A former head of Intelligence questions the Government's version regarding the CNI and demands more firmness with Morocco after the migration crisis.

The former director of intelligence services and former ambassador in Rabat considers "very hard to believe" that the Executive did not receive prior information and warns that Spain cannot face with resignation a scenario it already experienced in the Ceuta crisis of 2021.

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By A former head of Spanish Intelligence questions the Government's version regarding the CNI and demands more firmness with Morocco after the migration crisis.

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The words of Jorge Dezcallar, carry a weight that transcends the political debate. He is not only speaking as a veteran diplomat or a former ambassador to Morocco. He speaks as the one who directed the National Intelligence Center (CNI) and knows from the inside how the information system that feeds the Government's decisions on national security works. That is why his statements in 24 Horas de TVE questioning the Executive's explanation regarding the latest migration crisis acquire special relevance.

Dezcallar stated that he finds it "very hard to believe" that the CNI had not warned the Government about what was happening. Without directly accusing the Executive of hiding information, he made it clear that, due to the nature of the work of intelligence services, it is complicated to assume that movements of that magnitude could occur without prior information being in the hands of the State.

What happened to the information?

His reflection points less to the work of the agents than to the political management of that intelligence. The mission of the CNI is precisely to anticipate risks to national security, prepare reports, and convey them to the Government to facilitate decision-making. When the one who directed the service questions whether the Executive was unaware of what was happening, another question inevitably arises: if the information existed, what use was made of it?

The former director of the CNI was equally forceful in analyzing the relationship with Morocco. In his opinion, Spain needs a firmer position and a more defined strategy towards Rabat. Cooperation between both countries is essential in areas such as immigration, terrorism, or control of the Strait, but that need, he argued, cannot translate into a permanent renunciation of defending Spanish interests when episodes of pressure on the borders occur.

Surprised by the lack of foresight

Dezcallar considers what happened this summer especially concerning because Spain already knew perfectly well the precedent. In May 2021, the massive entry of thousands of immigrants into Ceuta demonstrated to what extent Morocco could use the control of migratory flows as a tool of diplomatic pressure. That crisis forced the State to rethink its response mechanisms and highlighted the need to strengthen the capacity for anticipation in similar scenarios.

Five years later, the former ambassador in Rabat understands that it is difficult to accept that an episode of this nature surprises the Spanish authorities again. Precisely because there was a recent and widely analyzed experience, he believes that the State should have been prepared to detect any movement that pointed to a new escalation of tension.

Dezcallar's statements also reopen the debate on the political management of intelligence. The effectiveness of a service like the CNI does not depend solely on its ability to obtain information, but also on whether that information arrives on time, is correctly interpreted, and translates into effective political decisions. It is at that point where the former head of the intelligence services hints at his greatest doubts about the actions of the Executive.

His analysis comes at a particularly sensitive moment for the Government, subjected to criticism for the management of foreign policy and border security. The stability of the relationship with Morocco has become one of the pillars of Spanish foreign action, but successive migration crises have shown that this stability remains fragile and that Rabat maintains significant pressure capacity over the southern border.

That is why Jorge Dezcallar's words transcend the scope of a television interview. They are not merely the opinion of a former high-ranking State official. They are the assessment of someone who led the main Spanish intelligence service and knows firsthand how threats affecting national security are detected, evaluated, and communicated. His diagnosis questions the explanation offered by the Government and brings back to the table a fundamental debate: whether Spain really learned the lessons from the Ceuta crisis of 2021 or if, five years later, it continues to react to events instead of anticipating them.

 

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AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the current status of the parliamentary process regarding possible reforms on the management of intelligence and national security in Spain?

The management of intelligence and national security is currently at a point of "open but very slow" reform: the main laws to update the CNI, the secrecy regime, and police and customs cooperation in the EU are formally under consideration, but almost all are blocked at the amendment stage. Only one organic reform impacting the judicial control of the CNI has been definitively approved. Meanwhile, Parliament continues oversight and study activities (committees, working groups), but these have not yet translated into a new comprehensive legal framework.

