a return decision adopted in one Member State to be recognized and executed by others, reducing duplications and gaps in the system.

Second, the regulation opens the door to the creation of deportation or return centers in third countries considered “safe,” where asylum seekers or irregular migrants could be referred. This possibility was one of the most controversial points of the negotiation and generated strong political debate, including opposition from the Spanish Government.

Third, the text incorporates strengthened coercive measures for cases where the person in return procedure does not cooperate, and flexibilizes the use of the notion of “safe country” to accelerate certain returns. All this is framed within the EU's political objective to make returns more “effective and rapid” as part of the Migration and Asylum Pact.

This architecture is coordinated with other instruments already in force, such as Regulation (EU) 2024/1349 on the border return procedure, adopted on May 14, 2024 and applicable since June 12, 2026, which specifically regulates returns after asylum procedures at the border. That is, there are already operational return rules at the border, while the “major” general internal return regulation will enter the application phase in June 2027.

3. Application in Spain and Government position

In the Spanish case, El Demócrata highlights that the Executive expressed repeated objections during the European negotiations, especially regarding return centers in third countries. According to the source, the Government argued that these devices pose insufficient legal guarantees and risks of violation of fundamental rights.

In line with that stance, in another of its articles, El Demócrata reports that the Executive has stated that, even though the regulation is mandatory, Spain does not plan to sign agreements with third countries to send migrants to external return centers. That is, Spain will apply the regulation regarding returns and the use of the European Return Order, but positions itself in the most restrictive part of the possibilities the text allows.

In practice, this implies two temporal levels:
– Short term (2026–2027): normative and administrative adaptation at the state level (reform of the Aliens Law, instructions to Police, Government Delegations, judicial authority, etc.).
– From June 12, 2027: start of the ordinary application of the new return regime, with Spain aligned with European regulation but without resorting, at least initially, to outsourcing centers in third countries.

In parallel, the implementation of the border return procedure regulated by Regulation 2024/1349, already operational, continues, mainly affecting entries at the border and management at Spanish ports and airports.

In summary: the processing of the Return Regulation is complete, the text is in force since June 2026, and the EU is in the phase of internal adaptation for its effective application from June 12, 2027, with a Spanish position critical of outsourcing but committed to complying with the new common framework.

The position exists and, according to the current configuration of the European Commission (mandate 2024‑2029), Magnus Brunner is responsible for the Home Affairs and Migration portfolio, politically known as the European Commissioner for Home Affairs and Migration. It is not a figure created by a specific law, but a political portfolio within the College of Commissioners, organized by the Commission President and approved by the European Parliament. His powers cover asylum, migration, external borders, Schengen, and internal security, and are legally supported by the EU Treaties (especially the TFEU, Title V). Practically, he leads legislative proposals, political coordination, and the implementation of the new Migration and Asylum Pact and key instruments in this area.

Existence of the position and political definition of the portfolio

In the current Commission chaired by Ursula von der Leyen, Magnus Brunner has been appointed as responsible for Home Affairs and Migration, usually presented as “European Commissioner for Home Affairs and Migration” or “European Commissioner for Migration” (interview, Euronews). Although media often refer to him as “Commissioner for Migration,” legally what exists is the collegiate body (the Commission) and an internal distribution of portfolios decided according to Article 17 TEU and the Commission's Rules of Procedure. This distribution was presented to the European Parliament, which held a specific hearing with Brunner to assess his priorities, focused on implementing the Migration and Asylum Pact, strengthening Frontex, and the new internal security strategy (EP hearing).

Legal basis in the Treaties of the European Union

Brunner's functions derive from the combination of the Treaties and the internal organization of the Commission, not from a norm that exhaustively describes “his” position. At the Treaty level:

1. Treaty on European Union (TEU)
• Article 17 TEU: establishes that the Commission promotes the general interest of the Union, ensures the application of EU law, exercises coordination, execution, and management functions, and has legislative initiative, all as a collegiate body. Brunner exercises these tasks in his material scope (home affairs and migration).
• In the area of justice and home affairs, the TEU foresees Union action to develop an area of freedom, security, and justice, the general framework in which migration policy is inserted.

2. Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) – Title V (Area of freedom, security, and justice):
• Art. 77 TFEU: basis for the policy on external borders, including controls and cooperation among Member States; from here derives, among others, the framework of the Schengen Borders Code and the Commission's political role in its management.
• Art. 78 TFEU: establishes the common policy on asylum and international protection, under which the Commission proposes and supervises the Common European Asylum System and the new legislation of the Migration and Asylum Pact.
• Art. 79 TFEU (mentioned in general summaries though not detailed in Demócrata): basis for the policy on legal immigration and the fight against irregular immigration.
• Art. 80 TFEU: sets the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility among Member States in asylum and migration matters, a central principle of the Pact that Brunner must apply.
Additionally, the cooperation framework with third countries is supported by TFEU provisions on external action and development cooperation.

Material competences: migration, borders, and Schengen

Substantively, Brunner's portfolio includes:

• Management of external borders and Schengen: coordinates the application of the Schengen Code and the political supervision of Frontex, including the expansion of its staff and capabilities to control borders, combat trafficking, and support returns, as committed in his European Parliament hearing (EP hearing).
• Asylum and refugee policy: oversees the implementation of the new Migration and Asylum Pact, including regulations on refugee status, procedures, and mechanisms for relocating applicants, as highlighted by Euronews and coverage by La Moncloa in meetings with Spanish authorities.
• Regular and irregular migration: prepares legislative proposals on legal pathways (worker mobility, talent, long-term residents) and on return and readmission of third-country nationals in irregular situations, including a “new return proposal with simplified procedures” announced for 2025 (EP hearing).
• Cooperation with third countries: negotiates and manages migration cooperation agreements (e.g., with African countries of origin and transit), integrating development instruments, visas, and border control, as reflected by the Spanish Ministry of Inclusion in its meeting with Brunner on the Pact's implementation (Inclusion note).

