Ceuta alerts of a new call on networks for another massive entry of migrants on August 15.

Negotiations between the Autonomous City of Ceuta and the central Government regarding the reinforcement of police forces are basically in a situational and crisis management phase, not a structural agreement. Following the massive migrant influx on July 30, very significant punctual reinforcements of the National Police and Civil Guard have been agreed upon, along with daily coordination with Juan Jesús Vivas' Executive, but there is no, according to available sources, a closed agreement on permanent staff increases nor on the full development of the “comprehensive security plan” that has been demanded for years. The political debate remains open in Madrid and Ceuta about whether these reinforcements should be consolidated and with what resources.

What has been agreed so far: emergency reinforcement

In Pedro Sánchez's appearance in Ceuta on July 31, after a coordination meeting with Vivas and the National Police and Civil Guard commanders, the president announced an immediate increase of 400 personnel between both forces, combined with the deployment of the Army and other state resources, to “guarantee the security of Ceuta's citizens” according to the transcript of his speech and the Moncloa activity note on that coordination meeting in Ceuta (president's activity).

In parallel, the Ministry of the Interior has detailed specific reinforcements: increase of UIP and UPR units of the National Police, deployment of Immigration specialists, and reinforcement of the Civil Guard at the border and in citizen security, in addition to military support. These measures are covered in several Demócrata reports on the deployment of the Civil Guard and National Police during the late July migration crisis (Interior reinforcement, increase to 400 reinforcements, Army deployment, Army mobilization).

Besides the human component, Interior has implemented material measures coordinated with Ceuta authorities, such as the installation of a pneumatic barrier and containment buoys on the Tarajal pier, announced by Fernando Grande-Marlaska on August 1 to comply with the Supreme Court ruling and strengthen border control, according to the official Interior note (pneumatic barrier at Tarajal). This material line adds to the previous “smart border” project at El Tarajal described in 2024 by Interior (Moncloa note, Interior note).

Political relationship and negotiation margin of Ceuta

Politically, the autonomous city has used the crisis to pressure for more resources and a reinforced State command. Vivas and all Assembly groups, including the PSOE, have successively demanded the declaration of a situation of interest for National Security, a single command, and extraordinary reinforcement of personnel, according to various Demócrata reports on Ceuta Government requests and talks with Sánchez and Marlaska (call for emergency and single command, Sánchez's guarantees to Vivas, Marlaska‑Vivas contacts).

Opposition parliamentary sources emphasize, however, that this relationship has not resulted in a structural agreement. The PP recalls that already in 2024 and 2025 it denounced a “staff deficit” and “unsustainable” conditions of the Security Forces in Ceuta and Melilla, and reproaches the Government that the promised Security Plan for the autonomous cities remains unfinalized, according to party notes (PP's complaint about staff deficit, demand for comprehensive plan, parliamentary offensive after crisis, request for Sánchez's appearance).

In other words, the current “negotiations” between Ceuta and the central Government function more as daily operational coordination and political pressure than as a formal table with figures and a stable staffing calendar. No further information is available in the consulted sources that proves a signed commitment to a permanent increase of National Police and Civil Guard agents beyond the specific reinforcements announced these days.

Pending debate: structural staffing and border model

The background of these negotiations is twofold. On one hand, the city and police unions have long requested structural personnel, better facilities, and material resources, not just reinforcements during crises, as various Demócrata reports on AUGC and JUPOL complaints during and before this last migration wave show (analysis of the migration “shock”, JUPOL demands, Senate debate on migration pressure, Feijóo's promises in Ceuta).

On the other hand, the central Government links part of the response to the technological development of the border (smart border, physical barriers) and cooperation with Morocco and the EU, as illustrated by Interior notes and actions regarding Frontex reinforcement proposals covered by Demócrata (Operation Minerva, Brussels proposal on Frontex, analysis on Frontex in Ceuta).

In sum, to date the Ceuta-Government negotiations have resulted in very broad temporary reinforcements and a generic political commitment to “use all State resources,” but disagreements remain about whether those personnel will be consolidated and how a stable security and border plan for the city will be structured.

Other Demócrata context pieces on this crisis and its effects in Ceuta can be consulted at: July migration crisis, constant entries, arrival evolution, Spain-Morocco agreement on returns, urban center shielding, citizen protests, Government self-criticism, Marlaska's appearance, containment barriers, Vivas's estimates on arrivals, Felipe VI calls, and call for a State pact.

Alejandro Ramírez institutionally appears as Minister of Environment, Urban Services, and Housing of the Autonomous City of Ceuta, and in the press he is also identified as spokesperson of the local Executive. However, in the consulted sources there is no record of any regulation or organic agreement expressly governing the position of “spokesperson of the Government of Ceuta” nor a closed catalog of competencies. Based on what is available, his spokesperson function is focused on publicly representing the position of the Ceuta Government and explaining its decisions, while his formal competencies derive from his status as minister within the City Government Council.

