Felipe VI will receive the president of Ceuta in Marivent a week after the migration crisis.

The Statute of Autonomy of Ceuta configures the President of the City as the highest political and institutional authority of the autonomous city, with a dual role: he is both president of the Assembly and the Government Council, and also holds the position of Mayor. His functions combine the representation of the City, the direction of the Executive, and the articulation of trust relationships with the Assembly. Below are detailed his main competencies and the basic regime of election and dismissal according to Organic Law 1/1995, of the Statute of Autonomy of Ceuta, published in the BOE.

Institutional position of the President

The Statute establishes that “the President of the city of Ceuta presides over the Assembly, the Government Council, whose activity he directs and coordinates, and holds the supreme representation of the City”. This implies three basic dimensions:

• Institutional leadership: he holds the highest representation of the City of Ceuta before the State, other Administrations, and the citizenry.
• Presidency of the Assembly: he directs plenary sessions, orders debates, and embodies the leadership of the representative body.
• Presidency and direction of the Government Council: he coordinates and guides the action of the autonomous-local Executive.

The Statute adds that the President “also holds the position of Mayor”, which reflects the hybrid nature of Ceuta as an autonomous city: it concentrates functions typical of an autonomous president and of a mayor of a large municipality.

Executive and government competencies

Within the Executive scope, the President is the central figure of the Government Council:

• Appointment and dismissal of Councilors: the President “appoints and removes the Councilors” who make up the Government Council, subsequently informing the Assembly.
• Delegation of functions: he can “temporarily delegate his own executive functions to some members of the Council,” which allows him to modulate the internal distribution of responsibilities.
• Political direction: although the general direction of the city's policy corresponds to the Government Council, it is the President who presides over it, sets priorities, and ensures coordination of government action.

Additionally, the Statute foresees that, by joint initiative of the President and the Government Delegate, mixed bodies may be created to develop and control joint plans and programs of works and services between the State Administration and the City Administration. This faculty strengthens the President's role as the main interlocutor with the State in shared policies.

Trust relationship with the Assembly

The President is politically accountable before the Assembly and has parliamentary instruments of trust similar to those of an autonomous president:

• Vote of confidence: “the President, after deliberation of the Government Council, may present a vote of confidence before the Assembly of Ceuta on his program or on a general policy statement.” Confidence is understood to be granted by a simple majority; if denied, the President must resign and a new election is held.
• Motion of censure: the Assembly may demand his responsibility “by adopting by absolute majority a motion of censure, which must include a candidate for the Presidency of the city.” If approved, the proposed candidate is considered invested and is appointed new President.
• Mutual limitation: while a motion of censure is pending, the President cannot present a vote of confidence, balancing relations between the Executive and the Assembly.

Election, appointment, and dismissal

Regarding his designation, the Statute provides that the President shall be:

• Chosen by the Assembly of Ceuta from among its members.
• The election must be made among those who head one of the electoral lists that have obtained a seat.
• Absolute majority of the Assembly is required in the first vote; if no candidate achieves it, the President is designated as the one who heads the list that obtained the highest number of votes in the elections.
• Once elected, he is appointed by the King, which underscores his institutional relevance within the constitutional framework.

The dismissal of the President occurs, directly or indirectly, by:

• Resignation, incapacity, or death.
• Approval of a motion of censure.
• Denial of confidence by the Assembly, which forces his resignation.
• Holding elections to the Assembly, after which the Government Council ceases, although it continues in office until the new Executive takes office.

In sum, according to the Statute of Autonomy, the President of Ceuta concentrates the highest representation of the City, the leadership of the Assembly and the Government Council, the capacity to appoint and dismiss councilors, and the ultimate responsibility for political action, always subject to the confidence of the Assembly of Ceuta.

The current state regulations do not establish specific requirements for the King to hold audiences with the presidents of autonomous communities. There is no detailed regulation in the Constitution, organic laws, or royal decrees of the Royal Household or precedence about who can request these audiences, how often they must be held, or how they should be convened. What does exist is a general framework about the functions of the King as Head of State, the organization of His Majesty's Household, and protocol rules. In practice, therefore, these are acts embedded in the representative function of the Crown, organized by the Royal Household and politically framed within the principle of governmental countersignature, but without material or formal requirements set by a norm.

