A tragedy in the middle of the electoral campaign alters much more than the parties’ calendar. It shifts the issues they had prepared, forces changes to the messages, and subjects public officials to extraordinary scrutiny. But does it necessarily translate into a punishment for those who govern? Can an effective response contain the wear and tear and even strengthen the Executive’s image of leadership? And what room does the opposition have to turn the crisis into a political opportunity?
The Urda railway accident places these questions at the center of the 29N pre-campaign. The PSOE had designed a positive mobilization strategy, with appeals to hope, references to the victory of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil and a political confrontation with the right and the far right. The tragedy has displaced that script and has placed the Government before an immediate priority: to attend to the victims, clarify what happened, and respond to the questions about possible responsibilities.
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29N waits for no one: the tragedy in Urda forces a PSOE 'in shock' to reorient its campaign
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The electoral impact, however, cannot be taken for granted. Academic research on political crises shows that citizens do not always react in the same way to extraordinary events. The result depends, among other factors, on how the origin of the event is perceived, on whom responsibility is attributed to, and on the response offered by the institutions.
Closing ranks does not work in all crises
In political science there is a concept known as rally 'round the flag, which describes the temporary increase in support for leaders during certain crises. The idea is that, in the face of an extraordinary threat, part of the citizenry may set aside their political differences and close ranks with those who represent the institutions. But not always. That effect is not universal nor does it guarantee an improvement in the Government’s popularity.
A study published in April 2026 in the journal Constitutional Political Economy, signed by Timothy Hellwig, Ryan E. Carlin, Jonathan Hartlyn and other researchers, analyzes government approval in 35 countries over a period of 25 years. Its results indicate that the rally-around-the-flag effects are more intense when crises are unexpected and are perceived as events relatively beyond the Executive's control. The study finds different responses depending on the type of crisis: the support effects are weaker in the face of natural disasters and it does not detect an equivalent direct effect in economic crises.
The research does not allow establishing a specific rule for railway accidents, but it does offer a clue for interpreting Urda: the more an event is linked to decisions that the institutions could control, the more room there will be for debate about political responsibility. The distinction is relevant. In the face of an external aggression, the Government can present itself as the institution that protects society from a shared danger. When the event affects a public service, such as the railway, the institutional response is examined together with other questions: what prevention measures existed, whether the controls worked and what information the authorities had.
That does not mean that an accident of this kind has to harm the Executive electorally. It means that the possible rally-around-the-flag coexists with a demand for explanations that can acquire a determining weight.
The support effects are weaker in the face of natural disasters and it does not detect an equivalent direct effect in economic crises
The management of the emergency is also judged
The action of a Government during a crisis is not limited to immediate attention. Transparency, coordination among administrations, information provided to families, aid and subsequent measures are part of the citizen evaluation.
Olivier Rubin’s research, published in the journal Disasters in 2020, reviews studies on the electoral effects of natural disasters and finds very disparate results. Some works identify punishments for rulers; others, rewards for an effective response. The author highlights that the political discourses that are built around the catastrophe help explain those differences. That is, it is not enough to measure the magnitude of the tragedy; it also matters how what happened is publicly interpreted, what responsibilities are assigned, and how the response of the institutions is valued.
Management can therefore contain the wear and tear. An Executive that informs clearly, recognizes what it still does not know, avoids contradictions and adopts verifiable measures can reinforce the perception that it is acting responsibly. But an effective response to the emergency does not automatically eliminate doubts about the prevention of the accident nor does it replace accountability.
Management can contain the wear and tear
In Urda, this distinction will be especially important. Attention to the victims and the investigation of the causes are immediate obligations; the eventual demand for political responsibility constitutes another dimension of the case. Confusing them can lead both to prematurely exonerating those responsible and to attributing responsibility to them before sufficient evidence is available.
The Spanish precedent: credibility after 11-M
The 11 March 2004 attacks in Madrid offer a particularly relevant precedent for analyzing the relationship between crisis, government communication and public trust, although the circumstances are very different from those of Urda.
The academic article La credibilidad de la fuente oficial. La secuencia 11-14 M, by Yolanda Martínez Solana, published in 2005 in Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico, studies the communication of José María Aznar’s Government during the days after the attacks and maintains that the management of official information deteriorated the credibility of the Executive. Three days after the attacks, the PP lost the general elections.
The temporal proximity between both events does not by itself demonstrate that government communication determined the electoral result. In the election, other political and social factors also intervened. However, the case illustrates to what extent trust in official explanations can become a central element during a crisis.