What is known for certain about Alejandro Ramírez's position

In the institutional database consulted, Alejandro Ramírez Hurtado is listed as Minister of Environment, Urban Services, and Housing of Ceuta, with ministerial rank within the Autonomous City Government. No specific position including the word “spokesperson” is identified in the official City organizational chart or in published appointments.

The only direct reference to his role as spokesperson comes from the general press. In a report on the reform of the Immigration Law and the relocation of migrant minors, elDiario.es explicitly defines him as “spokesperson of the local Executive” and records how he sets and explains the Ceuta Government's position against internal PP debate and other autonomous communities:

• He publicly defends the Ceuta Government's stance in favor of the normative modification and the distribution of minors.
• He emphasizes that “the law is to be complied with” against possible disobedience by autonomous executives of his own party.
• He presents Ceuta's position as aligned with the need for a structural solution for the reception of minors.

All this is covered in the report on the Ceuta PP and the distribution of migrant minors, which is the main journalistic piece where his role as spokesperson is made explicit.

Limits of available information on his formal competencies

Neither the Statute of Autonomy of Ceuta (cited indirectly in agreements published in the BOE) nor the internal organization texts consulted mention a specific “Government spokesperson” of the Autonomous City. The agreements and state resolutions describe Ceuta as an autonomous city with competencies in multiple areas—urban planning, socioeconomic development, employment, consumption, cooperation—but do not detail the existence or functions of an Executive spokesperson.

Therefore, based on the sources used, it can only be stated that:

• His certain legal-political position is that of minister of the Autonomous City Government.
• The spokesperson role attributed to him is of a political and communicative nature, evidenced in his media appearances, but not accompanied in these sources by detailed organic regulation.
• There is no official list of specific competencies inherent to the spokesperson role (press conference calls, message coordination, relationship with the Assembly, etc.).

In other words: the sources allow seeing what he does de facto when acting as spokesperson (explaining the Ceuta Government's position on issues such as migrant minor management), but do not provide a normative text that typifies and delimits his functions as “spokesperson of the Government of Ceuta.”

Institutional context and related references concerning Ceuta

The functioning of the Ceuta Government and its relationship with the State is reflected in various official documents and notes, which help frame the activity of the Executive of which Alejandro Ramírez is part, although they do not detail his spokesperson functions. Among them, for example, can be consulted:

• The agreement on comprehensive socioeconomic development plans in Ceuta and Melilla, which describes the institutional role of the Autonomous City and its president: Defense–City of Ceuta agreement.
• Agreements on employment and bonuses, citing the Statute of Autonomy and the City's competencies: SEPE–City of Ceuta agreement.
• The development of consumer arbitration in Ceuta, showing the articulation between the General State Administration and the City: consumer arbitration agreement.
• Official notes from the central Government about Ceuta and its financing or external dimension, such as the meeting between José Manuel Albares and Juan Vivas regarding the Comprehensive Plan: Foreign Affairs note on Ceuta.
• Various communiqués and agendas from La Moncloa detailing the interlocution between the Government president and Ceuta's president or describing the state response to the last migration crisis, recognizing the role of the City Government as full interlocutor:
  • Pedro Sánchez's appearance in Ceuta
  • coordination meeting in Ceuta
  • Ángel Víctor Torres's agenda in Ceuta
  • Elma Saiz's agenda with Vivas
  • Sira Rego's meeting with Vivas
  • Sira Rego's meeting with Vivas and the Presidency minister

None of these documents, however, introduce a formal definition of the spokesperson position of the Government of Ceuta. Therefore, with the available information it can only be stated that Alejandro Ramírez acts as spokesperson in the political and media sphere, combining that function with his executive responsibilities as minister, without the consulted sources allowing more detailed specification of his competencies.

The operational intervention of the European Union in the protection of external borders such as those of Ceuta and Melilla is based on the shared competence of the EU and the States in border control, but the border remains primarily Spain's responsibility. In practice, the EU acts mainly through the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and Schengen area rules. For a significant deployment of European resources, an explicit request or acceptance by Spain is usually required, a risk analysis, and a formal decision by the Agency or EU institutions. All this must respect human rights, asylum regulations, and specific Spanish legislation for Ceuta and Melilla.

1. EU–Spain competence framework on external borders

Although the question is situated in the EU scope and I am specialized mainly in the Spanish political and normative context, a general outline can be drawn:

• The EU has competence to establish common rules on external border control, short-stay visas, and police cooperation, through its Treaties and derived regulations (Schengen Borders Code and European Border and Coast Guard regulations).
• Member States retain primary operational responsibility over their borders. In Spain's case, this is articulated through the Ministry of the Interior, Civil Guard, and National Police, complemented by specific immigration and citizen security regulations.
• EU intervention does not displace Spanish sovereignty, but rather reinforces it through technical, human, and material support (joint operations, European deployments, information exchange, etc.).

