Five public employee organizations demand the recovery of the extra pay cut 16 years ago and threaten mobilizations in September

To modify or repeal the cut to the extra pay of public employees, it would be necessary to approve a regulation with the same rank as the one that established it (usually a budget law or a subsequent royal decree-law ratified as law). This can be done through a government bill, a parliamentary group bill proposal, or, more quickly, through a royal decree-law that is then ratified and, if applicable, processed as a bill. In all cases, the core is the same: approval in the Congress, passage through the Senate, and publication in the Official State Gazette (BOE).

a) Government bill

If the initiative comes from the Government, the typical instrument would be a bill that modifies or repeals the current provisions that cut the extra pay.

1. Government phase

First, the text is drafted in the competent ministry (likely Finance and Public Administration) and submitted to the Council of Ministers. The Council approves it as a bill and agrees to send it to the Congress of Deputies. At this stage, Parliament is not yet involved.

2. Admission and initial processing in the Congress

Upon receipt, the Congress Board classifies and admits it for processing. It is published in the Congress Bulletin and a period for total and partial amendments is opened.

• Total amendments: may propose returning the bill to the Government or approving an alternative text.
• Majority: the return is rejected or approved by simple majority of the Plenary.

If this phase is passed, the text goes to the competent committee (for example, Finance or Public Administration).

3. Committee, working group, and Congress Plenary

In the committee, a working group is appointed to study the bill and amendments, and draft a report. Then, the committee approves a report that includes the accepted amendments.

This report goes to the Congress Plenary, where articles are debated and pending amendments are voted on. The final text is approved by simple majority. This is where, expressly, it would be possible to:

• Remove the article that cuts the extra pay.
• Modify its conditions (for example, restore full pay or set a phased return).

4. Processing in the Senate and return to the Congress

The approved text is sent to the Senate, whose Board also classifies it and sends it to committee. The Senate can:

• Approve it as is.
• Introduce amendments.
• Approve a veto (rejection) by absolute majority.

If there are amendments or a veto, the bill returns to the Congress. The Congress can:

• Lift the veto by immediate absolute majority, or by simple majority after two months.
• Accept or reject the Senate's amendments by simple majority.

With this, the law that eliminates or modifies the cut is definitively approved.

5. Sanction, promulgation, and publication

The law is sent to the King for sanction and promulgation, and published in the BOE. The final provision sets the effective date of the new extra pay regime.

b) Parliamentary group bill proposal

If the initiative comes from deputies or groups, a bill proposal is used, which has the same force as a government bill when approved.

1. Presentation and consideration

A group registers its bill proposal in the Congress, with specific wording to repeal or modify the cut. The Congress Board admits it for processing and sends it to the Plenary for the so-called consideration.

The Plenary debates the opportunity to process it and votes by simple majority. If considered, the proposal enters the same circuit as a bill (committee, working group, amendments, Senate, etc.). If rejected, processing ends.

2. Ordinary processing

From there, the structure is analogous to the previous section: committee, working group, report, Congress Plenary, Senate, and, if applicable, second round in the Congress, with the same simple or absolute majorities depending on whether Senate amendments or vetoes are involved.

c) Royal decree-law and its ratification

The fastest way to reverse an extra pay cut is usually a royal decree-law, reserved for cases of extraordinary and urgent need.

1. Approval by the Government and entry into force

The Council of Ministers approves the royal decree-law that repeals or modifies the cut and publishes it in the BOE. It comes into force on the date set by the text itself, usually the day after publication.

2. Ratification in the Congress

The Government must immediately send it to the Congress, whose Plenary has a maximum period of 30 days to debate and vote on it as a whole.

• If the Congress ratifies it by simple majority, the royal decree-law remains in force.
• If it repeals it, it becomes ineffective, although situations already produced are usually preserved.

3. Processing as a bill

In the same ratification debate, the Plenary may agree to its processing as a bill by the urgent procedure. In that case, the royal decree-law text is subjected to the circuit of amendments, committee, working group, Plenary, Senate, and return to the Congress, but with shortened deadlines. This is the typical formula to technically adjust the content once the initial urgency is lifted.