1. What the Constitution says about the King's functions

The Spanish Constitution configures the Crown as Head of State in a parliamentary monarchy system and enumerates a closed set of the King's functions: sanctioning and promulgating laws, convening and dissolving the Cortes, calling referendums, proposing and appointing the president of the Government, appointing and dismissing ministers, issuing decrees agreed in the Council of Ministers, exercising supreme command of the Armed Forces, the right of grace, etc. These functions appear in the provision that begins with “Corresponds to the King: a) To sanction and promulgate laws…”.

In that list, “audiences” with authorities are not mentioned because they are considered instrumental or protocol acts proper to his representative role, not a differentiated material competence. The same constitutional block establishes that:

• The King must be informed of State affairs and may preside over the Council of Ministers “when he deems it appropriate, at the request of the President of the Government.”
• The King's acts must be countersigned by the president of the Government or the competent minister, and those who countersign are responsible for those acts.

Additionally, the Constitutional Court, in rulings such as STC 98/2019 and STC 111/2019, recalls the inviolability and absence of responsibility of the King, reinforcing the idea that political responsibility for official acts (including institutional meetings) lies with the authorities who countersign or coordinate them, not with the monarch.

2. His Majesty the King's Household: support and relations, but without set requirements

Royal Decree 434/1988, on the restructuring of His Majesty the King's Household, defines the Household as the body that “has the mission to support him in all activities derived from the exercise of his functions as Head of State.” Within that mission, the decree expressly states that the Household must especially attend to “the King's relations with official bodies, entities, and individuals.”

That is, the norm confirms that the Household organizes and channels the King's relationship with public authorities (including autonomous presidents), but:

• It does not set requirements about who can request an audience, nor does it establish a formal request procedure.
• It does not impose limits on frequency, duration, subjects to be discussed, or material conditions for the audience to take place.
• It focuses on internal structure (Headship, General Secretariat, Military Quarter, Royal Guard, etc.) and administrative and budgetary management, not on regulating the specific content of the institutional agenda.

Therefore, the regulation of the Royal Household confirms that these relations are managed as part of the representative function of the Head of State, under criteria of institutional opportunity and internal organization, not through a rigid legal procedure.

3. Protocol rules: Royal Decree of Precedences

Royal Decree 2099/1983, on the General Order of Precedences in the State, regulates the order of authorities in official acts. It details, for example, that in acts in Madrid or in an autonomous community, autonomous presidents occupy a certain place of precedence relative to the King, the president of the Government, and other authorities.

However, this royal decree is limited to organizing precedence and protocol in official acts. It does not regulate whether the King must or must not receive an autonomous president, under what conditions, or who can promote that meeting. It is a strictly protocol rule, not a distribution of competencies or regulation of audiences.

4. Difference with the Conference of Presidents (which is regulated)

The only clearly regulated instrument that regularly brings together the president of the Government with the autonomous presidents is the Conference of Presidents. Its Regulation appears as an annex to Order TER/257/2022.

This Regulation establishes, among other things:

• Its nature as the “highest political cooperation body” between the Government of Spain and the autonomous governments.
• Its composition: president of the Government (who presides over it) and autonomous presidents and those of Ceuta and Melilla.
• Convocation: the Conference meets at least twice a year and is convened by the president of the Government, on his own initiative or at the request of the Preparatory Committee or ten autonomous presidents.

These rules do not affect the King's audiences: they refer to a different institution, presided over by the head of the Executive, not by the head of State.

5. Conclusion: audiences without specific legal requirements

Based on the cited norms, it can be stated that:

• There is no provision in current state legislation that imposes specific formal or material conditions for the King to receive in audience presidents of autonomous communities.
• These audiences are framed within the representative function of the Crown, organized through His Majesty the King's Household, and inserted in the general framework of countersignature and political responsibility of the Government, but without a procedure set by law.
• What is legally detailed is the multilateral political cooperation in the Conference of Presidents, under Government leadership, which is a distinct and separate mechanism from royal audiences.

Consequently, from a strictly legal point of view, the King's audiences with autonomous presidents are governed by the Constitution, the internal organization of the Royal Household, and general protocol rules, but are not subject to specific requirements or limits set by a concrete norm.

In migration crises over recent decades, the response of the central Government and autonomous communities has always combined two levels: immediate management measures (reception places, transfers, police and military reinforcement) and more structural reforms (changes in Immigration law, distribution systems, and cooperation with countries of origin and transit). For specific episodes such as the Ceuta crisis of 2021 or the current pressure in the Canary Islands and Ceuta, available sources show a stable pattern: reinforcement of border resources, activation of exceptional reception mechanisms, and intensive use of diplomatic channels with neighboring countries. Regarding the 2006 cayucos crisis or the 2018 Aquarius, consulted sources do not provide specific regulatory details, so only general terms can be discussed.