1. Reform of the CNI Law and prior judicial control

In the Congress, the Bill to amend Law 11/2002 regulating the National Intelligence Center and Organic Law 2/2002 on prior judicial control is underway, promoted by the Basque Group (EAJ-PNV). The initiative was taken into consideration by the Plenary on September 24, 2024, with 177 votes in favor and 170 against, according to the official Congress record and the institutional press release on the consideration.

The bill aims, among other objectives, to strengthen the direct political responsibility of the Prime Minister over the CNI, modify the composition of the Delegated Commission for Intelligence Affairs, and transform the current single control judge into a collegiate body of three Supreme Court magistrates who unanimously authorize operations affecting fundamental rights, as explained by PNV and the analysis from Demócrata.

Current status (August 2026): the initiative is in the committee phase with the amendment period open and extended. Parliamentary information indicates the deadline for submitting amendments has been extended until September 2, 2026, reflecting a de facto blockage: as long as the period remains open, no working group is formed nor report drafted.

2. Classified Information Law and reform of official secrets

a) Government's Classified Information Bill

The Government submitted to Congress in 2025 its Classified Information Bill, which replaces Law 9/1968 on Official Secrets. The initiative is registered as project 121/000067 and, according to the Executive, establishes new classification categories (“Top Secret,” “Secret,” “Confidential,” “Restricted”), maximum time limits (up to 45 years for top secret), and an automatic declassification system, as well as a National Authority for the Protection of Classified Information, according to the submitted text and the description in the August 2025 Council of Ministers reference.

According to several reports from Demócrata, the project is “frozen” in the Constitutional Committee: the amendment period has been extended 24 times and the process does not advance due to lack of stable support, in a context of rupture with Junts and tensions with several partners. Minister Félix Bolaños has reiterated in various appearances his intention to push it forward “in the coming months,” but without a fixed schedule.

b) PNV's Bill on official secrets

In parallel, the PNV keeps alive its own Bill to reform Law 9/1968 on Official Secrets, registered as 122/000005. The Plenary took this initiative into consideration on February 27, 2024, but again, the amendment period has been extended until September 2, 2026.

The newspaper Demócrata describes a double blockage: Junts vetoes the government project and PSOE keeps the PNV proposal shelved, despite its consideration by the Plenary. The nationalists offer their text as a consensus base, but the Executive insists on a more ambitious reform through its own project.

3. Security and customs cooperation in the EU

In the broader national security field, the Government has approved and sent to the Cortes a Bill for the exchange of information between security and customs services of EU Member States, transposing Directive (EU) 2023/977. The draft was endorsed by the Council of Ministers on April 1, 2025 (Moncloa reference) and the formal project was approved on November 25, 2025 (new Moncloa agreement).

In Congress, the initiative is in the amendment phase, also extended until September 2, 2026, according to executive information. It is a relevant piece for the operational management of police and customs intelligence in a European key, but its development depends on the general unblocking of the legislative agenda.

4. Changes already approved: Judiciary and CNI control

The only reform with direct impact and already in force is the Organic Law Bill to reform LOPJ 6/1985 and Law 50/1981 of the Public Prosecutor's Office, promoted by PSOE and definitively approved on July 31, 2024 after passing through Congress and Senate (Congress record and Senate BOCG).

Among other aspects, this law strengthens the three-fifths majority of the General Council of the Judiciary to appoint the Supreme Court magistrate responsible for overseeing CNI activities affecting the fundamental rights of article 18.2 and 3 of the Constitution (interception of communications and home entries), as well as their substitute, raising the consensus threshold at this key point of judicial control.

5. Parliamentary monitoring activity on national security

In the absence of major completed reforms, oversight and study activity has intensified. The Joint National Security Commission has created a working group to analyze the impact on national security of the extraordinary regularization of migrants, promoted by PP and Vox, according to several reports from Demócrata. Additionally, appearances by the National Security Department on interference from China and Russia and the breakdown of cooperation with Israel have multiplied.

Overall, the picture is of strategic reforms under consideration but stuck at the amendment stage, with a high degree of dependence on the balances between PSOE, Sumar, and their partners (especially PNV and Junts), while the daily management of intelligence and national security continues to rely on a legal framework largely predating the current technological and geopolitical situation.

