Verónica M. Barbero runs for the leadership of Sumar in tandem with Rosa Martínez

Sumar's political-organizational document is currently, as of June 26, 2026, in an advanced draft and territorial and sectoral negotiation phase, still open to amendments. It was politically validated by the leadership and the Coordinating Group, but its final content will not be closed until the General Assembly on July 11, where it will be debated and voted on. Amendments are collected and candidacies for the new leadership are submitted until June 30, which will be officially published on July 5. After the Assembly, the focus will shift to constituting the new leadership, deploying the new organizational model, and trying to resolve the internal crisis that the movement is experiencing.

Current status of the political-organizational document

According to information gathered by Demócrata, Sumar already has a draft political-organizational report that must "structure the Movement" based on its discussion at the Assembly on July 11. This text was prepared by the organizing committee and debated in the leadership during a meeting held on June 10, where the congress regulations and internal calendar were also analyzed, in a context of strong internal tension, as detailed by Demócrata.

From June 16, the draft entered a phase of territorial and sectoral debate that extends until June 30, with discussions in territorial organizations and sectoral spaces and receipt of amendments. According to information gathered in mainstream media, the base text was approved in the Coordinating Group with around 90.7 % of votes in favor, and the Assembly regulations — which set how amendments are processed and voted on — reportedly received support close to 89 % in the same internal sphere, as detailed in pieces such as those from El Independiente and Europa Press.

At this stage, the document remains an internal processing text: it sets the political line, the organizational model, and the governing bodies, but it is still modifiable via amendments and does not yet include finalized names or lists. Demócrata emphasizes that, as of June 20, candidacies or lists had not yet been finalized, and that the document will be finally adjusted at the Assembly itself on July 11.

Immediate schedule until the Assembly on July 11

The internal regulations set several key milestones prior to the July 11 meeting. According to the reconstruction by Demócrata:

Between June 16 and 30, the territorial debate and registration of amendments to the political-organizational document take place. In parallel, the deadline for submitting candidacies to the leadership is open until June 30. From July 1 to 5, a period for correction and verification of candidacies is enabled, and on July 5 the official publication of the lists of candidates for the leadership is scheduled.

This sequence coincides with what other media such as El País, The Objective, Moncloa.com, and 20minutos report, which also highlight that, so far, no candidacy has been publicly formalized and there is pressure to articulate a unitary list to avoid an open clash between the sector linked to Lara Hernández and the critical sectors grouped around Verónica Martínez Barbero.

What will be decided on July 11 and what comes next

The General Assembly on July 11 is conceived as a turning point for Sumar, in the midst of an internal crisis derived, among other factors, from accusations of workplace mistreatment in the Secretariat of Organization and the resignation of Laura Moreno, a context widely described by Demócrata and media such as La Razón.

At the Assembly itself, the following are expected: the final debate and vote on the political-organizational document, already incorporating accepted amendments; the election of the new leadership with the candidacies that have been validated; and the validation of the new model of bodies and internal rules (relationship with territories, participation mechanisms, coalition rules with other forces in the space, etc.). Demócrata highlights that the explicit political goal is to close the crisis and redefine Sumar's role as a “broad front” and “engine of transformation” against the PSOE.

After July 11, the expected next steps are: the formal constitution of the new governing bodies and the distribution of responsibilities; the practical deployment of the new organizational design (territorial reorganization, development of primaries or other mechanisms provided for in the report); and the definition of a political and electoral roadmap for the remainder of the legislature, in coordination with the parliamentary group and allied forces. The key, according to press analyses, will be whether the Assembly results in a consensus candidacy or a more fragmented correlation: in the first case, the focus would be on internal normalization; in the second, the organizational document itself must serve as a guarantee for minority integration and orderly management of dissent.

Additional sources: La Sexta Noticias (video).