The available sources only provide general information about the Government's role in budgetary matters and how it can veto amendments that imply increased spending or decreased revenue, but do not detail the internal distribution of competencies among the different ministries regarding public employee remuneration. Therefore, it is not possible to precisely describe, based on these sources, what exactly each ministry (Finance, Economy, Presidency, sectoral ministries, etc.) does or how they specifically coordinate with autonomous communities and local entities. However, the issue can be framed within the general context of the Government's budgetary power and its relationship with the General Courts.

General framework: Government, General Courts, and public spending

Public employee remuneration is an essential part of public sector spending and, therefore, falls within the scope of the General State Budgets. The available information recalls that, according to the Constitution, the Government can oppose the processing of amendments that imply an increase in credits or a decrease in budgetary revenues compared to the Budgets. That is, there is a clear reservation in favor of the Executive in protecting budgetary balance.

This fact is relevant to understand that any decision about public employee remuneration (salary increases, new supplements, creation of positions, etc.) has a direct impact on spending and, therefore, falls within the Government's overall control. The Executive, as a unit, is responsible for drafting the Budget project and defending it against parliamentary amendments that increase spending, including personnel items.

Government's role in drafting and defending the Budgets

Although the intra-governmental distribution (what each specific ministry does) is not detailed, the sources allow some general conclusions:

• Budgetary decision unity: The Government acts as a collegiate body that approves the Budget project, where the global amounts allocated to remuneration of personnel serving the state public sector are set.
• Control against Parliament: Given the power to veto amendments that increase spending, the Executive maintains a strong position to prevent, during parliamentary processing, remuneration or staffing increases beyond what is foreseen in the project.
• Linkage of remuneration measures: Any remuneration modification implying higher spending must be previously framed within the budgetary framework designed by the Government to avoid violating that constitutional reservation regarding financial balance.

Relationship between budgetary competence and public employees

Decisions about public personnel salaries are not made in isolation but as part of a general budgetary policy. The Government's power to prevent processing of amendments that increase spending means that, although Parliament can debate and propose changes, the real margin to increase remuneration beyond what the Executive has agreed is limited by that veto power on spending.

This translates into the bulk of remuneration decisions being concentrated in the drafting phase of the Budget project and in negotiations the Government holds with parliamentary groups before or during processing, precisely because once the spending framework is set, the Legislative's capacity to unilaterally alter it when credits increase is restricted.

Parliamentary committees and technical analysis

The sources also explain the role of parliamentary committees in the processing of laws, including those with budgetary content. Committees carry out a more detailed and technical analysis of normative projects: they study the text, debate amendments, and issue a report. In certain cases, these committees may have full legislative competence, allowing them to definitively approve a law without returning to the Plenary, unless the latter decides to take over the debate.

In the case of regulations affecting public employee remuneration or Budgets, this technical and specialized work is relevant to refine the text and assess the economic impact of proposals. However, the capacity of committees and the Plenary to increase spending remains conditioned by the Government's veto power when budget limits are exceeded.

Absence of data on the distribution of competencies among ministries

There is no specific information in the consulted sources about:

• The concrete role of the Ministry of Finance and Public Administration in setting remuneration.
• The functions of the Ministry of Economy or other ministries in this matter.
• The competencies of the Presidency of the Government in coordinating remuneration policy.
• The precise coordination mechanisms with autonomous communities and local entities.

Therefore, any attempt to describe in detail that distribution of competencies or its practical functioning would exceed the available information and could not be done rigorously based on current sources. It can only be stated, in general terms, that public employee remuneration is framed within the Government's budgetary policy and its relationship with the General Courts, especially through the Budgets and the veto power over amendments that increase spending.

The available official and union sources show that the latest union elections of public employees in Spain are not concentrated on a single state date but have been held by sectors (General State Administration, health, education, autonomous communities) between 2023 and 2025. Based on those results, the composition of the General Negotiation Boards has been set, which today is the best homogeneous snapshot of representativeness. In the General State Administration (AGE), the majority union is currently CSIF, while in the entire Public Administrations (state, regional, and local) the leading force remains CCOO, with UGT very close; in health and education only qualitative information is available, not a complete recent numerical table. Below is a summary of the most updated picture with the data that is published.