What specific changes does the Classified Information Bill introduce regarding deadlines and secrecy categories compared to the 1968 law? Which parties support and which reject the CNI reform promoted by the PNV, and what key amendments have they presented? How does the Congress's Reserved Expenses Commission currently function in controlling the CNI, and what proposals exist to reform it?

What are the legal competencies of the Director of the National Intelligence Center according to Spanish legislation?

The Director of the National Intelligence Center (formally, the Secretary of State Director of the CNI) is the highest authority of the agency and concentrates strategic direction, institutional representation, and the main powers of organization, budget, and relations of the Center. His basic statute and competencies are regulated mainly in article 9 of Law 11/2002, of May 6, regulating the National Intelligence Center, complemented by Royal Decree 436/2002, of May 10, on the organic structure of the CNI. From these norms, a fairly precise map of his legal functions can be drawn.

Main regulatory framework

The competencies of the CNI Director are essentially contained in:

  • Law 11/2002, of May 6, regulating the National Intelligence Center, especially its article 9, which defines the appointment, mandate, and functions of the Secretary of State Director. Full text in the BOE: Law 11/2002.
  • Royal Decree 436/2002, of May 10, establishing the organic structure of the CNI, which develops the Director's position within the organization and details some functions already foreseen in the Law. Text in the BOE: Royal Decree 436/2002.

Other provisions (such as Royal Decree 593/2002, on the economic-budgetary regime of the CNI, or later amending norms) are issued “in accordance” with Law 11/2002 and complete the scheme, but the core competencies of the Director lie in the cited provisions.

Appointment, rank, and mandate

According to Law 11/2002, the head of the CNI Directorate is a Secretary of State:

  • He is appointed by Royal Decree, at the proposal of the Minister of Defense.
  • His mandate is five years, but the Council of Ministers may replace him at any time.
  • Royal Decree 436/2002 specifies that the Director “shall have the rank of Secretary of State.”

This positioning places him at the top of the CNI structure and politically links him to the Government through the Ministry of Defense.

General management functions

Section 2 of article 9 of Law 11/2002 establishes the Director's core functions:

  • Promote the Center's actions and coordinate its units “to achieve the intelligence objectives set by the Government.”
  • Ensure the adequacy of the CNI's activities to those objectives.
  • Hold the representation of the National Intelligence Center.

These competencies configure the Director as the ultimate responsible for planning, execution, and coherence of intelligence activity regarding the Intelligence Directive approved by the Government.

Specific organization and management functions

Law 11/2002 then lists a series of more specific powers, largely corresponding to what is developed in Royal Decree 436/2002:

  • Internal organization: prepare the proposed organic structure of the CNI and appoint and remove heads of its management bodies.
  • Budget: approve the Center's draft budget.
  • Contracts and agreements: “maintain the necessary relationship procedures for the development of the Center's specific activities,” as well as enter into contracts and agreements with public or private entities necessary to fulfill its purposes.
  • Relations with other services: maintain and develop collaboration, within its competence, with the intelligence services of the State Security Forces and Corps and with relevant civil and military administration bodies for intelligence objectives.
  • Powers as the highest authority of the agency: exercise the powers granted by current legislation to presidents and directors of public agencies and those assigned to the CNI Director by development provisions.

National Intelligence Authority and relation to oversight

Law 11/2002 also assigns the Director a reinforced role in the national intelligence system:

  • He performs the functions of National Intelligence and Counterintelligence Authority.
  • He exercises the direction of the National Cryptologic Center, according to the framework specifically developed by Royal Decree 421/2004 on the National Cryptologic Center.

Additionally, although parliamentary oversight falls to the Official Secrets Commission of Congress, the Law foresees that this Commission receives, among others, the annual report prepared by the CNI Director on activities, situation, and degree of objective fulfillment, which configures an indirect but relevant political responsibility and accountability.

General clause and regulatory development

Finally, the Law closes with an open clause: it corresponds to the Director “to perform any other functions legally or regulatorily assigned.” This allows subsequent provisions (for example, on economic or personnel matters) to assign new competencies without constantly reforming Law 11/2002. Overall, the CNI Director thus concentrates strategic direction, organizational leadership, and the main interface with the Government, other intelligence services, and the democratic oversight system.