In the Spanish political system, the Spokesperson of the Sumar Parliamentary Group is a leadership and political representation position within the Congress of Deputies, while the Secretary of State for Social Rights is a senior government body responsible for designing and implementing state policy on social rights. The former is situated in the legislative branch and organizes Sumar's parliamentary activity; the latter is part of the executive branch, under the authority of the competent ministry. In both cases, there is a mix of formal (regulated) competencies and material (de facto political) functions, but in very different areas and with different instruments.

1. Spokesperson of the Sumar Parliamentary Group in Congress

1.1. Nature and institutional position

A parliamentary group is the structure through which the deputies of a party or coalition organize themselves in Congress to act in a coordinated manner. The Spokesperson is the internal leadership body that speaks on behalf of the group and represents it before the Chamber's bodies, especially in the Board of Spokespersons. The person who exercises this Spokesperson role is always a deputy and is part of the group's leadership team, along with the presidency, deputy spokespeople, etc.

Institutionally, they relate directly with the Presidency and the Board of Congress, with the spokespeople of other groups, and, in fact, with the political leadership of the Sumar coalition, which sets the general line that the group conveys to Parliament.

1.2. Formal competencies

From a legal-formal point of view, the Spokesperson is governed by the Congress Regulations and by the internal regulations of the parliamentary group itself. Among its institutional functions are:

• Formally representing the Sumar Group in the Board of Spokespersons and before the Presidency and the Board of Congress.
• Participating in setting the agenda and organizing debates and speaking times.
• Distributing speaking turns and times among the group's deputies in Plenary and committees.
• Presenting parliamentary initiatives (amendments, bills, motions, requests for appearances, etc.) on behalf of the group.

1.3. Organic and material political functions

Internally, the Spokesperson directs the group's daily activity: plans legislative and government oversight strategy, coordinates sectoral spokespeople in committees, promotes voting discipline, and participates in assigning deputies to Chamber bodies. These functions are supported by internal rules but also by political practice.

Materially, the Spokesperson is one of the main public faces of Sumar in Congress: sets the discourse line in major debates, negotiates agreements with other groups (on laws, budgets, investitures, or motions), and communicates Sumar's parliamentary position to the media. Their real power depends both on their formal competencies and their political weight within the coalition.

2. Secretary of State for Social Rights

2.1. Nature and location in the Executive

The Secretary of State for Social Rights is a senior body of the General State Administration, situated immediately below the minister responsible for social rights. Its holder is a high-ranking official who directs a broad functional area (childhood, families, disability, social services, third sector, etc., according to the current Royal Decree on structure).

Hierarchically, they depend on the minister, are above the attached general directorates, and coordinate with other ministries, autonomous communities, and social and international actors regarding social rights.

2.2. Formal competencies

Their competencies are determined by the Constitution (social state and State–Autonomous Communities distribution), the Government Law, Law 40/2015, and specifically by the Royal Decree regulating the ministry's structure. Abstractly, they include:

• Proposing and developing government policy on social rights, according to the minister's guidelines.
• Directing the general directorates and units that make up the Secretariat of State.
• Promoting draft laws, royal decrees, and other regulations in this area.
• Planning and coordinating state programs and plans on social rights.
• Representing the State, by delegation, in sectoral conferences, cooperation bodies, and international forums.
• Managing programs and funds (including grants to the third sector and, where applicable, European funds) and evaluating applied policies.

2.3. Organic and material political functions

Organically, the Secretariat of State sets objectives and priorities for its general directorates, supervises program execution, proposes budget distribution in its scope, and participates in managing intermediate managerial personnel. It internally coordinates different sectoral policies to ensure coherence and resolve overlaps.

Politically and materially, the Secretary of State advises the minister on strategic orientation, negotiates with other ministries and autonomous communities, dialogues with social organizations, and appears before the Cortes to explain social rights policy. Although ultimate political responsibility lies with the minister and the Council of Ministers, in practice they become the government's main operational figure in this field.