Emergency measures and extraordinary funding

In response to surges in arrivals, the Executive has resorted to emergency declarations and the Contingency Fund to quickly expand reception places and services. In 2024, the Council of Ministers authorized more than 107 million euros for the fourth extension of the October 2023 Emergency Declaration, aimed at “providing services, carrying out works, and acquiring essential supplies” for migrants, especially in the Canary Islands, because “the current situation remains an emergency” and arrivals exceed the ordinary capacity of the system, according to the Treasury note on the migration fund from July 2024 (note of July 30, 2024).

In 2025 this route is used again: another note from the Ministry of Treasury authorizes a spending limit modification for “additional needs in humanitarian care programs and the operation of reception centers,” including transfers from the Canary Islands to the Peninsula and reinforcement of first aid on coasts (note on reception centers). In parallel, in contexts of sustained pressure, these funds are complemented with specific subsidies to Ceuta and Melilla for social, educational, cleaning, and security services due to the “strong migratory pressure” (subsidy to Ceuta and Melilla).

New contingency system and distribution of minors

One of the major lessons from the crises in the Canary Islands, Ceuta, and Melilla has been the collapse of their protection systems for minors. As a result, the Council of Ministers approved in 2025 a legislative modification that defines “extraordinary migratory contingency” when a territory triples its ordinary capacity of places for unaccompanied foreign minors (modification of article 35 of Immigration law). This reform, later developed through Royal Decree-law 2/2025, allows declaring contingency in the Canary Islands, Ceuta, and Melilla and activating mandatory relocation to other autonomous communities.

The Youth and Childhood note declaring that contingency in August 2025 explains that, once it is verified that these territories multiply “at least threefold their ordinary reception capacity,” the protocol approved by the Council of Ministers is activated, with interviews, allocation of places, and transfers to the Peninsula (declaration of contingency and note on the first relocations).

This scheme has been financially reinforced with sectoral agreements: for example, the Childhood Sectoral Conference approved in 2025 the distribution of 22 million euros to the Canary Islands, Balearic Islands, Ceuta, and Melilla to attend to unaccompanied minors, linked to the development of Royal Decree-law 2/2025 (distribution of funds for minors).

Border reinforcement and operational changes after Ceuta 2021–2026

In the Ceuta crisis of 2021, Demócrata recalls that the Government deployed the Army and military vehicles to stop entries, and the readmission agreement with Morocco was used to return about 4,000 people in the first hours (report on Ceuta). This combination of military presence, cooperation with Rabat, and diplomatic pressure has been repeated in the 2026 crisis.

Additionally, after the Supreme Court ruling of July 2026 that limits border rejections to those entering by sea, the Interior Ministry has installed an inflatable barrier and containment buoys on the Tarajal breakwater, to adapt physical control to the new legal framework (inflatable barrier on the Tarajal). At the same time, the Minister of Territorial Policy has linked these actions to the Ceuta Integral Plan and the need for a stable system of minor distribution (integral plan for Ceuta).

Cooperation with countries of origin and transit

Another constant has been strengthening cooperation with Mauritania, Senegal, and other West African countries, key for the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands. Interior classifies Mauritania as a “priority strategic partner” in migration matters, within an EU–Mauritania partnership that addresses root causes of flows, pursues mafias, and reinforces joint border control, with Civil Guard and Police resources deployed on the ground (Marlaska's trip to Mauritania). In 2025, Interior highlights that the “excellent cooperation” with Nouakchott has contributed to a 59% decrease in arrivals to the Canary Islands and 36% in Spain overall compared to the previous year (note from October 2025).

In parallel, the Presidency of the Government has focused on a “comprehensive migration policy” combining development, security, and regular pathways in Mauritania, Gambia, and Senegal, according to Sánchez's tour of the region in August 2024 (trip to West Africa).

Historical limitations

Regarding older crises such as the 2006 cayucos or the 2018 Aquarius episode, the analyzed sources do not provide concrete details of the royal decrees, orders, or operations then activated, beyond general political references. Therefore, for comparative purposes, it can only be stated that current lines —extraordinary funding, distribution mechanisms, border reinforcement, and cooperation with third countries— institutionalize responses that in those crises were more ad hoc. No further information is available in the consulted sources.