2. General conditions for EU intervention (Frontex)

Without going into article-by-article detail of European regulations (not found in the consulted sources), the legal framework of the European Border and Coast Guard is based on several types of actions, all relevant for land borders like Ceuta and Melilla:

• Joint operations and technical support: Spain can request Agency support in the form of technical teams and border guards from other Member States. Legally, this requires:
  • A request or agreement from Spain.
  • A formal decision by the Agency on the type of operation, scope, mandate, and rules of engagement.
  • Signing an operational plan that delineates responsibilities of Spain and the Agency, respecting human rights and international protection regulations.
• Rapid interventions at borders: designed for situations of intense migratory pressure or crisis at an external border. They require, in a simplified manner:
  • Identification of an urgent situation at the border.
  • Technical evaluation by the Agency of risks and needs.
  • Acceptance by the Member State of the deployment and operational plan.
• Serious deficiency scenarios: European regulations provide reinforced mechanisms when a State does not adequately protect a section of the external border, with the possibility of binding EU decisions intensifying European presence. In any case, the State remains obliged to cooperate and guarantee respect for fundamental rights.

3. Particularities of Ceuta and Melilla in Spanish law

Spanish regulation introduces a special regime for Ceuta and Melilla that conditions any European action in the area, because deployed agents must act according to current Spanish law.

• The Organic Law 4/2015 added to the Immigration Law a tenth additional provision, “Special regime of Ceuta and Melilla”. According to the text reproduced in LO 4/2015 itself, foreigners detected at the Ceuta or Melilla border line while attempting to overcome border containment elements “may be rejected to prevent their illegal entry into Spain,” always respecting international human rights and protection regulations, and processing asylum requests in designated places.
• The Constitutional Court, in Ruling 172/2020, analyzes this special regime and states that the singularity of Ceuta and Melilla is connected to migratory pressure and public security issues, emphasizing that any border rejection must be interpreted in conformity with the Constitution and Spain's international obligations.

Any EU deployment or action in Ceuta and Melilla must therefore be integrated into this framework: the final decision on rejection, admission, or processing of international protection is Spanish, and European cooperation cannot legitimize practices contrary to the Constitution or human rights treaties.

4. Related Spanish regulations and operational coordination

Domestically, there are several regulations that, without directly regulating EU intervention, structure the Spanish device at borders and in migration matters, conditioning how European support is articulated:

• Citizen security and border rejection: besides the already cited LO 4/2015, the Constitutional Court has indicated that the special regime of Ceuta and Melilla must be applied with guarantees in STC 172/2020.
• Competent authorities: LO 4/2015 defines the Minister of the Interior, the Secretary of State for Security, and the Government Delegates in Ceuta and Melilla as competent, implying that the request for EU support or acceptance of a border deployment is channeled through these bodies.
• Immigration management and coordination in the Strait and Alborán: a Coordination Authority against irregular immigration has been created through Order PCI/842/2018 and reinforced by Order PCI/121/2019, relevant for interlocution with Frontex in southern Spain.
• Measures to close or limit border crossings: for example, the Resolution of December 13, 2022 maintains the partial temporary closure of the land posts of Ceuta and Melilla, illustrating how Spanish decisions on opening or closing crossings condition the type of operation the EU can support.

5. Other relevant instruments published in the BOE

Although not all refer directly to Ceuta and Melilla, they are part of the normative framework affecting border control, immigration, security, or coordination with the EU and international organizations, helping to contextualize European intervention at borders:

• Compensations for participation in operations abroad: Order INT/661/2025.
• Cooperation for maritime information exchange (ECII-CISE): ECII‑CISE Cooperation Agreement.
• Organization of the Directorate General of Police: Order INT/859/2023 and its amendment by Order INT/985/2023.
• Coordination authority against irregular immigration in the Strait and Alborán: Order PCI/842/2018 and its reinforcement by Order PCI/121/2019.
• Rules on reception of international protection and management of places, affecting how people who do access the territory are managed: Order ISM/680/2022 and its amendment by Order ISM/535/2024.
• Various orders and resolutions affecting entry points (airports, ports) and border controls, such as enabling crossings or regulating health and customs controls (Order PCI/7/2019, Order PRA/223/2018, Order PJC/756/2024, Resolution of July 28, 2023, etc.).

Outside these references, no more detailed information on the specific articles of the EU Treaties or the current European Border and Coast Guard regulation is available in the consulted sources; therefore, the description of requirements has been kept at a general level.