We are in an objectively ideal moment to promote housing for sale or rent. There is a strong overdemand as a consequence of a lack of planning and supply in the last 15 years. Why then is the sector stagnant, absolutely stagnant, in affordable housing? Because a disincentivizing, punishing, and contrary environment has been created for the initiative to create new housing and for the permanence of the protected housing stock for rent.
The damage is twofold: not only is the construction and replacement of the one and a half million homes not built since 2008 prevented —almost 18 years of absence of protected housing—, but the existing portfolio also deteriorates, which will presumably end up leaving the market. Damage on all fronts.
Thus, large real estate projects can be observed in Spain, but oriented towards industrial warehouses, tourist sectors, or accommodations with services outside the strict scope of housing. However, those intended for affordable housing are very unrepresentative. Why? Because administrations, policies, and policymakers have turned the playing field into an unstable space, to the clear detriment of society as a whole.
If there is no construction of affordable private housing for rent with private sector participation, there is no viable housing strategy. If private initiative in housing construction is punished, ignored, and made difficult —with the magnitude of investment required at this moment—, there will be nothing but speeches and political promises, while the market will remain blocked and the problem will worsen.

Distrust and legal uncertainty
What would happen if, instead of penalizing banks with tax increases and demagogic speeches, a country collaboration agreement had been sought eight years ago? What if their involvement had been promoted in 0.5% or 1% of their balance sheet in the development of affordable housing, along with four-year plans and credit facilities?
Probably, the situation today would be radically different. Where do those taxes collected with so much publicity go? It is not known. Not in deficit reduction. Not in housing, either. Not in paying commitments to the ELA, either. Perhaps they are, within the budgets of the last three years, missing.
When an autonomous community proposes to alter rental housing plans or restrict them —failing to comply with agreements, rules, and the trust generated—, no investor will want to commit long-term to an administration that does not guarantee stability. Nobody signs contracts for 20, 30, or 40 years under legal uncertainty.
When the Administration breaks trust in contracts, alters agreements, or fails to comply with regulations, the logical consequence is the withdrawal of investment: ceasing to build or sell assets and abandoning the affordable housing market. The result is clear: less housing available and greater market tension.
Interventionism and effects on the market
When regional officials try to modify the four-year housing plans or limit rent increases, even with retroactive effects, it seems evident that they do not understand the real value of money over time. However, they do defend the updating of their salaries according to the CPI each year.
There is, therefore, a selective understanding: when the harm falls on third parties, it is accepted; when it affects one's own pocket, it is rejected. That inconsistency weakens the credibility of the system.
The result of this interventionism is predictable: less investment in housing, reduction in supply, and deterioration of the market. In Galicia, for example, certain modifications have reduced the prices of protected housing for rent to levels of 250 euros per month for apartments with two bedrooms, storage room, and garage, while aid of up to 40% was granted for the rehabilitation of free housing with rents limited to 700 euros.
These types of decisions, adopted without consensus with the sector, generate legal uncertainty, break regulatory coherence, and erode trust in institutions. The message conveyed to the investor is clear: "every man for himself".
Structural consequences
The direct consequence of these policies is known: lower housing supply, especially in affordable rentals, and greater difficulty of access for those who do not yet have housing.
The final result is a strained market, where those who already have a contract benefit, but those seeking access to housing or labor mobility are harmed.
International experience shows that unstable intervention in the housing market reduces available supply. And without supply, there is no labor mobility, no emancipation, no social balance.
Conclusion
Current policies seem more oriented towards generating media impact than solving the structural problem of housing. Faced with this, reports from the Bank of Spain, CECA, or European plans agree on the need to increase supply and facilitate investment.
Closing the viability of the rental market or of social housing without a real alternative can only respond to two scenarios: technical ignorance or political calculation. In both cases, the result is the same: the deterioration of access to housing.
The State and the autonomous communities cannot, on their own, assume housing policy without the collaboration of the private sector. The supply deficit is structural and will only be resolved with more construction, not less.
Without housing, there is no paradise.