Political and executive functions within the Commission

Functionally, and always within the collegiate nature of the Commission, Brunner's tasks are:

• Legislative initiative: lead the preparation and presentation of proposals for regulations, directives, and decisions on asylum, immigration, borders, Schengen, police cooperation related to flow management and return.
• Execute and supervise existing legislation: ensure the correct application of the Migration and Asylum Pact and other sectoral regulations, being able to initiate infringement procedures when Member States fail to comply with EU law.
• Agency coordination: exercise political supervision of agencies such as Frontex and the EU Asylum Agency, as well as promote the expansion of their mandates and resources.
• Crisis management: lead, on behalf of the Commission, the response to migration crises and pressure situations on external borders, seeking common solutions under the solidarity principle of art. 80 TFEU.
• Policy coherence: ensure that national decisions (e.g., mass regularizations or prolonged internal border controls) are compatible with the Schengen acquis and the general interest of the EU, something he himself has emphasized in public debates and visits to Member States (Euronews, La Moncloa).

The European Union can cooperate on readmission even with de facto authorities not recognized as legitimate governments, but only if it respects a very strict legal framework: primacy of fundamental rights, prohibition of return to risk of persecution or inhuman treatment (principle of non-refoulement), and competence limits on who can conclude international agreements. In cases of regimes like the Taliban, political recognition is secondary to the obligation to avoid illegal returns and guarantee minimum protection safeguards. This forces the EU to opt for technical and operational mechanisms, rather than formal readmission agreements with the appearance of state recognition. In practice, any cooperation is configured as de facto management of returns, extremely restricted, supervised, and judicially reviewable.

1. General framework: EU competences and nature of agreements

In readmission matters, the EU's main legal basis is Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), which allows the Union to develop a common policy on immigration and readmission of third-country nationals. However, formal international readmission agreements (the so-called “EU Readmission Agreements”) are concluded with States or internationally recognized entities, through the procedure of Article 218 TFEU (Commission proposal, Council approval, and, when applicable, European Parliament consent).

With unrecognized governments, such as the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the EU faces a political-legal limit: signing a classic treaty could be interpreted as government recognition. Therefore, cooperation is usually channeled through:

– Technical agreements or practical arrangements not equivalent to treaties.
– Operational cooperation via agencies (e.g., Frontex) or mediated by international organizations (IOM, UNHCR).
– Bilateral mechanisms of Member States, always subordinate to EU law.

2. Fundamental rights and the principle of non-refoulement

The main material limit is the principle of non-refoulement, present both in international law and EU law. Article 19.2 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights expressly prohibits expulsions to States where there is a serious risk of death penalty, torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment. This principle is reinforced by the European Convention on Human Rights (art. 3 ECHR) and the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees.

Applied to a regime like the Taliban, which imposes severe restrictions on fundamental rights (especially of women, ethnic minorities, and opponents), this principle means that it is not legally possible to return people when there is a reasonable risk of persecution, widespread violence, or inhuman treatment. Any readmission cooperation must therefore incorporate:

– Individualized risk assessment for each returned person.
– Effective access to asylum and judicial remedies.
– Mechanisms to verify, as far as possible, the subsequent treatment in the country of return.

3. Absence of recognition and dealing with de facto authorities

EU law does not abstractly prohibit contact or technical cooperation with de facto authorities not recognized; what conditions it is the form and scope of that cooperation. The key distinction is:

– Non-recognition as a legitimate government (political position and public international law).
– Limited operational relationship to manage practical issues (airport security, documentation, voluntary returns, etc.).

This requires cooperation instruments to avoid recognition language, be limited to logistical aspects (e.g., acceptance of travel documents, coordination for flights), and be designed as arrangements subject to review and subordinate to judicial and parliamentary oversight in the EU and Member States.

4. Institutional participation and democratic control

Any relevant cooperation mechanism in readmission must respect the internal distribution of EU competences:

– The European Commission negotiates at the EU level and verifies compatibility with the Charter and migration acquis.
– The Council authorizes agreements or negotiation mandates and sets political lines (e.g., conclusions on Afghanistan).
– The European Parliament exercises political control, can require transparency on arrangements, and, where applicable, give or deny consent for formal agreements.

Additionally, EU courts and national courts can review whether a specific return violates the principle of non-refoulement or the prohibition of collective expulsions (art. 19.1 Charter). If systemic risk is found in the destination country, the possibility of returns is drastically limited, even when operational agreements exist.

5. Voluntary vs. forced readmission

In contexts like Afghanistan under Taliban control, the EU tends to prioritize assisted voluntary return channeled through international organizations, rather than forced readmission. This route reduces the appearance of political recognition and facilitates incorporating:

– Individual return assessment.
– Reintegration programs managed by third parties.
– Some degree of subsequent monitoring, although very limited.

In any case, even “voluntary” return must be genuinely free of coercion: if the real alternative is expulsion to an unsafe third country or prolonged detention, courts may question whether true consent exists.

6. Operational conclusion

In summary, the EU can only cooperate on readmission with unrecognized governments if: no legal government recognition is configured, the principle of non-refoulement is strictly respected, individual protection of each returnee is guaranteed, and effective institutional and judicial control is maintained. In scenarios of serious and widespread human rights violations, such as the Taliban regime, these requirements make forced readmission legally very limited and, in many cases, practically unfeasible.