The lesson for any Government that faces a tragedy does not consist in seeking a message that minimizes the political cost, but in understanding that credibility is a limited resource. If the explanations change, contradict each other, or are perceived as an attempt to evade questions, the debate may shift from the emergency to the trust in those who manage it.
In the opposite sense, transparency does not guarantee an electoral reward. It may be a condition to contain the deterioration of trust, but it does not eliminate the pain, the uncertainty, nor the possible responsibilities that may arise from the facts.
The pandemic and the limits of the rally-around-the-flag effect
The Covid-19 pandemic made it possible to study the behavior of citizens in the face of an emergency that directly affected their security and required a sustained intervention by public authorities.
A study by Sylvia Kritzinger, Martial Foucault, Romain Lachat and other researchers, published in West European Politics in 2021, analyzed trust in the governments of Austria and France through surveys conducted over several waves of the pandemic. The results were different in both countries: Austria experienced a rally effect that quickly faded, while in France partisan division prevailed and no equivalent rally-around-the-flag effect was observed.
The authors also found that the assessment of government measures mattered in explaining trust in the Executive.
The comparison shows that a shared emergency does not necessarily produce a common political reaction. The response depends on the context, on partisan positions, and on how the decisions adopted are judged.
Another study, published in 2025 in European Journal of Political Research by Roni Lehrer and several researchers, delves into this issue based on panel data from more than 32,000 interviews collected during the first stage of the pandemic in Germany. Its conclusion is that crises can activate two opposing mechanisms: the perception of threat can increase support for the leader, while anxiety can reduce it. Both effects operate simultaneously, so the result is not automatic.
Applied to Urda, this invites us to avoid a simplistic reading. Collective shock can favor a demand for unity and institutional leadership, but fear, uncertainty, and questions about security can also influence the evaluation of those who hold public responsibilities.
The opposition: scrutinize without getting trapped in the crisis
Tragedies also modify the opportunities of parties that are not in government. The opposition can demand explanations, request appearances, call for independent investigations, and focus on possible management failures. That work is part of the democratic oversight of the Executive.
Tragedies also modify the opportunities of parties that are not in government. Turning the crisis into an immediate partisan confrontation also entails risks
However, turning the crisis into an immediate partisan confrontation also entails risks. If the leaders seem to put electoral calculation ahead of the clarification of the facts, they can lose credibility. The opposition needs to distinguish between demanding political accountability —something it can do without waiting for the entire investigation to conclude— and presenting as proven some causes that have not yet been established.
The way in which the public narrative is constructed is relevant. Olivier Rubin's review of disasters and electoral behavior highlights precisely that political discourses around catastrophes help explain why comparable events produce different electoral results. It is not only the event, but also the dispute over its meaning and its responsible parties.
In the case of Urda, the PP and Vox can put the focus on railway safety, network maintenance, and the performance of the Ministry of Transport. But the political opportunity that the accident offers them does not amount to an assured electoral benefit. Its evolution will also depend on the information that becomes known, the Government’s response, and how the opposition itself acts.
Urda and the examination of the Government in the middle of the campaign
The railway tragedy breaks into a pre-campaign that the PSOE had set out in a positive way. Ferraz must now adapt its schedule and its messages, while Óscar Puente faces requests for explanations and political responsibilities. At the same time, the Executive’s partners demand transparency and the opposition seeks to place railway management at the center of the debate.
The Government has room to act: it can prioritize attention to the victims, provide verified information, cooperate with the investigation, and commit to corrective measures when the causes are known. But it cannot completely control the public interpretation of the accident nor guarantee that an adequate response to the emergency will prevent political wear and tear.
Academic research makes it possible to identify mechanisms and precedents, not to anticipate the result of specific elections. Studies on closing ranks, disasters, and accountability cover different countries, political systems, and events; their conclusions serve to formulate questions and scenarios, not to calculate the electoral impact of Urda.
The central question for the PSOE is not only when it will be able to resume the campaign it had prepared, but how it will respond to the demands for information and responsibility raised by the tragedy. For the PP and Vox, the challenge will be to hold the Government to account without giving the impression of instrumentalizing the pain. And for citizens, the assessment will not be limited to the parties’ messages: it will also depend on what is clarified and on the decisions that are adopted.
A tragedy does not determine the vote by itself. But it can change the criteria with which those who aspire to govern are judged: from their promises, their capacity to respond, their credibility, and their willingness to account for themselves are examined.