1. General State Administration: official snapshot after the latest elections

The most consolidated data is the Agreement of the General Negotiation Board of the AGE of June 18, 2025, published in the BOE on July 7, 2025, which sets the representation of each union based on accumulated electoral results in the state public function. That agreement can be consulted in the BOE (Public Function resolution).

According to Annex I of that agreement, the distribution of representation is as follows:

General Negotiation Board of Public Administrations (AAPP, art. 36.1 TREBEP)

• UGT: 34.66% (5 representatives)
• CCOO: 33.84% (4 representatives)
• CSIF: 23.19% (3 representatives)
• ELA: 3.67% (1 representative)
• LAB: 2.58% (1 representative)
• CIG: 2.06% (1 representative)

This board reflects the balance of forces across all Administrations (State, Autonomous Communities, and local entities): the CCOO–UGT bloc exceeds 68% and CSIF is the third force.

General Negotiation Board of the AGE (art. 36.3 TREBEP)

• CSIF: 38.81% (5 representatives)
• UGT: 31.32% (4 representatives)
• CCOO: 27.38% (4 representatives)
• CIG: 1.62% (1 representative)
• ELA: 0.87% (1 representative)

General Negotiation Board of the AGE (art. 34.1 TREBEP)

• CSIF: 43.04% (6 representatives)
• UGT: 28.40% (4 representatives)
• CCOO: 26.09% (3 representatives)
• CIG: 1.72% (1 representative)
• ELA: 0.75% (1 representative)

That is: in the strict General State Administration, CSIF is the leading union, with just over 40% of representation in the specific AGE board, followed by UGT and CCOO, which together gather around 55% of representatives.

2. Overall representativeness in the entire employment (public and private)

In parallel, CCOO has published the closure of the 2019–2023 electoral cycle in private companies and Public Administrations. In the note “Spanish unionism grows, advances, and renews” (CCOO analysis), the union details that:

• It has obtained 104,206 delegates, 34.98% of the total in union elections closed in December 2023.
• CCOO and UGT together sum 67.01% of overall union representation.

This confirms that, in the entire system (private + public), CCOO remains the leading union in delegates, although in the AGE the distribution leans more towards CSIF, as reflected in the BOE.

3. Health and education: what is known and what is not

In the areas of health and education there is no single “state election” but processes by health services and autonomous administrations. The sources consulted in health (for example, about the negotiation of the Statute Framework of statutory personnel) show who sits in the SNS Negotiation Scope, but do not publish a complete recent percentage table by union.

In state health, the Ministry itself and specialized media identify the organizations of the Negotiation Scope as FSS-CCOO, UGT, CSIF, SATSE-FSES, and CIG-Saúde, that is, these are the organizations that have obtained representation in sector union elections and now negotiate the new Statute Framework (for example, in coverages like agreement on the Statute Framework or monitoring the medical conflict).

In education something similar happens: elections are held by autonomous communities and teaching bodies. We know, through union statements and regional news, that CCOO, UGT, CSIF, and other organizations (such as STEs, ANPE, nationalist unions…) maintain significant presence, but the sources used here do not provide a state-wide and homogeneous summary of delegates for the last electoral cycle.

In summary, with the available information it can be stated with certainty:

• In the AGE, after the latest elections, CSIF is the union with the greatest representation, followed by UGT and CCOO, according to the official agreement published in the BOE (agreement text).
• In the entire set of companies and Administrations, the leadership in delegates remains with CCOO, followed by UGT, which together concentrate around two-thirds of representation (CCOO balance).
• In health and education, the reviewed sources confirm which unions are present in negotiation boards, but do not offer detailed and comparable figures of representatives for the entire State in the latest union elections. No further quantitative information is available in the consulted sources.

As additional context on how the Government and unions use this representativeness in the public function, several analyses and news from Demócrata on salary negotiation and the role of union centers can be consulted, such as “Unionism and democracy, for the reduction of working hours” or reports on the 2025–2028 salary increase for public employees (key points of the salary agreement).