The words of Jorge Dezcallar, carry a weight that transcends the political debate. He is not only speaking as a veteran diplomat or a former ambassador to Morocco. He speaks as the one who directed the National Intelligence Center (CNI) and knows from the inside how the information system that feeds the Government's decisions on national security works. That is why his statements in 24 Horas de TVE questioning the Executive's explanation regarding the latest migration crisis acquire special relevance.
Dezcallar stated that he finds it "very hard to believe" that the CNI had not warned the Government about what was happening. Without directly accusing the Executive of hiding information, he made it clear that, due to the nature of the work of intelligence services, it is complicated to assume that movements of that magnitude could occur without prior information being in the hands of the State.
What happened to the information?
His reflection points less to the work of the agents than to the political management of that intelligence. The mission of the CNI is precisely to anticipate risks to national security, prepare reports, and convey them to the Government to facilitate decision-making. When the one who directed the service questions whether the Executive was unaware of what was happening, another question inevitably arises: if the information existed, what use was made of it?
The former director of the CNI was equally forceful in analyzing the relationship with Morocco. In his opinion, Spain needs a firmer position and a more defined strategy towards Rabat. Cooperation between both countries is essential in areas such as immigration, terrorism, or control of the Strait, but that need, he argued, cannot translate into a permanent renunciation of defending Spanish interests when episodes of pressure on the borders occur.
Surprised by the lack of foresight
Dezcallar considers what happened this summer especially concerning because Spain already knew perfectly well the precedent. In May 2021, the massive entry of thousands of immigrants into Ceuta demonstrated to what extent Morocco could use the control of migratory flows as a tool of diplomatic pressure. That crisis forced the State to rethink its response mechanisms and highlighted the need to strengthen the capacity for anticipation in similar scenarios.
Five years later, the former ambassador in Rabat understands that it is difficult to accept that an episode of this nature surprises the Spanish authorities again. Precisely because there was a recent and widely analyzed experience, he believes that the State should have been prepared to detect any movement that pointed to a new escalation of tension.
Dezcallar's statements also reopen the debate on the political management of intelligence. The effectiveness of a service like the CNI does not depend solely on its ability to obtain information, but also on whether that information arrives on time, is correctly interpreted, and translates into effective political decisions. It is at that point where the former head of the intelligence services hints at his greatest doubts about the actions of the Executive.
His analysis comes at a particularly sensitive moment for the Government, subjected to criticism for the management of foreign policy and border security. The stability of the relationship with Morocco has become one of the pillars of Spanish foreign action, but successive migration crises have shown that this stability remains fragile and that Rabat maintains significant pressure capacity over the southern border.
That is why Jorge Dezcallar's words transcend the scope of a television interview. They are not merely the opinion of a former high-ranking State official. They are the assessment of someone who led the main Spanish intelligence service and knows firsthand how threats affecting national security are detected, evaluated, and communicated. His diagnosis questions the explanation offered by the Government and brings back to the table a fundamental debate: whether Spain really learned the lessons from the Ceuta crisis of 2021 or if, five years later, it continues to react to events instead of anticipating them.