What role does the Government Delegated Commission for Intelligence Affairs have regarding the CNI Director? How is parliamentary oversight of activities led by the CNI Director practically articulated? What functional differences exist between the CNI Director and the Center's Secretary General?

How many parliamentary initiatives have been presented in the current legislature regarding cooperation between Spain and Morocco on migration matters?

There is no single official aggregated data that precisely answers how many parliamentary initiatives have been presented in the current legislature regarding cooperation between Spain and Morocco on migration matters. The Congress and Senate databases allow free-text searches but do not offer a specific category grouping only “Spain–Morocco migration cooperation.” With the available information, only a qualitative estimate can be made: we are talking about several dozen initiatives (questions, motions, non-legislative proposals, requests for appearances, etc.), distributed between both Chambers. Without exhaustive technical exploitation of those records, it is not possible to provide the exact figure nor the breakdown by type and sponsors you request.

Limits of available information

The operation of the Congress and Senate search engines themselves is the first constraint. There is no subject tagged as “migration cooperation with Morocco”; everything depends on which keywords the user enters (“Morocco,” “Ceuta,” “Melilla,” “migration cooperation,” “readmission,” “Frontex,” etc.) and whether those words appear in the title, the statement of reasons, or only in the text body.

Added to this is that many initiatives address cooperation with Morocco indirectly, as part of broader debates on migration policy, security, southern border, or Western Sahara. For example, the “Bill to amend Organic Law 4/2000, of January 11, on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration,” registered in Congress (file 122/000123) and already rejected, has a general scope on immigration, not exclusively Spanish-Moroccan, although it also affects those migratory flows. It can be consulted in the Congress initiative searcher via this Congress link and in its official bulletin publication available at this [link].

What is known qualitatively

Based on parliamentary information and Demócrata's coverage, it can be stated that in this legislature the following have been presented:

  • Written and oral questions about the management of the migration crisis in Ceuta and Morocco's role. Demócrata reports, for example, how Vox has registered questions and requests for appearances for Albares and the head of the CNI to explain their contacts with Morocco regarding the Ceuta crisis (Demócrata article) and how Junts has presented several parliamentary questions about coordination with Rabat and Frontex (Demócrata information).
  • Motions and non-legislative proposals linked to the southern border and migratory pressure on Ceuta and Melilla, where cooperation with Morocco is central to the debate. In the Senate, the Foreign Affairs Committee has approved motions from the Popular Group related to Ceuta and Melilla and Morocco's unilateral actions, according to official Senate notes from June 4, 2024 (Foreign Affairs Committee note) or October 22, 2024 (note on motions in Foreign Affairs).
  • Requests for appearances, such as those processed in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee for Albares to explain the “migration invasion” and the Government's position on Morocco's actions in Ceuta and the Canary Islands, reflected in agendas and notes like those from April and May 2025 (Cooperation committee).
  • Coordinated group offensives that translate into dozens of initiatives at once. The Popular Party has publicized, for example, an “offensive” in Congress and Senate after the latest crisis in Ceuta, with a battery of written questions and other control initiatives related to the massive entry of people from Morocco (PP note), which Demócrata contextualizes in its crisis coverage (Demócrata analysis, another piece on coordination with Morocco).

Why only an estimate can be given

To respond with the level of detail you request (total number, distribution by Chamber, type of initiative, and proposing group), a systematic exploitation of the Congress and Senate records would be necessary, with very fine searches on all texts where references to Spain, Morocco, and migration or border issues appear simultaneously. This exploitation is not published already done in any official note or consulted analysis.

Therefore, the best answer today is qualitative: in the current legislature, several dozen initiatives explicitly addressing cooperation between Spain and Morocco on migration have been presented—mainly in the form of control questions, appearances, and promotional motions—with prominence of PP, Vox, Junts, ERC, and Sumar in Congress and PP and PSOE in the Senate. But there is no official aggregated and verifiable count, and without direct technical access to parliamentary databases, it is not possible to provide the exact figure or complete breakdown you request.

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