3. Essential comparison

Sumar's Spokesperson is part of the legislative branch and exercises political-parliamentary leadership (representation, debate, and government oversight), while the Secretary of State for Social Rights belongs to the executive branch and focuses on the political-administrative management of public policies. The former promotes and negotiates law from Congress; the latter designs and executes it from the Government, with different but complementary logics, tools, and responsibilities in the functioning of the Spanish political system.

For Sumar to achieve voting in Spain from the age of 16, a simple political initiative is not enough: a reform of the Constitution and, afterwards, of the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG) is essential. The Constitution links the full exercise of political rights to the age of majority set at 18 years, so lowering the voting age requires modifying at least article 23 of the CE (and very likely clarifying the relationship with article 12 CE). This constitutional reform requires a very qualified majority in Congress and Senate, and only then could the LOREG be changed, which requires an absolute majority in Congress. Therefore, Sumar could only achieve this if it manages to negotiate a broad parliamentary coalition that gathers these majorities and, eventually, overcome a possible ratification referendum.

1. Which norms would need to be changed

1.1. Spanish Constitution

The key step is the constitutional block. Today:

• Art. 12 CE sets the age of majority at 18 years.
• Art. 23 CE recognizes the right to participate in public affairs through universal suffrage.

Doctrine has understood that active suffrage is tied to that age of majority. To introduce voting at 16, there are two main technical routes:

• Maintain the age of majority at 18 and reform art. 23 CE to allow an organic law to set the voting age from 16, or even to expressly recognize suffrage from that age.
• Or lower the age of majority directly to 16 in art. 12 CE, which would affect the entire legal system (civil, criminal, administrative…), not just voting.

In either model, before Sumar can change the electoral law, that constitutional reform is necessary.

1.2. LOREG and electoral legislation

Once the Constitution is modified, the LOREG (organic law) would need to be adapted:

• Change the definition of electors (art. 2 and related) to include Spaniards over 16 years old.
• Adjust the rules for general, European, local elections, and the state part of regional elections.

Additionally, regional electoral laws and, where applicable, the Statutes of Autonomy with explicit references to 18 years should be adapted to this new constitutional minimum.

2. Necessary majorities and role of each institution

2.1. Constitutional reform

The reform of articles 12 and/or 23 CE can be processed through the ordinary procedure of art. 167 CE, which requires:

• 3/5 majority in the Congress of Deputies and the Senate.
• If no agreement, a Mixed Congress–Senate Commission to seek a consensus text.
• Ultimately, Congress can impose the reform by 2/3 majority, provided the Senate has approved some version with an absolute majority.

The referendum in this case is optional: it can be requested by one-tenth of deputies or senators within 15 days after approval. Only if the aggravated procedure of art. 168 CE (deeper revision) is chosen would the referendum be mandatory and there would be dissolution of the Cortes and new elections.

2.2. LOREG reform

Once the Constitution is changed, the LOREG is reformed as an organic law:

• Requires absolute majority of Congress in a final vote on the entire text.
• The Senate can amend or veto, but Congress can:
  • Reject amendments by simple majority.
  • Override veto by absolute majority (or simple majority after two months).

In practice, Congress decides ultimately on the content of the LOREG reform.

2.3. Role of Sumar and other actors

Sumar can:

• Present a constitutional reform proposal and an organic law proposal to modify the LOREG.
• Negotiate with other groups to reach the required reinforced majorities (3/5 or 2/3 in the Constitution, absolute majority for the LOREG).

Without these broad agreements with other parties in Congress and Senate, the reform is not legally viable, regardless of Sumar's political program.

3. Limits and constitutional fit of voting at 16

From a material perspective, lowering the voting age to 16 is an expansion of the electorate, so it does not violate the essential content of suffrage nor the democratic principle; on the contrary, it tends to strengthen it. The key is to respect the reform procedures and articulate it through constitutional norm + organic law, coherently with jurisprudence on equality and political rights. There is no express limit in the Constitution prohibiting this age reduction, so if Sumar achieves the necessary majorities, the measure is legally possible.