Three versions coming from the State itself have opened a front on one of the great unknowns of the migration crisis in Ceuta: what did the Government know before July 30. The Minister of Defense, Margarita Robles, claims that the CNI communicated to the Government Delegation a call to attempt to swim in the next day; the Minister of the Interior, Fernando Grande-Marlaska, maintains that no intelligence service anticipated "anything like" what ultimately happened; and the Government Delegation itself denies having received any report warning of what was going to happen.
The statements and communications have followed one another this Tuesday with barely a few hours of difference and force us to distinguish between two issues that are not exactly the same: whether there was a prior warning about a call and whether that warning allowed for predicting the dimensions that the entry on July 30 would ultimately reach.
The discrepancy is relevant because it directly affects the reconstruction of the hours leading up to the crisis and the information that the different State structures deployed in Ceuta had.
Robles: the CNI warned on July 29
The most detailed version has been provided by Margarita Robles during her appearance before the Defense Commission of Congress.
The minister has defended the work of the 25 members of the CNI assigned in Ceuta and has explained that they carry out a permanent monitoring of issues related to the southern flank, the mafias, jihadist terrorism, hybrid threats, and irregular immigration.
Robles has assured that the intelligence services shared and analyzed information with the State Security Forces and Corps and with the Government Delegation. At the end of her speech, she specified what happened, according to her version, the day before the massive entry.
The minister claims that on July 29 the CNI conveyed to the Government Delegation the existence of a call to attempt to swim into Ceuta the next day, taking advantage of a holiday in Morocco.
Robles has also introduced an important element for later interpreting the response of the Delegation: those communications do not necessarily have to materialize in a written report.
Marlaska: no one anticipated "anything like"
Hours later, Fernando Grande-Marlaska has offered a different explanation during the press conference following the Council of Ministers.
"There was no report that hinted that on July 30 what finally happened was going to occur," said the Minister of the Interior.
Marlaska has extended that assertion beyond the CNI. According to what he has stated, no Spanish intelligence service, service of an allied country, or other intelligence agency anticipated "anything like" what finally happened.
The minister has defended his argument by posing what would have occurred if the State had had an alert of that magnitude.
"Can anyone understand that if something like what happened had been glimpsed, considering what had happened in May 2021, it would not have been raised to the highest levels?" he asked.
The difference with Robles is precisely there: Defense claims that there was prior information about a call; Interior denies that there was information capable of anticipating an episode comparable to the one that ultimately occurred.
The Government Delegation enters the scene
The controversy has added a third actor this Tuesday night. The Government Delegation in Ceuta has denied having received a report warning of what was going to happen on July 30.
"This Government Delegation did not receive, at any time, any report warning of what was going to happen on July 30," the institution states.
The Delegation acknowledges that during the previous days it transmitted information about the increase in entries by sea through the corresponding channels, but it asserts that none of those reports allowed for predicting an entry of the characteristics that ultimately occurred.
However, its statement introduces an important nuance. The institution expressly speaks of the non-existence of a "report" that anticipated what happened, while Robles has described a communication from the CNI about a call and has emphasized that this type of notice does not have to be made in writing.
Do the three versions really contradict each other?
The core of the controversy lies in distinguishing between being aware of a call and anticipating the dimensions of the massive entry.
Robles has not stated that the CNI knew that there would be an arrival of the dimensions recorded on July 30. What he maintains is that the intelligence service was aware of a call to attempt to swim in and conveyed it the day before.
Marlaska, for his part, focuses his explanation on another issue: he assures that nobody anticipated an episode similar to the one that finally occurred. And the Government Delegation specifically denies having received a report warning of what would happen.
For this reason, the three statements are not necessarily incompatible in all their extremes, but they do leave unresolved an essential question: what specific communication the CNI made on July 29, who received it, and what assessment the authorities responsible for the security of Ceuta made of it.
Robles, the only one who has admitted that the reaction was late
The differences are not limited to the CNI. During her appearance, Robles has also been the member of the Government who has most clearly acknowledged mistakes in the response to the crisis.
The Minister of Defense has admitted that the reaction was late and has apologized to the Ceutíes who feel abandoned, while defending that the CNI agents had done the work that corresponded to them.
The head of Defense has also lamented that the duty of secrecy that weighs on the Center sometimes operates as "a burden," because it prevents its members from publicly explaining the work done.